

# *The Contest for Macedon:*

*A Study on the Conflict Between Cassander and  
Polyperchon (319 – 308 B.C.).*

Evan Pitt B.A. (Hons. I). Grad. Dip.

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Humanities  
University of Tasmania  
October 2016

## **Declaration of Originality**

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text of the thesis, nor does this thesis contain any material that infringes copyright.

Evan Pitt 27/10/2016

## **Authority of Access**

This thesis may be made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968.

Evan Pitt 27/10/2016

## Acknowledgements

A doctoral dissertation is never completed alone, and I am forever grateful to my supervisor, mentor and friend, Dr Graeme Miles, who has unfailingly encouraged and supported me over the many years. I am also thankful to all members of staff at the University of Tasmania; especially to the members of the Classics Department, Dr Jonathan Wallis for putting up with my constant stream of questions with kindness and good grace and Dr Jayne Knight for her encouragement and support during the final stages of my candidature.

The concept of this thesis was from my honours project in 2011. Dr Lara O'Sullivan from the University of Western Australia identified the potential for further academic investigation in this area; I sincerely thank her for the helpful comments and hope this work goes some way to fulfil the potential she saw.

Very special thanks must also be given to Associate Professor Pat Wheatley from the University of Otago, who has always happily answered any queries I had regarding many aspects of the Hellenistic World over the years. I am now lucky enough to call him both friend and mentor.

To the Tasmanian Friends of the Australian Archaeological Institute in Athens, who facilitated my travel to Athens and my accommodation there for an extended period of time in 2013 as part of the Athens Scholarship - thank you; the chance to visit the locations associated with Cassander and Polyperchon has invaluable improved the quality of my research.

The list of friends who have seen me through my candidature is far too long to mention all, but special thanks must go to Bill, Chris, Hannah, Imogen, Isobel, Katrina, Matt and all my fellow post-graduates colleagues across Australasia, with whom I have had the pleasure of sharing this journey.

To my parents, Graeme and Jill, who supported all of my academic pursuits and inspired my love of learning from the very beginning. Without their support, this thesis would never have been possible.

Finally, I have the pleasure of acknowledging my partner, Erika, whose patience and support was always unwavering, and who makes me a better person every day.

## **Abstract**

In 319 B.C, the regent of Macedon and guardian of the kings, Antipater, died. Prior to his death, the experienced politician and general appointed one Polyperchon, the son of Simmias as his successor, with his own son Cassander as Polyperchon's subordinate. Cassander did not accept his father's decision and the ensuing conflict between him and Polyperchon would rage across Greece and the Macedonian homeland for over a decade resulting in the destruction of the royal Argead family as well as paving the way for the installation of the Antipatrid Dynasty. While previous investigations have been devoted to the conflict, primarily focussing on Cassander (Fortina, 1965; Adams, 1975; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003), or to a lesser extent Polyperchon (Carney, 2014), there has not previously been a substantial study devoted to the warring pair in apposition to each other. Because of the disproportionate amount of academic study based on Cassander, a distorted view of both Polyperchon and Cassander has emerged in perception of both men. In response to this, it is important to consider a re-evaluation of Polyperchon's career and standing within the fragmenting Macedonian Empire. In order to gain a greater understanding of events, this study investigates the way in which each man approached the conflict in Greece and Macedon, how they engaged with both the royal family and the Greek cities and how the conflict between them impacted on the political and military turmoil present in the fragmenting Macedonian Empire during the emergence of the Early Hellenistic World.

## **Formal Aspects on the Presentation of this Thesis**

### **Editions of ancient material used**

All references to primary sources are, for the most part, taken from the Loeb Classical Library with further reference to the Teubner and Oxford Classical texts for textual matters. Where a different translation or interpretation of a particular reading has been deemed appropriate, it has been discussed. If an alternate text or manuscript divergence has been used, it has been noted in the corresponding citation.

### **A note of orthography and nomenclature**

Research based on both Greek and Latin sources can lead to problems regarding the orthography. For the most part, the commonly used English spelling of names has been used, being based on the Latinised form of the name. However, due to the existence of multiple men with the same name, who are operating within the same geographical area, the names are delineated into both the Latinised form as well as the Greek transliteration, with each being assigned to separate individuals version for purpose of clarity.

### **The role of the appendix**

The appendix of this thesis contained and reproduction and accompanying translation to Antigonus' Letter to Scepis, written after the Peace of the Dynasts in 311/310 and first published by Munro in the late nineteenth century.<sup>1</sup> Other reproductions of this text, accompanied by translations, have become available following Munro's initial discovery.<sup>2</sup> The appendix presents my own choice among these possible readings. As these differences are significant to my argument, it is necessary to present my version of the text in this thesis.

---

<sup>1</sup> Munro, *JRS*. 19. (1899). pp. 330–340.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix 1. pp. 297-300.

## Abbreviations

Journal titles are abbreviated as in *L'Année philologique* and references to ancient source evidence follow standard academic conventions as set out by *LSJ* and the *OLD*.

# Table of Contents

	Page Nos
<b>Chapter 1: Introduction.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Chapter 2: Methodology.....</b>	<b>17</b>
2.1 Source critique.....	18
2.1.1 Hieronymus of Cardia.....	18
2.1.2 Duris of Samos.....	20
2.1.3 Cleitarchus of Alexandria.....	22
2.1.4 Diodorus Siculus.....	24
2.1.5 Quintus Curtius Rufus.....	27
2.1.6 Plutarch.....	29
2.1.7 Arrian.....	33
2.1.8 Justin.....	36
2.2 Chronology.....	38
2.3 Gaps in Knowledge and its Treatment.....	47
<b>Chapter 3: The Relationship between Antipater and Alexander.....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Chapter 4: Cassander in Babylon.....</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>Chapter 5: Antipater's Choice of Successor.....</b>	<b>106</b>
5.1 Cassander.....	109
5.2 Polyperchon.....	125
5.3 The Successor of Antipater.....	142
<b>Chapter 6: 'Cry Havoc!', and let slip the dogs of war: 319-318.....</b>	<b>150</b>
6.1 Cassander 319.....	152
6.2 Polyperchon 319.....	160
6.3 The Second Diadoch War.....	176

<b>Chapter 7: The Changing of the Guard.....</b>	<b>187</b>
7.1. Cassander's First Attempt at Macedon.....	188
7.2 The Winter of 317/16 and Cassander's Consolidation of Power.....	205
7.3 Cassander's Assumption of Power.....	222
 <b>Chapter 8: The Beginning of the End.....</b>	 <b>247</b>
8.1 The Third War of the Diadochoi 315.....	250
8.2 War and Peace of the Dynasts.....	261
8.3 The Aftermath of 311 and the Claim of Herakles.....	275
 <b>Chapter 9: Conclusion.....</b>	 <b>290</b>
 <b>Appendix 1: Antigonos' Letter to Scepis.....</b>	 <b>297</b>
 <b>Bibliography.....</b>	 <b>301</b>



## Chapter 1: Introduction.

In the late summer or early autumn of 319<sup>3</sup> and after a period of illness, the regent of Macedon and guardian of the kings, Philip III Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV, Antipater, the son of Iolaus, died. Before he died, Antipater appointed one Polyperchon, the son of Simmias, as the successor to the regency, along with his own son Cassander, as Polyperchon's second in command. While there was a brief period of time where the transition appeared peaceful, hostilities broke out between the regent and his second in command that would rage across Macedon and Greece for over a decade, eventuating in the death of the majority of the royal Argead family, and paving the way for the installation of the Antipatrid Dynasty in the European Sphere of the fragmenting Macedonian Empire.

In recent decades, the emerging Hellenistic World, and the multiple power factions that resulted in the creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms, have received an increased amount of academic attention. This was a period of great political and military upheaval as powerful members of Alexander the Great's court jostled for position and influence in the fragmenting Macedonian Empire. One of the points of contention during the time of the post-323 Macedonian Empire was the position of regent,<sup>4</sup> which was hotly contested among the Successors, or Diadochoi, of Alexander the Great. Not only did the position mean control over the traditional boundaries of the Empire, but it also allowed close access to, and control over, the members of the Argead House. One of the most bitterly contested and longest running struggles for the Regency took place in the last

---

<sup>3</sup> All dates should be understood as "B.C" unless otherwise stated. For the complete chronology used by this study, see: Ch. 2.2. pp. 38-46.

<sup>4</sup> For the purposes of this investigation, the term "regent" usually refers to the position of *strategos*. However, due to the amorphous nature of Macedonian official appointments as well as the pragmatic and autocratic nature of the Macedonian political structure, the use of the term regent or regency can also refer to different aspects of control in the Macedonian Homeland over the course of the investigation. For the purpose of practicality, the term regent should be understood as referring to the man who was either supported by the royal household, or who had direct practical control of Macedon itself.

decades of the fourth century B.C. between Cassander, the son of Antipater and Polyperchon, the son of Simmias.

The death of Alexander the Great in June 323,<sup>5</sup> seemingly at the height of his power and in his relative youth,<sup>6</sup> at Babylon, left a massive power vacuum within the Macedonian Empire. With the absence of either an obvious or completely satisfactory heir from the royal Argead House, the running of the Empire was left to the generals of Alexander's armies and other eminent men acting on behalf of the royal Argead family of Macedon.<sup>7</sup>

Since the outset of Alexander's great expansion of the Macedonian Empire into the east in 334, the monarch had left his trusted and long time supporter Antipater, the son of Iolaus, as the governor of Macedon.<sup>8</sup> Antipater was charged with managing the Macedonian homeland on the king's behalf, supplying fresh military resources and levies for the king's army as the campaign continued, as well as maintaining the uneasy peace among the recently subdued Greek city-states. Despite tensions rising between the king and his regent during the campaign, Antipater remained in his office as the regent of Macedon until Alexander's death, and would continue his tenure in the wake of the king's death, when he was appointed regent in conjunction with his partner Craterus, until the Macedonian Assembly at the Settlement of Triparadisus officially elected him the regent of Macedon in 321 at the conclusion of the First War of the Diadochoi.<sup>9</sup> Antipater's reign as regent however was to be short lived. After a period of ill health, Antipater died in the late summer or early autumn of 319.<sup>10</sup> Shortly before his death, Antipater left one of Alexander's generals, Polyperchon "*as guardian of the kings and supreme commander.*"<sup>11</sup> Along with Polyperchon,

---

<sup>5</sup> Arr. 7.26.3; Curt. 10.5.6; Just. 13.1.1; Heidl. Epit. *FGrH*. 155. F. 1.1; Plut. *Alex*. 76.4; Plut. *Eum*. 3.1.

<sup>6</sup> Just. 13.1.1.

<sup>7</sup> Diod. 18.1.2; Bosworth, 1988. p. 174; Billows, 1990. p. 52; cf. Ch. 3. p. 58.

<sup>8</sup> Arr. 1.11.3.

<sup>9</sup> Arr. *Succ*. *FGrH*. 156. F. 1.3; Diod. 18.39.3; Just. 13.4.5.

<sup>10</sup> Diod. 18.48.4.

<sup>11</sup> Diod. 18.48.4. "*ἐπιμελητὴν τῶν βασιλέων...καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα*" trans, Geer, 1947.

Antipater appointed his own son, Cassander, as the regent's second in command as *chiliarch*.<sup>12</sup>

This decision by Antipater was not without controversy. During his time of ill health, Antipater left the affairs of his office for Cassander to oversee.<sup>13</sup> Despite this apparent evidence of confidence in Cassander's abilities, instead of leaving his office to his son, Antipater made a conscious decision to bypass him, and to appoint Polyperchon, one of oldest members of the Diadochoi, as his successor. Like Cassander, Polyperchon also had experience of managing Macedon on behalf of Antipater. This had taken place during the First War of the Diadochoi in 321, when Antipater, and his co-regent Craterus, had led their combined forces against the Perdiccan factions in Asia Minor.<sup>14</sup> Because of Antipater's decision, conflict and rivalry was ignited between Cassander and the recently inducted Polyperchon. This struggle led to a civil war that lasted for over a decade, that raged over the European sections of the Macedonian Empire and even extended into Asia Minor.

It is the purpose of this study to examine and understand the war which resulted from Antipater's decision in 319 and Polyperchon's appointment as the succeeding regent of Macedon. The rivalry between Cassander and Polyperchon raged across the European of the Macedonian Empire for a decade, beginning soon after Antipater's demise in the second half of 319 until the death of Herakles, Alexander the Great's illegitimate son at the hands of Polyperchon during his ill-fated effort to remove Cassander from the Macedonian Homeland in 309/8. While the conflict itself was, for the most part, geographically confined to the vicinity of Greece and Macedon, its influence and effects permeated throughout the Macedonian Empire and directly engaged with the majority of Alexander's Diadochoi.

---

<sup>12</sup> Diod. 18.48.4; For more discussion on the office of *chiliarch*, see: Collins, *Phoenix*. 55. (2001). pp. 259-283, especially pp. 274-279.

<sup>13</sup> Diod. 18.49.1; Errington, 2008. p. 22; See also: Ch. 5.1.

<sup>14</sup> Just. 13.6.9.

There were also a number of other groups that played a pivotal role in the conflict, including the Greek cities, whose favour both Cassander and Polyperchon vied for throughout the conflict. Additionally, external political groups outside of direct Macedonian control, such as royal Epirote family, too would play important political and military roles during the early stages of Polyperchon's effort against the son of Antipater.

While the members of the Diadochoi and the Greek cities had profound effects on both Cassander and Polyperchon's war, the role of the royal Argead house, and the way that both Cassander and Polyperchon engaged with them as time progressed, was a hallmark to their conflict. Polyperchon would actively seek and employ Argead support to legitimise his position as regent and his cause throughout the war against Cassander. His opponent however, would not take such a unilateral approach to the royal family. Cassander's interactions with the Argeads vacillated wildly throughout the conflict, from complete aversion, to explicit integration as the conflict progressed.

This study examines and evaluates each of these issues in regards to their impact on the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon in their struggle for control of Macedon. At the centre of this study is the conflict itself and both Cassander and Polyperchon in combination and the ways in which they approached the war rather than as explicitly separate individuals.

Little is known about Cassander's early life prior to his journey to Babylon in 324 on behalf of his father.<sup>15</sup> With no extant biography devoted to him among the ancient sources, it must be left to modern scholars to draw upon the various literary sources and to speculate on the many unknowns surrounding him so as to construct an understanding of his early years and upbringing. The exact year in which Cassander was born is not known; this has led to speculation and debate among modern scholars.<sup>16</sup> While it is impossible to know his exact year

---

<sup>15</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.2.

<sup>16</sup> Heckel (2006. p. 79) asserts that his birth should be placed no later than 354. Adams (1975. p. 42) suggests that, while it is impossible to be certain of an exact

of birth, it seems reasonable to believe that he was born no later than 354. If Cassander were born roughly around this time, it would make him about the same age as Alexander the Great.<sup>17</sup> Because of Antipater's position within the Macedonian Royal Court, it is likely that Cassander would have had at least some interaction with the young Macedonian prince during their youth and that they would have known each other.<sup>18</sup>

Cassander's early military experience presents another difficult challenge for modern scholars. The only mention of a Cassander conducting a military action is found in Diodorus, who speaks of, "...nine-hundred Thracian Paeonian scouts with Cassander in command..."<sup>19</sup> However, Heckel has argued that this account of Diodorus is corrupt and should not read "Cassander" but, in fact, should read "Asander."<sup>20</sup> While it is impossible to argue with any certainty due to lack of evidence, it is likely that Cassander did not have a strong or illustrious military career prior to 319. Given the centrality of military experience to claims of leadership among the diadochoi, it is likely that there would have been some evidence of this in the ancient sources.

---

date, Berve's (Vol. II. 1926. p. 202) proposal that Cassander's birth should be placed just prior to 355 is best. The basis for the estimation of Cassander's birth to the mid-350s, presumably, is based upon his later interactions with Alexander the Great, which suggest the two were roughly the same age. For the purposes of this thesis, and for the purposes of clarity, Heckel's proposed *terminus ante quem* for Cassander's date of birth is used.

<sup>17</sup> Who was born in 356 (Heckel, 2006. p. 10).

<sup>18</sup> Adams suggests that, because of Antipater's strong position, Cassander would have served as one of the royal pages (the *basilikoi paides*) during his youth (Adams, 1975. p. 43.) in accordance with the tradition for Macedonian Elite Families to cement their bond with the monarchy in this way (Berve, Vol. I. 1926. pp. 37-39; Carney, in Howe & Reames, 2008. pp. 147-148.). While this does seem a very real possibility, it is unfortunately impossible to state unequivocally that Cassander was indeed part of this group. For recent discussion on the royal pages, and their role within the Macedonian Court, see: Carney, in Howe & Reames, 2008. pp. 145-164.

<sup>19</sup> Diod. 17.17.4. "...θρᾶκες δὲ πρόδρομοι καὶ Παίονες ἐννακόσιοι, Κάσανδρον ἔχοντες." (trans. Geer, 1947.).

<sup>20</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 79: Where Heckel suggests that the Asander in question might refer to either Asander, son of Philotas, or Asander of Agathon. For arguments supporting the reading of Cassander, see: Adams, 1975. p. 44; Adams, *Anc. World*. 2. (1979). pp. 111-115.

It seems clear however that there was a tense relationship between Cassander and Alexander the Great, with mutual dislike and suspicion.<sup>21</sup> This is typified by Plutarch's account of the hostile encounter that occurred between the pair after Cassander was said to have mocked the practice of *proskynesis* after its introduction into the royal court by Alexander.<sup>22</sup> This animosity was so extreme that, as Plutarch states, Cassander was subject to fits of trembling and illness whenever he saw an image of Alexander.<sup>23</sup> While this account seems unlikely, it is reasonable to assume that Plutarch was operating on some basis of historical events and understanding to emphasise the antipathy between the two men.<sup>24</sup> Adams suggests that this disdain may have originated from an event in their youth that persisted into their adulthood.<sup>25</sup> This tension between the two would greatly affect Cassander's future strategy as he set about building his support base after Antipater's death. Consequently, Cassander would avoid linking himself to Alexander the Great and make pains to bypass him in favour of his father, Philip II.

Just as with Cassander, there is no extant biographical work devoted to Polyperchon, either from ancient scholarship, or from modern academia. He was one of the oldest members of the Diadochoi, being born sometime between 390 and 380.<sup>26</sup> As is often the case when studying figures during the period of the Diadochoi, next to nothing is known about Polyperchon for at least the first forty years of his life. What can be deduced though is that he must have accompanied

---

<sup>21</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.1–4; Plut. *Mor.* 180f. This is to be contrasted and not confused with the deterioration of the familial relationship between the Antipatrids and the Argeads. This is dealt with in more depth in Chapter 2.

<sup>22</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.2–3; Heckel, *AJPh.* 99. (1978). p. 459; For other recording of the mockery of the practice, see: Arr. 4.12.2; Curt. 8.5.22. For more discussion of the infamous *proskynesis* affair and how it pertains to both Cassander and Polyperchon, see: Ch. 4. pp. 91–97.

<sup>23</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.6.

<sup>24</sup> Though, as Pelling highlights, Plutarch was more than willing to alter his adapted source material where and when it was fitting to do so (Pelling. 2002. pp. 91–96. For more discussion on Plutarch's methodology, see: Ch. 2.1.6 pp. 29–31.

<sup>25</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 55.

<sup>26</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 189. This would make him at least sixty-one by the time of Antipater's death in 319.

Alexander on his campaign into the East in 334.<sup>27</sup> It was while on campaign that Polyperchon entered into the upper levels of the Macedonian military,<sup>28</sup> when Alexander gave him command (*taxiarchy*) over a battalion whose leader, Ptolemaeus, the son of Seleucus, had recently been killed in battle, presumably during the fighting at Issus.<sup>29</sup> Polyperchon would continue in this capacity through the battle of Gaugamela<sup>30</sup> and Alexander's campaigns into India.<sup>31</sup>

Polyperchon was a trusted companion to Alexander, as is clearly demonstrated by the commands that the king allotted to him during his expansion of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>32</sup> Most telling of the faith which Alexander had placed in Polyperchon is the potentially vital position that he was given, namely, his placement as second in command of the returning veterans to Macedon under Craterus in 324.<sup>33</sup> Polyperchon's placement under Craterus clearly demonstrates his capability in the eyes of Alexander. A key purpose in sending Craterus and the thousands<sup>34</sup> of seasoned veterans he led back to Macedon was to replace Antipater as the regent of Macedon.<sup>35</sup> Arrian states that Craterus was

---

<sup>27</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 189; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Which implies that he may have served among the military officer class during the reign of Philip II. cf. Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Arr. 2.12.2. For the battle at Issus, see Arr. 2.11.7–10; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. p. 4.

<sup>30</sup> Arr. 3.11.9; Diod. 17.57.2; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 4.

<sup>31</sup> Arr. 4.16.1, 4.23.5, 4.24.6–7, 4.25.6, 4.26.1–27.4, 5.11.3, 6.5.5; Heckel, 2006. p. 226–227; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 4.

<sup>32</sup> Arr. 2.12.2; Arr. 7.12.4; Diod. 17.57.2.

<sup>33</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9; Contained within Justin's *Epitome*, there is another account that places Polyperchon in command of the Macedonian Army for their return to Babylonia in 324 (Just. 12.10.1.). Justin states that Alexander was unable to personally lead the army due to a leg injury he sustained which forced him to make the return journey by boat. However, as Yardley and Heckel have identified, Justin has mistaken Polyperchon's name for Craterus (Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 260.). This case of mistaken identity seems not to have been an isolated incident made by Justin who confuses them on a number of occasions (Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 276.), see Just. 13.8.5–7; 15.1.1.

<sup>34</sup> There exists a disparity in the number of veterans who were sent home at this time. Arrian (Arr. 7.21.1.) and Diodorus (Diod. 17.109.1; 18.4.1; 18.12.1) both suggest that ten thousand were at Craterus' command, while Justin (Just. 12.12.7.) states it was eleven thousand. For a discussion of numbers within the ancient sources, see Rubincam, *CQ.* 53. (2003). pp. 448–463.

<sup>35</sup> Just. 12.12.8–9.

an invalid and suffering ill health.<sup>36</sup> Alexander could not therefore be confident of Craterus surviving the return journey to Macedon.<sup>37</sup> Because of this, the man who was his second in command needed to be both trusted and capable of assuming Craterus' responsibilities, such as leading the troops home and replacing Antipater as commander in Europe. The man Alexander put his trust in was Polyperchon. The rule of Macedon could only have been left to someone in whom Alexander had complete faith. If Craterus was to die on the long journey, Alexander had to, and seemingly did, trust the capability and leadership of Polyperchon.

Following the death of Alexander the Great, the Diadochoi would soon use the remaining members of the Argead house as political pawns. This is exemplified by the case of Cassander and Polyperchon. Polyperchon had long-standing ties with the Royal house. His rise to prominence within the Macedonian Empire was through appointments made by Alexander. He was Alexander's man and his actions after Alexander's death are readily explicable in terms of cultivating and capitalising upon loyalty to the royal family. Thus Polyperchon went to great efforts to win, maintain and employ their support to further his own cause, with members of the royal family forming the core of his support base during the conflict against Cassander. This in turn would allow Polyperchon to build his standing and position as regent, while simultaneously undermining the legitimacy of Cassander's claim and support for his position. Conversely, Cassander and his father had been involved in an increasingly tense relationship with the Argeads. Therefore, during the opening years of the conflict, Cassander chose not to centre his powerbase on royally backed legitimisation, instead electing to employ the political and military connections his father had forged in Greece as well as creating alliances with various members of the Diadochoi to form the core of his support base. These initial support structures employed by Cassander and Polyperchon were by no means fixed, and would adapt and shift over time, with examples of Cassander actively engaging with the royal family

---

<sup>36</sup> Arr. 7.12.4.

<sup>37</sup> For more discussion of Polyperchon's role under Craterus, and how this may have impacted on Antipater's decision to appoint him as the next regent of Macedon, see: Ch. 5.2. pp. 126-128.



following his return to Macedon in 316, and Polyperchon giving tacit support for the deaths of Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice in 317. The vastly different ways in which Cassander and Polyperchon chose to approach working with the Argeads in their rivalry brought the royals, willingly or unwillingly, into the forefront of the conflict. This led, almost inevitably, to the destruction of the royal family itself by the time the war between Cassander and Polyperchon was brought to an end in 308, with the death of Herakles, the final Argead with any claim to the throne of Macedon.

Cassander and Polyperchon both played a substantial role in the downfall of the Argeads and their destruction. Despite this, relatively little modern scholarship has been devoted to either man. While there is a wide range of modern scholarship surrounding the Diadochoi, including numerous journal articles and books, many that deal with Cassander and Polyperchon treat them as side-notes and largely disregard the role they played in their relationships with the Royals post-323. This lack of scholarship is understandable, given the lack of attention given to the conflict by the ancient sources, with the account of Diodorus Siculus often serving as the sole surviving authority for events in Europe during the closing years of the Fourth century as well as the short-lived nature of the Antipatrid Dynasty. One exception, with respect to Cassander, is the work done by Italian scholar, Franca Landucci Gattinoni, whose publication *“L’arte del potere: Vita e opera di Cassandro di Macedonia,”*<sup>38</sup> is possibly the most important work on Cassander to date. Another scholar, whose output has become invaluable to modern scholarship concerning Cassander, is Lindsey Winthrop Adams, whose doctoral thesis and numerous journal articles have made substantial additions to the field.

In comparison to Cassander, there has been far less scholarly work devoted to Polyperchon. There is a ready answer available for this discrepancy in output, that being the dearth of extant information regarding Polyperchon and his life. In addition to this difference in readily available material, the general perception held by many scholars who describe him as an incompetent military leader and

---

<sup>38</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, 2003.

poor politician, who would inevitably fade into obscurity,<sup>39</sup> a perception that is not without ancient precedent. The ancient sources took pains to emphasise Polyperchon's shortcomings<sup>40</sup> and defeats throughout his life and during his conflict with Cassander.<sup>41</sup> One reason for this may be that Polyperchon was ultimately unsuccessful against the son of Antipater, in a civil war on the peripheries of an increasingly fragmented empire, at a time when substantial events were occurring in other regions of the Empire. This situation can easily result in a gross simplification of events and characteristics within the ancient sources. The age of the Diadochoi is one where a plurality of intertwining narratives exist, each centring around an eminent Macedonian, and because of the discrepancy in the amount of academic literature in favour of Cassander, it has led to an unfortunate distortion in the career of Polyperchon which has emerged. The reception of Polyperchon too has resulted in the unnecessary dismissal of his influence on the political environment during the conflict, especially during the final stages of the war against Cassander and during the Peace of the Dynasts.<sup>42</sup> Despite his defeat, Polyperchon was able to maintain a strong opposition to Cassander throughout the entirety of the conflict, a conflict that was not ended on the battlefield, but via diplomatic compromise. However, it must be noted that this investigation does not attempt to defend, nor rehabilitate Polyperchon in the late fourth century. Instead, the complexity and ever-evolving nature of the war between Cassander and Polyperchon is at the heart of examination. This thesis rejects the notion that the conflict between

---

<sup>39</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 229; Heckel 1992. p. 197, p. 204; Hornblower, 1981. p. 244; Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 50; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25 (2014).

<sup>40</sup> Aelian, *VH.* 12.43. (cf. Curt. 4.13.8-9; Heckel, *Mnemosyne.* 60. (2007). p. 125, who offers a possible explanation for the hostility towards Polyperchon within Curtius' account which comes via his source, the history left by Cleitarchus.); Athen. 4.155c; Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 50; it must be noted however, that Atheneaus, via his authority Duris of Samos (cf. *FGrH.* 76. F. 12), does highlight Polyperchon's military acumen in spite of his liking for dance and drink. This sentiment is also reflected in the assessment of Pyrrhus of Epirus, as recorded by Plutarch. Here, the biographer relays the esteem in which the great Carthaginian leader Hannibal held the Epirote king's military acumen. Here, Plutarch records a conversation during a dinner party where Pyrrhus praises Polyperchon's military ability (Plut. *Pyrr.* 8.3.).

<sup>41</sup> Diod. 18.69.3, 18.70.4, 19.36.6.

<sup>42</sup> See Ch. 8.2.

Cassander and Polyperchon was a one-sided affair leading to Cassander's unavoidable victory. By engaging directly with the conflict as it progressed, a deeper understanding of events in Europe during the closing decades of the fourth century is available.

It must be highlighted, as this examination does, that, despite Cassander's ability to subdue the threat of Polyperchon that ultimately saw his rival submit to his authority, this does not equate to an overwhelming and easy Cassandrian victory. Despite the hostile reception from both ancient and modern writers,<sup>43</sup> the depiction of Polyperchon as an incompetent leader appears overly harsh and simplistic.<sup>44</sup> Not only was Polyperchon's acumen trusted by Antipater, who left him in charge of Macedon not once, but twice,<sup>45</sup> but also by Alexander the Great himself, who gave Polyperchon several positions as commander of military forces, as well as his role alongside the returning Craterus in 324.<sup>46</sup> As previously stated, these appointments demonstrate that he was at least an able military leader and also one trusted with political positions by his contemporaries. The distortion too undermines our understanding of Cassander and his own rise to power, and overshadows some of the astute manoeuvring he achieved in bringing the Macedonian Homeland under his authority. This thesis tackles the examination of this period using a chronological method, which is done by allotting a set period of time to each of the six chapters it contains.

---

<sup>43</sup> cf. Heckel, *AJPh.* 99. (1978). p. 461; Particularly of note, Heckel's assessment of Polyperchon as a man out of his depth, "*A Jackel among Lions*" (Heckel, 1992. p. 188), Hornblower as one of Alexander's "*second class generals*," (Hornblower, 1981. p. 224), Wheatley's description of Polyperchon as "*indecisive, unlucky, and more than a little incompetent*," (Wheatley, *Antichthon.* 32. (1998). p. 12) and Carney's recent and welcome contribution, who, while recognizing Polyperchon's durability, describes him as one who "*lacked focus when political situations got more complex and, as with military matters, he never seemed to expect his opponents' counter moves*." (Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 18.).

<sup>44</sup> Indeed, this is a point that Heckel, via personal correspondence with Wheatley directly warns against (Wheatley, *Antichthon* 38 (2004). p. 3. n. 1).

<sup>45</sup> As he had done initially in 321, with the outbreak of the First War of the Diadochoi, see Ch. 5.2. p. 126.

<sup>46</sup> Arr. 2.12.2; 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.8.

The next chapter in this study is devoted to the methodology within which this thesis operates. Contained within this chapter is a brief evaluation of a number of the main ancient sources devoted to this period. While there has already been much discussion and scholarship concerning the ancient sources,<sup>47</sup> it is necessary to include a brief overview of the sources used in this study. The next issue that the methodological chapter concerns itself with is the matter of the chronology followed by the study. Chronologies for the period of the Diadochoi are a notoriously divisive issue which scholars face when studying this period.<sup>48</sup> There is still much discussion today concerning the issue. Three main schools of thought have emerged, these being the High,<sup>49</sup> Low<sup>50</sup> and the Mixed, or Eclectic,<sup>51</sup> chronological methods. While the chronologies of the Diadochoi are a critical issue, it is not one of the goals of this investigation to offer any substantial contribution on the matter. My focus, rather, is on the rivalry of Cassander and Polyperchon, and chronology is discussed in so far as it is relevant to this discussion.

This thesis subscribes predominantly to High chronology as suggested by Bosworth and Wheatley.<sup>52</sup> There is however, one insertion into this method, that being the movements of Polyperchon between 318–317 as suggested by Paschidis.<sup>53</sup> While Paschidis is a proponent of a mixed chronological method,<sup>54</sup> he does assert that the High Chronology is the most likely reconstruction of the years of 319–317.<sup>55</sup> Therefore, Paschidis' proposal can be inserted into Bosworth's chronology without complication. Further discussion and evaluation of the respective chronological schools takes place within the methodological chapter of this study.

---

<sup>47</sup> Hornblower, 1981; Kebric, 1977; Wheatley, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 179 – 192.

<sup>48</sup> Wheatley, *Phoenix* 52. 1998. p. 257.

<sup>49</sup> As suggested by Bosworth (*Chiron*. 22. 1992) and Wheatley (*Phoenix*. 52. 1998).

<sup>50</sup> As suggested by Errington (*Hermes*. 105. 1977) and Hauben (*AJPh*. 93. 1973).

<sup>51</sup> As suggested by Boiy (Boiy, 2007).

<sup>52</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. 1992; Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. 1998.

<sup>53</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. 2008.

<sup>54</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. 2008. p. 235.

<sup>55</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. 2008. p. 235.

As previously noted, there exist sections in the lives of both Cassander and Polyperchon where little to no evidence is available upon which modern scholars can draw. However, leaving these sections of silence without comment is not satisfactory and they must be assessed within their respective contexts. The final section of the methodological chapter outlines the way in which this investigation tackles the problematic historical issue of silence throughout the scope of its examination.

The third chapter is focussed on the events prior to the death of Antipater in 319,<sup>56</sup> being devoted to the career of Antipater during the reign of Philip II and Alexander III. During Alexander's life, Antipater had acted as a stalwart supporter of the king and had held a number of vital offices, the most notable of which was Antipater's appointment to the regency of Macedon during Alexander's embarkation east during the great expansion of the Macedonian Empire in 334. Of central concern to this study is the relationship between Alexander and Antipater during the king's reign. As Alexander's campaign continued, strains emerged between the two men, which ultimately saw Antipater replaced as regent by another of Alexander's trusted generals, Craterus in 324. The significance of this portion of investigation is to evaluate whether the tensions between Alexander and his regent were responsible for Cassander's lack of interest in securing Argead support following the death of his father in 319.

Chapter Four is devoted to Cassander's journey to the new Macedonian capital of Babylon in 324 in place of the recently replaced Antipater in order to meet with Alexander III following the conclusion of Macedonian expansionism in the same year. In addition to discussing Antipater's reasoning for remaining in Macedon in defiance of Alexander's orders, this chapter covers Cassander's relationship with the monarch, as well as his involvement in the infamous *proskynesis* affair. To conclude the fourth chapter of this investigation, the death of Alexander III in 323, and the confusion surrounding the cause of his death is evaluated, especially the supposed Antipatrid conspiracy to murder the king as

---

<sup>56</sup> Diod. 18.48.4.

well as the speed at which news of Alexander's death spread throughout the Macedonian Empire. Additional focus too is given to the relationship between Antipater and his replacement, Craterus, the way in which the two would forge a strong alliance with each other in the wake of Alexander's death, the unrest in Greece that resulted from Alexander's death and their actions during the First War of the Diadochoi in 321, as tensions erupted among the Successors.

Chapter Five moves from understanding the context of Cassander and Polyperchon, shifting into how each man's career, following the year of 324, affected the dying regent's thought process. To do so, this chapter is divided into three sections, with a section each on the movements of first Cassander and then Polyperchon in the intervening period between 324 and Antipater's death, and the final section devoted specifically to Antipater and how his choice of successor would impact on the greater Macedonian Empire.

Chapter Six is devoted to the events immediately following Antipater's death in 319, and the way in which Cassander and Polyperchon embarked upon the construction of their respective bodies of support. Soon after his father died, Cassander retired from the court at Pella, ostensibly for leisure, but used his departure to flee Macedon for Asia Minor and the court of Antigonus. In addition to Antigonus, Cassander would develop alliances with other members of the Diadochoi, his brothers in law, Lysimachus and Ptolemy. To complement his bonds with members of the Diadochoi, Cassander also took advantage of Antipater's long-standing connections to the oligarchies in southern Greece that he had installed during his tenure as regent of Macedon during Alexander III's expansion of the Macedonian Empire. By doing so, Cassander was able to build a foothold in southern Greece that could facilitate his return to the continent in 318. However, one group conspicuously absent from Cassander's repertoire of supporters was the royal Argead family.

This aversion to the royal family was not present for Polyperchon, Macedon's new regent. In stark contrast to his new rival, Polyperchon sought extensive support from both the royals at Pella, and those external to the Macedonian

Homeland, most notably Olympias, the grandmother of Alexander IV. The regent's concerted efforts to build on the aura of the royal family also extended to those members of the Diadochoi who continued in their support for the royal family, namely Eumenes of Cardia, who maintained his strong ties to Olympias following the death of Alexander III and was currently in conflict with Antigonus in Anatolia.

Just like Cassander, Polyperchon actively engaged with the Greek cities, first via political means, and subsequently via more military means. From these efforts, Polyperchon was able to develop a base of support, primarily in the Peloponnese, that would continue to serve a pivotal role in his war against Cassander. While the most notable event during Polyperchon's establishment of support in the south was the failed siege of Megalopolis in the summer of 318, the action should not be taken as representative of the regent's efforts to impart his influence in Greece. Chapter Five concludes with the series of naval battles that took place near Byzantium between the fleet commanded by Polyperchon's general Cleitus, and the combined forces of Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Antigonus, also dated to the summer of 318. While initially successful, Polyperchon's forces would be defeated, marking an early shift in the balance of power in Europe away from the regent to Cassander.

The seventh chapter of this investigation covers the aftermath of Cassander's victory over Polyperchon's navy off Byzantium until solidification of his authority in the Macedonian homeland, following the successful conquest of the region in the winter of 317/16. This period of time would see a major shift in the ways both Polyperchon and Cassander would approach the conflict for control of Europe, as it saw the deaths of the most prominent members of the Argead house as well as an upending in the alliances formed by the warring pair with external forces, namely the decision by Antigonus to forsake his alliance to Cassander, instead opting to throw his support behind Polyperchon's forces in southern Greece.

Chapter Eight engages with events in Europe following the creation of the Antigonid-Polyperchon alliance in 315 until the cessation of hostilities between Cassander and Polyperchon in 309 with the death of Alexander III's illegitimate son, Herakles. A central focus of this chapter is the evaluation of Polyperchon's strength in his position in southern Greece as well as his impact on greater Hellenistic politics after his expulsion from the Macedonian homeland in 316. While the prevailing interpretation of the war between Cassander and Polyperchon following Polyperchon's flight from Macedon places Cassander as the dominant master of Macedon, with Polyperchon relegated to a minor toehold in southern Greece, a re-evaluation of key neglected sources disrupts this view and demonstrates that not only was Cassander in a less well entrenched position, but that Polyperchon was still a powerful and influential figure within Hellenistic politics until the end of the war against his adversary.

In the final chapter I briefly revisit the key points of previous chapters. By examining the entirety of the rivalry between Cassander and Polyperchon and their relationships with the Argead family, this study hopes to demonstrate the role they played in the ultimate destruction of the royal family. Before assessing the events after the death of Antipater in 319, it is necessary to engage with his career and interaction with the Argeads. By doing this, the groundwork will be laid in order to more fully understand the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, conflict which ultimately led to the end of the Argead House.



## **Chapter 2: Methodology.**

This chapter is devoted to the methodology used in this study. It is divided into three sections, each tackling different, but no less significant, issues. The first is a brief outline, evaluation and discussion of a number of the major ancient sources that form the basis of the study. The second portion of the chapter is devoted to the problematic issue of chronologies for the period of the Diadochoi, as well as the chronology that this study follows. The third and final section of this chapter provides an overview to the approach this thesis takes to the gaps in surviving ancient literary corpus, the problematic issue of gaining understanding of the past and the undesirable necessity of arguments built upon silence.

This first section presents a brief description of the ancient sources concerned with this period. As well as a brief discussion and outline of each of the sources and their respective authors, the various problems inherent in each of them are also presented. This cross-examination of the ancient sources is vital. They are not always historically reliable in a modern context and must therefore be subject to scrutiny. Because of this, each ancient source must be placed within its historical and literary context so they may contribute to this analysis within an appropriate understanding. There has already been considerable modern academic scholarship devoted to these sources, and it is not the intent of the overview to contribute new elements of understanding. It is however, still a prudent venture for this study to undertake an overview of the major ancient sources that form the basis of the argument presented.

The second portion of the chapter is devoted to the problematic issue of chronologies for the period of the Diadochoi. One of the most challenging issues facing modern scholars who study this period is that of establishing a consistent, reliable chronology. This endeavour is made no easier by the difficulties surrounding the available ancient sources, which are notorious for the periodic compression, simplification and even omission of events, particularly those events in Europe, within their narratives. Over a period of many decades modern scholars have constructed various theories and timelines. These

theories have resulted in three major schools of thought, the High, Low and Mixed Chronological methods. Because of the lack of agreement on the most suitable approach, chronologies of the Diadochi have become a focal point for modern scholarship on this period.

Contained within this section is a brief overview of the academic debate as well as an evaluation of the various chronologies. From this, the chronology that this study follows which is based primarily on the High Chronology, as espoused by Bosworth and Wheatley, is outlined. There is one modification to the High Chronology that is accepted, that being the addition proposed by Paschidis<sup>57</sup> in 2008 regarding the movements of Polyperchon and Cassander in 318/317.

The final section of this chapter engages with the problematic issue of gaps within the ancient evidence from the surviving sources regarding the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon. These gaps prove a particular issue for understanding events in Europe during the late fourth century as the majority of our first hand accounts, and inherently their respective foci are primarily concerned with events in Asia Minor and the east.<sup>58</sup> Because of this, significant absences confront attempts to gain insight into events for the period that this study evaluates. This final section details the way in which these gaps in knowledge are tackled by this study.

## **2.1: Source Critique.**

### **2.1.1: Hieronymus of Cardia.**

Possibly the most important source for any study of the Diadochi is that written by Hieronymus of Cardia. Hieronymus was born at some time during the mid-350s,<sup>59</sup> in the Greek city of Cardia and died in approximately 260.<sup>60</sup> As a result

---

<sup>57</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). pp. 233-250.

<sup>58</sup> See below.

<sup>59</sup> Hornblower, 1981. p. 6. For a more in-depth studies of Hieronymus' life and work, see: Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). pp. 684-696; Hornblower, 1981; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. XIII-XVI; Roisman, in Carney & Ogden, 2010. pp. 135-150.

he was well positioned to record the events within the post-323 Macedonian Empire. Although his work is highly regarded by modern scholars,<sup>61</sup> Hieronymus' history has been completely lost, save for some nineteen fragments compiled by Jacoby.<sup>62</sup>

Adding further weight to the importance of Hieronymus' work is that the historian was an active participant in Macedonian politics, likely knowing many of the major belligerents who rose to prominence after Alexander's death in 323.<sup>63</sup> From the outset of his entrance into the political sphere, Hieronymus worked closely with Eumenes,<sup>64</sup> whom Hornblower suggests was his uncle.<sup>65</sup> Later, after the execution of Eumenes during the winter of 317/16 at the hands of Antigonos,<sup>66</sup> Hieronymus entered into the service of the Antigonid House.<sup>67</sup> From this point, the historian would serve the house for the remainder of his life.<sup>68</sup> These close, direct relationships with members of the Diadochoi allowed Hieronymus to use first hand accounts when constructing his works. As a result Hieronymus' history formed the basis for later ancient historical texts, which relied heavily on his accounts.<sup>69</sup> From what can be ascertained about Hieronymus' historiographical style, the historian appears to have allowed, as Brown highlights, "*the "facts" [their emphasis] to speak for themselves,*"<sup>70</sup>

---

<sup>60</sup> Hornblower, 1981. p. 5.

<sup>61</sup> Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 684; Bosworth, in Stadter, 1992. p. 57; Roisman, in Carney & Ogden, 2010. p. 135.

<sup>62</sup> *FGrH*. 154; Hornblower, 1981. p. 1; Roisman, in Carney & Ogden, 2010. p. 135

<sup>63</sup> Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 688; Roisman, in Carney & Ogden, 2010. p. 138.

<sup>64</sup> Whose employment under both Philip II and Alexander the Great as their scribe must have provided invaluable insight for the composition of Hieronymus' *magnum opus*. (Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 684.)

<sup>65</sup> Hornblower, 1981. p. 9.

<sup>66</sup> Diod. 19.44.2; Plut. *Eum*. 19.1; Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 686.

<sup>67</sup> Diod. 19.44.3; Jacoby, *RE*. 8. 1540; Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 684; Hornblower, 1981. p. 11; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. XIII.

<sup>68</sup> Hornblower, 1981. p. 15.

<sup>69</sup> Jacoby, *RE*. 8. 1540; Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 685, 687, 692; Hornblower, 1981. p. 17; Whealtery, in Heckel & Tritle, 2009. pp. 129-131; Roisman, in Carney & Ogden, 2010. p. 135, 138; Wheatley, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 25, also 29. n. 25; Hieronymus' influence is also felt in works not typically associated with the Diadochoi, including those of Strabo. For more discussion, see: Engels, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 9-12.

<sup>70</sup> Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 684.

providing an accessible and likely reliable account of the Macedonian Empire of the late 4<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>71</sup> Brown's assessment however should not be mistaken for lack of bias within the Hieronymus' narrative. As a member of the Antigonid court during the composition of his history, it is not unreasonable to suspect some measure of pro-Antigonid bias at one or more points in his history.<sup>72</sup> This aspect is vital to understand when engaging with the war between Cassander and Polyperchon, as Hieronymus' position of support for Antigonus Monophthalmus, a man who was in conflict with both men at some point during the conflict, results in a pejorative representation filtering down to our surviving later sources.<sup>73</sup>

### **2.1.2: Duris of Samos.**

Another historian who was living during the years of the Diadochoi was Duris of Samos.<sup>74</sup> Like Hieronymus, Duris had first-hand experience of Macedonian domination during his time as tyrant on the island of his birth. Little is known about the facts and events of Duris' life. Though it is clear that he lived in the late fourth and early third centuries BC, the exact dates of birth, death and the years within which he composed his works remain a mystery.<sup>75</sup> What is known is that Duris ruled as tyrant over Samos for a period of his life,<sup>76</sup> as well as possibly studying under the philosopher Theophrastus.<sup>77</sup> While the exact years in which

---

<sup>71</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 100.

<sup>72</sup> Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). pp. 694-695.

<sup>73</sup> Hughes, 2008. p. 224; Walsh highlights the effects of the anti-Antipatrid bias within Hieronymus' account (Walsh, *AHB*. 26. (2012). pp. 154-159). An example of this can be found in the account of Diodorus (Diod. 18.54.3-4; cf. Ch. 6.1. p. 153) during the initial alliance between Cassander and Antigonus in 318 as the son of Antipater arrived in Asia Minor. Here, Antigonus' alliance to Cassander is represented as disingenuous and based not of personal affection for Cassander, but more on the practical necessity of maintaining Polyperchon's location in Macedon.

<sup>74</sup> For a thorough investigation of Duris of Samos, see Kebric, 1977, and more recently, Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 43-56.

<sup>75</sup> Kebric, 1977. p. 2; Barin, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 61

<sup>76</sup> Athen. 337d = *FGrH*. 76. T. 2; Barron, *CR*. 12. (1962). p. 191; Kebric, *CPh*. 69. (1974). p. 286; Kebric, 1977. p. 1, 8.

<sup>77</sup> Athen. 4.128a; Kebric, *CPh*. 69. (1974). p. 286; Doubt however has been cast over this possibility at the accuracy of Athenaeus' account. cf. Dalby (*CQ*. 41.

this took place are unknown, Kebric suggests that his rule over Samos ended prior to the death of Lysimachus in 281.<sup>78</sup>

The most important work for this analysis that is attributed to Duris is his *Macedonian History*, which would serve as a central authority to many later ancient writers.<sup>79</sup> Even though the history is almost entirely lost, there are fragmentary remains, some thirty-five in total<sup>80</sup> and quotations, which are found in later sources.<sup>81</sup> Despite being criticised for his lack of reliability in these later sources,<sup>82</sup> Duris was a major influence on subsequent ancient writers, who used his history as the basis for their own works.<sup>83</sup> As with Hieronymus' bias, Duris too may have held close ties with the Antigonid factions during the late fourth century.<sup>84</sup> What can be deduced with more certainty, as Pownall has recently and convincingly argued, is that while Duris may have held links to the Macedonians, he was generally hostile towards the members of the Diadochoi as a whole.<sup>85</sup> Of particular note for this study is the excerpt of Athenaeus' narrative, for which Duris was the authority, that refers to Polyperchon.<sup>86</sup> While disparaging, as Duris was of all the Diadochoi, he does highlight Polyperchon's military prowess, offering a brief glimpse into Polyperchon's acumen on the battlefield.

---

(1991). pp. 539-540.) who warns against the over utilisation of the excerpt for understanding biographical aspects of Duris' life.

<sup>78</sup> Kebric, 1977. p. 10.

<sup>79</sup> Kebric, 1977. p. 9; Pownall, in Brill's *New Jacoby*, 2009. 76; Baynham, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 113; Landucci Gattinoni, in Naas & Simon, 2015. p. 37; Baron, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 62.

<sup>80</sup> *FGrH*. 76; Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 44.

<sup>81</sup> Kebric, 1977. p. 10; Engels, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 10; Baron, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 62.

<sup>82</sup> Kebric, 1977. p. 10; Dalby, *CQ*. 41. (1991). p. 539; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. XX-XXI.

<sup>83</sup> Kebric, 1977. p. 10; Baron, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. pp. 61-62.

<sup>84</sup> Kebric, *CPh*. 69. (1974). p. 686; in opposition to this position, see: Billows, 1990. pp. 335-356.

<sup>85</sup> *passim*. Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. especially pp. 50-52.

<sup>86</sup> Athen. 4.155c = *FGrH* F. 12; Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 50.

### 2.1.3: Cleitarchus of Alexandria.

*“There is an unwritten law that the volume of scholarship on a subject is in inverse proportion to the evidence available. That is particularly true of the early Hellenistic historian, Cleitarchus, son of Deinon.”*<sup>87</sup> This assessment by Bosworth offers a fitting introduction to any discussion of Cleitarchus, especially on the severe lack of surviving fragments attributed to him.

Like Hieronymus and Duris, Cleitarchus was a contemporary, albeit a later one, of the Diadochi.<sup>88</sup> Little to nothing can be confidently stated about the exact dates of Cleitarchus’ life, nor for the composition of his history. This lack of reliable material is problematic for modern scholars in general and for this study in particular because of the later impact and influence Cleitarchus had on historians, most notably (but not limited to) the vulgate writers, Diodorus, Curtius and Justin.<sup>89</sup>

For over half a century, various dates have been suggested for Cleitarchus’ years of work as a historian. While not the first, the date espoused by Tarn<sup>90</sup> for a composition date of no earlier than 280, has become a focal point of scholarly discussion since the 1950s. Hamilton called into question both the outcome of Tarn’s study and the methodology used to establish his post-280 date.<sup>91</sup> Though not suggesting an exact timeframe within which Cleitarchus wrote, Hamilton argues that it most likely occurred during the late Fourth Century.<sup>92</sup> In a clear demonstration of the lack of hard evidence to allow secure dating for

---

<sup>87</sup> Bosworth, *Histos*. 1. (1997). p. 211.

<sup>88</sup> Recent papyri evidence (*P. Oxy.* 4808) however might push Cleitarchus’ dates further back to around 260. See: Baynham, in Romm & Statler, 2010. p. 330. n. A.15b for more analysis.

<sup>89</sup> Tarn, *JHS*. 43. (1923). p. 95; Hammond, *CQ*. 41. (1991). p. 504; McKechnie, *CQ*. 45. (1995). pp. 423-424, 431; Bosworth, *Histos*. 1. (1997). p. 211; Heckel, *Mnemosyne*, 60. (2007). p. 124. n. 6; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 9; Walsh, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 155; Howe, in Heckel, Müller & Wrightson, 2015. pp. 169-171.

<sup>90</sup> Tarn, Vol II. 1950. p. 19; for a counter argument to Tarn’s position, see: Hamilton, *Historia*. 10. (1961). pp. 448-458.

<sup>91</sup> Hamilton. *Historia*. 10. (1961). p. 449-451.

<sup>92</sup> Hamilton. *Historia*. 10. (1961). p. 453.

Cleitarchus, Brown states that the composition of his history may have taken place any time between 312–260.<sup>93</sup> If it is safe to say that Cleitarchus dates from any time within the timeframe suggested by Brown, then the historian offers another vital primary historical account of events in post-323 Macedon. This is an account which later historians, central to this study, drew upon while composing their own works on the period.

Save for the thirty-six fragments compiled by Jacoby,<sup>94</sup> Cleitarchus' history is lost. From what survives of the narrative, some broad understandings can be reached regarding his literary style and composition of what appears to have been his sole literary work.<sup>95</sup> Given the dearth of surviving material, the fragmentary nature of Cleitarchus results in a severe limitation on the extent that historical understanding can be deduced,<sup>96</sup> and attention must be given to the later sources that made use of his history for their own work in order to gain a better understanding of his methods. An understanding of Cleitarchus is important for this study because, owing to his popularity among later sources, his style and themes may have impacted on the presentation of events that have been used by later extant sources.

From what material is available to modern scholars, Cleitarchus aimed to both entertain and inform and his literary style is one appropriate to this dual purpose.<sup>97</sup> The entertainment factor of his work could easily explain his later popularity amongst Roman readers.<sup>98</sup> However, caution is required when engaging with his influence, as this apparent desire to entertain may also detract from the historical accuracy of Cleitarchus as a source. Making entertainment a pivotal aspect of his work may have negatively affected the accuracy of his

---

<sup>93</sup> Brown, *AJPh*. 71. (1950). p. 142; cf. Baynham, in Romm & Statler, 2010. p. 330.

<sup>94</sup> *FGrH*. 137.

<sup>95</sup> Tarn, Vol. II. 1950. p. 43; Brown, *AJPh*. 71. (1950). p. 137; Bosworth. *Histos*. 1. (1997). p. 211.

<sup>96</sup> Brown, *AJPh*. 71. (1950). p. 141.

<sup>97</sup> Brown, *AJPh*. 71. (1950). p. 151; Hamilton, 1969. p. 208; Bosworth, *ClAnt*. 22. (2003). p. 176.

<sup>98</sup> Bosworth, *FAA*, 1988. p. 7.

historical narrative.<sup>99</sup> This problem would be further compounded when events were transmitted via the later sources, such as Curtius, Diodorus and Justin, all of whom may have altered, added to or deviated away from the Cleitarchian text.<sup>100</sup> The issue is central to the present study as historical events and characters may become distorted within the extant ancient sources, further complicating study of the period. Despite the many problems with Cleitarchus' History, it is of great significance for this study in that it was a major influence for the later surviving ancient sources that form the basis for this work.

The opening section of this source critique has engaged with the few sources of those writers who had direct contact with the world of the Diadochoi. All following sources were written after the end of Macedonian supremacy, utilising the above sources as the basis for their respective works.

#### **2.1.4: Diodorus Siculus.**

The historian Diodorus Siculus is responsible for the next major source of information regarding the Diadochoi. Born on Sicily, Diodorus lived during the twilight of the Roman Republic, in the First century BC.<sup>101</sup> His history, the *Bibliothèque*, reflects the geographical and temporal shift that had taken place since Hieronymus, Duris and Cleitarchus. His account covers the vast expanse of time from the Trojan War up until the year 60BC.<sup>102</sup> The expansive timeframe for *The Bibliothèque* is divided into forty books. Of these books, only Books 1 - 5 and 11 to 20 survive. Books 18 - 20 of the *Bibliothèque* are the central focus of this study, as the historian predominantly devotes these to Macedonian affairs after the death of Alexander the Great and are therefore critical for gaining a further

---

<sup>99</sup> Hammond, *AJPh*. 110. (1989). p. 159; Also note Walsh (*AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 155), who highlights the hostility Cleitarchus may have held, much as Hieronymus did, toward the Antipatrids within his historical work.

<sup>100</sup> Bosworth, *FAA*, 1988. p. 11-12.

<sup>101</sup> Sacks, 1990. p. 1.

<sup>102</sup> Diod. 1.4.6-7; Sacks, 1990. p. 1.



understanding of the period. These books offer modern scholars detailed accounts of and insight into Macedonian affairs.

Diodorus explicitly states in the opening book of his history that, in writing the *Bibliothēke*, he is attempting to construct an overarching history. This moves on from previous historians whom he accuses of focussing on a single subject for their works.<sup>103</sup> His rationale for this is clear. Diodorus argues that writing an overarching history is more beneficial to his readers due to the many varied accounts and lessons contained within the *Bibliothēke*.<sup>104</sup>

In order to write his history, Diodorus drew on many previous literary sources,<sup>105</sup> with Hieronymus serving as his chief authority for Books 18-20.<sup>106</sup> Most important for this study are the three main sources Diodorus relied on for his accounts of Macedonian affairs, Hieronymus of Cardia, Duris of Samos and Cleitarchus.<sup>107</sup> By using sources contemporary to the events he was recounting, Diodorus added historical credibility to his work. Credibility and reliability are explicitly described as fundamental tenants by Diodorus throughout Book 1 of the *Bibliothēke*.<sup>108</sup> His goal was to write a sound, reliable history.<sup>109</sup> In addition to his attempt at historical soundness, Diodorus constructed a chronology of events into his narrative.<sup>110</sup> His chronology for Macedonian affairs was based on that constructed by Hieronymus and incorporated into his own greater chronological scheme.<sup>111</sup> However, Diodorus had difficulty merging the

---

<sup>103</sup> Diod. 1.3.

<sup>104</sup> Diod. 1.3.2; cf. Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 85-87.

<sup>105</sup> Drews. *AJPh*. 83. (1962). p. 384.

<sup>106</sup> Brown, *AHR*. 52. (1947). p. 685; Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). p. 480; Whealtes, in Heckel & Tritle, 2009. pp. 129; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. XIII-XIV.

<sup>107</sup> Tarn, *JHS*. 43. (1923). p. 93, 95-96; Drew, *AJPh*. 83. (1962). p. 384; Sacks, 1990. p. 35; p. 94; Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). p. 480; McKechnie, *CQ*. 45. (1995). p. 431; Walsh, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 155.

<sup>108</sup> Diod. 1.

<sup>109</sup> Drews. *AJPh*. 83. (1962). p. 383.

<sup>110</sup> Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). p. 479; Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 56; Whealtes, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 257; Anson, *Phoenix*. 60. (2006). p. 228; Meeus, *Phoenix*. 66. (2012). p. 76; Whealtes, in Whealtes & Baynham, 2015. p. 247.

<sup>111</sup> Whealtes, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 261.

complexities of the chronologies and therefore his chronology for this period has become compressed, distorted and somewhat haphazard.<sup>112</sup> This means that Diodorus' chronology cannot be fully trusted by modern scholars.<sup>113</sup>

As a result Diodorus has attracted criticism from modern scholars.<sup>114</sup> Despite his desire for a consistent and reliable recount of events, Diodorus often encountered difficulty when compiling and incorporating his various sources into a single cohesive narrative.<sup>115</sup> It is important to take into consideration the confusion Diodorus encountered and, while there is great worth in engaging with the *Bibliothēke*, modern scholars should be aware that Diodorus is not infallible. Diodorus' chronological problems have created intense academic discussion among modern scholars and this is discussed in more depth in Section 2 of this chapter.

Despite the various reliability issues that have emerged from Diodorus' historical and chronological method, the *Bibliothēke* offers modern scholarship an invaluable account of Macedonian history and this work forms a central pillar of any study of the Diadochoi. In particular for the investigation of the war between Cassander and Polyperchon, Diodorus' narrative often becomes the monograph through which to engage with events in Europe following Antipater's death in 319. While not a simple task, with an understanding of Diodorus' method, as well as the possible bias that exists within his source material, the account can be used throughout the entirety of this examination.

### **2.1.5: Quintus Curtius Rufus.**

The next major source for the Diadochi, at least until the conclusion of the First Diadoch War in 319, is that written by the Roman Historian Quintus Curtius

---

<sup>112</sup> Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 261.

<sup>113</sup> Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). p. 481.

<sup>114</sup> see for example: Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). p. 479; Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 257; Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 87; cf. McKechnie, *Historia*. 43. (1994). p. 304.

<sup>115</sup> Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 261.

Rufus.<sup>116</sup> Curtius' only known work is the *Historiae Alexandri Magni*.<sup>117</sup> The *Historiae* follows the life of Alexander the Great, with a continuing narrative until the period of time after the meeting at Triparadeisus in 320. Curtius' work was in part a result of Roman fascination with Macedon, more specifically with the person of Alexander the Great,<sup>118</sup> providing vital insight into the early stage of this investigation, prior to the rise of the Diadochoi.

The exact dates of Curtius' composition of his history is the subject of notoriously contentious, exhaustive and long running debates among modern scholars with discussion and argument continuing for over a century. While it is generally accepted that Curtius wrote in the early 1<sup>st</sup> century AD, the exact dates remain a mystery to modern scholarship.<sup>119</sup> Other than the authorship of the *Historiae*, nothing is known about any part of Curtius' life.<sup>120</sup>

The *Historiae* was divided into ten separate books. While the first and second books have been completely lost, the remaining eight are mostly intact.<sup>121</sup> It is likely that the missing two books are responsible for much of the academic debate surrounding Curtius. This is because it is likely that the opening of Book One would have contained a prologue from the author, outlining who he was, and the methodology with which he was writing. Out of the ten books, the most valuable to this study is the final book, Book Ten. This section of Curtius' history focuses on the final years of Alexander the Great's life and subsequent events until after the events at Triparadeisus in 320. This final book of the *Historiae* offers an invaluable account of the intervening period between the death of Alexander the Great and the rise of Cassander and Polyperchon.

---

<sup>116</sup> For an in-depth evaluation of Curtius, see: Baynham, 1998.

<sup>117</sup> Steele, *AJPh*. 36. (1915). p. 402; Hamilton, *Historia* 37. (1988). p. 445.

<sup>118</sup> Adams, 2004. p. 40.

<sup>119</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 7; cf. Pomeroy, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 317; though wider suggestions to Curtius' dates have been postulated prior to Baynham, see for example: Milns, *Latmus*. 25. (1966). p. 490; cf. Rufus Fears, *CPh*. 71. (1976). p. 214.

<sup>120</sup> Steele, *AJPh*. 36. (1915). 402; Bosworth, *CPh* 78. (1983). p. 150.

<sup>121</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 1.

When compiling his history, Curtius drew on many and varied sources. From these, he wove the accounts together in order to construct his own narrative.<sup>122</sup> Curtius offers little insight into the sources he used, only rarely making a direct reference to the authorities for events he is recounting.<sup>123</sup> Arguably, Curtius had access to, Pompeius Trogas' *Historiae Philippicae*, which was composed during the Augustan Era and survived into the fourth century AD as an epitome, and it seems plausible that he used it.<sup>124</sup> Contained within the *Historiae* are accounts of the details of Alexander's life that are found nowhere else in extant ancient scholarship. As Baynham argues, this would suggest that Curtius also had access to other ancient sources that alluded to other contemporary scholars who were writing on the period.<sup>125</sup> There has been much comparison of events found in both Diodorus and Curtius' respective histories.<sup>126</sup> It seems likely that the original source on which both these sources relied was that of Cleitarchus.<sup>127</sup>

One of the fundamental features of the *Historiae Alexandri Magni* is the concept and role of *fortuna*.<sup>128</sup> The various figures contained within Curtius' history were governed by *fortuna*'s influence, which would ultimately be responsible for his

---

<sup>122</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 89; Heckel, *Mnemosyne*. 60. (2007). p. 124. n. 6, 125; One of the few references Curtius makes can be found in Curt. 9. 5. 21, when he makes references to Cleitarchus and Timagenes, both of whom he is critical.

<sup>123</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 57.

<sup>124</sup> Baynham, 1998. pp. 30 -31. For more on Pompeius Trogas and Justin's epitome of Trogas' history, see: Ch. 2.1.8. pp. 33-35.

<sup>125</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 57.

<sup>126</sup> Atkinson, in Bosworth & Baynham, 2000. p. 320.

<sup>127</sup> Tarn, *JHS*. 43. (1913). p. 95; Brown, *AJPh*. 71. (1950). p. 146; Rufus Fears, *CPh*. 71. (1976). p. 219; Bosworth, *Histos* 1, 1997. p. 211; McKechnie, *Historia*. 48. (1998). p. 45; Bosworth, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 81; Howe, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 69. n. 16; Müller, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 207; Howe, in Heckel, Müller & Wrightson, 2015. p. 169; Lane Fox, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 166; Heckel, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 29; though Cleitarchus is by no means Curtius' sole authority, as he appears to have also made extensive use of Hieronymus' history during the composition of the *Historiae* (Errington, *JHS*. 90. (1970). p. 75; McKechnie, *Historia*. 48. (1999). p. 47; cf. Wheatley, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 29. n. 25.

<sup>128</sup> Baynham, 1988. p. 103. For more on the tradition of *fortuna* within Curtius, see: Baynham, 1988. pp. 101 – 131; cf. Tarn, Vol. II. 1948. pp. 91-116.

subjects' actions.<sup>129</sup> By using *fortuna*, Curtius taps into a long-standing literary tradition within Greek and Roman sources,<sup>130</sup> and this would have made his account readily received by his readership.<sup>131</sup>

The historical reliability of Curtius, and the perception of this among modern scholars, has changed a great deal since Tarn's evaluation of him as having an "...entire lack of historical principle..."<sup>132</sup> Tarn's expectation that Curtius should provide a cohesive, historical narrative comparable to modern academic scholarship is unfortunate and misguided. As Baynham convincingly affirms, "...Roman historians were not interested in their traditions to the same extent as a modern scholar; while they were aware of issues like historical veracity, they were far more concerned with moral didacticism and its presentation."<sup>133</sup> If the *Historiae Alexandri Magni* is approached with this understanding, Curtius' account and its completeness provide a valuable source for modern scholarship.

#### **2.1.6: Plutarch.**

The next major sources for study on the Early Hellenistic World come from select biographies from the Greek biographer Plutarch's series, *The Parallel Lives*.<sup>134</sup> In this series Plutarch compared the lives of eminent Greeks with their Roman counterparts.<sup>135</sup> The composition of his biographies most likely occurred after 96 AD, after the death of the Roman Emperor Domitian, and continued until Plutarch's own death in 120 AD.<sup>136</sup> Of *The Parallel Lives*, four are of particular importance and relevance to this study; these are *The Life of Alexander*, *The Life of Demetrius*, *The Life of Eumenes* and *the Life of Phocion*.

---

<sup>129</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 113.

<sup>130</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 104.

<sup>131</sup> McKechnie, *Historia*. 48. (1999). pp. 52-53; Adams, 2007. p. 43; cf. Tarn. Vol. II. 1948. p. 92.

<sup>132</sup> Tarn, Vol. II. 1948. p. 93.

<sup>133</sup> Baynham, 1998. p. 59.

<sup>134</sup> For in depth engagement with Plutarch's works, see: Pelling, 2002; Duff, *CQ*. 30. (2011). pp. 213-278.

<sup>135</sup> Duff, *CQ*. 30. (2011). p. 213.

<sup>136</sup> Duff, 1999. p. 2; Buszard suggests composition of the *Lives* may have taken a period of some twenty years (Buszard, *TAPA*. 138. (2008). p. 186).

Plutarch's biographical style differs greatly from the sources previously dealt with in this section, which were written by historians. Plutarch's aim was not to record historical truths. Rather he aimed to provide moral lessons to his readership via the subjects of his works.<sup>137</sup> With this in mind, Plutarch's *Lives* offer another valuable account of the Early Hellenistic World for this study, albeit from a different perspective than that of an historian.

Before dealing directly with Plutarch's biographies, it is necessary to distinguish the object of biography from those of history. While superficially biography may be seen as a synonym for history, in an ancient context they are vastly different literary styles with differing methodologies and goals. Understanding this difference between biography and history is vital for any historical study that draws upon Plutarch's *Lives*.

It is best to begin with Plutarch's own words on the difference between biography and history. While there is no overall prologue for his *Lives*, where one might expect him to discuss his style and methodology,<sup>138</sup> the biographer makes clear statements on what he is, and is not, concerned with in his works: "οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους ... ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ξωγράφοι τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀπὸ τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ὄψιν εἰδῶν, οἷς ἐμφαίωεται τὸ ἥθος, ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἐλάχιστα τῶν λοιπῶν μερῶν φροντίζοντες, οὕτως ἡμῖν δοτέον εἰς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς σημεῖα μᾶλλον ἐνδύεσθαι καὶ διὰ τούτων εἰδοποιεῖν τὸν ἐκάστου βίον, ἑάσαντας ἑτέροις τὰ μεγέθη καὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας."<sup>139</sup>

Unlike historians, who place great importance on historical accuracy and overarching themes, Plutarch is more focussed upon the individual subject to which each of his biographies is devoted. Within this he conducts a moralising investigation of their lives in order to establish the moral *personae* of his

---

<sup>137</sup> Duff, 1999. p. 13, 50; Marincola, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 102; see also: Hägg, 2012. pp. 268-281.

<sup>138</sup> Duff, 1999. p. 14.

<sup>139</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 1.1-3.

subjects.<sup>140</sup> It is vital to remember Plutarch's purpose when biographical works are subjected to historical scrutiny. This is because historical, chronological, sequential narrative does not always play a central role within biography.<sup>141</sup> Therefore Plutarch is able to distort events and chronologies to suit his purpose,<sup>142</sup> or even to create events within his accounts.<sup>143</sup> This difference in focus and element of creativity results in his sequence being more focussed upon characters rather than on historical accuracy.<sup>144</sup>

An additional distortion in Plutarch's account can occur in the biographer's notion of "parallel lives" - the belief that the eminent Greeks and Romans he compares were living the same lives.<sup>145</sup> This notion of two men living the same life, albeit in different geographic and temporal spaces, is highly unlikely and improbable. In order to make the lives he is comparing fit with this belief in a same life scenario, Plutarch may downplay or omit certain events, or conversely, emphasise or introduce events into his biographies in order to enhance the plausibility of his biographical method.<sup>146</sup> Additionally, Plutarch at times does allow providence to exert itself upon the narrative of his biographies, however, as Swain has duly identified, for the *Life of Alexander* and the successive biographies of the Diadochoi, *τύχη* is not an influential factor on the works.<sup>147</sup>

---

<sup>140</sup> Swain, *Phoenix*. 43. (1989). pp. 62-64; Pelling, 2002. p. 237; Buszard, *TAPA*. 138. (2008). p. 187; Duff, *JHS*. 128. (2008). pp. 19-26; cf. Beck, *Hermes*. 130. (2002). pp. 467-469; Marincola, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 102)

<sup>141</sup> cf. Duff, *CQ*. 30. (2011). p. 265; Though it is vital to note is keenly aware of history as a genre and engaged deeply with his authorities (Baron, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 62; Marincola, in Priestley & Zali, 2016. p. 101).

<sup>142</sup> Pelling, 2002. p. 92.

<sup>143</sup> Pelling, 2002. p. 95.

<sup>144</sup> Bosworth, in Stadter, 1992. pp. 67; 79.

<sup>145</sup> Recent scholarly thought has argued convincingly that the *Lives* should not be read as separate Greek and Roman biography to be later read in comparison, but instead as a single literary work (Buszard, *TAPA*. 138. (2008). p. 185; Duff, *CQ*. 30. (2011). pp. 215-216.)

<sup>146</sup> Pelling, 1980. pp. 127-140; Bosworth, in Stadter, 1992. p. 70; though it is, of course, overly simplistic and unfair to state that Plutarch strictly adheres to this method, as his work does include inconsistencies within comparative biographies (see: Buszard, *TAPA*. 138. (2008). pp. 187-188). cf. Eskine, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 591-596; See also: Swain, *AJPh*. 110. (1989). pp. 276-279.

<sup>147</sup> Swain, *AJPh*. 110. (1989). p. 282.

Awareness of issues of biographical manipulation and Plutarch's willingness to distort his historical narrative in order to fit his style does not mean that the *Parallel Lives* are not a useful source for this study. General consensus among modern scholarship is that Plutarch was widely read in the source material used for the composition of his biographies.<sup>148</sup> It can therefore be argued that the strong foundation that he had with previous scholarly sources lends legitimacy to certain accounts contained within his biographies.<sup>149</sup>

Despite the difference of genre, and the problems that arise from this, Plutarch's *Parallel Lives* offers a series of vital literary sources for any study of the Diadochi and the Early Hellenistic World.

### **2.1.7: Arrian.**

The next major source for study of Macedonian Affairs is found in accounts from the Greek writer Lucius Flavius Arrianus of Nikomedia.<sup>150</sup> Arrian's historical works form a central resource for any study of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>151</sup> Thus it is vital for this study to gain an understanding of his accounts. While a prolific writer, crossing many genres,<sup>152</sup> the works of most value to this study are two of his historical works, the *Anabasis of Alexander*, and the *Successors of Alexander*.

---

<sup>148</sup> Müller, 1973. pp. 55-57; Wardman, 1974. p. 153; Bosworth, in Stadter, 1992. pp. 56 – 57; Baynham, 1998. p. 72; Pelling, 2002. p. 1; Paschidis, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 126; Wheatley, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 24; Engels, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 10; Mileta, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 427, 434; Roisman, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 472; O'Sullivan, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 44-45; As can be seen with Plutarch's use of Duris as an authority (compare Athen. 4.155c = *FGrH*. 76. F. 12 and Plut. *Pyrr.* 8.3; cf. Anson, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 103; Pownall, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 44, 55. n. 7.).

<sup>149</sup> Tritle, 1998. p. 22

<sup>150</sup> For more extensive evaluations of Arrian's life and works, see: Bosworth, Vol. I 1980; Bosworth, *FAA*. 1988; Bosworth, Vol. II. 1995.

<sup>151</sup> Bosworth, *FAA*. 1988. p. 16.

<sup>152</sup> Bosworth, *FAA*. 1988. p. 25.



Arrian's date of birth cannot be stated with confidence, but it is most likely to have occurred between AD 85–90.<sup>153</sup> Likewise many details of Arrian's life remain a mystery, including the date of his death. However, it is clear that Arrian held a prestigious position within the Roman political sphere, receiving a Consulship in either 129 or 130 AD.<sup>154</sup>

Providing a historically accurate literary work was a central concern for Arrian during his composition. Within the preface of the *Anabasis*, Arrian explains the way in which he approaches his source material,<sup>155</sup> evaluating each of them for their trustworthiness and historical merit.<sup>156</sup> Arrian's ability as an historian was such that, as Bosworth writes, amongst later ancient scholarship, “....he [Arrian] became a model of historiography”,<sup>157</sup> as well as being considered one of the best sources for Alexander the Great by modern scholars.<sup>158</sup>

Possibly the most well known of Arrian's literary works is his *Anabasis of Alexander*.<sup>159</sup> The historian devotes the work to the reign of Alexander the Great, commencing shortly after the death of his father, Philip II, in 336 with his coronation as King of Macedon,<sup>160</sup> and concluding with the events directly following Alexander's own death at Babylon in 323.<sup>161</sup> As with the majority of

---

<sup>153</sup> Bosworth, Vol. I. 1980. p. 1.

<sup>154</sup> Bosworth, *HSPh.* 81. (1977). p. 217; Bosworth, Vol. I. 1980. p. 23; Syme, *HSPh.* 86. (1982). p. 188; Bosworth, *FAA.* 1988. p. 16.

<sup>155</sup> Arrian drew upon a diverse group of sources to construct his histories, particularly the work of Aristobulus and the lost history of Ptolemy I Soter. See for identification of Arrian's authorities: Meyer, *Hermes.* 33. (1898). p. 651; Steele, *CPh.* 14. (1919). p. 147, 148, 152-153; Steele, *CPh.* 15. (1920). p. 282; Bosworth, *HSPh.* 81. (1977). p. 248; Baynham, in Romm & Strassler, 2010. p. 329-331; Engels, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 23. n. 45; Landucci Gattinoni, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 40; Kennedy, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 280.

<sup>156</sup> Arr. i.1-3; Steele, *CPh.* 14. (1919). p. 147; cf. Bosworth, *HSPh.* 81. (1977). p. 248; Syme, *HSPh.* 86. (1982). p. 206; see also: Baynham, in Romm & Strassler, 2010. pp. 325-332.

<sup>157</sup> Bosworth, *FAA.* 1988. pp. 38-60.

<sup>158</sup> Meyer, *Hermes.* 33. (1898). p. 651; Bosworth, *HSPh.* 81. (1977). p. 217; Milns, *Historia.* 27. (1978). p. 374; Baynham, 1998. p. 13; Baynham, in Romm & Strassler, 2010. p. 325.

<sup>159</sup> cf. Bosworth, *FAA.* 1988. p. 27.

<sup>160</sup> Arr. 1.1.1.

<sup>161</sup> Arr. 7.28.1.

Alexander's reign, much of the *Anabasis* is devoted to the campaigning and expansion of the Macedonian Empire. The *Anabasis* contains an almost completely intact account of the entirety of Alexander's rule.<sup>162</sup> However, in relation to this study, the work provides a detailed context for the current analysis, employing precise terminology<sup>163</sup> that lays the foundation for the events after Antipater's death in 319, including the tensions between the Argeads and Antipatrids and especially, the hostility between Olympias and Antipater.

Contained within the *Anabasis* are accounts and details not present in other ancient literary sources. Given Arrian's determined commitment to provide an accurate historical account, the *Anabasis* offers a detailed insight into events of Alexander's reign as monarch. Arrian's other work that is of concern to this study is his history, the *Successors of Alexander*. This work continued the narrative of the *Anabasis*. It spanned ten books and covered events after the death of the monarch, until the partition of the Macedonian Empire during the meeting of the Macedonian Generals at Triparadeisus in 319.<sup>164</sup> Unfortunately, Arrian's *Successors*, in its original form, has been lost.<sup>165</sup> However, some fragments of the work have survived as well as a summary of the history as a whole, written by the Byzantine scholar, Photius, in the mid ninth century AD.<sup>166</sup> Photius' summary offers a highly condensed version of Arrian's original work that, while brief and hence prone to omissions from the original work,<sup>167</sup> gives an insight into the material that was covered in the *Successors*.<sup>168</sup>

It is likely that Arrian would have continued with his ambition to provide a cogent historical narrative for his audience from the *Anabasis* to the *Successors*

---

<sup>162</sup> Bosworth, *FAA*. 1988. p. 13.

<sup>163</sup> Milns, *Historia*. 27. (1978). p. 374.

<sup>164</sup> Bosworth, *FAA*. 1988. p. 29; Bosworth, Vol. II. 1995. p. 2; Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 85; Wheatley, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 22.

<sup>165</sup> Meyer, *Hermes*. 33. (1898). p. 649; Bosworth, *FAA*. 1988. p. 28; Dreyer, in Heckel, Tritle, Wheatley, 2007. p. 245.

<sup>166</sup> Treadgold, 1980. p. 34.

<sup>167</sup> cf. Roisman, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 471; Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 30.

<sup>168</sup> Dreyer, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. p. 246.

and had the scholarly ability to do so. If this hypothesis is correct it means that Photius' summary could have been based upon a previous work of historical merit. This is not to say that Photius' summary should be considered by modern scholarship as being of the same importance as an original work of Arrian. His epitome must be treated with caution when scrutinised for its historical merit as a source of study of post-323 Macedon. Owing to the highly condensed nature of the epitome itself, combined with the vast temporal gap between Arrian's original composition and Photius' epitome, this work is of limited use to historiography and should not be treated as an original Arrianic source.

While Arrian's output are pivotal for all studies of ancient Macedonia and the initial phases of the early Hellenistic World, his accounts are limited for the scope of this study. Arrian's accounts offer insight into events occurring towards the end of Alexander the Great's Life in the *Anabasis*, and early 319 for the *Successors*. Despite not dealing directly with Cassander, Polyperchon and the fate of the Argead House, Arrian briefly refers to both men and his accounts offer invaluable insight into pivotal events that would go on to influence the rivalry of Cassander, Polyperchon and the end of the Argeads.

### **2.1.8: Justin.**

The final source under evaluation for this study is the epitome of Pompeius Trogus' *Philippic History*, but the Latin historian Marcus Junianus Justinus.<sup>169</sup> Justin's account is infamous for its problematic nature. Modern scholars have treated his work with criticism,<sup>170</sup> and even dismissal;<sup>171</sup> however perception of the epitome has undergone a drastic change and has recently, despite its flaws,

---

<sup>169</sup> For in depth investigations of Justin, see: Alonso-Núñez, *G&R*. 34. (1987). pp. 56-72; Syme, *Historia*. 37. (1988). pp. 358-371; Yardley & Develin, 1994; Yardley & Heckel, 1997; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011.

<sup>170</sup> Steele, *AJPh*. 38. (1917). pp. 28-35; Meiggs, 1972. p. 475. Hammond, 1983, p. 86; Bosworth, *FAA*, 1988. p. 12; Syme, *Historia*. 37. (1988). p. 358; Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 36; Bellesteros Pastor, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 186; Howe, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 65-66; Hauben, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 236; cf. Wheatley, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 501-502.

<sup>171</sup> Tarn, Vol. II. 1948. p. 122.

become more appreciated for its content by modern scholars.<sup>172</sup> When approached with due caution, Justin's Epitome offers important insight into the Post-323 Macedonian Empire and the Early Hellenistic World.

Little is known of Justin or his dates,<sup>173</sup> including the date of composition for his epitome.<sup>174</sup> The epitome of Trogus is all the writer leaves from which modern scholars can draw upon to understand his life.<sup>175</sup> Because of this lack of information regarding the author, his dates have become a contentious focal point of academic debate. This study, however, accepts the proposal put forward by Develin of a composition date some time in the late second-century AD.<sup>176</sup> Justin's Epitome is a condensed account of the work written by the Augustan historian Pompeius Trogus, the *Philippic History*.<sup>177</sup> Trogus' history however, is entirely lost and its only preservation is found in the forty-four books of Justin's Epitome.<sup>178</sup>

Within the praefatio of the epitome, Justin states his admiration for Trogus' history, and follows the basic framework of the Augustan Historian.<sup>179</sup> Like Trogus, the epitome records a continuous narrative of events from Assyria, up to events within the final years of the Roman Republic.<sup>180</sup> Of particular value to this study are Books 13–17. These books are devoted specifically to Alexander's successors and therefore must be taken into consideration. Justin's Epitome is significant because it offers modern scholars the only surviving continuous narrative of events in the Hellenistic World,<sup>181</sup> as well as, at times, the most

---

<sup>172</sup> Yardley & Develin, 1994. pp. 1-2.

<sup>173</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 1.

<sup>174</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 8.

<sup>175</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 8.

<sup>176</sup> Yardley & Develin, 1994. p. 4.

<sup>177</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. pp. 1-8; see also: Steele, *AJPh*. 38. (1917). pp. 19-41; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. pp. 1-22.

<sup>178</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 2.

<sup>179</sup> Just. 1.4; For more on Trogus's dates, see: Urban, *Historia*. 31. (1982). pp. 82-96; Alonso-Núñez, *G&R*. 34. (1987). pp. 56-72; Hammond, *CQ*. 41. (1991). pp. 506-507; Yardley, *CQ*. 50. (2000). pp. 632-633; Rubicam, *Historia*. 54. (2005). pp. 266-26.

<sup>180</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 22

<sup>181</sup> Yardley & Develin, 1994. p. 1.

extensive surviving account of events during the zenith of Macedonian power.<sup>182</sup> However, Justin and his *Epitome* are notoriously problematic. Even though it is expected that an epitome of a more extensive work will abbreviate or neglect certain events that the epitomiser does not feel important to his narrative,<sup>183</sup> Justin goes beyond a simple compression of Trogus' History. In the praefatio, Justin signals that he has deliberately omitted material that he believes his audience may not find enjoyable.<sup>184</sup> This is important to take into consideration because the sequences within the work are called into question by the epitomiser's stated aim, that being to entertain his readers.

Justin's epitome also contains many exaggerated<sup>185</sup> and fabricated events; this is exemplified by his account of Alexander's single-handed assault on a city held by the Mandri and Sudrace while campaigning in India.<sup>186</sup> While it could be argued that the account of this event was designed more for entertainment and glorification of the King than for historical accuracy, its inclusion detracts from the historical validity of the work. Another issue with the *Epitome* is the author's regular confusion of names within the text. This is typified by an example that has a direct relation to this study; Justin regularly confuses the names of Craterus and Polyperchon.<sup>187</sup> These confusions can be refuted by other, more reliable, ancient scholarship,<sup>188</sup> and must be taken into account when reading Justin.

Despite the criticisms levelled against Justin and both his methodology and the obvious mistakes within his narrative, this does not detract from the significance of the epitome to this study. By drawing on the extensive academic

---

<sup>182</sup> See: Wheatley, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 512-514; Howe, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 134-135.

<sup>183</sup> Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 1.

<sup>184</sup> Just. 1.4.

<sup>185</sup> cf. Baynham, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 114.

<sup>186</sup> Just. 12.9.5-13.

<sup>187</sup> Just. 12.10.1. (see: Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 260.); 13.8.5,7. (see: Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 158.); 15.1.1. (see: Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 218.); Though, as Lane Fox notes, Justin routinely omits or alters names within his work (Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 168-170).

<sup>188</sup> For example Just. 12.10.1. cf. Arr. 6.15.5.

commentaries and critiques of Justin by Yardley, Develin, Heckel and Wheatley,<sup>189</sup> it is possible to engage with the epitome of Trogus in an effective manner. With an understanding of the problematic nature of Justin's source, this study closely adheres to the output of Yardley, Develin and Wheatley, and by doing so, Justin can be used as a valuable historical source for the Early Hellenistic World.

## **2.2: Chronology.**

This section of the methodology chapter is devoted to the chronology to which this study adheres. There are few areas of Early Hellenistic scholarship that are as divisive in modern academia as the subject of chronologies between 323–301 B.C. resulting from the compressed and distorted narratives contained within the accounts of the ancient sources. Because of this, discussion of the timeline used by this study is required. It must be stated however, that the area of focus of this study is not upon the chronologies of the Diadochoi, nor does it attempt to add to the debate in this area. Of greater significance for this study than the assessment and comparison of the respective schools of chronological thought is a coherent narrative and sequence of events between the years of 319–301 during the rivalry between Cassander and Polyperchon. At this time, it is not possible to present a timeline that is universally acceptable and agreed upon by all of modern scholarship, but as no crucial evidence from the overall conclusions of this study rest uniquely upon chronological uncertainty, it is possible to adopt a previously proposed chronological methodology. Of more importance to this study is a coherent sequence of events within the European sphere of the post-323 Macedonian Empire.

Over the past ninety years, various chronological theories have been proposed and built upon by modern scholars.<sup>190</sup> From these various theories, three main

---

<sup>189</sup> Yardley & Develin, 1994; Yardley & Heckel, 1997; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011.

<sup>190</sup> The sequence of chronological schools of thought amongst modern scholars is an extensive and much discussed topic. While currently there exist three main bodies of thought, that is not to say that there are only three options for scholars

schools of thought have emerged regarding chronologies for the period after the death of Alexander III and the year of 301, those being: the High, Low and Mixed chronological methods. While each of these schools has their own respective merits and strengths, this study follows the High chronology as argued by Bosworth and Wheatley,<sup>191</sup> for the entirety of the period covered by it. The only variation to the High chronology used is an addition to the years of 318–317. This addition, originally proposed by Paschidis,<sup>192</sup> is concerned with the movements of Polyperchon and a military expedition into Asia Minor during the campaigning seasons of the years stated above. The following is divided into two sub-sections, these being first a brief justification of the chronology used by this study and then a table of the chronology itself.

---

to choose from or accept. Many scholarly works (including this one) base themselves upon one of the schools with variations from the set timeline. What follows is a brief overview of the discussion of chronologies for the Early Hellenistic World that has occurred over the last century. It would be impractical to list every work completed by every scholar on this topic. The proceeding hopes to demonstrate the general sequence of thought and the ebb and flow of scholarly thought upon this topic. The original High Chronology was established by Beloch (Beloch, Vol. III<sup>2</sup> 1904. pp. 187–201 and IV<sup>2</sup> 1927. pp. 235–249). Beloch's chronology was later counter-proposed by Manni, whom presented his own Low Chronology (Manni, *RAL*. 4. (1949). pp. 53–83.). Manni's chronology became the generally accepted sequence among modern scholars for the next four decades (See for example: Hauben, *AJP*. 94. (1973). pp. 256–267; Hauben, *AncSoc*. 8. (1977). pp. 85–120; Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). pp. 478–504; Williams, *Hermes*. 112. (1984). pp. 300 – 305; Anson, *Phoenix*. 60. (2006). pp. 226–235; Anson, in Heckel, Tritle, Wheatley, 2007. The 1990s saw a re-emergence of the High Chronology, headed by Bosworth (Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). pp. 55 – 81; Bosworth, 2002.) and Wheatley (Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998), pp. 257–281); Wheatley (*ZPE*. 166. (2003), pp. 268–276.) who convincingly argued the value of the High Chronology. In recent years, the Mixed Chronology been put forward, spearheaded by possibly the most substantial work on the chronologies of the Early Hellenistic World, composed by Boiy (Boiy, 2007). For an introduction to the problems surrounding chronologies of this period, see: Wheatley, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 179–192. For an in-depth evaluation of each of the chronological schools, see: Boiy, 2007.

<sup>191</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992); Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). A combinations of these timelines can be found in Bosworth, 2003. pp. 246 – 284.

<sup>192</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). pp. 233 – 250.

While the justification for the High chronology and its integrity have already been convincingly argued elsewhere,<sup>193</sup> the insertion proposed by Paschidis deserves more attention. Contained within a Nesian decree that honours one of its prominent citizens, Thersippos,<sup>194</sup> is a passage relating to an expedition made by Polyperchon into Asia Minor.<sup>195</sup> Precise details of this expedition are not recorded in any of the ancient literary sources.<sup>196</sup> Unfortunately, the passage in question is fragmented and required reconstruction.<sup>197</sup> Paschidis convincingly argues for an alternative reconstruction to the one offered within the corpus:

καὶ Πολπέρχοντος εἰς τὰν Ἀσί[αν]  
[διάβα(?)]ντος διώικησε φίλον αὐτον τᾷ πό-  
[λι ὑπά]ρχην.

“...and when Polyperchon  
crossed(?) to Asia, he [*scil.* Thersippos]  
arranged for him to become a friend of the  
city.”<sup>198</sup>

If this construction is correct, it would suggest that the nature of Polyperchon’s expedition into Asia Minor was a military intervention, possibly to aid his strongest ally in the region, Eumenes, designed to threaten their joint-enemy, Antigonos and his base of operations in Anatolia. However, to view the manoeuvre as solely designed to harm Antigonos is over simplistic. Polyperchon’s venture into Asia Minor was much more complex and multifaceted. Had it secured the removal of Antigonos as an influential member of the Diadochoi it would also have dealt a significant blow to Cassander’s efforts in Europe. In addition, it would have helped the regent to secure the services of the

---

<sup>193</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron* 22. (1992); Wheatley, *Phoenix* 52. (1998); Wheatley’s output concerning the dating for Polyperchon’s final invasion of Macedon and the death of Herakles (*Antichthon* 32. (1998)), is used. Though, as Wheatley identifies, supplying precise dating for these events is difficult to assert (*Antichthon* 32. (1998). p. 12.).

<sup>194</sup> *IG*. XII 2, 645.

<sup>195</sup> *IG*. XII 2, 645. 23–25.

<sup>196</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria* 9. (2008). p. 234.

<sup>197</sup> For discussion surrounding the reconstruction of *IG*. XII. 2, 645. 23–25, See Paschidis, *Tekmeria* 9. (2008). pp. 233–234.

<sup>198</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria* 9. (2008). p. 234. cf. *IG*. XII 2, 645. 23–25.



mother of Alexander III, Olympias, whose close ties to Eumenes of Cardia are well attested.<sup>199</sup>

Paschidis' support of the Mixed chronology does not interfere with the overall chronology of this study. The discrepancies between the High chronology and that followed by Paschidis do not present a problem for the proposed insertion used by this study. As there is not satisfactory alternative chronological sequence apart from the High chronology for events within Europe after the death of Antipater in 319 and the death of Philip III in 317, the insertion can be made without issue.<sup>200</sup>

Though no date is provided by the text, a clue as to when Polyperchon conducted the expedition does exist. A reference is made to the kings, in the plural.<sup>201</sup> This suggests that at the time of the expedition, both the kings were still living and that Polyperchon's venture into Asia Minor took place prior to his embassy to Epirus in the autumn of 317.<sup>202</sup> Since both kings are being referred to within the text, a *terminus ante quem* exists for Polyperchon's return from the expedition as taking place no later than the autumn of 317. It is, of course, impossible for Polyperchon to have occupied both positions simultaneously and this would therefore, suggest that the most plausible period of time in which the invasion of Asia Minor must be situated was prior to the closing stages of 317.

It is unlikely in the extreme that the expedition into Asia Minor occurred during the year of 318. The reasoning behind this claim is that Polyperchon had sustained sizable military defeats, both at Megalopolis,<sup>203</sup> as well as during the series of engagements off Byzantium.<sup>204</sup> These defeats would have necessitated time for Polyperchon to regroup and replenish his military strength before embarking for Asia Minor. Following the conclusion of the siege action at

---

<sup>199</sup> For more discussion, see Ch. 6.2. p. 168.

<sup>200</sup> Paschidis, 2008. p. 235.

<sup>201</sup> *IG*. XII 2, 645. 27.

<sup>202</sup> Diod. 19.11.2.

<sup>203</sup> Diod. 18.70-72.

<sup>204</sup> Diod. 18.72.3. cf. Ch. 6.3.

Megalopolis, there is reference to Polyperchon turning his attentions to other, more pressing business, which Paschidis suggests concerned preparations of the embarkation of Polyperchon's troops across the Aegean.<sup>205</sup>

The implications of Polyperchon's military expedition into Asia Minor in 318/7 are of great significance to this study. Not only does this expedition place Polyperchon outside of Europe during a volatile time in his conflict with Cassander, but it also suggests that he would have taken with him a substantial segment of his military resources on the mission, thereby weakening his position within Macedon and the Greek Peninsula.<sup>206</sup> It is unlikely that Polyperchon left Cassander in peace during his absence. It is also unlikely that he would have lacked the military strength needed to hold his own positions. However Polyperchon's absence from Europe during this time would have weakened his position in that it allowed Cassander time to organise his next manoeuvres in gaining power and influence within the Greek Peninsula as well as opening an opportunity for Cassander's first venture into Macedon during the summer of 317.

Presented in the table below are key events on the Greek Peninsula during the timeframe of this paper. However, events occurring outside of Europe are also taken into account during this study, as they play key roles in the evolution of events during the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon.

---

<sup>205</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 240; cf. Diod. 18.72.1.

<sup>206</sup> This area is discussed in further detail in Ch. 7.1.

<b>Date:</b>	<b>Cassander:</b>	<b>Polyperchon:</b>	<b>Other Events:</b>
<b>Late Summer/Autumn 319.</b>	Appointed <i>chiliarch</i> under Polyperchon	Appointed <i>strategos</i> of Macedon	Death of Antipater
<b>Autumn 319.</b>	Leaves Macedon for Antigonos' Court.	Philip III issues decree to the Greeks	Nicanor arrives in Athens.
<b>Spring 318.</b>	Arrives in the Peiraeus.	Alexander invades Attica.	Death of Phocion (May).
<b>Summer 318.</b>		Campaigns in the Peloponnese.	Siege of Megalopolis. Naval battles off Byzantium. Polyperchon's fleet destroyed.
<b>Winter 318/7.</b>	Capitulation of Athens. Demetrius of Phalerum installed as Govenor.		
<b>Spring 317.</b>		Campaigns in Asia Minor.	Nicanor executed.
<b>Summer 317.</b>	First venture into Macedon.	Returns to Macedon to check Cassandrian advances north.	

<b>Autumn 317.</b>		Journeys to Epirus to escort Olympias back to Macedon.	<p>Eurydice declares Cassander regent of Macedon.</p> <p>Olympias returns to Macedon.</p> <p>Philip III and Adea-Eurydice executed.</p>
<b>Spring 316.</b>	Takes control of Macedon.	Flees to southern Greece and the Peloponnese.	<p>Capitulation of Olympias to Cassander.</p> <p>Execution of Olympias.</p>
<b>Summer 316.</b>	<p>Marriage to Thessaloniki</p> <p>Burial of Philip III and Adea-Eurydice at Vergina</p> <p>?Embarkation of building programme.</p>		

<b>Spring/Summer 315.</b>	Campaigns in the Peloponnese.	Forges alliance with Antigonus	Aristodemus arrives in the Peloponnese
<b>Summer 314.</b>	Campaigns in Acarnania, the Adriatic Coast and Illyria.	Alexander defects to Cassander's – Killed shortly afterwards.	Asander visits Athens.
<b>Winter 314.</b>	Sends expeditionary force to Caria.		
<b>Summer 313.</b>	Intervenes in Epirus.  Besieges Oreüs.  Campaigns in Euboea and Boeotia.		Antigonus moves against Lysimachus and Cassander.  Polemaeus arrives in Greece.
<b>Summer 313.</b>	Returns to Macedon before winter to forestall threat from Antigonus.		
<b>Autumn/Winter 312.</b>			Polemaeus campaigns in Euboea, Attica, Boeotia, Phocis and Locris.

<b>Summer 312.</b>	Sends expeditionary force to Epirus.		Polemaeus checks Telesphorus' dissent.
<b>Autumn 312.</b>	Unsuccessful siege of Apollonia.  Returns to Macedon for the Winter.		Battle of Gaza.
<b>Autumn 311.</b>			?Peace talks begin among Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Antigonus.
<b>Winter 311/310.</b>			Peace of the Dynasts enacted.  Death of Alexander IV and Rhoxane.
<b>310.</b>			?Arrival of Herakles into southern Greece.

309/8.		?Appointed commander of the Peloponnese under Cassander.	?Death of Herakles.
--------	--	---	------------------------

### 2.3 Gaps in Knowledge and its Treatment

All areas of historical investigation must contend with problematic, often frustrating, gaps in the surviving evidence from the source material and the early Hellenistic World of the late fourth century is a notorious example.<sup>207</sup> Evidence for this period is often fragmentary at best, and completely absent at worst, with only the works of Diodorus and Justin surviving in any complete state with which to inform our understanding of the Diadochoi.<sup>208</sup> Because of the nature of the surviving textual, and to a lesser extent for this study archaeological, evidence, there are ultimately events that are impossible to state with complete certainty simply because of the lack of surviving information.

Vast gaps are endemic within our surviving source tradition, especially for events in the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire, as many of the contemporary historical works of the era are lost or transmitted via intermediaries. This therefore results in a limitation on our understanding of the events that took place during the closing years of fourth century. This means that there are will always be gaps in certain knowledge of the period that will remain so until the possible, although unlikely, discovery of more evidence. This does not mean that no comment can be made about the spaces within which certain understanding is limited. It is, however, both prudent and necessary to outline the ways in which analysis and discussion of events is approached.

---

<sup>207</sup> See for discussion of prosopographical issues specifically focused on the topic of the Diadochoi: Wheatley, *Liminia* 3. (1997). pp. 61-70; Wheatley, in Heckel & Tritle, 2009. pp. 127-161, especially 129-131; Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 84-98.

<sup>208</sup> See above Ch. 2.1.4; Ch. 2.1.8 for discussion of there two accounts.

Both Wheatley and Meeus have quite correctly urged the implementation of strict methodological adherence to what our source material can, and cannot reveal.<sup>209</sup> They warn against the employment of arguments on these gaps and silence primarily based upon supposition at any level and argue that hypothetical reconstruction does little to advance overall comprehension and academic thought, especially when one hypothetical construction is made, and then built upon by other, inherently less-stable, hypotheticals. In particular, Meeus has noted that without explicit references to events taking place within the ancient sources, our ability to establish historical truth is removed.<sup>210</sup>

Within this study, there are several points in which there are significant gaps in our understanding of the motivations, locations and events within the lives of Cassander, Polyperchon and with those with whom they interact, which require some comment. However, these gaps in the source account should not be mistaken for a gap in events taking place in Europe. During the conflict between Cassander Polyperchon, there are period where no explicit information is available. These breaks in our source material do not equate to a stoppage in the conflict and pivotal events must have occurred during these breaks in available information. These gaps emerge when there is an existence between two nodal historical points of certainty where the situation has altered for a myriad of reasons. While it would be desirable to have all the known ancient sources that have been lost available, reality dictates that, in order to engage with these men and the world they inhabited, they must be viewed with only a portion of the known ancient literature at hand. It is not the purpose of this study to determine what may, or may not have existed within the lost literary accounts, nor is a goal to insert informed assumptions as concrete evidence or facts.

In these instances where it is necessary to comment upon these gaps in the surviving historiographical material, this study clearly highlights these areas in

---

<sup>209</sup> Wheatley, *Liminia* 3. (1997). p. 61, 67; Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 84, 94-95. Also see McNeal, *Historia* 19. (1970). p. 306. For a select overview of the employment of arguments from silence for the period of the Diadochoi, see: Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 84-98.

<sup>210</sup> Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 88-89.



order to avoid confusion between events that can be understood with support from ancient evidence and those that can only be tentatively assumed. These assumptions are primarily focussed upon identifying possibilities in circumstance and conveying the options that may have existed for the people they effect. In addition to these identifications, these assumptions are not built upon to inform later events. As Meeus highlights, each instance must be evaluated on its own merits before proceeding,<sup>211</sup> and it is possible to make some assumptions about the occurrence of historical events that may, despite the impossibility of knowing for certain, be in fact true.<sup>212</sup> The mistake however, is not to confuse factual certainty with assumption and informed guesswork.

Ultimately, as Meeus highlights, a general employment of silence is not a desirable, nor a valid approach to understanding antiquity.<sup>213</sup> However, as long as there exist historical nodal points, interspersed with these gaps in the lives and endeavours of both Cassander and Polyperchon, it is possible, with great caution and conservative reconstructions, to suggest possible placements and actions of the pair during this time, as long as these points are understood as suggestions and not mistaken for concrete historical certainty and built upon as such for later purposes. It is this approach taken by the current study and every attempt has been made to ensure clear distinction between factual account and tentative hypotheses.

An example of the way in which this investigation engages with silence and the problematic issues that result from it can be found with the interaction between Antipater and Alexander following Antipater's replacement with as regent of Macedon by Craterus in 324.<sup>214</sup>

---

<sup>211</sup> Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 84.

<sup>212</sup> Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 94-95.

<sup>213</sup> Meeus, in Alonso Troncoso, 2013. p. 94.

<sup>214</sup> See Ch. 5.2. But also Pitt & Richardson, *CQ*. 67 (forthcoming 2017) for an employment of the same approach.

### **Chapter 3: The Relationship between Antipater and Alexander.**

Before engaging directly with the war between Cassander and Polyperchon following Antipater's death in 319, it is necessary to understand the career of Antipater. Therefore this chapter explores the career of Antipater, from his role in the expansion of the Macedonian Empire into Greece by Philip II until 324, and Alexander's replacement of Antipater as regent of Macedon, with another eminent officer from the army, Craterus. By doing so, this chapter provides the groundwork and context for the way in which Cassander experienced the royal family prior to his rise to prominence in 324, and his mission to Babylon. Of central concern is the dynamic of the relationship between Antipater and Alexander III over the course of Alexander's life. The evolving dynamic between the two is significant to the greater scope of this inquiry because of the ways in which this would affect Cassander's attitude towards, and engagement with, the Argeads following 319 and the war with Polyperchon. It is also relevant to what is known about Polyperchon's career due to his connections with Craterus.

During Philip II's expansion of Macedonian power into Greece, Antipater had played a central role as both a military leader and a political negotiator for Philip's cause in order to secure greater influence over the Greek Cities. These activities provided Antipater with invaluable practical experience of engaging in the Greek political sphere. It also demonstrated that Philip II, and later Alexander III, believed that Antipater had the skills and knowledge needed to act on their behalf during the periods of time when they were away from court. This is also evident much later when Antipater would act as regent in Alexander's absence during his expansion into the East in 334. However, despite the trust evidently placed in Antipater, tensions did arise between the regent and king. As Alexander ventured further east the relationship between the pair became increasingly strained for a number of reasons, including the extension of supply lines between Macedon and Alexander's ever-advancing army and the depletion

of manpower within the Macedonian homeland as well as unrest within Macedonian controlled Greece.<sup>215</sup>

Little is known of Antipater's early years, and this gap may account for the lack of modern scholarship dedicated to his life.<sup>216</sup> His date of birth has been suggested to be around 399/8,<sup>217</sup> making him one of the oldest members of the Diadochoi when Alexander died in 323. Despite the lack of extant accounts of Antipater's early life, the few references that exist within the ancient literary corpus do permit some reasonable inference about his rise within the Macedonian Court.<sup>218</sup> The consensus among modern scholars draws upon the accounts contained within the *Suda*, most notably that Antipater wrote a historical work on Perdiccas III's Illyrian campaigns, "*τὰς Περδίκκου πράξεις Ἰλλυρικός*."<sup>219</sup> The ability to write this history would at least suggest that Antipater held an influential position under Philip II's predecessors, Perdiccas III and Amyntas IV.<sup>220</sup> If so, such a position would have provided him with political and military experience prior to Philip's succession.

Antipater's emergence into the ancient sources takes place during the expansion of Macedonian influence under Philip II and the Third Sacred War between 356 - 346.<sup>221</sup> It is evident that by this time Antipater was a trusted leader and an integral part of Philip's plans and that a very strong relationship existed between the two. Antipater played a leading role in the peace negotiations with Athens in 346 on behalf of the king during Philip's expansion of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>222</sup> These negotiations and the subsequent peace treaty brought the

---

<sup>215</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 40.

<sup>216</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). pp. 14–64; Heckel, 1992. p. 38, who does highlight that despite the dearth of information regarding the families of the Diadochoi, the Antipatrids are second only to the royal Argead family in terms of available information; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 332.

<sup>217</sup> *Suda*, 2704; Berve, Vol II. 1926. p. 46; Heckel, 1992. p. 38; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 333; Heckel, 2006. p. 35.

<sup>218</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 39; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 333.

<sup>219</sup> *Suda*, 2703. Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 17.

<sup>220</sup> Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 335; Heckel, 2006. p. 35;

<sup>221</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 17.

<sup>222</sup> *Din. Dem.* 28; *Just.* 9.4.5.

hostilities and the Third Sacred War to a close.<sup>223</sup> In addition to these military positions, Antipater would take a more politically focussed role when he assumed the position of regent during times when Philip was away from court.<sup>224</sup> The significance of Antipater's role in these proceedings cannot be overstated. Bringing the politically charged and sensitive talks to a favourable conclusion demonstrates not only that Antipater possessed the ability to represent Macedonian interests, but also that he was trusted by Philip II to conduct political embassies with the Greek cities.<sup>225</sup> This provided Antipater with vital experience that would later be beneficial to his tenure as regent under Alexander III.

Heckel has suggested that it was during his time in Athens, after the negotiation of the peace treaty, that Antipater came into contact with, and in some cases befriended, eminent figures in Athenian politics.<sup>226</sup> This engagement with the politics of southern Greece would give him the experience and ability to interact with influential figures and to understand political sentiment in ways that were vital to implementing and maintaining Macedonian control over the Greek cities during Alexander's absence from Europe during his expansion of the Macedonian Empire into the east.

Among the surviving letters of the philosopher Isocrates is one written to Antipater on the behalf of one of the philosopher's students, Diodotus.<sup>227</sup> If the letter is genuine,<sup>228</sup> it offers valuable insight into Antipater's direct interactions and engagement with Athens, particularly those within the Athenian philosophical community. The date of the letter has been placed around 340 –

---

<sup>223</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 26.4, 30.4; Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 17, 34; Heckel, 1992. p. 40; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 336; Heckel, 2006. p. 35.

<sup>224</sup> Isoc. *Ep.* 4. Garnjobst argues that, because the Isocrates letter was addressed to Antipater rather than Philip, Antipater had already assumed the regency. Garnjobst, 2006. p. 274.

<sup>225</sup> This trust by Philip of Antipater is echoed in Plutarch, Plut. *Mor.* 179B.

<sup>226</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 35.

<sup>227</sup> Isoc. *Ep.* 4.

<sup>228</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 25, 26; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 336; Heckel, 2006. p. 35.

339, during the recommencement of hostilities between Athens and Macedon,<sup>229</sup> demonstrating that even during times of conflict, Antipater maintained contact with eminent members of Athenian society.

While the letter is presented as official and unemotional, Isocrates highlights and emphasises the goodwill that exists between the two men and the fondness he felt towards Antipater.<sup>230</sup> The closeness implied by this, as well as his connection with Aristotle, suggests that Antipater was engaged with the Athenian philosophical community and also that sections of that community were willing to maintain personal correspondence with him even during the conflict between Athens and Macedon. These connections demonstrate that Antipater both forged and maintained strong ties within the Greek Peninsula throughout his life.<sup>231</sup> A number of conclusions can be drawn from this. First, that Antipater was an educated man. Second, that he had the warmth and emotional intelligence to develop and sustain friendships under difficult conditions and third, that he was both willing and able to use these personal skills for the benefit of the ruler of Macedon. Given the later significance Cassander placed on gathering support from Southern Greece, it seems that he had learned from his father's connections with eminent members of Greek society and the importance placed on maintaining these. After Antipater's death in 319, Cassander made good use of his father's influence among the Greek cities within the Greek Peninsula to build his own support base in the conflict with Polyperchon for the regency of Macedon

It is prudent at this time to touch on the connection between Antipater and another eminent Greek philosopher, Aristotle. Aristotle's tutelage of Alexander is well known to modern scholarship.<sup>232</sup> While only briefly referred to in the ancient sources, it can be deduced that a long-standing rapport existed between Aristotle and Antipater, most likely beginning when Antipater undertook

---

<sup>229</sup> Van Hook, 1945. p. 411.

<sup>230</sup> Isoc. *Ep.* 4.12-13; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 336.

<sup>231</sup> cf. Baynham, in Palagia & Tracy. 2003. p. 24.

<sup>232</sup> Ael. *VH.* 3.17; D.L. 5.4; Dio. Chr. 49.4; Just. 12.6.17, 12.16.8; Plut. *Alex.* 7; Plut. *Mor.* 327e; Bosworth, 1988. p. 20-1; Heckel, 2006. p. 51.

tutelage under the philosopher.<sup>233</sup> Their political enemies, such as Olympias, would later use the long-standing relationship between the two after the death of Alexander in 323, to discredit them and accuse them of Alexander's assassination.<sup>234</sup> Accusations would also be brought against Cassander, who was also present at Babylon and was accused, particularly by Alexander's mother, of being the facilitator of the king's death.<sup>235</sup>

The evidence for this relationship comes from the accounts of Arrian, Diodorus and the biographies of Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* and Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Aristotle*. These accounts for the most part refer to events towards the end of Aristotle's life and in Diogenes' case, after his death. However, the context of each of these references implies that Antipater and Aristotle were well acquainted. Given this, and knowing that Cassander was of a similar age to Alexander and that Antipater's position and influence within the court may have allowed Cassander to receive his education there and to act as one of Alexander's *paides*,<sup>236</sup> it is plausible that, along his association with Antipater, the philosopher also tutored Cassander during his tenure in Macedon.<sup>237</sup> This would suggest that Cassander, was roughly the same age as Alexander and that knew the young prince as the two grew up and that he received an education similar to that of the future king.

The relationship between Alexander III and Antipater began amicably. As one of the most powerful elites in Macedon under Philip II, Antipater had a great deal of contact with the young prince. During the year of 340, when Philip was on campaign against Byzantium, Antipater was called away to Thrace and left the

---

<sup>233</sup> *Suda*. 2703; D.L. 4.8-9, 5.11-13, 6.44, 66; Baynham, in Worthington. 1994. p. 335. n. 16; Baynham, in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 24.

<sup>234</sup> Bosworth, 1988. pp. 174-5.

<sup>235</sup> cf. Diod. 19.11.8; Bosworth, 1988. p. 171.

<sup>236</sup> Antipater himself was recorded as a student of Aristotle (cf. *Suda*. 2703; Berve, Vol. 1. pp. 4-5; Adams, 1975. p. 43-44). For recent evaluation of the *Paides Basilikoi* see: Carney, in Howe & Reames, 2008. pp. 145-164, particularly in regards to the composition of the group. pp. 148-149.

<sup>237</sup> This position too is supported by Cassander's time in Babylon in 323, when during a confrontation between the pair; Alexander accuses Cassander of employing Aristotelian rhetoric (Plut. *Alex*. 74; Adams, 1975. pp. 44-45).

regency in Alexander's control.<sup>238</sup> The decision for Antipater to leave Alexander as an unsupervised regent while both he and Philip II were absent from Pella does suggest that significant trust had developed in the young royal's ability to command.

Following the assassination of Philip II in 336, Antipater was an influential supporter of Alexander, playing a key role in his claim to the throne. Antipater would aid the young prince in securing his position as the next king of the Macedonian Empire. Just as with his father, Antipater would also serve as an advisor to the young king and continue to maintain Macedonian interests in the Greek Peninsula. The assassination of Philip II at Aegae in 336 created a volatile political situation for Alexander.<sup>239</sup> He faced a hostile court with various prominent Macedonians in place with enough support to challenge his claim. Alexander was also concerned by a possible revolt from the Greek cities during this period of unrest and uncertainty when lack of clear control could lessen Macedonian dominance of the region.<sup>240</sup> While there were other potential claimants for the throne in the highly pragmatic Macedonian Court, it seems likely that Philip II had been grooming Alexander for succession since his youth.<sup>241</sup> Although Alexander would have been seen as the favoured choice over other possible contenders such as his half brother Arrhidaeus, whose disability saw him discounted as a serious rival,<sup>242</sup> the volatile nature of Macedonian royal succession would mean that Alexander's claim to the throne would not go unchallenged. Alexander needed a strong support base from powerful political and military figures among the Macedonian aristocracy to bolster his claim. During this time of uncertainty, Antipater brought the political ability honed in foreign political affairs to bear within the Macedonian Court to secure the ascension of Philip's son. Soon after Philip's murder, Antipater, the young

---

<sup>238</sup> Plut. *Alex* 9.1; cf. Diod. 16.76.3; Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 27; Heckel, 2006, p. 35.

<sup>239</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 25; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 337.

<sup>240</sup> Diod. 17.3.2.

<sup>241</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 19.

<sup>242</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 28.

Alexander and one Alexander Lyncestes,<sup>243</sup> moved swiftly to remove any opposition within the court by arranging the deaths of the influential Heromenes and Arrhabaeus,<sup>244</sup> Alexander's half-brother Attalus<sup>245</sup> and Amyntas IV, the son of Perdiccas III, the king deposed by Philip II.<sup>246</sup> Their deaths would cement Alexander's claim as successor to Philip II.<sup>247</sup>

Antipater's actions in securing Alexander's succession were not without self-interest. The fact that he was so closely aligned with Philip II and Alexander III meant that he risked dangerous repercussions if a rival to Alexander was able to build a substantial support base and make a successful claim to the throne of Macedon.<sup>248</sup> Therefore, shortly after Philip II's murder, Antipater was key to engineering a strong support base for Alexander III by instructing Alexander Lyncestes to proclaim Alexander III as the new King of Macedon.<sup>249</sup> By engineering this support without being the initiator of Alexander's claim, Antipater demonstrated to the wider court that Alexander's support base among the Macedonian political sphere was greater than may have been initially perceived. This he did in an attempt to mitigate potential claims of others who still had a desire to seize the throne. The move can be seen as Antipater protecting himself against any possibility of Alexander's claim failing. He was not the first person to proclaim Alexander's rule, but there were two results from the support that he offered. By organising others to be open in their support of Alexander before he was, Antipater reduced the level of personal risk that he would have faced should Alexander face serious opposition to his succession. At the same time he was able to demonstrate his support and continue to maintain the close ties with the king that had been established during Philip II's reign.

---

<sup>243</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 40; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 337; Heckel, 2006. p. 19.

<sup>244</sup> Arr. 1.25.1. Bosworth, 1988. p. 26; Heckel, 2006. p. 52.

<sup>245</sup> Diod. 17.2.3-6; Heckel, 2006. p. 62.

<sup>246</sup> Arr. 1.5.4; Just. 12.6.14; Heckel, 2006. p. 23.

<sup>247</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 43.

<sup>248</sup> Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 339.

<sup>249</sup> Just. 11.2.2; Heckel, 1992. p. 40; Heckel, 2002. p. 11, 35; Heckel, 2006. p. 19; Bosworth, 1988. p. 26. Arrian's account (1.25, 1-2) relays that Amyntas's wife Cyanna was widowed and available for marriage by summer of 335.



Under the new king, Antipater was able to continue in the role of advisor and military leader that he had enjoyed under Philip II, making him a visibly dominant figure within the capital. While not attested directly within the ancient sources, but because of his previous experience in the role under Philip II, Antipater would continue to assume the regency on behalf of Alexander during the new king's absence from Pella.<sup>250</sup> As one of Alexander's strongest supporters the close relationship and high levels of trust that had previously existed between the new king and Antipater were still in place.

The eastward expansion of the Macedonian Empire would test the relationship between Alexander and Antipater, who was left in Macedon as regent during Alexander's absence. The strain that was now placed on the relationship between the two can be attributed to the growing demands placed on Antipater by Alexander for fresh supplies of Macedonian troops for the army.<sup>251</sup> At the same time, Antipater also had the unenviable task of maintaining a peaceful home front with the Greeks with fewer military resources. The Greeks had been subjugated by Macedonian rule but this did not mean that they were pacified. There were a number of instances during Alexander's reign when unrest, and even revolt, was threatened in Greece. The person who was expected to deal with this Greek unrest while Alexander was absent from Europe was Antipater and he had to do this despite the diminishing military strength at his disposal as troops were diverted into the east in response to the king's orders. In order to maintain control in the Greek Peninsula, Antipater was required to use both his dwindling military strength and his substantial political skills and cunning.

Antipater was under greatest pressure during the spring of 336 with the commencement of Alexander's great expansion of the Macedonian Empire into the east. In the absence of Alexander from Macedon itself, Antipater was assigned the regency of Macedon, giving him command of both Macedon and

---

<sup>250</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 40; Heckel, 2002. p. 35.

<sup>251</sup> Adams, *Anc. World*. 10 (1984). p. 79; Hammond, *JHS*. 109. (1989). pp. 62-64; cf. Diod. 17.17.3-5; Just. 11.6.2; Plut. *Alex*. 15.1

Greece, making him the most powerful single person in the region.<sup>252</sup> In addition to the regency, Antipater assumed Alexander's title of *hegemon* of the Corinthian League, thereby giving him authority over the garrisons throughout Greece.<sup>253</sup> The task for Antipater was clear. He was to maintain peace within Macedon and the Greek Peninsula and quell any hint of revolt should this occur. In addition Antipater was expected to provide Alexander and his army with fresh troops and supplies during the indeterminate period of time that the campaign would take, allowing Alexander to continue his endeavours.<sup>254</sup>

In order to achieve these objectives, Alexander left Antipater in charge of a force consisting of 12,000 infantry along with 1,500 cavalry, while taking roughly the same number of troops over the Hellespont into Anatolia.<sup>255</sup> Alexander would have been confident of winning the support of Macedonian mercenary phalanxes already stationed within Asia Minor,<sup>256</sup> ultimately expanding the strength of his army with regional additions as his invasion against the Persian Empire progressed, from a size of between 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry up to 40,000 and 5,500 respectively.<sup>257</sup> There was still the very real possibility of a Greek revolt while Alexander III was absent from Macedon and with little chance of reinforcement from the king should a general revolt occur, a force of roughly 13,500 men might seem undersized for the task facing Antipater. In addition to this Macedonian core of troops, Antipater would also have also been able to recruit levies from the various garrisons and militias from the neighbouring Greek cities. If his military strength was left intact, quarantined

---

<sup>252</sup> Diod. 17.17.5. Bosworth, 1988. p. 35; cf. Badian, *Phoenix*. 17. (1963). p. 248.

<sup>253</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 37. For more on the role of the Corinthian League, see: Bosworth, 1998. pp. 187–197.

<sup>254</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 45.

<sup>255</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 45; Bosworth suggests (1988. p. 259) that Alexander's forces consisted of about 15,000 men once he had arrived in Asia Minor. For a concise record of the size of Alexander's army throughout his campaigns, as reported in the ancient sources, see: Heckel, 2008. pp. 158–163.

<sup>256</sup> Diod. 17.7.10. Bosworth, 1988. p. 259.

<sup>257</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 259. Berve Vol. I. 1926. pp. 177–8; Brunt, *JHS*. 83. (1963). pp. 32–6; Bosworth 1980a. pp. 98–9. The disparities within modern scholarship are understandable considering the various numbers of troops Alexander had in 334 in the ancient sources. For a recent catalogue of the reports on the size of Alexander's army throughout his campaign, see: Heckel, 2008. p. 158–163.

from Alexander's constant demands for fresh troops, the task of maintaining a peaceful home front with the available military resources may have been more possible for Antipater. However, this would not be the case and Alexander would make a constant series of requests for resupply by Antipater over the coming years. These requests for reinforcement would put serious strain on the relationship between Antipater and Alexander. As Antipater's military reserves were drawn off into Persia, he was also occupied in simultaneously engaging in mitigating threats to the security of the heartland of the Macedonian Empire.

Antipater must have known that a sizable portion of his relatively small military force, and the body of Macedonian citizens who could be pressed into military service, would be expected to go to replenish the royal army's dwindling numbers in the east, numbers that were constantly being diminished by the rigours of a military campaign. This removed vital resources from his command that he could use against resistance to Macedonian hegemony within Greece. He would therefore need to use the resources available to him effectively and economically. By relying on the existing relationships with the Greek cities that he had developed during Philip II's expansion of Macedonian hegemony and using political policy, rather than military strength, Antipater would be able to effectively manage the region during the absence of both Alexander and the majority of the Macedonian military forces.

An insight into how Antipater was able to manage the Greek Peninsula by political means, rather than by direct military intervention, can be found within the statutes of the Corinthian League. Should one of the signatory city-states choose to violate the general peace in the region and rebel against Macedonian rule, the other members of the league were compelled to provide military strength in order to reinstate a peaceful *status quo*.<sup>258</sup> However in order to encourage a willingness amongst the Greek cities to subjugate dissidence, Antipater would still need to engage politically with the Greek cities and their garrisons. He needed to maintain a strong and close relationship at a personal level to maintain and nurture favourable pro-Macedonian sentiment in order to

---

<sup>258</sup> IG. II<sup>2</sup> 236.

avoid the very real possibility of a general rebellion throughout the Peninsula. In order to keep close contact within the Greek cities and strengthen his own influence with the Peninsula, Antipater began to appoint men who were personally loyal and dedicated to him, rather than to the royal household,<sup>259</sup> to the position of governor of the various Greek city-states. These appointments have been seen as a manoeuvre by Antipater to centralise power around himself and as a possible threat to Alexander III's rule within the region.<sup>260</sup>

While it is certain that the appointment of men personally loyal to him, rather than to the monarchy, did increase Antipater's personal influence within the Greek Peninsula, there is little to suggest that any attempt was made by the regent to break away from the Macedonian Empire or to subvert the rule of Alexander. As regent, the relatively small military force available to him required Antipater to employ strategic political tactics to maintain a quiet home front during the absence of Alexander and the greater component of the Macedonian military machine. With the various Macedonian garrisons within Greece being led by men on whom he was able to depend, Antipater would be able to react swiftly and deal with any possible issues that may arise, without the need to defer to Alexander's authority and the problems resulting from the time delays involved in communication with the king. This suggests that the creation of a personal powerbase centred on him, rather than on Alexander III, was done for pragmatic reasons, rather than as an attempt to subvert Argead rule within Macedon and the Greek Peninsula. There is also no reason to believe that a close relationship with Antipater meant that the newly appointed governors were not also loyal to Alexander. If this were so, then Antipater's actions can be seen as him using his personal network of loyalties to support Alexander's position as ruler. Alexander must have been aware of Antipater's skills as an astute politician and this was one of the reasons that he had been

---

<sup>259</sup> See for example, the record of Rhodian garrison (Diod. 18.8.1-4.) and the garrison of Munychia (Diod. 18.18.4; Plut. Phoc. 27.3.).

<sup>260</sup> Particularly by Olympias, who attempted to use these appointments to undermine Antipater in the eyes of Alexander during his eastern expansion of the Macedonian Empire (cf. Arr. 7.12.4; Diod. 17.117.1; Just. 12.12.9). For more discussion of the rivalry between Olympias and Antipater, see below.

entrusted with the position of regent in Alexander's absence. These actions by Antipater would influence Cassander in his behaviour immediately after his father's death in 319. While there seems to have been relatively little initial support for him in the Macedonian Court itself after Polyperchon's appointment as Antipater's successor,<sup>261</sup> it is clear that Cassander was able to rely on his father's existing base of support within the Greek garrisons to bolster his claim to the Regency of Macedon.

It was not long before Antipater faced unrest within the Greek Peninsula. During Alexander's absence from Macedon, Sparta and its king Agis III had been in negotiations with the Persian Empire for financial aid in order to continue hostilities with the Macedonian forces back in Greece.<sup>262</sup> This was achieved in 333 when the Persians provided Agis with money and warships in order to open up a second front against the Macedonian Empire and potentially stall Alexander's progression eastwards.<sup>263</sup> However, after the news of Alexander's victory at Issus in 332 was known, the Spartan king chose to defer direct action in Greece and instead focus his attentions on bringing Crete under his control, which it seems he was able to do.<sup>264</sup> Control of Crete would serve as a vital link between Sparta and the Persian Empire and would also allow Agis to recruit mercenary troops to bolster his own forces.<sup>265</sup> Agis initiated hostilities against Macedon in the summer of 331 in the Peloponnese by laying siege to the city of Megalopolis.<sup>266</sup> For Antipater, it was vital to remove Agis and Sparta as a threat as soon as possible. If he failed to do so, he risked possible defection from Greek

---

<sup>261</sup> cf. Ch. 6.2. pp. 162-166.

<sup>262</sup> Arr. 2.13.4-6; Curt. 4.1.38-40; Diod. 17.48. 1. Bosworth (*Phoenix* 29 (1975), p. 27) correctly highlights that Agis's war should not be seen as a revolt against Macedonian dominion in the Peloponnese, but as an aggressive action against one of the Macedonian allies. This is because Sparta was not a member of the Corinthian League, nor was it a signatory to the Common Peace after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 (cf. Aesch. 3.254; Bosworth, 1988. p. 198.); Adams, *Anc. World*. 10 (1984). p. 81.

<sup>263</sup> Curt. 4.8.15; Diod. 17.48.1-2; Bosworth, 1988. pp. 199-200.

<sup>264</sup> Arr. 2.13.6; Bosworth, 1988. p. 200.

<sup>265</sup> Arr. 2.12.6; Curt 4.1.38-40; Diod. 17.48.2; Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 55; Potter, *ABSA*. 79. (1984). p. 233.

<sup>266</sup> For the various dating issues of the Agis campaign, see: Bosworth, *Phoenix*, 29. (1975). pp. 35-38.

cities over to Agis, thereby destabilising the region and resulting in further unrest.

However events closer and more immediate to Macedon itself would distract Antipater from sole focus on the war with Agis in the Peloponnese. At much the same time as Agis's declaration of war, trouble in Thrace arose when the Macedonian governor of the region, Memnon,<sup>267</sup> instigated an uprising by the population against Alexander and the Macedonian Empire.<sup>268</sup> For Antipater, the prospect of a full-scale revolt in Macedon's neighbouring province would have been daunting and the ramifications devastating if it was successful. Should Memnon be able to break the Thracians away from Macedonian control, the supply lines to Alexander in Asia would be cut. In addition, Macedon would be isolated with only half the military strength needed to defend itself. This isolation would present Macedon in a weakened position and would also risk the unacceptable prospect of further unrest in the Greek Peninsula. Antipater was swift to react to the revolt. As Diodorus states, Antipater mobilised the entirety of his military strength and marched swiftly against Thrace in order to quell the unrest.<sup>269</sup> Diodorus's account specifically mentions that Antipater took with him the entire military force available to him.<sup>270</sup> This suggests that Antipater was keen to see the rebellion subdued as swiftly as possible. His reaction can also have been seen as a demonstration of Macedonian military strength to the Greeks whose commitment to the peace treaty with Macedon may have been weakened by Alexander's absence.

---

<sup>267</sup> Memnon had been appointed to the Governorship of Thrace by Alexander before embarking into Asia (Berve, Vol II. 1926. p. 254.).

<sup>268</sup> Diod. 17.62. 4. The account of Memnon's revolt is solely recorded by Diodorus (Bosworth, 1988. p. 201), though it is alluded to within Curtius' account (6.1), which seems to mirror Diodorus' summation of events once hostilities with Thrace were concluded (Diod. 17.63.1). Diodorus' account is highly compressed and sparse, but there does exist enough information to allow some postulations to be made with regard to the events that took place.

<sup>269</sup> Diod. 17.62.6. It is likely that Antipater would have also brought with him allies from the neighbouring Greek cities in his march on Thrace.

<sup>270</sup> Diod. 17.62.6: "...παῖσαν ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν προῆλθε." (trans. Geer, 1947).

It was at this time, when Antipater's attentions were focussed on Thrace, that Agis chose his moment to begin hostilities against Macedonian rule. He began by appealing to other Greek cities to form a greater alliance in order to, as Diodorus states that Antipater sought then “...to unite for in defense for their freedom.”<sup>271</sup> It seems that Agis's appeal was received favourably by a number of the Greek cities, especially within the immediate area around Sparta in the Peloponnese.<sup>272</sup> Curtius states that the only cities within the Peloponnese not to join with Agis were Megalopolis in Arcadia and Pellenê in Elis because of their loyalty to the Macedonians (“...fida Macedonibus propter Philippi memoriam, a quo beneficiis affecta fuerat.”)<sup>273</sup> Agis responded to the Megalopians' refusal to join his coalition against the Macedonians by laying siege to the city, thus initiating the war against Macedon.

For Antipater, the news from the south left him in a dire position. To divide his forces between the Thracian campaign and the growing dissidence in the Peloponnese would be to risk failure in either or both fields of conflict with his already depleted military resources.<sup>274</sup> While Diodorus' account does not specifically state as much, it seems likely that Antipater employed a diplomatic approach to end Memnon's revolt in Thrace.<sup>275</sup> There has been much discussion of the conclusion to Memnon's revolt, with next to no evidence to support the respective theories. However Bosworth's postulation seems to be the most plausible. Bosworth hypothesizes that Memnon may have lost control of the

---

<sup>271</sup> Diod. 17.62.6-7: “...συμφρονῆσαι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας.” cf. Curt. 6.1.

<sup>272</sup> Curt. 6.1a.1; Diod. 17.62.7. The Athenians were conspicuously absent from the Agis war. Athens had been contacted by Agis to join in a war against the Macedonians (Diod. 19.63.7) and the appeal to overthrow the yoke of foreign domination would have been received well by the Athenian *demos*, whose sentiment can be seen in Demosthenes' Treaty with Alexander with its call to declare war on Macedon (Dem. 17.). However Athens remained inactive and chose instead to not engage with the conflict, due to discouragement from Demosthenes (Aesch. 3.166) and the actions of Demades, who highlighted the financial implications and consequences of any engagement in the war (Plut. *Mor.* 818e-f; Bosworth, 1988. p. 202.). The concept of Greek freedom was a powerful political tool and would be one that Polyperchon would play upon throughout the war against Cassander. For more discussion, see Ch. 6.2.

<sup>273</sup> Curt. 6.1a.1.

<sup>274</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 201.

<sup>275</sup> Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 53.

revolt he was leading, and sought the aid of Antipater to bring the hostilities to a close.<sup>276</sup> By ending the conflict with Memnon by non-military means, Antipater was not only able to bring about a swifter end to the hostilities than may have been achieved from a potentially long and protracted military campaign, but was also able to preserve his army for the march south against Agis.<sup>277</sup> The diplomatic end to Memnon's revolt demonstrates Antipater's abilities as a political negotiator as well as his skill in managing the complex range of responsibilities that were part of his role as regent of Macedon. For Cassander the lesson was clear. Antipater's swift end to the Thracian campaign via non-military means was clearly a viable, and - if peace was secured - a preferable option to an arduous military operation. These were lessons Cassander would take with him into his struggle for the regency after 319.<sup>278</sup>

With the trouble in Thrace dealt with, Antipater was now able to turn his focus to Agis and the troubles in the Peloponnese. It is clear from Arrian's account that Alexander and Antipater were still in communication with each other, and that Alexander was aware of the war with Sparta and its Greek allies and the king treated the threat seriously.<sup>279</sup> In response, Alexander sent some three thousand talents to Antipater for recruitment of mercenary corps, showing the level of concern felt by both the king and his regent.<sup>280</sup> It would have taken many months for Antipater to recruit these troops,<sup>281</sup> most likely men drawn from the

---

<sup>276</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 201. *contra*. Berve, Vol II. 1926. p. 254; Badian, 1967. pp. 179-180.

<sup>277</sup> Diod. 17.63.1. While the terms of the conclusion of the revolt are not known, it seems that Memnon was able to retain his position as Governor of Thrace. This is because the same Memnon is recorded as leading Thracian troops to India so as to reinforce Alexander's army (Curt. 9.3.21.).

<sup>278</sup> An example of this can be seen in Cassander's eventual conclusion to the civil war with Polyperchon in 309, when he presented Polyperchon with the command of the Peloponnese under his rule in exchange for peace being declared in the region (cf Ch. 8.3. pp. 284-287.). Additionally, the lessons taught to Cassander by his father would shape his political persona and *modus operandi* during his career (*passim*. Adams, 1975).

<sup>279</sup> Arr. 3.16.10.

<sup>280</sup> Badian, in Worthington. 1994. p. 272.

<sup>281</sup> Bosworth (1988. p. 202) suggests that Antipater was not able to begin his march south until the early spring of 330.



northern barbarian tribes and the levies from the northern Greek cities.<sup>282</sup> With the addition of these mercenaries to the core of his army - an army almost certainly composed of Macedonian troops - the final size of Antipater's army has been said to be at least 40,000 men.<sup>283</sup> This was double the force led by Agis, an army of roughly 21,000 in total.<sup>284</sup> Even though the core of the force was composed of Macedonian troops, with Antipater in command, the presence of troops from the Greek cities demonstrated that the oath of the Corinthian League was in effect. With one of its signatories, Megalopolis, attacked by Sparta, ostensibly a foreign power, the other members were obliged to come to the aid of their ally and restore peace within the region as soon as possible. Instead of his march south being seen as a Macedonian reaction to aggression from Agis, Antipater took care to turn his response into an action by the Corinthian League to aid an ally that had been attacked.

Once Antipater had formed his army, he marched south in order to confront Agis who was still occupied with the siege of Megalopolis.<sup>285</sup> After Antipater arrived a brief, but bitterly fought, conflict ensued between the two forces.<sup>286</sup> The conflict resulted in an overwhelming Macedonian victory and the death of Agis.<sup>287</sup> With Sparta's total defeat, Antipater could have been at the forefront of negotiations with the defeated alliance to achieve the most satisfactory outcome for Macedon. However, instead of directly arbitrating the terms for their surrender, Antipater delegated the task to the Corinthian League for them to decide the fate of Sparta and its allies.<sup>288</sup> This decision to refer the terms that would be imposed on the

---

<sup>282</sup> Diod. 17.63.1; Bosworth, 1988. p. 202-203.

<sup>283</sup> Diod. 17.63.1; Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). p. 58.

<sup>284</sup> Diod. 17.62.7; Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*, 16 (1958/59). p. 58; Bosworth, 1988. p. 201.

<sup>285</sup> Curt. 6.1; Diod. 17.63.1: Diodorus is keen to highlight the strength of Antipater's forces stating that once again he brought the entirety of his military reserves ("...μετὰ πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως") against Sparta; Just. 12.1.8-12.

<sup>286</sup> Curt. 6.1.1-16; Diod. 17.63.2-4; Just. 12.1.8-11.

<sup>287</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 203; Heckel, 1992. p. 42; Heckel, 2006. p. 8.

<sup>288</sup> Curt. 6.1.20: The conclusions reached by the League stated that the Achaeans and the Eleans were to pay 120 talents in compensation to the primary victims of the Spartan led aggression, Megalopolis. The Tegeans, on the other hand, who seemed to have been compelled by a minority of the polis to take up arms against Macedon (Bosworth, 1988. p. 203.), were pardoned for their role in the

defeated Spartans and their allies to the pro-Macedonian Greek cities is an important one in understanding the way in which Antipater maintained Macedonian control in the Greek Peninsula.<sup>289</sup> It demonstrated to the League, and more widely to the greater Greek cities that Antipater, in his position as regent of Macedon and *hegemon* of the Corinthian League, was able and willing to allow the Greeks to have a significant say in their own political affairs without direct intervention from Macedon. There were a number of benefits for Antipater in doing this. Allowing the Greek cities to have some freedom and a practical voice within the Greek political sphere, rather than having Macedonia completely dictate all political affairs, would result in a more peaceful region.<sup>290</sup> It would strengthen the relationship between the cities and Pella as well as making it an easier task for him to govern the region in Alexander's absence.

With the destruction and subjugation of Spartan aggression by Antipater and the Corinthian League complete, the regent was able to reinstate, via the League's authority, the *status quo* within the Peninsula. The inclusion of the League

---

revolt. The Spartans were forced to provide fifty hostages to Antipater as security against any further military aggression (Plut. *Mor.* 235B). Curtius presents an unlikely explanation for Antipater's reasoning behind the move to allow the Corinthian League to dictate the peace terms to Sparta. In his account (Curt. 6.1.17-19), the historian states that Alexander was displeased with the extent of the victory by Antipater's army over the Spartan coalition, "*Quippe Alexander hostes vinci voluerat. Antipatrum vicisse ne tacitus quidem indignabatur, suae demptum gloriae existimans quidquid cessisset alienae.*" (Curt. 6.1.18.) This account seems unlikely given that Antipater had at the initiation of hostilities gone to great lengths to present the reaction to Agis' War as one conducted by the Corinthian League, and not one of Macedonian conquest. Given this, the act of allowing the League to determine the peace terms would be a natural conclusion to the war; Kanatsulis, *Hellenika*, 16 (1958/59). pp. 61-63; Baynham, in Worthington. 1994. p. 342.

<sup>289</sup> This was not the first time that a Macedonian leader had given this power to the Corinthian League. Greek inclusion had previously been used by Alexander after the defeat of Thebes in 335 (Bosworth, 1988. p. 33, 195). The aftermath of the League's decision (see: Arr. 1.9.9; Diod. 17.14.1; Just. 11.3.8; Bosworth, 1988. p. 195) must have been known to Antipater as *hegemon*, as well as the political results that were likely to occur if employed again; allowing the Greek Cities a voice in their political affairs would bring a measure of placation to the members of the League, thereby aiding Antipater in maintaining the *status quo* during his tenure as regent.

<sup>290</sup> Baynham, 1998. pp. 167-168.

proved a shrewd tactic versus one of overt Macedonian military operations. However, the numbers of Macedonian troops available to Antipater afforded him little choice but to work with the League, rather than against it. Despite concerns for possible unrest in Greece, Alexander was still continuing to make constant demands for fresh troops to be sent to maintain his armies in the east. While it is true that there were movements of troops both to the east and returning west, the shift was disproportionately in Alexander's favour. The series of requests for fresh troops between 334 and 331 may mark the point where the relationship between Antipater and Alexander began to fray. Therefore, the movement of troops away from Macedon deserves attention.

As early as the winter of 334, Alexander began sending requests for reinforcements from Macedon.<sup>291</sup> This resulted in the embarkation of 3000 Macedonian men accompanied by 500 cavalry and other Greek auxiliaries led by Ptolemy the son of Seleucus,<sup>292</sup> Coenus the son of Polemocrates<sup>293</sup> and Meleager the son of Neoptolemus<sup>294</sup> from Macedon to Alexander in the spring of 333.<sup>295</sup> That such high-ranking officers commanded the mission shows the importance that Alexander placed on its success.<sup>296</sup> It was not long after this initial request was met that Curtius states Alexander saw the arrival of more soldiers from Macedon joining the army prior to its journey to Cappadocia.<sup>297</sup>

---

<sup>291</sup> Arr. 1.29.4; Adams, *Anc. World*. 10. (1984). p. 80.

<sup>292</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 234.

<sup>293</sup> Heckel, 2006. pp. 91-2.

<sup>294</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 159.

<sup>295</sup> Arr. 1.29.4. Here Arrian clearly states that the soldiers were Macedonian in origin as opposed to Greek levies who began their journey from Macedon. The majority of the Macedonian troops that left Macedon in 333 were newly married men (Arr. 1.29.4) who had spent the winter of 334/3 sojourning in the country presumably to reduce the decline in birth rates in the region while the majority of men of fighting age were on campaign with the king (Bosworth, *JHS*, 106 (1986). p. 5.).

<sup>296</sup> Adams (*Anc. World*. 10. (1984). p. 80) states that Coenus and Meleager both held the rank of *taxiarch*, while Ptolemy was assigned the position of *somatophylakes*.

<sup>297</sup> Curt. 3.1.24: Unlike Arrian (cf. Arr. 1.29.4), Curtius' account does not provide the numbers that joined the army, who led them or any information detailing their composition. Bosworth (*JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 6.) correctly highlights the possibility that the reinforcements in Curtius' account may be the same as those

Soon afterwards Polybius' account reports that another contingent of Macedonian troops consisting of 5000 infantry and 800 cavalry arrived in Alexander's camp prior to his invasion of Cilicia.<sup>298</sup> This account, however, has been either questioned or dismissed entirely by some scholars. Berve,<sup>299</sup> suggests that the high number of troops is unlikely and is more plausibly a count of the entirety of troop movements from the Hellespont and Issus. Doubt is also cast on the possibility of Antipater's ability to send such a vast force to Alexander at this time, considering the difficult task of maintaining peace within Greece.<sup>300</sup> In discussion of the details in Polybius' account, Bosworth dismisses these reservations, highlighting that the credibility of the source is dubious and notes the difficulty in the summation that Polybius had compounded the respective reinforcements into a single movement.<sup>301</sup> It may be that Antipater was not pleased to be sending vast troop numbers so early on in Alexander's campaigns; however, future reinforcements in the subsequent years do suggest that a decrease in the availability of manpower was beginning to occur and eventually alternative reservoirs of men needed to be tapped.

In the same year, another account of troops moving from Macedon to join with Alexander is recorded in Curtius. The account states that there was an unspecified number of reinforcements *en route* to Alexander that had yet to reach him prior to the battle of Issus.<sup>302</sup> As with the record of Polybius, Curtius' account too, has been dismissed as fictitious.<sup>303</sup> However the accusation that this was an invention by the historian does not seem plausible and there is no obvious reason to disbelieve the claims being made.<sup>304</sup> Therefore, by the end of 333, a little over a year after its commencement, the ancient sources record that

---

who were detailed in Arrian (1.29.4), however the brevity and lack of specifics within Curtius means it is difficult to state this with certainty one way or the other.

<sup>298</sup> Polyb. 12.19.2.

<sup>299</sup> Berve. Vol. I. 1926. pp. 179-180.

<sup>300</sup> Berve. Vol. I. 1926. p. 180.

<sup>301</sup> Bosworth, *JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 6.

<sup>302</sup> Curt. 3.7.8.

<sup>303</sup> Atkinson, 1980. p. 181.

<sup>304</sup> Bosworth, *JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 6.

four separate groups of troops had journeyed from Macedon to reinforce Alexander's eastern campaigns. Of those four accounts, the accounts of Arrian<sup>305</sup> and Polybius<sup>306</sup> provide detailed and reliable information about the scale of the respective groups, which combined consisted of over 8,000 infantry. With the addition of Curtius' account,<sup>307</sup> it is expected that the number would have been far greater. From the initial division of Macedonian military strength that set out the previous year, with roughly equal numbers granted to both Antipater and Alexander, the sources indicate a general shift in the concentration of Macedonian military strength eastwards. Without evidence of returning troops being repatriated back to Macedon, a disparity in the available troops between Antipater and Alexander begins to emerge. For Antipater, the loss of such a large number of men of serving age would have caused concern. The number of men leaving Macedon for the east would not be sustainable if the requests from Alexander continued, especially if the task of maintaining Greek pacification in the face of rebellion was to continue.

Unfortunately for Antipater's troop reserves, the year of 332 saw further requests for military support by Alexander. These requests were necessary for Alexander following the fierce fighting at the Battle of Issus in late 333,<sup>308</sup> and the protracted sieges of Tyre<sup>309</sup> and Gaza.<sup>310</sup> In order to facilitate the reinforcement of his army, Alexander dispatched one of his senior officers, Amyntas, the son of Andromenes, to Macedon with orders to raise a new army from men of military age.<sup>311</sup> It is clear from the ancient sources that swift replenishment of troops was required, as Amyntas was dispatched to Macedon via the swiftest route possible, the sea.<sup>312</sup> This was despite the usual avoidance of sea travel in the Mediterranean during the winter months. That Amyntas was

---

<sup>305</sup> Arr. 1.29.4.

<sup>306</sup> Polyb. 12.19.2.

<sup>307</sup> Curt. 3.7.8.

<sup>308</sup> Arr. 2.11.1; Curt. 3.8.22-3.11.12; Just. 13.9.9.

<sup>309</sup> Arr. 2.18.3-2.24.6; Curt. 4.2.2-2.24, 4.4.6-20; Diod. 17.40.4-17.46.6; Plut. *Alex.* 24.4-8.

<sup>310</sup> Diod. 17.48.7

<sup>311</sup> Diod. 17. 49. 1; Curt. 4. 6. 30.

<sup>312</sup> Arr. 1.29.4; Adams, *Anc. World.* 10 (1984). p. 80.

sent in this manner demonstrates the urgency placed on his recruitment of fresh forces for Alexander. After several months, the newly raised force set out from Macedon.<sup>313</sup> Diodorus provides details of its size and composition. The historian states that of the 15,000 men who comprised Amyntas' force 6,000 were Macedonian footmen, accompanied by 500 Macedonian cavalry.<sup>314</sup> This would be the last substantial embarkation of Macedonian troops leaving Macedon to bolster Alexander's army recorded in the ancient sources. Antipater was no longer able to risk further weakening of the Macedonian military presence within Greece. The past two years had seen a large percentage of Macedon's serving men leaving the country either in the initial force accompanying Alexander, or in the successive large scale reinforcements seen in 333 and 332 comprising at least 14,000 infantry plus 800 cavalry being reported in the ancient sources.<sup>315</sup> The following years would see a change in the nature of troops being sent to Alexander by Antipater. Pressure was being put on the reserves of manpower in Macedon itself by the turbulent political environment in the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire, following Memnon's rebellion in Thrace and the war with Agis in the Peloponnese. Despite this Antipater still needed to keep the supply of fresh troops heading eastwards. In order to achieve this, the regent looked to other avenues in order to maintain the king's army.

The year of 331 saw the end of Macedonian troops moving eastwards to Alexander.<sup>316</sup> The lack of any further significant movement of troops was to be expected as Antipater was facing simultaneous military actions that required what manpower he had at his disposal to focus on affairs in Thrace and Greece. Alexander was aware of the situation facing Antipater.<sup>317</sup> He also knew that Amyntas was leading a newly formed army, currently *en route* to his position,

---

<sup>313</sup> Arr. 1.29.4; Adams, *Anc. World*. 10 (1984). p. 80.

<sup>314</sup> Diod. 17.65.1.

<sup>315</sup> It is highly likely that smaller scale movement of troops, both east and west, was occurring throughout the campaign. However, given the size of these movements and their relative insignificance, they were likely ignored or unrecorded by the ancient writers.

<sup>316</sup> Bosworth, *JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 7; Hammond, *JHS*. 109. (1989). p. 64.

<sup>317</sup> Adams, *Anc. World*. 10. (1984). p. 82; Hammond, *JHS*. 109. (1989). p. 64.

and finally relented from further requests for reinforcements until the situation was resolved thus temporarily easing pressure on the regent to allow Antipater to effectively secure the home front.

Despite this brief lull in demand for new troops, renewing the flow of fresh troops was necessary to support Alexander's campaign and was still an integral part of Antipater's role as regent. However the recent military campaign in which he had been engaged, combined with the progressive syphoning off of Macedonian manpower, forced Antipater to turn to the alternative groups under Macedonian control to fill the levies needed to maintain Alexander's army. By 329, Antipater was once again able to resume dispatches to the east as evidenced by Curtius's report of a contingent of some 3,000 Illyrians arriving at Alexander's camp.<sup>318</sup> Again, Antipater demonstrated his political aptitude by the dispatching of non-Macedonian troops, and there were benefits that resulted from this for the stability of Macedon's borders.

Since the 7<sup>th</sup> century, Illyria had engaged in various states of conflict with Macedon over territorial holdings,<sup>319</sup> and had been a constant concern for Macedonian interests. Philip had conducted military campaigns to bring Illyria under Macedonian subjugation since 359.<sup>320</sup> Antipater, being one of Philip II's closest confidants, had experience in these campaigns. With the events of 331 in his mind, the prospect of weakening the military strength of potential enemies close to Macedon itself, while at the same time continuing the supply of fresh men to Alexander presented an excellent opportunity to ease any political instability. This was an opportunity that Antipater could ill-afford to miss.

The negative impact that troop movements had on the relationship between Antipater and Alexander was a by-product of the vastly different focus and objectives of the two most powerful members of the Macedonian Empire. Alexander wanted to expand the dominion of the Macedonian Empire; Antipater

---

<sup>318</sup> Curt. 6.6.35; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 342; Bosworth, *JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 7.

<sup>319</sup> Ellis, 1976. p. 35.

<sup>320</sup> Ellis, 1976. p. 56.

sought to preserve the borders and holdings that the empire possessed prior to Alexander's embarkation of the Persian Campaign in 334. Personal conflict between the two was not a factor by 331. Any tension that was present resulted from the task with which each man was charged. What would impact positively on the task confronting Alexander had a negative impact on the task confronting Antipater and vice versa. Both men understood the importance of their counterpart's role and they went to great efforts to support each other. This can be seen in Antipater's continuance of reinforcements to the east, and Alexander's shipment of funds to Antipater to aid in combating Memnon's rebellion and the war with Agis in 331. Troop movements were not the dominant factor in explanation of the breakdown of the relationship between the king and the regent. A more active factor may instead be found in the person of Olympias, the mother of Alexander. Her actions during Alexander's reign would evolve into a passionate feud between herself and the Antipatrid house.

Throughout her son's life, Olympias had maintained a close relationship to Alexander and was a powerful voice in his decision-making.<sup>321</sup> The ancient sources suggest that Olympias had problematic relationships with the influential people who made up the inner circle and acted as advisors of Alexander's court.<sup>322</sup> Considering Antipater's central role in securing Alexander's succession to the throne in combination with the influential role he played in Alexander's early reign, friction between Antipater and the royal mother was inevitable. The feud with Olympias constituted the most strained point in the relationship between the regent and the king. The antipathy that grew between Olympias and the Antipatrids had devastating consequences for both sides. For Olympias, the growing enmity with Antipater saw her flee from Macedon to her home in Epirus.<sup>323</sup> From here she would continue to undermine Antipater's position as regent, which in part resulted in his replacement by Craterus in 324.<sup>324</sup> In

---

<sup>321</sup> Carney, 2006. pp. 27-8, 41; Heckel, 2006. p. 182.

<sup>322</sup> As exemplified by her conflict with Hephaiston, cf. Diod. 17.114.3; Carney, 2000. p. 88; Carney, 2006. p. 57, 126;

<sup>323</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 52; Heckel, 2006. p. 182.

<sup>324</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 108; cf. Ch. 3. p. 77.



addition to facilitating the installation of Craterus as regent, Olympias' hatred of Antipater saw her level accusations of regicide and responsibility for her son's death against him and his family following Alexander III's death in 323.<sup>325</sup> Cassander's thinking was particularly shaped by his negative interactions with Olympias and the events in Babylon in 324-323.<sup>326</sup> As a result of these events, Cassander would distance himself from Argead support throughout his initial struggle with Polyperchon in 319. In contrast, Polyperchon sought to exploit the wedge between Olympias and the Antipatrids to support his own position as regent once Antipater appointed him to the role.<sup>327</sup>

As one of Philip's closest advisers, Antipater was likely present at the marriage between Olympias and the king in 357 and would have had contact with her during their time in court. If tensions existed between the two, these do not become explicit in the sources until Alexander left Macedon in 334. During her son's absence, Olympias remained in Macedon at Pella with Antipater.<sup>328</sup> The point at which hostilities between Antipater and Olympias began is difficult to ascertain. Carney suggests that the most likely period when this took place was during Alexander's reign between 336 and 323.<sup>329</sup> Diodorus too asserts that both parties were at loggerheads for a substantial period of time during Alexander's time on the throne,<sup>330</sup> however this account only records that the variance took place, not when it began.<sup>331</sup> One possible point for the ignition of the feud may have been during the turbulent final years of Philip's reign. The last two years of Philip's rule saw tensions rise between Alexander and his mother against Philip. This saw Alexander depart from Pella and enter a period of self-imposed exile in Illyria.<sup>332</sup> While the two factions were able to reconcile formally, Philip was still wary of Olympias as a political adversary within the

---

<sup>325</sup> cf. Diod. 19.11.8; Carney, 2006. p. 79.

<sup>326</sup> See. Ch. 6.1. p. 158.

<sup>327</sup> See Ch. 6.2. pp. 154-165.

<sup>328</sup> Carney, 2006. pp. 48-49; Heckel, 2006. p. 182.

<sup>329</sup> Carney. 2006. p. 30.

<sup>330</sup> Diod. 17.118.1.

<sup>331</sup> Diod. 17.118.1.

<sup>332</sup> Ath. 13.557d-e; Just. 9.7.3-6; Plut. *Alex.* 9.4-5;

Macedonian court.<sup>333</sup> As one of Philip's closest confidants and a member of his inner-circle, Antipater was privy to the private machinations of the royal family. Early lessons of the danger and political weight that would accompany Olympias' displeasure were there for him to learn, and she became a known quantity as a political adversary in terms of her influence over her son. The period between 334 and 331 pitted Olympias and Antipater against each other and it was at this time that their quarrelling came to the forefront. Both were in contact with Alexander expressing their displeasure with each other,<sup>334</sup> but instead of arbitrating the issue between the two, Alexander chose not to interfere in the matter.

Olympias' status at court during this time is unclear, but it is likely that she did not hold an official office, but rather relied upon her familial ties to Alexander, her former status as Philip's great wife and her royal Molossian heritage to gain influence in the political environment within Macedon, her home of Epirus and greater Greece.<sup>335</sup> Olympias participated directly in Greek politics and religious debates, notably her actions as described by the Attic orator Hyperides,<sup>336</sup> where she is seen claiming her ownership to the Molossian state in discussion of practices taking place at the temple at Dodona.<sup>337</sup> Additionally, Olympias made requests to the Athenians on the matter of Harpalus'<sup>338</sup> extradition back to Macedon.<sup>339</sup>

The relationship between Antipater and Olympias would continue to deteriorate over the course of their time in Macedon. Olympias may have wished that Antipater were more subservient to the royal family and, more directly, to herself. This would explain her claims of irreverence against the regent in her

---

<sup>333</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 37.

<sup>334</sup> Diod. 17.117.1

<sup>335</sup> Carney. 2006. p. 50.

<sup>336</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 141.

<sup>337</sup> Hyp. *Eux.* 24-25; Whitehead, 2000. p. 228.

<sup>338</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 130.

<sup>339</sup> Diod. 17.108.7; Carney, 2006. p. 51; Worthington, *LCM.* 9. (1984). p. 48; Blackwell, 1999. p. 88; Whitehead, 2000. p. 388. Diodorus also records Antipater making the same request for Harpalus to return to Macedon. Whether this was made in conjunction or in co-operation with Olympias is unclear.

correspondence to Alexander. She may have regarded any reluctance by Antipater to respond to her wishes and those of Alexander as a sign of defiance against Argead rule. As previously stated, Antipater's main objective, as regent, was the maintenance of Macedon while Alexander was away. He did, in fact, comply with the requests made by the king when it was possible to do so without jeopardising the safety and peace of the lands under his jurisdiction. It was Alexander, not Olympias, who had appointed Antipater and it was to the king that Antipater was accountable. He would not, and did not, accept interference in the running of the country from anyone save the king, even if they were members of the royal family. As a result, Antipater reacted negatively to Olympias's attempts to directly interfere in the management of his office.

Though the date is uncertain, in either 331 or 330, Olympias left Macedon and returned to her home in Molossia.<sup>340</sup> It has been suggested that a possible explanation for her departure was fear for her personal safety from attacks by the regent.<sup>341</sup> However it is more likely that her departure was a result of the tense relationship with the regent.<sup>342</sup> The notion of Antipater attempting to assassinate Olympias is problematic; although Antipater was not opposed to removing political rivals in the court who had proved a threat to his position,<sup>343</sup> the removal of Olympias was not a viable or appealing option for the regent. Despite the problematic relationship between the two, Alexander would not have accepted the murder of his mother. Antipater would have expected to face swift and terrible retribution had he followed this course of action.

Antipater was without question one of the most powerful and influential figures in the Macedonian Empire, but the notion that he was able to act with total

---

<sup>340</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 68.4; Diod. 18.49.4; Pau. 1.1.3. The exact timing of Olympias' journey to Epirus is unclear from the accounts, however Carney (2006. p. 52.) suggests that it took place some time between the death of her brother, the King of Epirus Alexander (Just. 12.2.14.) and the defeat of Agis by Antipater in 330 (See above).

<sup>341</sup> Paus. 1.1.3; Carney, 2006. p. 52; Heckel, 2006. p. 182.

<sup>342</sup> Diod. 18.49.4.

<sup>343</sup> As can be seen in his removal of potential rivals when securing Alexander's succession to the throne after Philip II's assassination in 336.

impunity is not persuasive. While Alexander was alive, Antipater was ultimately responsible and accountable to him and Olympias would be safe from physical harm.<sup>344</sup> What can be deduced is that Olympias departed for Epirus and Molossia around 331/0, when Antipater's focus was upon the more pressing issues of re-establishing Macedonian domination in Greece and restoring the *status quo* among the Greek cities. The most plausible reason for her to leave was the hostility that existed with Antipater, combined with Alexander's reluctance to either arbitrate the matter, or to support her position. Her displeasure with Antipater did not end after Olympias had left the capital. Even after she had reached her homeland, she persisted in criticising the regent in her correspondence with her son and seeking Antipater's replacement with another, more acceptable, figure. These requests would continue until, in 324, Alexander finally gave in to his mother's wishes and replaced Antipater with Craterus as regent of Macedon.<sup>345</sup>

The timeframe immediately prior to 323 saw the period of greatest tension in the relationship between Antipater and Alexander. Antipater had been replaced as regent in Macedon by another of Alexander's generals, Craterus, and had been summoned to the new capital of the Empire, Babylon. Antipater however remained steadfast in Macedon and sent Cassander in his stead, leading to Cassander's infamous encounter with Alexander at court in Babylon.<sup>346</sup> While it may be that Antipater had feared for his safety should he have ventured to the Babylonian court, there is another, more plausible, explanation for why he dispatched his son to Alexander, rather than making the journey himself. Antipater would have been well aware of the political implications of leaving Macedon while Craterus was still *en route* to Pella. Given his understanding of the tense political situation in Greece Antipater would have realised that to leave Pella in order to journey to Babylon would be to create a power vacuum thereby risking civil unrest and possible rebellion amongst the Greek Cities.

---

<sup>344</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 42.

<sup>345</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9; Ashton, *Makedonia*, 5 (1993). pp. 126-127; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 108.

<sup>346</sup> See Ch. 4. pp. 88-91.

While it is true to say that the relationship between Antipater and Alexander came under strain as would be expected from the two men who each had very different agendas, this should not be mistaken for hostility between them. Antipater continued to supply Alexander and his army with both soldiers and supplies; he also continued to implement potentially volatile political decrees within an already troublesome Greece. This support and loyalty Antipater demonstrated to Alexander is evident by the promulgation of Alexander's Exile's Decree in the summer 324.<sup>347</sup> While the decree may have had elements that could decrease the chances of another Greek uprising like those led by Agis and Memnon,<sup>348</sup> it is critical to note that Antipater continued to enforce the decree despite Greek discontent,<sup>349</sup> even after he had been replaced by Alexander with the younger Craterus.<sup>350</sup> If Antipater and Alexander's relationship, either personally or professionally was beyond repair, it is puzzling why Antipater would continue to maintain Greece on the king's behalf in the face of hostility, friction with the royal family and his replacement as regent. A more likely scenario would hold that even though tensions may have arisen between the king and his regent, Antipater was still willing and able to maintain the office he had been assigned until a time when his replacement was able to take effective control of Europe.

This chapter has provided an overview of the career of Antipater as well as his relationship with the royal Argead family, covering Antipater's prominence within the Macedonian political and military spheres, his significance during the reign of Philip II and the role he played in securing and mentoring the young Alexander as well as his time as regent of Macedon during Alexander's great expansion east. Despite Antipater's long support of Alexander during his youth and during the king's time in office, tensions emerged between the two men.

---

<sup>347</sup> Diod. 18.8.3-4; Just. 13.5.2-4; Heckel, 2008. p. 146, 189. n. 13; Dmitriev, 2011. p. 423; Proddighe, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 231; Pitt & Richardson, *CQ.* 67 (forthcoming 2017). *contra*. Mendels, 1984. p. 146; Blackwell, 1999. p. 157

<sup>348</sup> Blackwell, 1999. p. 146; Heckel, 2008. p. 147.

<sup>349</sup> Especially expressed by Athens and Aetolia (Diod. 18.8.6-7; Heckel, 2008. p. 147; O'Sullivan, 2009. p. 22).

<sup>350</sup> Poddighe, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2012. p. 231.

Alexander's requirement for re-enforcements and resupply put great strain upon the resources available to Antipater and his mission to maintain a peaceful home front during Alexander's absence. While these tensions are better explained by the conflicting demands of Alexander's and Antipater's respective offices, than by personal animosity, these strains were exacerbated by the interference of Olympias, ultimately resulting in Antipater's replacement in 324. The lack of personal animosity and familial hostility, at least prior to Alexander's death, indicates that Cassander's future unwillingness to actively seek support from the royal family in 319 was not based on some long-held inter-familial feud. Instead, the cause of his initial lack of interest in Argead support was more likely based on events after the conclusion of Alexander III's expansion of the Macedonian Empire and the king's return to the new capital in Babylon.

## Chapter 4: Cassander in Babylon.<sup>351</sup>

The previous chapter of this investigation focussed on the interpersonal interactions between Antipater and Alexander during Antipater's initial tenure as regent of Macedon. This was in order to ascertain whether the tensions between these two powerful men could help to explain Cassander's future aversion to seeking Argead support after his father's death in 319 during the ensuing struggle for dominance against Polyperchon. This chapter continues this investigation and engages with the inter-familial interactions between the Antipatrids and Argeads after Antipater's replacement as regent of Macedon by Craterus in 324. The chapter covers the period of time up until news of Alexander's death arrived in Greece and Macedon in 323 that occurred within a period of weeks after the king's death on June 11<sup>th</sup>. Tensions still existed between Antipater and Alexander as a result of the conflicting responsibilities of their respective offices during Alexander's eastern expansion of the Macedonian Empire, however at this point the tensions were relatively minor. Each man still held respect for the other and the friction that existed between the two was not significant enough to explain Cassander's actions post-319, nor does it explain the rift that developed between the Antipatrid and Argead factions. It is during this time that Cassander enters the accounts of the ancient sources, when he arrives in Babylon at the behest of his father. The purpose of his journey was to meet with Alexander and account for his father's policies amongst the Greek cities as well as to answer for the grievances levelled against Antipater by Greek emissaries to Babylon. Details of Cassander's journey are relatively clear; he began his journey after being dispatched by his father in Macedon, concluding in Babylon at Alexander's court.<sup>352</sup> Since Alexander's embarkation east, Antipater was the face of Macedonian domination within Greece and the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire; because of this he had come to be the target for Greek dissatisfaction with their subjugation.

---

<sup>351</sup> Sections of this chapter will appear in a forthcoming publication of *The Classical Quarterly*. I would like to thank the editors for accepting such contribution.

<sup>352</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.2; Metz. § 89; Ps. -Kall. 3.31.4; Curt. 10.10.16–17; Fortina, 1965. p. 9; Adams, 1975. p. 48; Heckel, 2006. p. 79.

Details of Cassander's relationship with his father are sparse, but by drawing on the nature of his mission to Babylon, it is possible to draw some reasonable inferences. Since Antipater was unable to travel in person to Babylon, therefore the man sent in his stead needed not only be personally trusted by him, but also to have the appropriate political acumen to represent his interests in the Macedonian court before the king. That Cassander was sent suggests that he possessed both his father's trust and the ability to represent his father within an increasingly tense diplomatic situation. Cassander was not ordered to Babylon; his father was. Antipater was ordered to leave Macedon for Babylon at the head of 10,000 soldiers who would replace the returning veterans of Craterus.<sup>353</sup> However Antipater did not follow these orders, choosing instead to remain within Macedon. Because of this, it is prudent to consider the reasons behind Antipater's actions. Antipater was aware of the consequences that might result from his departure from Macedon. Craterus and his troops had not yet arrived in Macedon to replace him and the men he would be taking from the Macedonian home front. In fact Craterus was no further than Cilicia by the time of Alexander's death.<sup>354</sup> Should Antipater have left Macedon before the arrival of his replacement and a handover of power, leading some 10,000 men fit for military service away from the region, further depleting an already strained resource that had been syphoned off over the past decade, the risk of losing control of the Greek cities would have been a very real prospect.

The timing of Cassander's departure from Babylon westwards is also unclear. It seems that he did however remain in the city until some time around Alexander's death on June 11<sup>th</sup> 323. The period between Cassander's arrival and departure from Babylon saw hostile exchanges between Alexander and Cassander, namely the infamous account of *proskynesis* within Plutarch's biography of Alexander that saw Cassander mock the Persian practice that had

---

<sup>353</sup> cf. Bosworth, *JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 4; Ashton, in Wheatley and Baynham, 2015. p. 108; Pitt & Richardson, *CQ*. 67 (forthcoming 2017).

<sup>354</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Diod. 18.14.1; Just. 12.12.9; Bosworth, *CQ*. 21. (1971), p. 125; Heckel, 1992. p. 126; Heckel, 2006. p. 98. cf. Dunn & Wheatley, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 42; Anson, 2014. p. 14; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 108.



been introduced by Alexander.<sup>355</sup> Plutarch clearly states that the encounter affected Cassander to such an extent that he was physically disturbed to even see a statue of the king, even years later.<sup>356</sup> This would, in part, provide an explanation for Cassander's reluctance to engage with royal supporters in 319. However, there are a number of significant issues surrounding Cassander's involvement in the *proskynesis* affair. This chapter discusses the various accounts of *proskynesis* within the Macedonian court extant in the ancient literary sources and explores why Plutarch's account involving Cassander can be dismissed. Additionally, the depiction of Cassander by Plutarch as an adversary to Alexander is evaluated.

Finally, the chapter discusses the events that took place immediately after the demise of Alexander the Great. Of particular significance to this study are the rumours and political jostling amongst the Successors, especially in regard to who, or what, brought about the young king's death. In an effort to discredit the Antipatrids, the rumour of a conspiracy involving a family plot to poison Alexander emerged throughout the Empire. This rumour gained momentum as Alexander and Antipater had an increasingly difficult relationship since 334 culminating in Antipater's dismissal as Regent of Macedon. This was further compounded by the role that Olympias played after her son's death. Once news had reached Greece of Alexander's death, the already heated relationship between the royal mother and the Antipatrids developed into an inter-dynastic conflict that would ultimately result in the deaths of Philip III Arrhidaeus, his wife Eurydice and Olympias herself in 316.<sup>357</sup> While tensions had existed between Antipater and Alexander over the past decade, it was not until Alexander died and the rumours involving the Antipatrids became widespread that the fracture between the two factions finally emerged, thereby explaining Cassander's actions in 319.

---

<sup>355</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.2; Plut. *Mor.* 180F; Adams, 1975. p. 55

<sup>356</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.6; Adams, 1975. p. 55.

<sup>357</sup> See Ch. 7.2. pp. 208-209.

Of particular interest to this study is the speed at which the news of Alexander's death travelled from Babylon to Greece, a journey of over two and a half thousand kilometres.<sup>358</sup> If this period of time can be established, then a precedent for the speed at which news could travel may be set. This is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the date of the initiation of the Lamian War can be narrowed. Additionally, the precedent may be used for later aspects of this study, most significantly in discussion of Cassander's first unsuccessful invasion of Macedon in the summer of 317 and Polyperchon's swift reaction to this.<sup>359</sup>

Before discussing Cassander's arrival in Babylon and the events that followed, it is prudent to investigate why Antipater chose to remain in Macedon and dispatch his son in his stead. Antipater's presence in Babylon had two different aspects. Firstly, he was required to lead re-enforcements from Macedon to replace those veterans who were returning under the command of Craterus,<sup>360</sup> and secondly, he was to answer charges laid against him.<sup>361</sup> While Plutarch does not identify who the originators of these charges were, it is likely that they came from the Greek cities and the League of Corinth, a group that had grown increasingly disgruntled with the regent over the previous years. Since the conflicts of 331/0 with the simultaneous revolt in Thrace and the war with Agis of Sparta, Antipater, with the diminished resources resulting from Alexander's campaigns of the past decade, had wanted to maintain a peaceful Greece and minimise the potential for further rebellion to Macedonian domination. Initially, Antipater had ruled Greece with a relatively light hand. However, after the conflicts of 331/0 with the *status quo* reinstalled, he increased Macedonian hold on the region.<sup>362</sup> He did this by placing further trust in pro-Macedonian oligarchies and installing men who were personally loyal to him who would be more easily able to quash dissent at a local level.<sup>363</sup> As previously

---

<sup>358</sup> Talbert, 1985. pp. 18-19.

<sup>359</sup> See Ch. 7.1. pp. 183-200.

<sup>360</sup> Just. 12.12.9; Bosworth, *JHS*. 106. (1986). p. 4.

<sup>361</sup> Which is implied during the tense discussions between Cassander and the king found in Plutarch's narrative (Plut. *Alex.* 74.4-5).

<sup>362</sup> Adams, *Anc. World*. 10. (1984). p. 83; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 339, 342.

<sup>363</sup> Diod. 18.56.7.

demonstrated,<sup>364</sup> the Greeks were already discontented with Macedonian subjugation. Antipater's new measures to protect Macedonian interests in the region, combined with the installation of pro-Macedonian groups within the Peninsula, further exacerbated the unrest. These measures resulted in Antipater becoming the face of Macedonian oppression in Greece and the target of Greek dissatisfaction. These sentiments and grievances against the regent were voiced to Alexander.

Despite the calls for his presence in Babylon, Antipater remained in Macedon. The reasons behind his decision to do so have been speculated upon by the ancient literary sources; however their accounts are not completely satisfactory. Both Diodorus and Justin interpret Antipater's inaction to be as a result of his fear of reprisal or punishment at the hands of Alexander.<sup>365</sup> There is some merit to this reasoning. Since Alexander had returned from India to Babylon the monarch had embarked on a series of executions and replacement of satraps throughout the Macedonian Empire.<sup>366</sup> The various replacements and executions spread fear of incurring Alexander's wrath for any indiscretion among the governors of the Empire.<sup>367</sup> Diodorus writes that two executions especially affected Antipater, those of Philotas and his father Parmenion, who were killed by Alexander in 330, despite evidence of their guilt being tenuous at best.<sup>368</sup>

However the assertion that Antipater remained in Macedon solely as a result of fear for his safety is not entirely convincing and fails to address two key factors in Antipater's character and his relationship with Alexander as well as the practicalities of the governance of Greece and Macedon. Arrian's evaluation of the interpersonal relationship between Antipater and Alexander for this period of time does not suggest ill will between the two,<sup>369</sup> calling into question the

---

<sup>364</sup> See. Ch. 3. and below.

<sup>365</sup> Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.14.5.

<sup>366</sup> Arr. 7.27.1-2; Curt. 10.1.37 – 39; Diod. 17.118.1; Just. 12.10.8.

<sup>367</sup> Arr. 7.27.3; Diod. 17.106.3.

<sup>368</sup> Diod. 17.118.1; Heckel, 1992. p. 42.

<sup>369</sup> Arr. 7.12.5-6.

likelihood that Antipater would be harmed should he journey to Babylon.<sup>370</sup> In addition to Arrian's account, there is the problem of Macedon's governance should Antipater embark eastward. The order requiring Antipater's presence in Babylon does not survive; therefore its contents cannot be evaluated or assessed. If the order had survived, much of the uncertainty around the relationship between Antipater and Alexander, as well as Antipater's relationship with Craterus, would be resolved. While no interpretation can be stated with any level of assertion, it is entirely possible that Antipater was to remain in Macedon until Craterus, who was *en route* from the east to assume the office of regent, arrived. This seems unlikely because if Antipater were expected to wait until his replacement arrived, it would have been unnecessary for him to send Cassander to Babylon and the arguments between the king and Antipater's son become even more inexplicable. Conversely, Antipater may have been ordered to leave for Babylon as soon as the order was received and the replacements for Craterus's veterans raised. This seems more probable since, if this were so, Cassander's mission to Babylon would have resulted from the need to meet with Alexander as soon as possible. This would also explain the tense reception Cassander received when he arrived. Because Cassander arrived in Babylon shortly after Antipater's replacement was announced, we may assume that Antipater was required to leave for Alexander's court, placing someone in a caretaker position as regent of Macedon.

The tense political environment and the instability in the Greek City-States was another vital factor that Antipater needed to take into account. Antipater would have been aware that should he leave Macedon, a power vacuum would be created by the absence of a strong regent *in situ*. Craterus was yet to arrive to fill the power gap, being still in Cilicia at the time of Alexander's death the following

---

<sup>370</sup> Ashton (*Makedonia*. 5. (1993). p. 126; Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 108-109.) have suggested, quite plausibly, that due to his advanced age and experience, Antipater may even have been expected to assume a governmental position in the eastern regions of the Macedonian Empire. cf. Poddighe, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2012. p. 231.

year.<sup>371</sup> Should this have occurred, anti-Macedonian sentiment might have fermented further and there was clear risk of civil unrest and revolt in the region. While this factor seems self evident, it has gone without comment by modern scholarship.<sup>372</sup> Antipater was all too aware that the Greek cities could revolt; his previous experiences with Sparta and Thrace had shown him as much. Consequentially, it is in no way surprising that Antipater chose to remain in Macedon until a time when he could be relieved of his position by Craterus.

The question then is why Craterus was so slow in returning to Macedon.<sup>373</sup> The details of his mission to Macedon are unclear, and its intended purpose difficult to discern. While the clear end point of his orders was to reach Macedon and replace Antipater as the regent,<sup>374</sup> the timeframe within which Alexander wished this to be carried out is less well defined. If Craterus was expected to travel to Macedon with speed, thereby allowing Antipater either to lead the troops that would replace Craterus' force, or to face judgement by Alexander for his indiscretions, the pace that Craterus was able to achieve and the distance he covered is perplexing. His slow progression can be attributed to a number of factors which indicate that, while his mission was important, it was for more pragmatic reasons than the personal animosity between Alexander and Antipater. Bosworth attributes the time that Craterus spent in Cilicia to the installation of a military framework in preparation for future military endeavours in the Mediterranean,<sup>375</sup> a task which is likely to have been officially

---

<sup>371</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Diod. 18.14.1; Just. 12.12.9; cf. Badian *JHS*. 81. (1961). pp. 35-6; Bosworth, *CQ*. 21. (1971). p. 125; Heckel, 1992. p. 126; Heckel, 2006. p. 98; Anson, 2014. p. 14; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 108; Pitt & Richardson, *CQ* 67 (Forthcoming 2017).

<sup>372</sup> Errington (2008. p. 16.), comes close to this interpretation, however does not assert the point that Antipater was unable to leave Macedon due to Greek unrest. For more on the situation facing Antipater in Macedon and the impact it had on his ability to depart for the east, see: Pitt & Richardson, *CQ*. 67. (Forthcoming, 2017).

<sup>373</sup> For discussion of this topic and a detailed evaluation of the scholarship, see: Pitt & Richardson, *CQ*. 67. (Forthcoming, 2017).

<sup>374</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.9; Ashton, *Makedonia*. 5 (1993). p. 126; Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 50; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 108.

<sup>375</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 161; cf Badian. *JHS*. 81. (1961). p. 36; Bosworth, *CQ*. 21. (1971). pp. 125-6.

sanctioned by Alexander.<sup>376</sup> If this is the case, the need for Craterus' immediate return to Macedon, as well as for Antipater's presence in Babylon may not have been as pressing as presented within the ancient texts. It has also been suggested that desertion may have plagued Craterus' ranks in 324, slowing his progress, as time would be required to replenish the depleted ranks.<sup>377</sup> Diodorus states that *"ἦγε δὲ πεζοὺς μὲν τῶν εἰς Ἀσίαν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ συνδιαβεβηκότων ἑξακισχιλίου, τῶν δ' ἐν παρόδῳ προσειλημμένων τετρακισχιλίου."*<sup>378</sup> This phrasing, however, is not precise enough to determine when the four thousand troops were recruited or by whom.<sup>379</sup> It is entirely possible that Bosworth is correct, and that there were desertions by tired veterans longing for home who decided not to wait in Cilicia and left of their own accord. An alternative interpretation of the four thousand in Diodorus may be that the historian is merely making a distinction between those troops that Alexander secured after he had entered Asia and those who comprised his original force, meaning that Craterus was leading a combined force of veterans back to Macedon. It is possible that the former were recruited from the Macedonian mercenaries operating in the region prior to 334 and Alexander's invasion and that their recruitment had been factored into the king's plan.<sup>380</sup> By 324, these men would also have been considered Macedonian veterans of Alexander's campaigns and Diodorus may have been providing further information for his readers. However caution must be exercised, as the composition of Craterus' army is not mentioned in any other entry within the ancient sources, or even elsewhere by Diodorus himself.<sup>381</sup> While this does not discount the possibility of desertion occurring on a large scale in the force led by Craterus, therefore causing him to remain in Cilicia longer than he or Alexander intended, the evidence for this is not as convincing as has previously been suggested.

---

<sup>376</sup> Bosworth, 1988. p. 162.

<sup>377</sup> Bosworth, *CQ.* 21. (1971). p. 125.

<sup>378</sup> Diod. 18.16.4.

<sup>379</sup> Landucci Gattinoni (2008). p. 97.) does not provide any further light on this issue, instead focusing upon Craterus's later actions and his subsequent meeting with Antipater in Europe. For discussion on the 4,000 recruits, see: Bosworth, *JHS.* 100. (1980). p. 19; Hammond, *JHS.* 109. (1989). p. 67; Anson, 2004. p. 68.

<sup>380</sup> cf. Ch. 3.

<sup>381</sup> Diod. 18.3.4; cf. Arr. 7.12.4; Curt. 10.4.3.

An additional consideration, which may explain Craterus's slow advancement was his health, or rather lack thereof. While not elderly,<sup>382</sup> Craterus was well advanced in years, and Arrian states that by the time of his despatch to Macedon, he was an invalid,<sup>383</sup> a situation which would have hampered a swift journey if Alexander required him to replace Antipater quickly.

Polyperchon was placed as Craterus's second in command of the army "*so that they would not long for a leader.*"<sup>384</sup> This may imply that Alexander was not confident that Craterus would survive the journey to Macedon. Additionally, Alexander must have regarded Polyperchon as sufficiently trustworthy to not only lead Craterus' veterans home, but also to assume all of his duties, including those of the Regency. The high regard in which Alexander held Polyperchon may also have influenced the decision later made by Antipater in choice of his replacement as regent. In selecting Polyperchon he was, in effect, following the original choice that had been made by Alexander. This, however, was in the future. The more immediate question is whether Antipater would have relinquished the regency to Craterus upon his arrival if Alexander were still alive at this point. If Antipater was hostile towards Alexander and his representative, it may be expected that he would have attempted to retain his position of power.<sup>385</sup> Diodorus does provide an account that states Craterus was sent by Alexander to kill Antipater and that Craterus immediately decided against this course of action once news of Alexander's death had reached him.<sup>386</sup> The initial order may suggest hostility between Antipater and Craterus. This was later compounded by Craterus' lack of action in aiding Antipater during the Lamian War that had broken out in Greece, despite Antipater's request for assistance.<sup>387</sup> Craterus may have been waiting for an opportune time when he

---

<sup>382</sup> Being born ca. 370. cf. Heckel, 1992. p. 107; Heckel, 2006. p. 95; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 109.

<sup>383</sup> Arr. 7.12.4.

<sup>384</sup> Arr. 7.12.4: "...μή ποθῆσαι στρατηγὸν τοὺς ἰόντος."

<sup>385</sup> Bosworth, *CQ.* 21. (1971). p. 125.

<sup>386</sup> Diod. 18.4.1.

<sup>387</sup> Diod. 18.12.1. cf. Diod. 18.14.4–5; Plut. *Eum.* 3. Leonnatus was forced to travel to Antipater's aid from Phrygia.

would be able to enter Macedon when Antipater was at his weakest, thereby enabling him to supplant the *de facto* regent with relative ease.<sup>388</sup> However, taking into account the distances between Cilicia and Macedon as well as his ill health, Craterus' ability to launch a swift military intervention seems unlikely.

The notion that Craterus was ordered to kill Antipater too seems unlikely. Antipater was to bring fresh troops to reinforce Alexander in Asia. Given this, the order for his death seems illogical. Although caution must be exercised when evaluating events with the benefit of hindsight, the supposed assassination order does seem to stand out as an anomaly in the sequence of events, particularly considering how soon after it is suggested, it is dismissed by Craterus. Because of the unrest that may arise in the absence of a powerful officer, Antipater's unwillingness to depart for Babylon can be attributed to the potential turmoil that may arise, more so than any personal concerns that he had for his safety. An alternative explanation is that, even if Antipater did fear Alexander, the notion of a leaderless Macedon and an unruly Greece provided a pragmatically convincing reason for his reluctance to obey Alexander and attend him in Babylon. If this reasoning is accepted, the level of animosity between the two then becomes redundant.

The events that took place between Cassander and Alexander are sparsely recorded by the ancient sources, and the details that are available need to be treated with caution. Plutarch is the only source that provides a detailed account of Cassander's actions once he arrives in Babylon.<sup>389</sup> Arrian is silent on Cassander's time in Babylon, save that he was a member of a fictitious conspiracy to murder Alexander, a statement which is echoed by Diodorus, Curtius, and Justin.<sup>390</sup> However, none of these sources make reference to Cassander's actions within Babylon to represent Antipater other than Plutarch,

---

<sup>388</sup> Bosworth, *CQ.* 21. (1971). p. 125.

<sup>389</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.4; Adams, *Anc. World.* 2. (1979). p. 114.

<sup>390</sup> Arr. 7.27.1; Curt. 10.10.19; Diod. 17.118.2; Just. 12.14.6. The accounts contained within the other ancient sources as well as a brief outline of the Antiaptrid conspiracy to murder Alexander are discussed below.



who provides the most extensive report on Cassander.<sup>391</sup> The biographer devotes an entire section of the *Life of Alexander* to the interactions between Cassander and Alexander, a detailed account when compared to the brevity of the other sources. The relationship between the pair presented by Plutarch indicates a tense dislike between the two that results in both physical and verbal confrontations.<sup>392</sup> It has been suggested that Alexander and Cassander may have been acting upon an old mutual dislike of each other from their childhood, a childhood which they may have spent together in the Macedonian Court.<sup>393</sup> Certainly there are references that suggest as much, both in Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* and *Moralia*, with references to Cassander's tutelage under Aristotle, when Alexander states "ταῦτα ἐκεῖνα ... σοφίσματα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους εἰς ἑκάτερον τὸν λόγον."<sup>394</sup> The *Moralia* records a dinner party of uncertain date with both Alexander and Cassander being present, where Alexander becomes enraged with Cassander's behaviour as he forced a flautist he lusted after to kiss him, leading the king to exclaim, "ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἐρασθῆναί τινος ἔξεστι δι' ὑμᾶς."<sup>395</sup> The most violent encounter between Cassander and Alexander recorded by Plutarch is centred around Cassander's reaction to the practice of *proskynesis*, after Alexander introduced the practice into his court. Soon after arriving in Babylon, Cassander witnessed Alexander taking part in "βαρβάρους τινὰς προσκυνοῦντας."<sup>396</sup> Plutarch's account conveys a significant rift between Cassander and Alexander, which according to Plutarch, affected Cassander so deeply that he carried the mental scars of this long after the king's death in 323.<sup>397</sup> This could also explain Cassander's aversion to seeking royal support against Polyperchon after 319. However, there are issues with Plutarch's account that require closer scrutiny in order to determine its usefulness. As previously stated, Plutarch's information is not corroborated by any other

---

<sup>391</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.4.

<sup>392</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.3; Plut. *Mor.* 180F.

<sup>393</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 44; Possibly stemming from Cassander's time as Alexander's companion during their youth. cf. Berve, Vol. I. 1926. pp. 37-39; For a recent discussion of importance and role of the *Paides Basilikoi* in the Macedonian Court, see: Carney, in Howe & Reames, 2008. pp. 145-164.

<sup>394</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.5.

<sup>395</sup> Plut. *Mor.* 180F.

<sup>396</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.2.

<sup>397</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.6.

ancient account and a picture of general animosity between Alexander and Cassander is evident throughout his work.

That Alexander was prone to outbursts of physical and verbal violence, as recorded by Plutarch in the description of his behaviour towards Cassander, is not an isolated account. Contained within the histories of Arrian and Curtius are similar accounts of the Macedonian elites' mockery of the practice of *proskynesis*.<sup>398</sup> Arrian preserves an interaction between Alexander and Leonnatus in 327, where the king reprimands Leonnatus for his mockery of Persian dignitaries who prostrated themselves before the king.<sup>399</sup> There has been some debate over which Leonnatus is involved within Arrian's account. Berve suggests he was the son of the otherwise unknown Antipater of Aigai,<sup>400</sup> however Badian and Heckel correctly identify him as the famous *somatophylax*.<sup>401</sup> Curtius recalls a violent attack against Polyperchon at the hands of Alexander for a similar reaction to the foreign practice, which took place at the same time as Arrian's account.<sup>402</sup> After mocking the practice, Polyperchon is thrown to the ground and subsequently himself mocked by Alexander. Both the versions by Arrian and Curtius are strikingly similar to Plutarch's account involving Cassander in 324.<sup>403</sup> Therefore three separate accounts exist of Alexander's rebuking of Macedonian officers for the mockery of *proskynesis* within his court, two of which are said to have occurred simultaneously in 327 and another in 324. Each of the recording sources provides a different name for the victim of the king's rage and all lack corroborating evidence that could help in strengthening their historicity. While these reports are isolated and lack corroboration by other ancient writers, this is not enough to automatically dismiss them. Issues and questions are raised that require further examination in order to determine how best they can be used in

---

<sup>398</sup> Arr. 4.12.2; Curt. 8.5.22. For a detailed evaluation of the practice of *proskynesis*, see: Bowden, *BICS* 56. (2013). pp. 55-77.

<sup>399</sup> Arr. 4.12.2; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978) p. 459.

<sup>400</sup> Berve, Vol. II. 1926. p. 235. cf. Arr. *Ind.* 18.6; Heckel, 2006. p. 147.

<sup>401</sup> Badian, *TAPA*. 91. (1960) p. 337, n. 34; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 459; Heckel, 1992. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 147. s.v. *Leonnatus* [2].

<sup>402</sup> Curt. 8.5.22; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p.459.

<sup>403</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 74.2-5; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 461.

relation to this study, in particular how Plutarch's version of Cassander's interaction with Alexander might explain his later actions. If historical, Alexander's assault on Cassander within the Macedonian Court would provide a fitting cause for Cassander's later reluctance to engage with royals after Antipater's death in 319.

There is some concern regarding the similarity of the accounts of Arrian, Curtius and Plutarch. The question is then raised as to whether they are in fact separate isolated accounts, with separate recordings by separate authors that record Alexander's punishment of three separate men, or whether in fact some confusion has taken place within the ancient literary tradition. If confusion or mistakes have occurred, there is a possibility of reducing the number of accounts of mockery against *proskynesis* conducted by Macedonian elites. Problems are immediately raised with Polyperchon's involvement. Heckel has identified two specific issues that suggest that Polyperchon's *proskynesis* account, which is found in Curtius, can be redirected into Arrian's account involving Leonnatus.<sup>404</sup> First is the contradiction that takes place within Curtius's own narrative; the historian had placed Polyperchon away from Alexander and his court during the period of time in which his *proskynesis* event is supposed to have occurred.<sup>405</sup> This placement of Polyperchon also has supporting evidence from Arrian, who clearly states that Alexander left Polyperchon behind in Sogdiana as he departed for Bactria with the majority of Macedonian forces, along with fellow infantry commanders, Attalus<sup>406</sup> and Alcetus,<sup>407</sup> who were under the overall command of Craterus.<sup>408</sup> Arrian then goes on to write that their mission in Sogdiana was to subdue rebellion in the region of Pareitacene.<sup>409</sup> Heckel suggests that Curtius, or his source, may have confused Polyperchon for Leonnatus, and dismisses the possibility that the

---

<sup>404</sup> Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). pp. 459-460.

<sup>405</sup> Curt. 8.5.2. "*Polyperchon quoque regionem, quae Bubacene appellatur, in dicionem redegit.*"; Heckel. *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 460.

<sup>406</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 63.

<sup>407</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 8.

<sup>408</sup> Arr. 4.22.1.

<sup>409</sup> Arr. 4.22.1; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 460; Heckel, 1992. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 227.

versions by Curtius and Arrian can both be historical, particularly as there is persuasive evidence for Polyperchon's absence from court at this time.<sup>410</sup> The most plausible explanation for the account by Curtius is that both Arrian and Curtius are referring to the same instance of *proskynesis* mockery, which occurred in 327.<sup>411</sup> Combined with the physical impossibility of Polyperchon's simultaneous presence at Alexander's court and his mission with Craterus, it can be argued that Curtius, or his source material, is mistaken in his account of Polyperchon's involvement in the *proskynesis* affair.<sup>412</sup> Given this, it is possible to assimilate the accounts of both Arrian and Curtius into a single episode.

It has been persuasively argued that Arrian and Curtius have both described the same event, and there is cause to think that Plutarch, or his original source material may have done so as well. Plutarch's version of events also requires further dissection and a differentiation needs to be made between Cassander's arrival in Babylon in 324 and his supposed mockery of *proskynesis* being practised within the Macedonian court. The arrival of Cassander in order to defend Antipater's policies within Macedon is historical,<sup>413</sup> and while entangled within Plutarch's version of *proskynesis* mockery, can be treated as a separate time marker for Cassander's movements in 324. There is a striking similarity between Plutarch's account and that of Curtius<sup>414</sup> and though this is not enough in and of itself to dismiss Cassander's treatment by Alexander, caution is required in its evaluation. Plutarch's account has received some acceptance in respect to its historicity; it has also been met with more convincing

---

<sup>410</sup> Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 460. The confusion and misattribution of Polyperchon is not isolated to Curtius. Justin regularly makes the same mistake, confusing Craterus with Polyperchon on four separate occasions, Just. 12.10.1. cf. Yardley & Heckel, 1997. p. 276; Just. 13.8.5, cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 158; Just. 13.8.7. cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 159; Just. 15.1.1. cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 218. In this case though, Leonnatus cannot be substituted with Polyperchon in Curtius' text, as Polyperchon was also assigned duties that required him to be away from Alexander (Arr. 4.22.1; Plut. *Alex*. 55.6; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 460; Heckel, 1992. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 148.

<sup>411</sup> Bowden, *BICS*. 56.2. (2013). p. 73.

<sup>412</sup> Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 460, 461; Heckel, 1992. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 227.

<sup>413</sup> Heckel, 1988. p. 10.

<sup>414</sup> Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 461.

scepticism.<sup>415</sup> Heckel dismisses the account as “...a clumsy reworking of the famous episode involving Leonnatos...”,<sup>416</sup> and Bowden highlights the interchangeable nature of Alexander’s reaction to the mockery of *proskynesis* within the court.<sup>417</sup> Both these evaluations detract from the historicity of Plutarch’s account.

The reason, as much as it can be speculated upon, for Plutarch’s transfer of the *proskynesis* event to Babylon and Cassander’s insertion into the work is for literary purposes rather than historical. The event is placed in the 74<sup>th</sup> of the 77-section biography, which is immediately prior to Alexander being taken ill,<sup>418</sup> an illness ultimately resulting in his death.<sup>419</sup> It must be highlighted that this narrative sequencing by Plutarch should not be confused with the historic chronological sequence, as the biographer has highly compressed Cassander’s activities in Babylon, placing his arrival in the city, the *proskynesis* event and Alexander’s death in close proximity. Cassander’s arrival has already been stated as taking place in 324 with the *proskynesis* event occurring shortly thereafter. The date of Alexander’s death has generated a great degree of scholarly evaluation, and is set firmly to the 11<sup>th</sup> of June the following year.<sup>420</sup> The transfer may be deemed an attempt to locate Cassander and the Antipatrids in closer thematic proximity to Alexander’s death; Plutarch names Antipater in discussion of possible causes for the king’s demise,<sup>421</sup> however he does explicitly highlight the issues with the poisoning plot.<sup>422</sup> While the plausibility of Plutarch’s version of *proskynesis* involving Cassander taking place is improbable, the passages still have significance to this study as they are indicative not only of the existing inter-familial tensions between the Argeads and Antipatrids, but also of the

---

<sup>415</sup> Blackwell, 1999. p. 158; Bowden, *BICS*. 56. (2013). p. 73; Heckel, *AJP*. 99. (1978). p. 460; Heckel, 1988. p. 10.

<sup>416</sup> Heckel, 1988. p. 10.

<sup>417</sup> Bowden, *BICS*. 56.2. (2013). p. 73.

<sup>418</sup> Plut. *Alex*. 75.5.

<sup>419</sup> Plut. *Alex*. 75.6.

<sup>420</sup> Boiy, 2007. p. 41.

<sup>421</sup> Plut. *Alex*. 77.3.

<sup>422</sup> Plut. *Alex*. 77.1. For further discussion of Plutarch’s treatment of Alexander’s death, see below.

propaganda campaign to discredit the Antipatrids which took place amongst the Didochoi after June 323, both of which are not Plutarchean inventions.<sup>423</sup>

While it is possible to deduce from our ancient sources that Cassander arrived in Babylon, details of what took place thereafter are less certain. The majority of accounts compress Cassander's time in Babylon and conflate the period of time he was there into the death of Alexander and the rumours of a conspiracy to murder him, rumours which place members of the Antipatrid house as engineers of the plot. It should be noted that the cause of Alexander's death is not a central focus of this study, nor will a definitive answer to the question of the involvement of the Antipatrids be attempted. More important for this discussion are the effects that the rumours surrounding Alexander's death had upon Antipater and Cassander, particularly in the impact of these on Cassander's later attempts to secure a base of support after 319. Arrian provides an overview of the conspiracy, describing Cassander's delivery of the poison to his brother Iollas<sup>424</sup> who, as Alexander's royal cupbearer, had means to administer it to the king. However, Arrian does not state outright that Alexander's death was the result of Antipatrid machinations, stating "πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα οἶδα ἀναγεγραμμένα ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτῆς,"<sup>425</sup> though he does fail to mention what the other accounts actually are. Curtius, while not as hesitant to question the conspiracy's validity, for the most part echoes Arrian's appraisal, regarding the origins of the rumours.<sup>426</sup> Justin is more direct, stating with confidence that Alexander did indeed meet his demise through a conspiracy involving Antipater and his sons, stating, "*auctor insidiarum Antipater fuit.*"<sup>427</sup> Diodorus does not name Cassander specifically as a participant, but does acknowledge the family plot to murder Alexander, with Antipater's son, this

---

<sup>423</sup> For further discussion of the events after Alexander's death, see below.

<sup>424</sup> Arr. 7.27.1.

<sup>425</sup> Arr. 7.27.1.

<sup>426</sup> Curt. 10.10.14. "*Veneno necatum esse credidere plerique.*"

<sup>427</sup> Just. 12.14.1. cf. Just. 12.13.10. "*Amici causas morbi insidae fuerunt, quarum infamiam successorum potentia oppressit.*" Heckel suggests that Justin's acceptance of the poisoning rumour does not necessarily indicate that it was the shared opinion of Trogus and urges extreme caution in taking Justin's opinion for that of Trogus (Heckel, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. p. 266.).

time referring to Iollas rather than Cassander, being the one to administer the poison.<sup>428</sup> However, while these accounts seem to demonstrate relative consensus as to the cause of Alexander's death, ancient and modern writers have expressed scepticism as to the reality of Antipatrid involvement. Plutarch provides a name for a possible originator of the rumour, the otherwise unattested Hegnothemis, who narrated the episode, claiming to have heard it from Antigonos (*"Ἀγνοθεμὶν τινα διηγεῖσθαι λέγουσιν ὡς Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ βασιλέως ἀκούσαντα"*).<sup>429</sup> He also goes so far to state that *"οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τὸν λόγον ὅλως οἴονται πεπλάσθαι τὸν περὶ τῆς Φαρμακείας."*<sup>430</sup> The reference to Antigonos is telling, as is the time frame within which Plutarch states the rumour emerged. The rumours that surrounded the cause of Alexander's death were many and complex, and were used as a tool for political advancement within the post-323 Macedonian Empire. The impact that these rumours would have on Antipater and Cassander was extensive, and it is to the events after Alexander's death that this study now turns.

The death of Alexander the Great saw one of the most tumultuous periods of time in the history of the Macedonian Empire. Without a satisfactory heir who could assume effective control on the throne, it was left to his officers to maintain the integrity of the Empire. As previously stated, it is not the intention of this study to investigate, or contribute to the discussion surrounding the cause of Alexander the Great's death on June 11<sup>th</sup> 323, nor to state a definitive cause of his death. Of much greater significance to Antipater, Cassander and to a lesser extent, Polyperchon, is the political turmoil into which the Macedonian Empire was plunged and the power that the poisoning conspiracy achieved within the European-sphere of the Macedonian Empire. The validity of the plot has already been questioned, but its historicity is not of significance to this study. What is significant however is the large amount of currency that the rumour achieved among the Greek cities; it seems to have been accepted without question by Alexander's mother, Olympias, who was still in Molossia, and whose

---

<sup>428</sup> Diod. 17.118.1.

<sup>429</sup> Plut. Alex. 77.3.

<sup>430</sup> Plut. Alex. 77.5.

hatred of Antipater has been discussed previously.<sup>431</sup> For Cassander, the rumours of involvement had a profound effect on his later attempts at securing support against Polyperchon in 319; his avenues of potential support were limited as pro-monarchical groups and members of the Argead royal house would not be willing to enter into alliances with him against Polyperchon, the officially appointed regent of Macedon.<sup>432</sup>

Luckily there is a sizable body of ancient source material for this period of time, as well as substantial modern scholarship devoted to the events surrounding Alexander's death and the jockeying for position by the members of the Diadochi, from which this study is able to draw. Much of the modern scholarship, primarily the works of Errington,<sup>433</sup> Bosworth,<sup>434</sup> Anson,<sup>435</sup> and Meeus,<sup>436</sup> have provided significant detail and clarification to the events immediately after the death of Alexander and the heated political environment that it created.

There were many rumours and theories regarding the cause of Alexander's death, and those who may have played a part in it.<sup>437</sup> However, for the purposes of evaluating and assessing the effects that the rumours of Antipatrid involvement in the murder of Alexander had on the family and on Cassander's future endeavours after 319, there needs to be a delineation and separation of the rumours and propaganda circulating around Babylon and the greater Macedonian Empire at the time of Alexander's death, and those used in later years as a political device by the Diadochoi in order to defame and undermine their respective opponents in the empire. The propaganda campaign conducted against Cassander by Antigonus during Cassander's consolidation of power in

---

<sup>431</sup> See: Ch. 3.

<sup>432</sup> See: Ch. 6.1.

<sup>433</sup> Errington, *JHS*. 90. (1970). pp. 49 – 77.

<sup>434</sup> Bosworth, *CQ*. 21. (1971). pp. 112 – 136; Bosworth, 2003.

<sup>435</sup> Anson, *CP*. 87. (1992), pp. 38 – 43.

<sup>436</sup> Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008). pp. 39 – 82.

<sup>437</sup> Heckel (2006. p. 17.) has collected the various causes proposed by modern scholars, including, but not limited to, “...*typhus, malaria, alcoholism, pancreatitis, perforated bowel, West Nile Virus or even bereavement* [after the death of Hephaiston].”



316, following the deaths of Philip III Arrhidaeus, Eurydice and the execution of Olympias<sup>438</sup> is of particular significance for this study.

Bosworth has clearly highlighted the caution that is required in investigating the influence of the propaganda on the ancient sources, when he discussed the version offered by Diodorus of accounts based upon his primary sources for the year of 323, Hieronymus of Cardia, *"...propaganda is not always clearly labelled, and it can be difficult to detect, particularly when politically biased interpretations are swallowed as factual by secondary [ancient] sources...the probability of our extant sources being fouled by propaganda is very high."*<sup>439</sup> It is only with an awareness of this integration and assimilation of propaganda and historical narrative within the ancient sources that the effect that the rumour of Alexander's poisoning had on the Antipatrids can be assessed.

Plutarch provides evidence for a succession of propaganda campaigns conducted by the Diadochi against each other. During his evaluation of the poisoning of Alexander, he writes “*φαρμακείας δὲ ὑποψίαν παραντίκα μὲν οὐδεὶς ἔσχεν, ἔκτω δὲ ἔτει φασὶ μηνύσεως γενομένης τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα πολλοὺς μὲν ἀναλεῖν, ἐκρῖψαι δὲ τὰ λείψανα τοῦ Ἰόλα τεθνηκότος, ὥς τούτου τὸ φάρμακον ἐγγέαντος.*”<sup>440</sup> With this account, he provides a historically tenuous authority for the rumour, the unknown Hagnothemis, and states where he was able to get his information, Antigonus (“*Ἀντιγόνου τοῦ βασιλέως.*”)<sup>441</sup> These two excerpts are historically tentative as Plutarch was mistaken in the belief that the poisoning theory was a later invention and not present in Babylon in 323, however his account is indicative of a series of propaganda campaigns employed by the Diadochi, in this case, by Antigonus against Antipater.

News travels fast, and the news of Alexander's death moved swiftly throughout the Empire, and with it, no doubt, the suspected cause. The speed at which the news travelled is not difficult to ascertain, so that a *terminus ante quem* can be

<sup>438</sup> For a full discussion and analysis of these events, see Ch. 7.2.

<sup>439</sup> Bosworth, *CQ*. 21. (1971). pp. 112 – 113.

<sup>440</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 77.2.

<sup>441</sup> Plut. *Alex.* 77.3-4.

placed for its arrival into Greece and Macedon. The latest point at which Alexander's death could have become known in Greece was the initiation of the Lamian War in 323.<sup>442</sup> For Antipater in Macedon, an immediate concern would have been the possible unrest occurring in the Greek cities. Just as with Philip's assassination in 336, Antipater was well aware of the risks resulting from the political instability caused by the death of a monarch.<sup>443</sup> Without an heir apparent to succeed Alexander, combined with a significant portion of Macedonian military reserves being spread throughout the new boundaries of the empire, there was need for swift and decisive action.

Facing unrest in Greece, and limited military reserves, Antipater knew he would need to bring more reserves into Macedon as soon as possible. When news arrived of Alexander's death, Antipater sent word to Craterus, who was still in Cilicia, to bring his troops to Macedon, to assist in the subjugation of civil unrest. The event that sparked the conflict was the news that Alexander was dead. If this is so, then the period of time that it took rumour, and subsequent affirmation, to travel within the empire can be ascertained. However determining when this was is less well defined. Our sources only state what caused the Lamian War, but not how much time passed between June 323 and the initiation of hostilities. The significance of the timing would not only aid in understanding the speed at which news could travel through the Macedonian Empire, but also mark the point at which Cassander had potential support groups available. His support at this time was limited. Pro-monarchical groups within the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire would not have wished

---

<sup>442</sup> Diod. 18.9.1; Poddighe, 2002. p. 17; Green, in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 1; Bosworth (in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 19) places the outbreak of hostilities by the autumn of 323; Errington, *JHS*. 90. (1970). p. 57. Errington states that news of Alexander's death would have arrived at much the same time into Macedon as it did in Greece. Justin (13.5.7.) states that the hostilities began when news of a Macedonian force travelling from the east to Greece in order to subdue Greek revolt arrived. However, within the context of his narrative, Alexander has already died (cf. 12.16.1.) and a delineation between events in Greece taking place during Alexander's life and events taking place after is implied by Justin (13.5.1; Ashton, *Antichthon*. 17. (1984). p. 52, 60; Yardley, Wheatley and Heckel, 2011. p. 123.).

<sup>443</sup> See Ch. 3.

to align themselves with Cassander if he had in fact played a role in the king's death. Additionally, if the time that it took for the news of Alexander's death to reach Greece and Macedon from Babylon can be defined, the implications for later events can be better understood, in particular the time taken for Polyperchon to learn of Cassander's first invasion of Macedon in 317 while in Asia Minor fighting alongside Eumenes as well as his speedy return.<sup>444</sup>

The ancient sources do not provide a well-defined, precise timing for the initiation of hostilities for the Lamian War.<sup>445</sup> Justin merely implies that conflict broke out after Alexander's death,<sup>446</sup> where he ties the war with Antipater's later besiegement at Lamia in the autumn of 323.<sup>447</sup> This compression of events and time between the news of Alexander's death arriving in Greece and the outbreak of the Lamian War is also recorded by Diodorus, who states that conflict broke out not long after the news arrived.<sup>448</sup> Plutarch refers to the Lamian War in several of his biographies. Within the Demosthenes, much of the compression in Justin and Diodorus can be also found, combining the outbreak of war with the death of Alexander, linking these events to the siege of Antipater at Lamia.<sup>449</sup> The Eumenes touches upon events in Greece after Alexander's death after hostilities in the region had already commenced, beginning his account of events with Antipater at Lamia.<sup>450</sup> Plutarch does provide a more detailed account of the Athenian reception to news of Alexander's death in the Life of Phocion,<sup>451</sup> however this is of limited use in ascertaining the passage of time between the news arriving and war taking place. These accounts from the ancient sources, while vital for understanding the Lamian War itself, and the significance for the region, do not aid significantly in understanding the passage of time between the 11<sup>th</sup> June 323 and the conflict beginning. It is unreasonable to expect this from

---

<sup>444</sup> Polyperchon's campaign in Asia Minor as well as Cassander's first invasion of Macedon in 317 are both discussed in detail within Chapter 6.

<sup>445</sup> Schmitt, 1992. p. 55. n. 41; Poddige, 2002. p. 17.

<sup>446</sup> Just. 13.5.1-8.

<sup>447</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 44; Heckel, 2006. pp. 36-37.

<sup>448</sup> Diod. 18.9.1.

<sup>449</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 27.1.

<sup>450</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 3.3.

<sup>451</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 22.4.-23.4.

the ancient writers, as their focus was not on providing succinct dating for all events within the respective narratives.

Because of the lack of clear temporal accounts within the ancient sources, modern scholarship has attempted to present a more defined date for the commencement of the Lamian War. Heckel has suggested that the war broke out during the summer of 323 but is not more precise than this.<sup>452</sup> Both Adams and Boiy offer much the same conclusions, with a general dating to the summer of 323.<sup>453</sup> Landucci Gattinoni has ventured slightly further than Heckel and Boiy, proposing that the Lamian War began in the late summer of 323, roughly two months after the death of Alexander.<sup>454</sup> Bosworth offers a narrow, albeit tentative, date for commencement of the Lamian War, with a proposal of late July 323.<sup>455</sup> What can be drawn from these conclusions is that the word of Alexander's death spread fast, taking no more than two months, possibly less depending on the definition of summer, for the news to travel the roughly two and a half thousand-kilometres between Babylon and the Greek Peninsula.<sup>456</sup>

From the account of Diodorus and Plutarch's Phocion, it is clear that there were two phases in the news regarding Alexander's death arriving in Athens from Babylon.<sup>457</sup> First, there was the news that arrived via messengers, most likely travelling along communication lines through the empire. While originating from Babylon, these messengers were not eyewitnesses to events in Babylon, and therefore could only provide the information contained within their communications. This caused this initial phase of news to be treated carefully by the Athenians; to go to war against Macedon based on incorrect information regarding Alexander's death would be disastrous for their cause. Despite the news carried by the messengers ultimately proving to be true, it was deemed prudent for Athens to wait for more reliable accounts from Babylon to arrive in

---

<sup>452</sup> Heckel, 1988. p. 77.

<sup>453</sup> Boiy, 2007. p. 148; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 209.

<sup>454</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. LII.

<sup>455</sup> Bosworth. 2002. p. 280.

<sup>456</sup> Talbert, 1985. p. 71.

<sup>457</sup> Diod. 18.9.1-4; Plut. Phoc. 22.4

the city before any action was taken.<sup>458</sup> This should not be taken as a comment on the reliability of the news brought in this initial phase, but more that the Athenians did not wish to commence a rebellion without complete certainty that Alexander was dead. The two phases of news coming to Athens came at different times. The news arriving by messenger could travel more swiftly and came to Athens in the space of a few short weeks.<sup>459</sup> This allowed Athens, already preparing to overthrow Macedonian rule, to intensify their arrangements for conflict should confirmation of Alexander's death arrive.<sup>460</sup> This confirmation arrived in the beginning of August 323, and because of their previous readiness, Athens began the war.<sup>461</sup> Two key factors can be learned from the date of the commencement of the Lamian War. First it was possible for news to travel via messenger from Babylon to Athens in a few weeks and secondly it was possible when pressed by necessity for the entire journey to be undertaken in just under two months.<sup>462</sup>

No war begins in an instant, and the Athenians had clearly been preparing for conflict secretly for some time prior to the news of Alexander's death arriving in the city.<sup>463</sup> Diodorus states that Alexander's death was the catalyst that began the hostilities.<sup>464</sup> If the news of Alexander's death was indeed the cause for the war to break out, it provides a set date for the latest possible time that this news arrived in Greece. Additionally, and what is important to the central issue of this study and the struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon is that, if the news arrived in Greece and Macedon at roughly the same time, it is likely that Epirus

---

<sup>458</sup> Diod. 18.9.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 22.3-4. Schmitt suggests these eyewitnesses may have been in the form of Athenian Embassies returning from the court in Babylon. Schmitt, 1992. p. 55-56.

<sup>459</sup> Schmitt, 1992. p. 55. n. 41.

<sup>460</sup> Diod. 18.9.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 22.4.

<sup>461</sup> Diod. 18.9.1,5; Plut. *Phoc.* 23.1; Schmitt, 1992. p. 55.

<sup>462</sup> For more discussion of sailing and travel in the ancient world, see Casson, 1974, especially pp. 150-162.

<sup>463</sup> Diod. 18.9.1-4. Plut. *Phoc.* 21.3

<sup>464</sup> Diod. 18.9.1.

would have learned of it as well. This in turn means that word of her son's death reached Olympias, who was still in Molossia, in 323.<sup>465</sup>

When news reached Olympias of Alexander's death and the rumoured involvement of Antipater, her political adversary for the last thirteen years, and his sons, there was a significant change in the dynamic of their feud. The proposition of Antipatrid involvement would not have been difficult for Olympias to believe and she accepted the truth of their involvement without hesitation. Her willingness to do so was due to the still ongoing tensions between Antipater and Olympias that had existed ever since Alexander took the throne of Macedon in 336.<sup>466</sup> That Olympias had departed from Macedon to Molossia during Alexander's absence in 331 was a direct result of her dissatisfaction with Antipater's position as regent, and the tensions between the two.<sup>467</sup> Her continuous correspondence with Alexander pleading for a replacement of Antipater as regent due to the apparent irreverence he displayed towards the king and her success in this endeavour, having Antipater replaced with Craterus in 324, gave her further reason to believe that Antipater and his family had been involved in the assassination of Alexander. Antipatrid involvement in Alexander's death, regardless of the validity of this accusation, added to the growing list of grievances Olympias held against Antipater. As she would have seen the situation, Antipater, a troublesome, powerful and recently supplanted elite within the Macedonian Empire, locked in an increasingly tense relationship with the king, had sound reasons for plotting to eliminate Alexander. Despite the tensions between the two being attributable to a difference in agendas between Alexander and Antipater because of their respective goals after 334, Olympias constructed the events as an interpersonal struggle for power within the Macedonian Empire.

This event marks an important evolution in the conflict between Antipater and Olympias. Cassander was explicitly tied to the reported conspiracy to poison

---

<sup>465</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 121; Carney, 2006. p. 59. For Olympias' grief, see: Ael. *VH*. 13.30.

<sup>466</sup> See Ch. 3.

<sup>467</sup> See Ch. 3. pp. 75-76.

Alexander, as it was he who had supposedly transported the deadly agent from Macedon to Babylon. Whether Cassander was in fact responsible for Alexander's death cannot be known, nor is this a major focus of this study. The story is believable considering the negative atmosphere between Alexander and Cassander and the close proximity that the family had to Alexander prior to his death. What is important for the purposes of this study is the impact that the rumours had on the already tense relationship between Antipater and Olympias. It resulted in the feud now extending beyond Antipater and Olympias, including Cassander and other members of the family as targets for her anger. As Carney eloquently states, "[t]he death of Alexander would transform what had begun as a personal struggle between Antipater and Olympias into an increasingly deadly dynastic dispute."<sup>468</sup> Alexander's death was a driving force for Olympias's later actions. She entered into an alliance with Polyperchon, Cassander's greatest rival in Greece, facilitating her return to Macedon in 317 in order to act as caretaker for her grandson, Alexander IV. During her time in Macedon, Olympias would embark upon a series of executions and murders that had some basis in retribution for her son's death.<sup>469</sup>

The period between 324 and 323 was a pivotal and informative time in the life of Cassander, as well as for an understanding of his coming conflict with Polyperchon in 319. It is clear from his journey to Babylon that he was a trusted and capable diplomat in the eyes of his father, who was unable to depart from the Macedonian homeland following his replacement with Craterus, due to the unrest among the Greek cities, which was likely to occur as a result of his absence. Cassander's time in Babylon was volatile, given his previously negative experiences with Alexander III. The desire to throw off the shackles of Macedonian hegemony in Greece was real, and with the news of Alexander's death reaching Europe, Antipater's decision to remain in Macedon was justified by the outbreak of the Lamian War. While the hostile interactions with Alexander may in part, account for the Cassander's later aversion to seeking

---

<sup>468</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 59.

<sup>469</sup> For discussion of the multifaceted nature of Olympias' return to Macedon in 317 at the behest of Polyperchon, as well as the events thereafter see, Ch. 6.

immediate Argead support in 319, his perceived involvement in the conspiracy to murder Alexander, and the traction that the rumour achieved within the empire would also turn Cassander away from the royal family during the initial years of conflict against Polyperchon. The supposed Antipatrid involvement in Alexander's death would not only affect Cassander, but also had a profound impact upon Polyperchon's ability to secure Argead support from groups hostile to Cassander's efforts to build his powerbase. Most prominent of these groups was Olympias and her Epirote supporters, who would go on to actively combat Cassander, as the previously political hostility between Olympias and the Antipatrid's evolved into a violent war. With the sudden and unexplained death of Alexander III, the emerging Diadochoi would refocus the empire, capitalising on the possibility to advance their own standing in this new period of opportunity.



## Chapter 5: Antipater's choice of successor.<sup>470</sup>

After a protracted illness spanning several months, Antipater died in the late summer or early autumn of 319.<sup>471</sup> Before he died, he appointed his successor for the regency of Macedon.<sup>472</sup> Antipater chose to appoint Polyperchon, one of the oldest members of the Diadochoi as regent,<sup>473</sup> and his son Cassander as *chiliarch*. During Antipater's period of ill health, Cassander had assumed the running of his father's office, maintaining Antipatrid representation in the Macedonian political sphere. This decision by Antipater to name Polyperchon, an experienced war veteran who was trusted by Alexander, rather than his son, was the catalyst for the conflict between Cassander and the newly appointed regent. The war between them ultimately resulted in the foundation of the short lived Antipatrid Dynasty and the destruction of the royal Argead family. It is clear that Cassander did not accept his father's choice for successor. Diodorus states that he considered it "... *outrageous that one not related by blood should succeed to the command of his father.*"<sup>474</sup> Rather than accept his father's decision, Cassander chose to leave Macedon for Asia Minor, building a support base there that he would bring to bear against Polyperchon on his return.

Diodorus' account suggests that Cassander may have viewed the position of regent as a hereditary post, however this interpretation may be influenced by

---

<sup>470</sup> Portions of this chapter have been presented at the *AMPHORAE*. 8. Conference held at the University of Melbourne, 2014 and the *AMPHORAE*. 9. Conference held at Victoria University of Wellington, 2015. I offer my sincere thanks and gratitude to all those who attended and the feedback they provided.

<sup>471</sup> Diod. 18.84.4; Heidl. Epit. 1.4 = *FGrH*. 155. F.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1; PM. *FGrH*. 239. B. 12; Adams, 1975. p. 73; Heckel, 1992. p. 48; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 355; Poddighe, 2002. p. 171, 173; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 27; Heckel, 2006. p. 38; Boiy, 2007. pp. 136-137; Hughes, 2008. p. 215.

<sup>472</sup> Antipater's position as regent of Macedon had been reaffirmed at the Settlement of Triparadisus. Prior to this he had been operating as *strategos* of the region under the meeting of the Diadochoi at Babylon after Alexander's death. Adams, *Anc. World*. 10. (1984). p. 84; Boiy, 2007. p. 135.

<sup>473</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 193, cf. 189; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 354; Heckel, 2006. p. 227. cf. Diod. 18.48.4; Hughes, 2008. pp. 215-216.

<sup>474</sup> Diod. 18.49.1: "...δεινὸν ἡγούμενος εἰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἡγεμονίαν ὁ μὴ προσήκων κατὰ γένος διαδέξεται." (trans. Geer, 1947.); Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 215.

Diodorus' belief that Cassander's primary goal was to establish himself as king. However it is clear that the regency of Macedon was not inherited, but appointed. It seems unlikely that Cassander was unaware of this; he may, however, have felt that he was more worthy of the appointment than Polyperchon, particularly considering the political offices he had held after Alexander's death. In order to gain an understanding of Antipater's choice, it is necessary to engage with the various aspects that influenced his decision. Therefore, this chapter is separated into three distinct sections.

The first section is devoted to Cassander and his movements after his mission to Babylon in 323 until his father's death in 319. During this time, Cassander was actively engaged with the political environment, not only within Macedon once Antipater fell ill, but also within the greater Macedonian Empire, holding varied offices such as the command of the royal bodyguard, the *agema* and *chiliarch* under Antigonus after the Settlement of Triparadisus in 321/0. Upon hearing that Antipater's ill health meant he was unable to act as regent, Cassander returned to his father's side and took over the daily running of Macedon and the Greek cities until Antipater's death in 319. Despite this impressive political experience, there were issues that rendered Cassander an unsuitable candidate to take over from his father, in particular his apparent lack of military experience and his perceived immaturity as evidenced by his behaviour within the Macedonian Court.

The second section of the chapter is devoted to Polyperchon and the role he played during his return to Macedon under the command of Craterus after the opening phases of the Lamian War in 322 as well as his actions during the First Diadoch War from 321 to 320. Polyperchon's return to Macedon under Craterus demonstrated the faith placed in him by Alexander. As previously discussed,<sup>475</sup> it was by no means certain that Craterus would be able to return to Macedon. Due to his ill health, there was a real possibility that he may die on the road, leaving the veterans he led without a leader and the position of regent vacant.

---

<sup>475</sup> For the nature of Craterus' return mission to Macedon to relieve Antipater of the Regency, see Ch. 4. pp. 83-91.

Polyperchon's appointment under Craterus in 324 suggests that he was trusted and considered able to assume Craterus' role and offices should his superior die. There is no reason to suggest that Polyperchon was any less capable as a candidate for the regency five years later in 319. During the Lamian War, Antipater and Craterus worked in close conjunction and while missing from the ancient sources, it is likely that Polyperchon accompanied Craterus. That Antipater and Polyperchon became acquainted during this time is a distinct possibility. Craterus died in 321 during the First War of the Diadoch, when he fell from his horse during an engagement against Eumenes in Asia Minor near the Hellespont. After his death, Polyperchon would have taken over Craterus' position. Due to his extensive military experience and the trust that was placed in him by Alexander, Polyperchon was a prime candidate as Antipater's successor. In addition Polyperchon was closely linked to the traditional old guard, a combination which made his appointment to replace Antipater an easy and uncontroversial option within the context of the greater empire and the way in which the appointment would be perceived.

The third and final section of this chapter is concerned with Antipater himself and evaluated his decision to promote Polyperchon to the regency following his death with Cassander placed as the new regent's subordinate. While it is not the aim of this investigation to evaluate Antipater's mindset or impose an understanding upon his thought process, the outcome of Polyperchon's appointment is contextualised within the political state of play in 319.

The role of Perdiccas, and the factors leading to the First War of the Diadoch must also be considered. There was the fear that Perdiccas, in his guise as regent of Macedon, had centralised power around himself to the point where he could have attempted to seize the Throne of Macedon. There was also the issue of the wedding, which Olympias had planned between Perdiccas and Alexander's sister, Cleopatra, a plan that resulted in the rejection of Antipater's daughter, insulting the Antipatrid house. The removal of Perdiccas in 321 was still fresh in the minds of all the Diadochoi, not least of all Antipater, who was named at Triparadisus to take Perdiccas' place as regent of the empire. The Diadochoi

were, in 321, wary of the notion of a non-Argead assuming both the Throne of Macedon and other monarchical positions within the empire. These factors are vital in understanding Antipater's course of action. Should he appoint Cassander as the next regent, the appointment could be perceived as an effective foundation for an Antipatrid Dynasty within Macedon in 319, risking political repercussions, much as those set against Perdiccas. The appointment of Polyperchon helped avoid this predicament; the move was also politically astute. Although Cassander still held a sizable amount of power and influence in Macedon, the move could be seen as a statement of intent by Antipater, one designed to ease the tensions between the Antipatrid and Argead Houses, dispel any notion of Antipatrid dominance with the region and as expression of intention to keep the integrity of the Macedonian Empire, preventing it fragmenting into various fiefdoms.

### 5.1: Cassander

Just as with the period of time prior to his arrival in Babylon, references to Cassander after Alexander's death within the accounts of the ancient sources are almost non-existent. The timing of his departure from the city is also unknown and no reliable record of it taking place exists.<sup>476</sup> Nor is there any information as to his journey. There does exist within the highly fictionalised and problematic *Alexander Romance* a reference to Cassander leaving Babylon shortly before Alexander's death, suggesting that he fled to Cilicia.<sup>477</sup> This excerpt is placed in the context of the supposed Antipatrid conspiracy to have the king poisoned, placing Cassander's journey to Cilicia at the time after he had delivered the poison to his brother Iollas. This account of the *Romance*, however, does little to assist in understanding the movements of Cassander in 323. The account needs to be considered with caution and can be dismissed when placed in the greater context of the ancient extant sources. More reliable accounts do not match with the *Romance*, and therefore the account of Cassander's travel to Cilicia can be disregarded.

---

<sup>476</sup> Bosworth, 2002. p. 32. n. 17.

<sup>477</sup> Metz. *Epit.* 100; Ps. Call. 3.32.2.

The day after Alexander's death in 323, the Diadochoi convened in order to determine how the Macedonian Empire would continue in the wake of the monarch's unexpected death. The ultimate result of these meetings was the Settlement of Babylon.<sup>478</sup> While no record exists of his active participation in these discussions, it is possible that Cassander was present at the meetings as a representative of his father, in much the same way as in his original presence in Babylon the previous year.<sup>479</sup> A central focus of these meetings was maintaining the effective administration and continuation of the Empire, as well as the crowning of Arrhidaeus as Philip III as one of the successors to Alexander's throne along with the unborn child of Roxane, Alexander's wife.<sup>480</sup> It was during this time that the management of a number of satrapies within the Empire took place.<sup>481</sup> These redistributions of power are recorded in the narratives as compressed lists and a reference to Cassander can be found in the manuscripts of these sources. In Photius' account of Arrian,<sup>482</sup> Curtius,<sup>483</sup> Diodorus,<sup>484</sup> Justin<sup>485</sup> and Orosius,<sup>486</sup> Cassander is reported to have been appointed the satrapy of Caria. This assignment provides insight into not only Cassander's standing in the Macedonian Political Sphere, as the son of one of the most powerful men in the Empire, but also suggests that he was judged to have the administrative capability to govern the region in Asia Minor in his own right.

---

<sup>478</sup> Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008). p. 40.

<sup>479</sup> Certainly the possibility of such is not implausible (cf. Bosworth, *CQ.* 21. (1971). p. 21.), though reservations have been raised that Cassander remained in Babylon following Alexander's death have been raised (Adams, 1975. p. 66.).

<sup>480</sup> For a full, in depth discussion of the events that took place during the formation of the Settlement of Babylon, see: Errington, *JHS.* 90. (1970); Anson, *CPh.* 87. (1992); Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008).

<sup>481</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.5–9; Curt. 10.10; Diod. 18.3–4; Just. 13.4; Oros. 3.23.

<sup>482</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.6: "Καρῶν δὲ Κάσανδρος." This passage has been unhelpfully amended by Jacoby, who removed the kappa in order to supply Asander's name (*FGrH.* 156. F 1.6. cf. *FGrH Kommentar* pp. 557–558, where he asserts the corruption of Arrian by Photius.).

<sup>483</sup> Curt. 10.10.2. "in Cariam Cassander."

<sup>484</sup> Diod. 18.3.1. "Κασάνδρῳ μὲν Καρίαν." Also note Fischer's 1906 Tuebner of Diodorus' History, which follows the manuscript tradition, reading Asander.

<sup>485</sup> Just. 13.4.15. "Cariam Cassander."

<sup>486</sup> Oros. 3.23.9. "Cariam Cassander."

However, despite the relative consensus in the manuscript tradition,<sup>487</sup> issues have been raised with regard to the accuracy of this appointment to Caria in 323.<sup>488</sup> The central concern raised is whether it was Cassander who was in fact the recipient of the satrapy of Caria, or Asander, the son of Agathon who received the position.<sup>489</sup>

While the majority of the manuscript tradition attributes Cassander to the Carian satrapy, not all the sources are in agreement. Photius' recording of Dexippus,<sup>490</sup> later fragments of Arrian's *Successors*,<sup>491</sup> as well as the *Testmonia*<sup>492</sup> ascribe the position to Asander. This leaves a divergence in the sources, which requires discussion. Both Cassander and Asander were seemingly equally qualified for the position, as neither had received a significant administrative position within the Macedonian Empire prior to June 323.<sup>493</sup> Although the issue is contentious, given the divergence in accounts it seems clear that a scribal error has taken place at some stage during the transmission of the ancient sources. That such an error occurred within the manuscript tradition is the position that has been taken by modern scholarship, as Adams aptly describes, "*from Droysen on.*"<sup>494</sup> This was initially based on source criticism and upon

---

<sup>487</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 27.

<sup>488</sup> See Adams, 1975. p. 194.

<sup>489</sup> For more on Asander, see: Heckel, 2006. p. 57. s.v. *Asander* [2]. The possibility for who received the appointment is only between Cassander and Asander (Adams, 1975. p. 192.).

<sup>490</sup> Phot. 82.64A.40

<sup>491</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.37. The origin of the inconsistency in Arrian is difficult to attribute, but has been blamed on a scribal error that occurred at some stage in the duplication of the ancient texts over the centuries. For more comments on the possibility of a scribal error in the manuscript tradition, see below. Gorlanski (*Anc. World*. 19. (1989). p. 83.), states that, in regards to the historical worth of his recording, Photius was "*mostly correct in substance.*" cf. Henry, Vol. I. 1959. pp. XXIII-XXV.

<sup>492</sup> *LM*. 117.

<sup>493</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 198; Heckel, 2006. p. 57.

<sup>494</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 194. (It must be noted that Adams takes an opposing view within his doctoral dissertation to the general opinion of modern scholars). Cf: Droysen, Vol. II. 1878. pp. 17-18 and n. 1. p. 18; Jacoby, *FGrH Kommentar*. pp. 557 – 558; Beloch, IV<sup>2</sup> 1924. pp. 65- 66 and p. 307; Berve. Vol. II. 1926. p. 87; Stähelin, s.v. "*Kassandros* (2)", *RE*. 21<sup>2</sup>, 2293-2294; Fortina, 1965. p. 15-16; Bosworth, *CQ*. 43. (1993). pp. 421-422; Blümel, *EA*. 29. (1997). p. 139; O'Sullivan,

dismissal of the questionable reliability of various ancient literary sources, particularly the accounts of Curtius and Justin.<sup>495</sup> In more recent years, the weight of evidence coming from inscriptions has removed all doubt as to who was appointed the satrap of Caria in 323. *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 311 contains a decree by the Koarendians in Caria, and opens with the lines, “[ἐ]το[υ]ς πρώτου Φιλίππου βασιλεύοντος, Ἀσάνδρου σατραπεύοντος.”<sup>496</sup> There is also the discovery of an inscription from Latmos, first published by Blümel,<sup>497</sup> which details the naming of a new tribe of the city in honour of Asander during his tenure as satrap of Caria.<sup>498</sup> The inscription evidence supports Photius’ recording of Dexippus’ attribution of the satrapy of Caria to Asander and not Cassander. As a result, it is clear that the son of Antipater is not the person referred to from the manuscript tradition in relation to Caria in 323.

There has been little argument among modern scholars regarding the appointment of Asander to the satrapy of Caria in 323. The supporting evidence supplied by inscriptions confirms that it was indeed he who received the position. However it is important to highlight the misappropriation of appointments within the manuscript tradition when understanding Cassander’s career prior to 319. Given that he can be discounted from the appointment at Caria, it is possible to look elsewhere for clues to understand where Cassander was and what position he occupied prior to returning to Macedon. Helpfully, one does not need to look far for an alternative for Cassander’s placement during 323. Contained within the account of Justin and in close proximity to the

---

*ZPE*. 119. (1997). pp. 107-108; Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 269; Wörrle, *Chiron*. 33. (2002). pp. 137-139; Heckel, 2006. p. 57; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 27; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 101.

<sup>495</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 193. Though the endeavors of Errington (*JHS*. 90. (1970). p. 47) and more recently Baynham (1998. p. 100) have shown that Curtius’ account should not be dismissed out of hand and is more reliable than previously credited.

<sup>496</sup> *SIG*<sup>3</sup> 311.1-3. = *IStr*. 501.1-3. The Philip referred to in this inscription is Philip III Arrhidaeus, thereby placing the temporal context firmly after 323/2.

<sup>497</sup> Blümel, *EA*. 29. (1997). pp. 135-142.

<sup>498</sup> Blümel, *EA*. 29. (1997). cf. p. 139. This work has been built upon by Wörrle (*Chiron*. 33. (2002). pp. 121-143). Latmos was not the only city to pay honour to Asander, Athens is also known to have paid tribute to him in 314/3, cf. *Diod.* 19.68.2-7; *IG*. II<sup>2</sup> 450 (= *SIG* I<sup>3</sup> 320); O’Sullivan, *ZPE*. 119. (1997). p. 107.

misappropriation of Cassander to Caria, is another reference which has significant consequences not only for his standing within the Macedonian Empire, but which also accounts for all of Cassander's movements until the council of Triparadisus in 320. Justin 13.4.18 states: "*Stipatoribus regis satellitibusque Cassander, filius Antipatri, praeficitur.*"<sup>499</sup> While the earlier reference to Cassander in 13.4.15, which as previously shown can be dismissed, was made in passing within the distribution of satrapies by Perdiccas, this entry regarding Cassander is qualified, clearly identifying the appointee of the royal bodyguard and entourage as the son of Antipater. It must be noted that this excerpt of Justin is not supported by corroborating evidence within any other ancient source, save Orosius, possibly due to the confusion with the satrapy so common in the manuscript tradition. However the probability that Justin is correct is difficult to argue against as it is highly unlikely that Justin (or Trogus) would be mistaken twice in such a narrow section of their works.<sup>500</sup> Cassander's nomination to the royal bodyguard and entourage firmly places him in Babylon post-June 323 holding a significant and important role in the Macedonian Court.

There is an event that may aid in identifying the location of Cassander during 322, that being the marriage between his sister, Nicaea and Perdiccas. Soon after Alexander the Great's death, arrangements were made between Antipater and Perdiccas to form a familial alliance.<sup>501</sup> The initial intent of Perdiccas to forge a working alliance with the Antipatrids seems genuine.<sup>502</sup> Diodorus states that it was in fact a ruse employed to lull Antipater into a false sense of security before spurning Nicaea and marrying into the Argead family through a marriage with

---

<sup>499</sup> This passage is duplicated nearly verbatim by Orosius 3.23.10.

<sup>500</sup> cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 107

<sup>501</sup> Just. 13.6.5; Diodorus (18.23.1-2) explicitly states that the marriage was made to further strengthen Perdiccas' uncertain position. This suggests a timing prior to the Settlement of Babylon (Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 140; Nielse (Vol. II. (1896). p. 195.), suggests that it took place prior to the distribution of the satraps within the empire. Because of the close temporal proximities of the death of Alexander and the Settlement of Babylon, both Antipater and Perdiccas may have been open to the prospects of an inter-familial marriage prior to June 323; Carney, *Historia*. 37. (1988). p. 399.

<sup>502</sup> Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 140.



Alexander's sister, Cleopatra.<sup>503</sup> However, it is also recorded that Antipater was not fooled by the Perdiccan plot.<sup>504</sup> Nicaea left Macedon for the east in 323, escorted by her brother Iolaus, and Archias.<sup>505</sup> She had arrived in Asia Minor by 322, and shortly thereafter married Perdiccas.<sup>506</sup> It is possible that Cassander may have played a role in the facilitation of the marriage during his time in Babylon, waiting for Nicaea to arrive.<sup>507</sup> This would place Cassander in Babylon during 322 and 321 at the time of the divorce when Perdiccas took Cleopatra as his wife, aiding in an understanding of his movements between 323 and 320.

It is prudent to discuss what the office of bodyguard entailed, as well as comment on the ambiguity that the term bodyguard (*stipatores* and *σωματοφύλακες*) has received from the ancient sources. It has been noted by modern scholars that the use of this term 'bodyguard' has been used somewhat haphazardly and applied to a number of groups within the Macedonian Empire over time.<sup>508</sup> At least three groups are referred to as bodyguards by the ancient sources. These are, as Heckel highlights: "...the Royal Pages (normally the *παῖδες βασιλικοί*), the infantry bodyguard (the *ἄγημα* of the hypaspists) or the seven-man elite bodyguard (always known as the *σωματοφύλακες*)."<sup>509</sup> However, in this instance, the most likely possibility for Cassander was a position of command

---

<sup>503</sup> Diod. 18.23.2-3; Carney, *Historia*. 37. (1988). p. 399.

<sup>504</sup> Just. 13.6.7; Diod. 18.23.3. Diodorus records that Antipater learned of Perdiccas' plans from Antigonus, who had fled Asia Minor to Macedon. However Antigonus' flight could not have taken place prior to 321; Carney, *Historia*. 37. (1988). pp. 399-400.

<sup>505</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F.9.21; Phot. 92.69B.1; Adams, 1975. p. 66; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 140;

<sup>506</sup> Diod. 18.23.3. Heckel, 2006. p. 175.

<sup>507</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 67. Jacoby (*FGrH. Kommentar*. 156. F. 9. p. 561. n. 156.) suggests that Cassander was best man (*brautführer*) during the marriage. The marriage would be short lived, as Perdiccas was also presented with the opportunity of marrying Cleopatra (Diod. 18.23.3, 25.3; Just. 13.6.4-8; Carney, 2000. p. 120, 124-125; Carney, 2006. pp. 66-7; Heckel, 2006. p. 90; Perdiccas would spurn Nicaea, and by extension Antipater, in order to marry Cleopatra. For a greater discussion on this topic, see below.

<sup>508</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 193; Heckel, *Historia*, 27. (1978). p. 224; Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). p. 279; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 107.

<sup>509</sup> Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). p. 279. cf. Berve, Vol. I. 1926. pp. 122-126. For a full discussion of the various uses and roles of the *somatophylakes*, see Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). pp. 279-294.

within the *agema*,<sup>510</sup> an elite group from the *hypaspists* but operating separate from them, which accompanied the king as his personal bodyguard.<sup>511</sup> Cassander took over this position from Seleucus, who had been promoted by Perdiccas to *chiliarch* of the Companion cavalry.<sup>512</sup>

The exact composition of these royal foot troops has been difficult to define and has been the basis of some discussion amongst modern scholars.<sup>513</sup> However, Heckel correctly identifies that the *agema* of the *hypaspists* should be considered as an infantry equivalent to the *ile basilikes* and the famed Companion cavalry of the Macedonian Army.<sup>514</sup> That is, as an infantry formation under the direct command of the king which kept close to him to ensure his personal security.<sup>515</sup> The close proximity to the king required of the *agema* has profound consequences for this study in gaining an understanding of Cassander's career. While Cassander is not explicitly referred to within the ancient sources during this time,<sup>516</sup> that the *agema* were intrinsically linked to the movements of the king, or after 323, kings of Macedon means that it is possible to connect his location between 323 and, at the very latest, 321 with the Council of Triparadisus. If the movements of the kings during this time can be defined, then it is possible to also know Cassander's movements.

Conveniently, not only are the movements of Philip III and Alexander IV both known, they are the same, as during this time they travelled together. This increases the precision with which it is possible to understand the movements

---

<sup>510</sup> Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). p. 288; Heckel, 2006. p. 300. n. 197; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 107.

<sup>511</sup> Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). p. 287; Heckel, 2008. p. 153-154. *contra*: Berve, Vol. I. 1926. p. 126; Milns. *CP*. 78. (1983). p. 49; For references to the use of the *agema*, see: Just. 12.12.4; 15.3.11; Curt. 10.7.17; Diod. 17.110.1.

<sup>512</sup> Arr. 7.14.10; Diod. 18.3.4; Just. 13.4.17; Heckel, 1992. p. 257; Heckel, 2006. p. 247; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. pp. 106-107

<sup>513</sup> Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). p. 286; cf. Berve. Vol. I. 1926. pp. 122-126; Tarn Vol. II. 1948. pp. 148-154; Miln, *CP*. 78. (1983). pp. 47-50.

<sup>514</sup> Heckel, *Historia*. 27. (1978), p. 227; Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986), p. 286; Hatzopoulos, 2001. p. 37.

<sup>515</sup> Heckel, *Phoenix*. 40. (1986), p. 287; cf. Arr. 1.1.11, 1.5.10, 1.6.9, 3.1.4, 3.17.2, 3.18.5.

<sup>516</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 66.

of Cassander and because the kings remained together, attempting to assign Cassander to either one of them is unnecessary. The kings would remain in Babylon until the spring of 322, when they both accompanied Perdiccas to Cappadocia to aid Eumenes, bringing the region under Macedonian control.<sup>517</sup> Cappadocia, faced with the might of the Perdiccan forces, was swiftly subdued.<sup>518</sup> Diodorus states definitively that Philip III was with Perdiccas during the regent's time in Cappadocia (ἔχων μεθ'ἑαυτοῦ τὸν τε βασιλέα Φίλιππον).<sup>519</sup> Though there is no mention of Alexander IV accompanying him in this account, there is mention of the son of Alexander (*Alexandri Magni filium*) in Justin,<sup>520</sup> described as leaving Cappadocia for Pisidia in 321.<sup>521</sup>

It is after the return of Perdiccas and the kings to Babylon, in the first half of 321, which offers the most plausible period for Cassander's departure from Babylon and the *agema*. Tensions between Antipater and Perdiccas had been on the rise since Alexander's death and by 321, the marriage alliance involving Nicaea was not as politically vital or appealing as it had been in 323. Perdiccas' position prior to his appointment to the guardianship of the kings (*prostates*) was not secure. Having Antipater as an ally by marrying into the Antipatrid house would have secured the control of fresh Macedonian troops if these could be spared by

---

<sup>517</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F.9.11; Diod. 18.22.1; Just. 13.6.1; Plut. *Eum.* 3.6. Eumenes had been appointed to the satrapies of Cappadocia and Phaphlagonia (Curt. 10.10.3; Plut. *Eum.* 3.2.). Cappadocia had never formally submitted to Macedonian rule during Alexander's lifetime and for the most part Alexander had by passed the northern parts of the region (Anson, 2004. pp. 65 - 66.). Eumenes did not command enough power to take the region on his own and therefore, Perdiccas had ordered both Antigonos and Leonnatus to aid Eumenes in this endeavor (Plut. *Eum.* 3.2-3.). However, Plutarch records that Antigonos dismissed the command outright and Leonnatus, after receiving an urgent request for help from Antipater who was besieged in Lamia, chose to journey into Europe to aid Antipater (Plut. *Eum.* 3.4-5.). Eumenes then returned to Babylon and Perdiccas in the early spring of 322 (Plut. *Eum.* 3.10-11. cf. Nepos, *Eum.* 2.4-5; Anson, 2004. p. 72).

<sup>518</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F.9.11; Diod. 18.16.2.

<sup>519</sup> Diod. 18.16.1.

<sup>520</sup> Just. 13. 6. 10. It must be noted that Justin has conflated the campaigns of Cappadocia and Pisidia (Yardley & Develin, 1994. p. 128. n. 10; Heckel, 2006. p. 18.

<sup>521</sup> Diod. 18.22.1.

Antipater,<sup>522</sup> the Lamian War having soaked up the few reserves at his disposal.<sup>523</sup> Another option had presented itself to Perdiccas in his bid for control within the Macedonian Empire, in the person of the sister of Alexander the Great, Cleopatra. Cleopatra had journeyed to Sardis at much the same time as Nicaea in 323,<sup>524</sup> and by 321, the prospect of marrying into the Argead house, rather than continuing a seemingly worthless alliance to Antipater, had become the more attractive option.<sup>525</sup> Perdiccas' actions in breaking the alliance to Antipater led to a declaration of war against him by Antipater resulting in the First Diadoch War.<sup>526</sup>

That Cassander would have stayed in Babylon after the divorce of his sister and the conflict resulting from this is improbable. Though not mentioned in any of the ancient sources, it is likely that Cassander left Babylon, accompanied by Nicaea shortly or immediately after the decision was made by Perdiccas to pursue Cleopatra. Their destination once they had left Babylon is again a mystery, but there are two likely options. First was the court of Ptolemy in Egypt which itself was in alliance with the Antipatrid family, after another of Antipater's daughters, Eurydice had married Ptolemy in 321/0.<sup>527</sup> Second, and possibly more likely, Cassander and Nicaea may have made a direct journey back to Macedon and Antipater.<sup>528</sup> The appointment of Cassander to the *agema*, while not filling the gap in time between June 323 and his return into the ancient record in 320 at Triparadisus in its entirety, however does significantly diminish the period of time that his movements remain unknown to modern scholars to a space of roughly six months. What the appointment also demonstrates is that

---

<sup>522</sup> Errington, *JHS*. 90. (1970). p. 58; Carney, 2000. p. 125; Boiy, 2007. p. 47.

<sup>523</sup> Adams, *Anc. World*. 10. (1984). p. 84; cf. Ch. 4. pp. 99.

<sup>524</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. 9.26.

<sup>525</sup> Diod. 18.23.3. cf. Just. 13.6.5. Perdiccas must surely have known that to spurn Antipater's family in such a way was to invite conflict between the two, however, it seems he was confident that he would be able to prevail over any response that could arise from marrying Cleopatra.

<sup>526</sup> Carney, *Historia*. 37. (1988). p. 440; It should however be noted that hostilities did not occur until Ptolemy took custody of Alexander the Great's body in Syria.

<sup>527</sup> Diod. 18.14.2; Pau. 1.6.8; Carney, 2000. p. 160; Heckel, 2006. p. 122, 238.

<sup>528</sup> *contra*. Adams, 1975. p. 66.

Cassander was capable and trusted with not just a military command, but also a command that was vital in ensuring the personal safety of the kings of Macedon.

Following the defeat of the Perdiccan faction during the First War of the Diadochoi,<sup>529</sup> the council of Triparadisus served as the meeting point for the Diadochi as well as for the kings of Macedon.<sup>530</sup> As with the meeting in Babylon two years prior, the meeting at Triparadisus was called to decide how the administration of the Macedonian Empire would continue. Here, Antipater's position in Macedon was officially confirmed; he would become the regent of Macedon (*strategos autokrator*) and the guardian of the kings (*epimeletes*), once again,<sup>531</sup> holding a powerful position close to the royal family as he had done for much of his career.<sup>532</sup>

Cassander, who was also present at the meeting,<sup>533</sup> was appointed to a prominent office in the Empire; it would be the last major position he would occupy prior to his arrival to Macedon with his father in mid-320. Antipater had grown weary of Antigonus' ambition in the east. After the death of Perdiccas, Antigonus was arguably the most powerful man in the Empire after Antipater. Because of this, Antipater placed Cassander as a *chiliarch* of the cavalry under Antigonus.<sup>534</sup> In effect, this position amounted to a promotion within the Macedonian hierarchy, taking over from Seleucus, who at the time had been given the satrapy of Babylon as a reward for his rejection of the Perdiccan

---

<sup>529</sup> For the defeat of Perdiccas: Diod. 18.36.6; Just. 13.8.10, 14.1.1, 14.11, 15.1.1; Nepos, *Eum.* 5.1; Pau. 1.6.3; Heidl. *Epit. FGrH.* 155. 1.1; For thorough overviews of the First War of the Diadochoi, see: Errington, *JHS.* 90. (1970). pp. 49-77; Anson, 2014. pp. 47-82.

<sup>530</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.30; Curt. 10.7-8; Diod. 18. 36. 6-7; Just. 13.4.-For discussion, see: Errington, *JHS.* 90. (1970). pp. 49-77; Bosworth, 2002. pp. 29 – 63; Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008). pp. 39-82.

<sup>531</sup> Diod. 18.39.1-2.

<sup>532</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.3; Diod. 18.3.2, 18.12.1; Just. 13.4.5; Heckel, 1992. p. 43; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. pp. 346-347; Heckel, 2006. p. 36; Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38 (2008). pp. 52-54.

<sup>533</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 9.32; Diod. 18.39.3-4; Phot. 92.71B. 40.

<sup>534</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.38; Diod. 18.39.7; Billows. 1990. p. 69; Heckel, 2006. 79; Caroli, 2007. p. 47.

faction during the First Diadoch War.<sup>535</sup> Once again, Cassander was called upon to take on an important and politically sensitive position. He was required to not only fulfil the political and military demands of his new office, but it was vital that he do this while providing his father with information on the movements and intentions of Antigonus.

Cassander's time under Antigonus was short lived. Photius' recording of Arrian states that the two had a disagreement shortly after the meeting at Triparadisus concluded.<sup>536</sup> The nature of the disagreement is difficult to define. The only mention of the variance between Cassander and Antigonus is in Photius' Arrian, so a distinct lack of corresponding literary evidence means it is impossible to confirm this account. Billows has asserted that the cause of the dispute was Cassander's accusations that Antigonus seemed to be lacking in effort and enthusiasm in bringing the war against Eumenes to an end.<sup>537</sup> Certainly events after Antipater's death would suggest that, if a disagreement had taken place between Cassander and Antigonus, it did not divide them to the extent that would render future co-operation impossible.<sup>538</sup> The likelihood of unnecessary discord within an already delicate political environment forced Antipater's intervention. He ordered that Cassander cease his criticism and obey Antigonus.<sup>539</sup> Following this, Cassander left to meet with his father, who was located in Phrygia, while in transit back to Macedon.<sup>540</sup> It was at this meeting of father and son that Cassander urged Antipater to bring the royals with him back

---

<sup>535</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH* 156. F. 1.35; Heidl. *Epit. FGrH*. 155. F. 1.4; Diod. 18.33.2. Heckel, 2006. p. 247.

<sup>536</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.43 = Phot. 92.72B.14-16. It is impossible to date exactly when the disagreement took place. However, due to subsequent events (see below), a window of time can be provided to position Antipater when Cassander was reunited with his father.

<sup>537</sup> Billows, 1990. p. 72.

<sup>538</sup> For events that took place after Antipater's death, see Ch. 6. However, Hughes (2008. p. 207.) asserts that Antigonus and Antipater were still on friendly terms up until the regent's death.

<sup>539</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.40

<sup>540</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.42. Once again Photius provides the most extensive account of Cassander's movements in the period immediately after the meeting at Triparadisus.

to Macedon.<sup>541</sup> This then provides a marker for Cassander's return to Macedon, which can be dated to roughly mid-320.

If Antipater's decision to bring the royal family back to Macedon from the east can be attributed to Cassander's advice, there are several important points of significance that can be extrapolated. Cassander's advice was valuable to Antipater; he had enough confidence in his son's judgement to act upon the information he provided. Despite his intervention between Antigonus and his son, Antipater still had faith in Cassander's ability to understand the ever-changing political environment in the Macedonian Empire. Additionally there was the potential problem that bringing the royals out of the eastern portion of the Empire may create. If Cassander were the person who convinced Antipater that the royal family should be relocated to Macedon after he left Triparadisus, this would imply that the regent had originally planned for the kings to remain in Asia, presumably in the custody of Antigonus.<sup>542</sup> The removal of the kings away from the control and influence of Antigonus<sup>543</sup> could result in tensions

---

<sup>541</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.42. cf. Diod. 18.39.7; Heidl. *Epit. FGrH*. 155. F. 2.2: Diodorus and the unknown writer of the epitome do not credit Cassander with the inspiration for Antipater to bring the royal family back to Macedon. The possibility of a substantial lacuna existing in the section of the narrative written by Diodorus that leaves out Cassander's involvement in bringing the royals to Macedon has been raised (Geer, 1947. p. 124-125. n. 1.) What does exist in Diodorus' account is a clue into Antipater's reasoning: "αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἀναλαβὼν καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν δύναμιν προῆγεν ἐπὶ Μακεδονίαν, κατὰξων τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν πατρίδα." (Diod. 18.39.7.). By transporting the royal family back to Macedon from the east, Antipater would also return the epicentre of Macedonian politics back the homeland of the empire after the years of the Alexander's expansion.

<sup>542</sup> Antigonus had been appointed satrap of Greater Phrygia, Lycaonia, Pamphylia and Lycia at Triparadisus (Diod. 18.39.6; Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.37. cf. Billows, 1990. p. 69; Heckel, 2006. p. 291. n. 68.). Additionally, he was appointed *hegemon* of the Macedonian Army (Diod. 18.39.7; Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.38.) and most likely *strategos* of the greater eastern portion of the Macedonian Empire (App. *Syr.* 53). This would make him the most powerful man in the Empire save for Antipater.

<sup>543</sup> It must be noted however that this did not include the entire royal family. Perdiccas' potential bride to be Cleopatra would remain in Sardis under the control of Antigonus until 308, when she was killed after quarrelling with him and siding with Ptolemy (Diod. 20.39.1; 20.39.5; Billows, 1990. pp. 144-145; Heckel, 2006. p. 90).

emerging between the Antipatrid and Antigonid families, arguably the two most powerful families in the empire after Alexander's death in 323. However tensions do not seem to have arisen between the families. Antipater left a significant portion of his own army that he brought with him into Asia Minor with Antigonus in order to aid in a speedy end to the war against Eumenes.<sup>544</sup> Antipater knew from experience that conflict was always a possibility and if he was in fact hostile towards Antigonus, the notion of supplying an army with a significant amount of his own military reserves would have been counter intuitive. The disagreements between Cassander and Antigonus are not mentioned by any extant ancient literary source apart from Photius' account of Arrian. This is not to say that it did not happen; however what it does highlight is that the argument was not sufficiently important to cause hostility between the Antipatrids and Antigonids in 320. For this study, the significance of Cassander rejoining his father in Phrygia is not in the arguments he may have had with Antigonus and the reprimand he received from Antipater, but the geographical location it provides for Cassander's movements in 320. One point that can be taken from the disagreement between Cassander and Antigonus which is pertinent to this discussion is the effect that it may have had on the choice Antipater was to make in the future. While it is clear that he trusted his son and valued his advice, he may have been concerned about his ability to work co-operatively with others.

It was not long after Antipater and Cassander's return to Macedon that the regent fell ill with the ailment that would ultimately result in his death.<sup>545</sup> The exact nature of Antipater's sickness is difficult to define, as the only information that survives is in the narrative by Diodorus, that states it was one which usually proved fatal for the elderly.<sup>546</sup> The time at which Antipater became unwell is equally difficult to ascertain. What is apparent is that it took place prior to the arrival of the Athenian embassy of June 319, headed by the politician and orator,

---

<sup>544</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.43; Billows, 1990. p. 72-73.

<sup>545</sup> Diod. 18.48.1; Adams. 1975. pp. 69-70; Heckel, 1992. p. 48; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 355; Heckel. 2006. p. 38; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 212.

<sup>546</sup> Diod. 18.48.1: "...τοῦ βίου γήρως συνεργοῦντος πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τὸ βίου."



Demades.<sup>547</sup> By the time of the arrival of Demades, Antipater was already gravely ill and unable to carry out the daily affairs required in the office of regent.<sup>548</sup> As to where Cassander was, and in what capacity he operated after his return to Macedon, no mention is made by the ancient sources. It is however likely that he occupied a prominent position within the court at Macedon. While unsupported by ancient evidence, considering the offices he occupied between 323 and 320, namely, the command of the *agema* and the *chiliarchy* under Antigonus, it is likely that Cassander continued in a similar role, either in a position of close proximity to the kings, or within the military until Antipater became ill.

As Antipater's health failed, he was no longer able to maintain effective control of the regency. It was at this point that Cassander began to operate in his father's stead, maintaining the office of regent when his father was unable to do so.<sup>549</sup> Due to the nature of Antipater's illness, Cassander may have believed that, while he was for the time being operating in an unofficial capacity as the regent of Macedon, a transition into an official role would not be far away as his father came closer to death.<sup>550</sup> After the assumption of Antipater's duties, the most prominent reference to Cassander after his return to Macedon and prior to Antipater's death took place. The event was the Demades affair. This may have been the deciding factor in Antipater's decision to appoint Polyperchon as his successor to the regency of Macedon. Demades was a prominent Athenian with a pro-Macedonian bias who had a long history of productive co-operative work

---

<sup>547</sup> Diod. 18.48.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 30.5; Plut. *Dem.* 31.4-6; cf. *IG. II.*<sup>2</sup> 383B; Tritle, 1988. p. 138; Heckel. 2006. p. 292. n. 88.

<sup>548</sup> For further discussion of the Demades affair, see below.

<sup>549</sup> Fortina. 1965. p. 23; Adams, 1975. p. 70; Stähelin. *RE.* 10<sup>2</sup> 2294; Hughes, 2008. p. 206.

<sup>550</sup> This can be seen in Cassander's reaction to Antipater's appointment of the regency to Polyperchon (see: Ch. 6.1.), as well as the replacement of Menyllus with Nicanor as the commander of the garrison at Munychia (for more on the replacement of officers by Cassander, see below p. 147). The possibility that Antipater was using the embassy with Demades as a chance for Cassander to prove his political merit has also been raised by Hughes (2008. pp. 206-207.)

with Macedon.<sup>551</sup> He was sent to treat with Antipater, requesting that the Macedonian garrison positioned at Munychia be removed.<sup>552</sup> It seems that Demades had expected to meet with Antipater, rather than Cassander. This expectation may provide some indication of the timing of the regent's infirmity and worsening condition as, while Antipater's condition may have been known in Athens at the time of Demades' departure, it is likely that his health deteriorated significantly while the embassy was *en route* to Pella.<sup>553</sup> As a result, it was Cassander that would meet and treat with the Athenians and not his father.<sup>554</sup>

Events did not go well for the Demades embassy. Upon his arrival, Cassander presented correspondence written by Demades that had previously come into his possession.<sup>555</sup> This was said to be between the Athenian and Perdiccas, during the aftermath of the Lamian War. The letter asked Perdiccas to send troops to Greece, freeing the Greek cities from Antipatrid rule.<sup>556</sup> This act places

---

<sup>551</sup> cf. Diod. 16.87.3; 17.15.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 1.1; 16.5; Ath. 6.251B; Ael. *VH.* 5.12; Plut. *Cleo.* 27.1; Plut. *Mor.* 191E; Plut. *Mor.* 818E; Heckel. 2006. p.107.

<sup>552</sup> Diod. 18.48.1; Plut. *Phoc.* 30. 1; Fortina, 1965. p. 23; Adams, 1975. p. 70; Tritle, 1988. p. 138; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 209-210; Heckel, 2006. p. 107; Hughes. 2008. p. 203.

<sup>553</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 30.5. offers some comment on the timing of the Demades' embassy arriving in Pella and the timing of Antipater's sickness. Suggesting that Demades journey coincided with Antipater taking ill.

<sup>554</sup> There is a discrepancy at this point in the ancient sources as to whom it was who received Demades and the Athenian embassy. Diodorus suggests that Antipater was the one with whom Demades negotiated (Diod. 18.48.2- 3), while Plutarch states that it was Cassander (Plut. *Phoc.* 30.5; Plut. *Dem.* 31.6) who greeted the embassy in mid-319 (Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.14). The latter position has been accepted by modern scholarship (Fortina, 1965. p. 23; Adams. 1975. p. 70; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 27; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 209; Hughes (2008. p. 205. n. 515.) suggests that the cause for the discrepancy can be attributed to the source material used by Diodorus, as opposed to that of Plutarch and Arrian.

<sup>555</sup> The supplier of the letter to Cassander has been attributed by Plutarch to the Corinthian, Dinarchus (Plut. *Dem.* 31.6; Heckel, 2006. p. 107; Hughes. 2008. p. 205. n. 513.)

<sup>556</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 30.5; Plut. *Dem.* 31.3; Diod. 18.48.2; Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.14. Once again, there exists a slight variation in the sources as to whom Demades was in correspondence. Plutarch's *Demosthenes* states it was Perdiccas that was contacted by Demades (Plut. *Dem.* 31.3), which is further supported by Diodorus (Diod. 18.48.2), while Plutarch's biography of Phocion curiously suggests that it

Demades in an unescapable position and his fate was sealed.<sup>557</sup> Cassander became enraged and in the full view of the court, killed Demeas, the son of Demades, who had travelled north with his father. Following this, Cassander ordered the immediate execution of Demades.<sup>558</sup> It is not the intention of this study to justify Cassander's actions at this time although they were, at least in Plutarch's opinion, warranted.<sup>559</sup> Modern scholars disagree, suggesting that the events are evidence of Cassander's immaturity and would not have taken place if Antipater had been well enough to receive Demades upon his arrival in Macedon.<sup>560</sup> The murder of Demades and his son may also have raised the ire of the Macedonian military establishment,<sup>561</sup> who were concerned that the death of political ambassadors could exacerbate the tense political environment as well as threatening the uneasy peace that existed between Macedon and Athens in the aftermath of the Lamian War.<sup>562</sup>

The period following Alexander's death until Antipater's own demise saw Cassander's further rise to prominence within the Macedonian Empire. It was a period that afforded him a number of prestigious and vital offices, providing him with significant political experience, both concerning internal Macedonian politics, with his appointment to the commander of the *agema* and also as Antigonos' *chiliarch* following the Settlement of Triparadisus in 320. Cassander also gained direct experience with Greek politics, as evidenced by his role in the Demades Affair and his capacity as Antipater's adjutant as his father's health

---

was Antigonos whom Demades had contacted (Plut. *Phoc.* 30.5). However, due to the historical context and timing of the communication, it is most likely that the recipient of Demades's request was Perdiccas (Adams. 1975. p. 70; Hughes. 2008. p. 205; Heckel, 2006. p. 79, 107.)

<sup>557</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 31.3.

<sup>558</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 9.15; Plut. *Dem.* 31.4; cf. Diod. 18.48.2.

<sup>559</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 31.5.

<sup>560</sup> Adams. 1975. p. 71; cf. Hughes, 2008. p. 205-206.

<sup>561</sup> Hughes. 2008. p. 207.

<sup>562</sup> Hughes. 2008. p. 207. Hughes does highlight however that while the death of Demades was unexpected, it did yield effective results. No further requests for the removal of the garrison at Munychia were made by Athens for the time being (cf. Hughes. 2008. p. 207. n. 519). Hughes is correct in his observation, though the short period of time after the execution of Demades to the death of Antipater may also contribute to the lack of new embassies traveling to Macedon from Athens.

declined. Additionally, it was this period when Cassander forged the connections, especially with Antigonos, that would go on to aid his efforts against Polyperchon once the forthcoming war against the new regent began. While Cassander's behaviour was not beyond reproach and his actions during the Demades Affair were clearly excessive, this alone would not have been enough to account for Antipater's decision to favour Polyperchon as the next regent of Macedon in 319. Antipater's choice to overlook his son for the older Polyperchon was not based on Cassander, or his career up until this point in time, in isolation. External factors also played a major role for the dying Antipater and because of these external factors, it is vital to also engage with the career of Polyperchon during this time, in order to gain a greater understanding of the choice facing Antipater in 319.

## **5.2: Polyperchon**

Despite the extended period of time in which Cassander occupied an office of significant importance between 323 and 319, Antipater overlooked his son as an appropriate successor to the regency of Macedon. Instead Antipater chose to appoint Polyperchon. Therefore it is necessary to engage with Polyperchon's career over the same period in order to understand what may have caused Antipater to make the choice he did. This period marks the point in time during which Antipater and Polyperchon came into close contact with each other and engaged in a co-operative and effective working relationship.

Though it is possible that the two had become acquainted prior to Alexander's Persian Campaign in 334, explicit references to their association are extant within the ancient literary sources in the post-323 Macedonian Empire, particularly in the accounts of Diodorus and Justin. Much like Cassander, Polyperchon was appointed to significant military and political offices between 323 and 319. Cassander spent the majority of this time in Asia Minor serving in the *agema* and as *chiliarch* under Antigonos. Polyperchon spent the entirety of this period under the command of Craterus, in the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire. As Craterus' second in command, Polyperchon would play a

significant role during the First War of the Diadochoi, most notably in his military activities against the Aetolians and the Thessalians.

In much the same way as references to Cassander, explicit references to Polyperchon at this time are few and far between. This does not prove as fundamentally problematic for this investigation as it initially appears. As with Cassander's appointment to the *agema* between 323 and 322 which attached him to the nearby vicinity of the royals, thereby providing a helpful fixture for his whereabouts, Polyperchon's position operates in much the same manner. Because Alexander had placed Polyperchon under Craterus to assume his position should he fall, Polyperchon was required to maintain close proximity to Craterus. Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that if Craterus' location can be determined, and unless an explicit reference places him away from his commander, Polyperchon's orientation can also be ascertained.

The outbreak of the First Diadoch War in 321 brought Polyperchon to the forefront in the chaotic political environment of the post-Alexander Macedonian Empire. When Antipater and Craterus embarked into Asia Minor to lend their strength against the Perdiccan faction they required a capable and effective man who could be trusted to take temporary control of the regency in their absence. This was more vital than ever in light of the recent Greek uprising that had destabilised Macedonian control over the region. The man chosen was Polyperchon. That he was appointed to this position is an indication that Polyperchon was seen to have the skills and personal abilities need to carry out important and potentially problematic duties.

It must be kept in mind that Polyperchon's original appointment under the frail Craterus by Alexander in 324 was so that, in the event of Craterus' death, Polyperchon would be able to assume Craterus' position as leader of the 10,000 veterans returning to Macedon, as well as the regency itself. While Craterus did in fact make a successful, albeit delayed, return to Macedon in 322, he met his end during the period under investigation. During the First Diadoch War, Craterus was killed falling from his horse while on campaign against Eumenes

near the Hellespont. His death resulted in Polyperchon's further elevation in the political hierarchy in Macedon. His connection to Craterus may have influenced Antipater's ultimate decision to name Polyperchon as the next regent of Macedon.

As previously stated,<sup>563</sup> at the time of Alexander's death, Polyperchon was in Cilicia, accompanying Craterus and his returning veteran force back to Macedon.<sup>564</sup> It is appropriate at this time to discuss the nature of Alexander's appointment of Polyperchon to Craterus' returning army. This discussion is fundamental in understanding Polyperchon's career between 323 and 319. His connection to Craterus and Alexander would define his approach to gaining, and maintaining, power in Macedon after the death of Antipater. Alexander was not confident that Craterus' health would allow his safe return to Macedon. Due to this uncertainty surrounding Craterus' strength, Alexander knew that careful consideration was needed before naming the man to be Craterus' second in command. Polyperchon and Craterus were familiar with each other, having been together during Alexander's expansion of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>565</sup> The relationship which existed between them may have been seen as aiding in the transition of power should Polyperchon be required to take Craterus' place thereby minimising delay in the veterans' return to Macedon, another factor making him an appealing choice for Craterus' second in command.

More significant are the consequences that may have arisen from the hand over of power from Craterus to Polyperchon once he had led the army back to Macedon. Arrian's account provides some insight into the expectations

---

<sup>563</sup> cf Ch. 4. p. 81.

<sup>564</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Diod. 18.4.1; Just. 12.12.8; Badian, *JHS*. 81. (1961). pp. 35-6; Berve, Vol. II. 1926. p. 225; Bosworth, *CQ*. 21. (1971). p. 125; Errington, *JHS*. 90. (1970). p. 55; Meeus, *Anc. Soc*. 38. (2008). p. 78.

<sup>565</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 227, p. 335. n. 623; cf. Arr. 4.23.5, 4.24.6-7, 2.26.1-27.4, 5.11.3, 6.5.5. The closeness of the pair towards the end of Alexander's campaigns could explain for the confusion between Craterus and Polyperchon that regularly appears in Justin's account (Just. 13.8.5, 13.8. 7, 15.1.1, Heckel, 2006. p. 335. n. 623; cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 158, 189, 218.).

Alexander had of Polyperchon once he had taken control of Craterus' men.<sup>566</sup> This excerpt implies that Polyperchon was expected to continue Craterus' orders in the transfer of troops to Macedon. By guiding the veterans from Opis home, Polyperchon would then have enabled Antipater the possibility to embark eastwards with the levies he was ordered to bring to Alexander. What is not known is Polyperchon's role once he arrived in Macedon. This can only be speculated upon, as Craterus was able to complete his mission, in 322, although substantially delayed.<sup>567</sup> Polyperchon's appointment by Alexander was not without thought; it was deliberate and calculated, and it should not be dismissed as an unimportant short-term military appointment. As Arrian states, Alexander was well aware of Craterus' frailty before his embarkation to Macedon where he would replace Antipater as regent.<sup>568</sup> The possibility that Polyperchon was merely expected, in the event of Craterus' death, to lead the army back to Macedon and await a new replacement for Antipater to arrive from Babylon does not seem likely as it dismisses Polyperchon's political and military acumen. If he were not expected to assume Craterus' regency, further delays would face Antipater with regard to his command from Macedon into the east. Craterus' ill health was known prior to his departure to Macedon. That Polyperchon was appointed as second in command suggests that in the event of Craterus' death, Polyperchon would assume all duties originally intended for Craterus. Not only would he lead the veterans back to Macedon, he would also relieve Antipater of the regency of Macedon. This possibility needs to be entertained as if this was not what was expected of Polyperchon, his appointment by Alexander is puzzling. A more likely alternative is that, because Alexander was aware that Craterus's safe return to Macedon was uncertain, that a substitute would be required was a real possibility. To insure against further delay of Antipater's

---

<sup>566</sup> Arr. 7.12.4.

<sup>567</sup> See below.

<sup>568</sup> Arr. 7.12.4; Heckel, 1992. pp. 126-7; Heckel, 2006. p. 95, 98; Polyperchon was not the only senior officer accompanying Craterus. Justin asserts that Clitus, Gorgias, Polydamus and Antigones were also with the veterans of Opis (Just. 12.12.8; cf. Heckel, 2006, p. 31, 87, 127, 226; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2001. pp. 276-277.). Justin says nothing of Polyperchon's position, however, when used in conjunction with the evidence from Arrian, any confusion about the hierarchy among the officers is removed.

departure east, as well as to avoid the need to send an additional replacement for Craterus, Alexander named Polyperchon as second in command, a man he trusted to assume Craterus' role in the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire should Craterus die before reaching Macedon.

News of Alexander's death would have reached the pair within days due to Cilicia's placement along the famed Royal Road of the Persian Empire.<sup>569</sup> The news presented a difficult quandary for Craterus. Should he continue on his journey to Macedon relieving Antipater of the regency, return to Babylon and lend his voice to the court, or remain in Cilicia as the political situation developed? This lack of certainty left Craterus and Polyperchon in a state of limbo.<sup>570</sup> While Alexander was alive, Craterus' return to Macedon was backed by royal authority, but soon after receiving news of Alexander's demise, word came to Craterus that Perdiccas had chosen to end his journey to replace Antipater,<sup>571</sup>

---

<sup>569</sup> Hdt. 5.52.2; French, *Iran*. 36. (1998). p. 16; Graf, *Achaemenid History*. 8. (1994). p. 175. Young, *PAPHS*. 107. (1963). p. 348. For a collection of maps devoted to the Persian Royal Road, see: French, *Iran*. 36. (1998). pp. 34-42; After Alexander's defeat of the Persian Empire, the Royal Road did not go unused. Alexander continued employing the Road to great effect for the relay of communications as well as allowing the swift movement of troops throughout the empire (Graf, *Achaemenid History*. 8. (1994). p. 174; Lane Fox, 1973. p. 103). Indeed, Alexander had used the Road himself when conducting his campaign against Darius (Arr. 2.4.2-3; Brunt, *CQ*. 12. (1962). p. 142.). It is highly likely that not only did Craterus and Polyperchon use the Royal Road to make their march back to Macedon, but Cassander may have travelled via this way as well during his pressing journey to represent Antipater in Alexander's court in 324. The precise date at which the news reached Craterus and Polyperchon is unknown. However, given the speed at which the initial word of Alexander's death reaching Athens and Macedon within the space of a few short weeks, thereby initiating the Lamian War (cf. Ch. 4. p. 101.) combined with the renowned swiftness that the Road was able to facilitate correspondence (Hdt. 5.52-53 (Herodotus states the journey between Susa and Sardis would take some ninety days on foot); 8.98; Xen. *Cyrop*. 8.17-19; Young, *PAPHS*. 107. (1963), p. 349), it can be assumed that the time required for word to reach Cilicia would be dramatically less than that taken to reach the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire.

<sup>570</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 127; Schachenmeyr, 1973. p. 149. suggest that Craterus was trapped between "*Staatsrecht*" and "*Faustrecht*."

<sup>571</sup> Diod. 18.4.1: states "*τοῖς δαιδόχοις ἔδοξε μὴ συντελεῖν τὰ βεβουλευμένα*", though as Meeus correctly identifies, this equates to the wishes of Perdiccas (Meeus, *Anc. Soc*. 38. (2008). p. 78). It is unknown whether or not Perdiccas' orders arrived in Craterus' camp at the same time as word of Alexander's death. It would be expected that as the political situation in Babylon developed over



forcing Craterus to sojourn in Cilicia.<sup>572</sup> This political limbo did not last for long. Communications between Babylon and the rest of the empire were swift, with new information arriving to Craterus and Polyperchon constantly. They would have known that the Diadochoi in Babylon had convened to plan the continuation of the empire.<sup>573</sup> While not having any input or voice in the decisions made by the Diadochoi in Babylon, the order to cease his journey east suggests that Craterus was receiving updates from the capital, informing him of the proceedings of, and the decisions reached by, the council.

Although absent from the talks taking place in Babylon, Craterus' name was prominent throughout the proceedings. During the proposition for the continuation of the Empire's administration, Craterus was, with the support of Meleager, named as *prostates* of Philip III's empire,<sup>574</sup> placing him, at least in theory and in light of Philip III's inability to rule in his own right, in a position of power over the entirety of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>575</sup> However this position was not to be his for long. Even before word reached Craterus of his new office, the situation at Babylon had changed. Perdiccas, tired of Meleager's perceived interference in the negotiations, ordered his death. This removed him as a potential threat but also meant that the compromise they had reached was now in ruins.<sup>576</sup> As a result, Craterus lost his position as regent of the Empire. Following Meleager's death, a new direction was taken. Perdiccas assumed the

---

the time immediately after Alexander's death that a number of dispatches were sent throughout the empire by the convening Diadochoi. Though it must be noted that the placement in the sequence of correspondence of Perdiccas' orders halting Craterus' march west again is not known. If it did not arrive at the same time as news of Alexander's death, it must have arrived shortly thereafter. Motivation for Perdiccas' order has been understood as part of his strategy to win the support of Antipater.

<sup>572</sup> Diod. 18.4.1; Bosworth, *CQ.* 21. (1971). p. 125; Heckel, 2006. p. 98; Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008). p. 78; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 40.

<sup>573</sup> See below.

<sup>574</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F. 1.3, 1.4; Anson, *AHB.* 26. (2012). p. 52. For details of the office of *prostates*, see: Anson, *CP.* 87. (1992). pp. 38-43.

<sup>575</sup> Anson, *CPh.* 87. (1992). pp. 38-43; Anson, *Historia.* 58. (2009). pp. 280-5; Anson, *AHB.* 26. (2012). p. 52.

<sup>576</sup> Anson, *CPh.* 87. (1992). p. 42; Heckel, 2006. p. 161, 199; Meeus, *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008). pp. 57-58

regency himself,<sup>577</sup> while Craterus was to receive a different, less well-defined role. Along with Antipater, he was given co-command of affairs in Europe.<sup>578</sup> This new appointment would give Craterus cause to move into Europe with haste. Polyperchon would follow, marking the point at which he would re-enter the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire. No mention of Polyperchon is made during the proceedings at Babylon. Nor is there any mention of the position he would occupy under the new administrative regime. It is likely, however, that he continued in the original appointment given to him by Alexander in 324 as his second in command under Craterus.

Returning to Craterus in Cilicia, it is true that he was in political limbo after receiving word that Alexander was dead, news that halted his advance into Macedon. However the uncertainty of his position was not substantial and should not be exaggerated. From first meeting, the day after Alexander's death, to final agreement among the Diadochoi, a period of only six days passed.<sup>579</sup> Considering the speed at which news would be reaching him in Cilicia, combined with the time that the settlement took to ratify, Craterus would have known of his new office by the end of June, 323.

The results from the Settlement at Babylon have several implications for Craterus. Rather than replacing Antipater as ordered by Alexander, he was now required to move into Greece, working in co-operation with Antipater in order to manage affairs in Greece and Macedon. While Craterus may have seen this as a slight to his standing in the Empire, he seems to have accepted the position without complaint.<sup>580</sup> Even though Antipater and Craterus were now to work

---

<sup>577</sup> Diod. 18.2.2, 18.3.1, 18.23.2; Anson, *Historia*. 58. (2009). p. 284; Meeus, *Historia*. 58. (2009). pp. 296-7; Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 52.

<sup>578</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.7; cf. Diod. 18.4.1-6; Just. 13.4.5; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 81.

<sup>579</sup> Curt. 10.10.9; cf. Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2014). p. 51; Bosworth, 2002. p. 55. *contra* the account found in Aelian (*VH*. 12.64), which suggest a longer period of time for the deliberations to take place.

<sup>580</sup> Anson (*AHB*. 26. (2014). p. 52), states that in addition to Craterus' compliance with his new position, he did not view Perdikkas' assumption of the regency of Macedon as an act of usurpation on the part of the new regents (cf. Diod. 18.2.4; 18.3.1.).

together, it is important to note that Polyperchon was still acting as Craterus' direct subordinate. Additionally, Craterus' connection to the dead Alexander was still strong. He was the last regent of Macedon named by Alexander and Antipater was well aware of this. By his compliance, Craterus brought a sense of legitimacy and authority to Antipater's continuation of command in Macedon. As Alexander's last appointed regent, Craterus' willingness to work with Antipater would aid him in maintaining pro-Antipatrid garrisons and oligarchies in Greece. Craterus' close ties with the royals and other groups sympathetic to their cause would also help to mute any criticism from groups at Pella hostile to Antipater. For the time being, Antipater's position as *strategos* in Macedon was safe.

Craterus' appointment to Europe had given him cause to resume his march west. With the outbreak of the Lamian War, that cause was exacerbated. News of Alexander's demise had reached Europe, and the Greek cities found the opportune moment to launch their revolt against Macedonian hegemony. Facing a Greek revolt with the depleted military reserve resulting from Alexander's campaigns was the very situation Antipater had feared. The only Macedonian troops in the region apart from the depleted supply in Macedon itself,<sup>581</sup> were to be found in the form of the garrisons placed by Alexander and Antipater in Greece. Relocating the garrisons from relatively passive regions to more volatile areas was not an appealing option, as this risked the possibility of further unrest spreading throughout Greece. Antipater needed to react quickly, and knew external help would be required if Macedonian control of Greece was to continue. As soon as he learnt of Alexander's death, he dispatched messengers to at least two generals in Asia Minor who had the potential to lend swift support, those being Craterus, and Leonnatus, who received the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia.<sup>582</sup>

---

<sup>581</sup> Adams, *Anc. Soc.* 10. (1984). p. 84.

<sup>582</sup> Diod. 18.12.1; Heckel, 2006. p. 36. Diodorus' narrative (18.12.1) makes an error with who occupied Hellespontine Phrygia, stating that it was Philotas, not Leonnatus (cf. Diod. 18.16.4; Heckel, 2006. p. 36; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 77.).

The account by Diodorus suggests that news of the division of the satrapies following the Settlement of Babylon and Alexander's death arrived in Macedon at the same time.<sup>583</sup> This would not have been the case and is more likely the result of a compression of events in the historian's narrative. As with Craterus, Antipater would have learnt of unfolding events in Babylon via a series of correspondence from the east, rather than in the form of a single messenger. News of Alexander's death would force him to turn his attentions south to the Greek cities, as the potential of unrest was likely. As for Antipater's regency and his replacement by Craterus, the prospect of departing from Macedon before his replacement arrived with 10,000 soldiers further depleting much needed troops, was gone.

Once Antipater's request for aid reached Cilicia, Craterus began preparations to depart for Macedon.<sup>584</sup> Anson has identified that Craterus could not, and would not, have refused Antipater. Additionally, it has been noted that significant emphasis has been placed on the reasons for the slow progression made by Craterus in the journey west during this period.<sup>585</sup> When it is placed in comparison with the far swifter response to the uprising in Greece by Leonnatus,<sup>586</sup> Craterus' own mission appears tardy. The cause of the delay is not known and can only be speculated on. It is possible that Craterus waited in Cilicia to assess how the developing situations would play out in Babylon and Macedon.<sup>587</sup> Another explanation for Craterus' sluggish progression could be that he was waiting to gauge the effectiveness of the support offered by Leonnatus in relieving the besieged Antipater in the Thessalian city of Lamia.<sup>588</sup> There may exist elements of truth in each of these postulations which, when

---

<sup>583</sup> Diod. 18.12.1.

<sup>584</sup> Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 55.

<sup>585</sup> Ashton, *Makedonia*. 5. (1993). pp. 127-128; Anson, 2004. p. 74; Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012), p. 53; Ashton, in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. p. 109.

<sup>586</sup> Leonnatus was able to reach Antipater at Lamian by the spring of 322, several months ahead of Craterus, who achieved the same feat during the summer of 322 (Diod. 18.15.5; Boiy, 2007. p. 45, 148.).

<sup>587</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 98; Boiy, 2007. p. 44; Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 53.

<sup>588</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 98.

used in combination, can explain Craterus' supposed slow progress.<sup>589</sup> However, another key issue that may have factored aid in Craterus' slow progression to the Hellespont requiring consideration is once again his ill health.

It must be remembered that it took Craterus and his forces three months to make the journey from Babylon to Cilicia, some 1000 kilometres. The distance between Cilicia and the Hellespont is roughly 1200-1500 kilometres, which would require around fifty to sixty days travel.<sup>590</sup> If Craterus' slow progression to Cilicia, which took three months in 324-323, was due to his physical frailty, it is possible that this weakness may have continued after Alexander's death, necessitating a greater length of time to cover roughly the same distance as Leonnatus. Despite the emphasis on the time taken by Craterus to travel any distance, it should be noted that the difference in his rate of progress and that of other travellers is not vast.

Craterus had returned to Macedon with Polyperchon at his side by the summer of 322.<sup>591</sup> Prior to this Antipater had been able, with the aid of the forces led by Leonnatus, to break the siege of Lamia conducted by the Athenians in the spring of the same year.<sup>592</sup> It is at this point that Antipater and Craterus embarked upon their collaborative endeavours to re-establish Macedonian hegemony over the rebelling Greek city-states. Combined, their forces were substantial, numbering, if Diodorus' numbering scheme can be trusted to provide any indication, some 48,000 men.<sup>593</sup> Once their forces had combined, the dynamic in the joint command of Antipater and Craterus changed. In order to facilitate more

---

<sup>589</sup> Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012), p. 53.

<sup>590</sup> Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012), p. 53.

<sup>591</sup> Diod. 18.16.4; Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1.

<sup>592</sup> Diod. 18.15.1-2. Somewhat conveniently for Antipater, Leonnatus had perished during the fighting that had taken place outside the city (Diod. 18.15.3-4; Plut. *Phoc.* 25.3; Heckel, 2006. p. 151.) Not only did this mean that Antipater had one fewer powerful rival in the region with whom he would need to contend, he was able to absorb Leonnatus's army into his own ranks, an easy means to increase his limited troop supply (Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.9; Just. 13.5.15; Heckel, 2006. p. 37.)

<sup>593</sup> Diod. 18.16.5; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 97; Heckel, 2006. p. 37.

effective leadership of the combined Macedonian forces against the rebellious Greek cities, Craterus transitioned into a supporting role under Antipater.<sup>594</sup>

This shift in command, if it can be defined as such, was for pragmatic reasons. In order to avoid confusion in the newly integrated Macedonian troops, a clearly defined hierarchy of command needed to be established. It must be remembered that only a short time had passed since Craterus, presumably with his 10,000 veterans behind him, had arrived. Now that the dynamic in command had shifted, it was essential to remove any hints of dissent within the army before it arose. It was at this point that Antipater and Craterus began to share control of Europe between them, with Antipater taking the more forward role. This was the most practical option for both Antipater and Craterus. Antipater had held command of Greece and Macedon for more than a decade, which afforded him a more comprehensive understanding of the political environment than that available to Craterus. Additionally, Antipater also held the loyalty of the pro-Macedonian oligarchies that he had installed during his time in office. A change in command may have resulted in needless complications for Antipater and Craterus in subduing the rebellion as the political structure implemented by Antipater since 336 were already well established. While the chance of the pro-Macedonian oligarchies choosing to no longer support Macedon with Craterus as its leader in Europe was remote, particularly during a time of insurrection, it was a possibility that could be easily avoided. For Craterus, this alteration of his role in Macedon was not an issue. He was aware of the need to bring the Greeks back under control and he accepted this secondary role under Antipater without apparent resentment. His continued ill health may have impacted on his willingness to do so, as may the difference in age between the two, Craterus being some twenty-six years younger than Antipater.<sup>595</sup>

With Antipater freed from Lamia, he and Craterus turned their attention to tackling the cities individually rather than collectively, allowing Macedonian

---

<sup>594</sup> Diod. 18.16.5; Ashton, *Makedonia*. 5. (1993). p. 129; Heckel, 2006. 98; Ashton, in Wheatley and Baynham, 2015. pp. 111-112.

<sup>595</sup> Ashton, *Makedonia*. 5. (1993). p. 127; Ashton, in Wheatley and Baynham, 2015. p. 109.

power to come back into effect more easily and at a swifter pace. What followed shortly thereafter involved the pair moving into Thessaly, and their victory against the Greek at the battle of Crannon in the middle of 322.<sup>596</sup> The defeat of the Greeks at Crannon ultimately led to the capitulation of Athens to Macedonian rule.<sup>597</sup> One of the results of Macedon's re-subjugation of its dominance, in the case of Athens, was the installation of the garrison at Munychia,<sup>598</sup> which in turn led to the Demades Affair of 319.<sup>599</sup> The important point to be taken from this sequence of victories is that Antipater and Craterus worked well together in swiftly bringing the rebellious Greeks back under Macedonian control, a partnership, which would not have been possible without a close and co-operative relationship between the two.

In order to further strengthen the already close ties with his counterpart, Antipater entered into another marriage alliance. In much the same manner as his alliance with Perdiccas,<sup>600</sup> Antipater chose another of his daughters, Phila, to wed Craterus around 322/1.<sup>601</sup> It is difficult to know the early life of Phila. What is known is that she was a recent widow, her husband, the satrap of Cilicia, Balacrus, being killed in 324.<sup>602</sup> Her location after the death of Balacrus too is unknown and can only be speculated on. She may have returned to Macedon and her father, or she may have remained in Cilicia. If the latter is true, there is a possibility that she may have come into contact with Craterus during his extensive time in the region. Though the marriage took place before Craterus entered into Asia Minor with Antipater against Perdiccas, negotiations for the alliance may have had earlier origins, possibly even during 324, shortly after the

---

<sup>596</sup> Diod. 18.17; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1; Plut. *Dem.* 28.1; Plut. *Cam.* 19.5; Pau. 10.3.4; cf Arr. *Succ FGrH.* 156. F. 1.12; Anson, *AHB.* 26. (2012). p. 55; Boiy, 2007. p. 46, 147; Bosworth, in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 14; Heckel, 2006. p. 37. The suggested dating come from Plutarch's *Camillus* (19.8.) and *Demosthenes* (28.1.), with the battle reported to have taken place on 7 Metageitnion.

<sup>597</sup> Baynham, in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 23.

<sup>598</sup> Bosworth, in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 14.

<sup>599</sup> cf. Ch. 5.1. pp. 116-119.

<sup>600</sup> cf. Ch. 5.1. pp. 107-108.

<sup>601</sup> Diod. 18. 18. 7; Carney, 2000. p. 165; Dunn & Wheatley, *AHB.* 26. (2012). p. 42. n. 22; Heckel, 2006. p. 208.

<sup>602</sup> Diod. 18. 22. 1; Carney, 2000. p. 165; Heckel, 2006. p. 69, 208.

death of Balacrus.<sup>603</sup> If discussions did begin not long after this death, it would suggest that both Antipater and Craterus were willing to forge strong, long-term alliances with each other, even before Alexander's death. However, this position is entirely based on speculation and hypothetical reconstruction and while the implications are appealing, they should not be pressed beyond conjecture.

Polyperchon's movements during the Lamian War are not referred to in the ancient literary corpus, however his participation in the conflict itself is most probable. It can be assumed that he continued to function in a military capacity under Craterus during the campaign. Though not referred to, it is likely that during the progression of the war, Polyperchon was able to demonstrate his ability to Antipater, with whom contact must have been made. This can be drawn from Polyperchon's next attested position which took place in 321, the position in question being the regency of Macedon.<sup>604</sup>

In order to combat Perdiccas, Antipater and Craterus both invaded Asia Minor with their forces. From there, they would divide their strength to combat the Perdiccan faction.<sup>605</sup> As with his original appointment in 324 as second in command to Craterus and his potential substitute in 324, Polyperchon's first regency was not an arbitrary decision. While it can be expected that Polyperchon had the support of Craterus due to the long career they had shared together, Polyperchon would not have received the position without Antipater's consent. For Polyperchon to assume a caretaker role in the regency until the return of Antipater and Craterus, he required their trust that he was capable of holding the position. The Greek cities had only recently been brought back under Macedonian control, and with the departure of a significant portion of

---

<sup>603</sup> While not explicitly stating, this is tentatively suggested by Carney (2006. p. 165).

<sup>604</sup> Diod. 18.38.6; Just. 13.6.9; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 167; Heckel, 2006. p. 227; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 144; Landucci Gattinoni (2008. p. 168), notes the similarity between Polyperchon's appointment to the regency and Antipater's own position given to him when Alexander left Macedon in 334, suggesting, at least hypothetically, that Polyperchon may have been expected to engage with the office in much the same capacity as Antipater had.

<sup>605</sup> Diod. 18.29.6; Plut. *Eum.* 6.4; Heckel, 1992. p. 47, 132; Heckel, 2006. p. 37, 99.



Macedon's military reserves into Asia Minor, the possibility of further insurrection increased. Clearly careful thought had gone into the selection of Polyperchon to manage Macedon and Greece. To do otherwise would have demonstrated extreme negligence on the part of the two strategoi. The notion that Polyperchon was selected as interim regent only because there was no other alternative does not seem likely. Antipater would not have left him in charge of the region if he were not confident of Polyperchon's capacity to quell unrest from the south. If there was no faith in Polyperchon, the display of neglect on behalf of Antipater and Craterus is profound and would seem out of step with the political astuteness that Antipater had demonstrated throughout his career. More likely than an arbitrary appointment, seemingly selected at random, Polyperchon's appointment as regent during the First Diadoch War demonstrates not only that he was able to manage the position, but also the favourable light in which he was regarded by both Antipater and Craterus, valuing both his political ability to run the office and his capacity to engage in military endeavours should the need arise.

It was not long before Polyperchon's administration of Macedon and Greece was tested. Soon after Antipater and Craterus had crossed into Asia, the Aetolians, led by one Alexander,<sup>606</sup> who had entered into an alliance with the Perdiccan faction against Antipatrid Macedonian *hegemony* in Europe, began to agitate against the *status quo* in Greece with a force of roughly 12,500. The objective of Aetolian aggression was to distract the Antipatrid forces in Asia with the not insignificant threat of chaos among the Greek cities and, potentially, Macedon itself.<sup>607</sup> The exact result the Aetolians, or perhaps more precisely Perdiccas, wished to achieve beyond Antipater's distraction is difficult to discern from the brief account offered by Diodorus. Potentially it may have been their goal to draw Antipater back from Asia, relieving pressure on Perdicca's main ally in Asia, Eumenes who would then only be required to face Craterus.<sup>608</sup> The

---

<sup>606</sup> Diod. 18.38.1; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 166.

<sup>607</sup> Diod. 18.38.1: "ἀντιπερισπάσαι βουλόμενοι τὸν Ἀντίπατρον."; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 166; Heckel, 2006. p. 227.

<sup>608</sup> This method or intent bears striking similarities to Cassander's first invasion of Macedon, in the summer of 317. For more on this venture, see Ch. 7.1.

Aetolian forces began by besieging the city of Amphissia in Locris and subsequently moving into Thessaly.<sup>609</sup>

Polyperchon's initial reaction to Aetolian aggression is not recorded. However, Macedonian forces were not idle in confronting the insurrection. The Aetolians met a Macedonian army led by Polycles in Thessaly. During the ensuing conflict both the Macedonian forces and its leader were defeated and destroyed by the Greeks.<sup>610</sup> The exact relationship between Polyperchon and Polycles is not known. Polycles served as one of Antipater's subordinates,<sup>611</sup> however whether or not he had been ordered to Thessaly by Polyperchon in reaction to Aetolian movements or whether he, and the forces at his command, were already stationed in Thessaly as part of the process to reinstall Macedonian rule in the wake of the Lamian War. While the possibility exists that Polyperchon may have dispatched Polycles against the Aetolians, what is more certain is his subsequent reaction to the unrest in Greece. In order to put an end to Aetolian insurrection, Polyperchon led a substantial Macedonian army into Thessaly.<sup>612</sup> Following his entry into Thessalian territory, Polyperchon's army met with and shortly thereafter destroyed the Greek forces, now led by the Thessalian, Menon of Pharsalus.<sup>613</sup>

Polyperchon's effective action when engaged with the Aetolian led uprising demonstrated that the faith placed in him by Antipater and Craterus was well

---

<sup>609</sup> Diod. 18.38.3.

<sup>610</sup> Diod. 18.38.2; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 166; Heckel, 2006. p. 225, 227.

<sup>611</sup> Berve, Vol. II. 1926. pp. 324-5; Heckel, 2006. p. 225.

<sup>612</sup> Diod. 18.38.6.

<sup>613</sup> Diod. 18.38.6; Plut. *Phoc.* 25.5; Heckel, 2006. pp. 166-7, 227. It must be stated here that the Greek forces were significantly diminished, which preceded Menon's assumption of command of the Greek forces, at the time of Polyperchon's arrival in Thessaly. This was due to the Aetolian forces's abandonment of Thessaly and swift return to Aetolia. With the absence of more than 12,000 men from the region, Aetolia presented itself as a tempting target for the Acarnanians, who were hostile towards Aetolia. Diod. 18.38.4; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 167; Heckel, 2006. p. 227.). In response to the attack on their home soil, the Aetolian departed from Thessaly and returned home, leaving their allies to face the Macedonian response alone. While the Greek strength had been reduced, it was still a significant threat, consisting of more than 14,000 men. (Heckel, 2006. p. 167, 319. n. 435; cf. Diod. 18.38.1, 18.38.3.).

founded. He was able to identify the threat presented by the Aetolian aggression and following the defeat of Polycles, he personally engaged with the Greek forces and destroyed them. This engagement would have provided Antipater with an understanding of how Polyperchon could manage the position of regent following his decision to name him as his successor in 319. Polyperchon's ability to manage the regency in his own right was also a quality already known to Antipater, due to the effective administration of the office during the time that he held the position. Because of this, Antipater may have seen the selection of Polyperchon as a more secure choice than the comparatively younger Cassander. Little information exists for the remainder of Polyperchon's first regency. What can be understood is that his time as interim regent in the stead of Antipater and Craterus was short-term, limited to the point at which the two *strategoi* returned to Macedon and the conflict conducted against Perdiccas and his supporters. The shared regency of Craterus and Antipater was not to be resumed on their return. Craterus would not survive the First Diadoch War, dying as the result of a falling from his horse while engaged against the forces of Eumenes near the Hellespont.<sup>614</sup> This resulted in Antipater taking sole command as regent in Europe upon his return to Macedon with Cassander following the proceedings of the Settlement of Triparadisus in 320.<sup>615</sup>

What can be understood from later events, exemplified by Antipater's role of authority during the Demades Affair, is that the transition of power from Polyperchon back to Antipatrid hands was smooth and effective. Polyperchon does not appear to have been unwilling and following the results from Triparadisus, which officially placed Antipater in command of Europe, it can be assumed that the regency reverted to Antipater without complaint. This ease in transition is reinforced by Polyperchon's ultimate selection as Antipater's successor in 319. If problems had arisen after Antipater's return, he may have

---

<sup>614</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.27; Diod. 18.30.5; Nepos, *Eum.* 4.3-4; Plut. *Eum.* 7.6; Heckel, 1992. p. 133; Baynham, in Worthington, 1994. p. 352; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 146; Heckel, 2006. p. 99; For more on the implications that Craterus' death had on Antipater as well as Polyperchon, see Ch. 5.3.

<sup>615</sup> cf. Ch. 5.1. p. 118.

been given cause to seek an alternative to Polyperchon during his final months as regent.

Polyperchon's defeat of the rebellious Greek cities during his brief tenure as regent is the last explicit reference made to his activities prior to his appointment to the regency after Antipater's death in 319. His absence from the literary record could be seen as a critique of his brief regency or of his position in the court following the First Diadoch War. However, Polyperchon's absence from the records should be seen as simply that, an absence. In what capacity he continued during the period after 320, through Cassander's management of Antipater's office during the regent's declining health can only be left to unsupported speculation.

During the years between 324 and 321, Polyperchon's career was extricably linked to that of Craterus. Craterus' connection to Alexander and his royally backed position needs to be extended to Polyperchon. Craterus' health was still questionable, and Polyperchon would need to be close to his side should he be unable to continue in his role, now as co-strategos of Europe. The association between Polyperchon and the royal Argead authority that Craterus embodied would have an effect upon Antipater's decision to name Polyperchon as his successor in 319. Polyperchon continued to follow his commander from his position in Cilicia into the Macedonian Homeland when word from Antipater reached the pair following the outbreak of the Lamian War when Alexander III's death became known throughout the empire. Once in Macedon, and with the Greek uprising subdued, little is known of Polyperchon's role. However, drawing on his appointment to the interim regency once the tensions between the Diadochoi turned violent in 321, Polyperchon was seen as a respected and capable military and political figure, able to manage Europe in the absence of both Antipater, Craterus and the military forces under their command. The trust placed in Polyperchon by the regents was rewarded, as soon after the Aetolian uprising, the interim regent was able to put down the hostile Greek forces without the requirement of reinforcement of the occupied Antipater and Craterus.

### 5.3: The Successor of Antipater – Cassander or Polyperchon.

If Diodorus' evaluation of Antipater's ailment as being one that usually results in death for the elderly can be trusted,<sup>616</sup> then the regent would have been aware that his death was likely. This in turn must have made the question of his successor foremost in his mind. As has been discussed, the most practical option present for Antipater in 319, was either Polyperchon or Cassander. Both these men had already demonstrated their abilities in managing the regency, Polyperchon during the events of the First Diadoch War when Antipater and Craterus had entered Asia Minor, and Cassander during the final months of Antipater's life. However, it should be noted that this choice might be seen as a false dichotomy, excluding other options that may have been considered by Antipater. It is possible that neither Polyperchon nor Cassander were Antipater's original choice as successor to the regency of Macedon.

While it is not the goal of this investigation to engage in constructions of alternate histories based on either actively manipulating or ignoring previous events, if Craterus had not died in 321, the quandary of who would become Antipater's successor would have been rendered moot. As one of the two officially appointed commanders of Macedon during the Settlement of Babylon, it is safe to assume that Craterus was the obvious choice as the next regent to succeed Antipater.

This section of investigation is devoted to the ways in which the death of Craterus in 321 appears on Antipater's approach of a successor of his position as regent of Macedon. It is not possible, given the severe lack of available evidence to postulate on Antipater's thought processes regarding the reasons why he deemed Polyperchon a more suitable successor to the position of *strategos* in Europe over Cassander, though it is a safe assumption on the ground of Antipater's long career and understanding of political machinations that the decision was not made in haste or without proper consideration that the

---

<sup>616</sup> Diod. 18.48.1. Antipater was well into his seventies by 319, easily placing him into Diodorus' age bracket (γῆρως).

important office requires. Given this dearth of information, Polyperchon's promotion from whatever office he occupied prior to Antipater's death, if indeed he occupied one, are impossible to know. However, there are a number of interesting consequences that resulted from Antipater's choice declaration of Polyperchon as the succeeding *strategos* and Cassander as *chiliarch* that at the very least, suggest Antipater expressing the desire to mating the integrity of Macedonian power structures in Europe and further throughout the Empire itself. From the position of hindsight, it is easy to see that Antipater's choice failed in this regard, but from the perspective of 319, this is not as evident as it now appears. This section which follows concludes discussion of the relationship between Antipater and Craterus, the factors impacting on the choice of Polyperchon as regents and lays the groundwork for the coming conflict between Polyperchon and Cassander.

After the Settlement of Babylon was approved, the dynamic between Craterus and Antipater changed. Instead of one replacing the other, they became colleagues.<sup>617</sup> The appointment brought stability to Antipater's standing in Macedon, particularly with regard to suppressing the continued tensions between himself and Olympias. Craterus, as the last regent appointed by Alexander before his death, could be seen as having Argead authority and Antipater would have known this. Evidence for correspondence or other explicit interaction between Craterus and Olympias does not exist. However, it is still possible to assume that the royal mother was positively disposed to working with the newly appointed regent. As previously examined, Antipater's replacement by Alexander with Craterus was the result of a series of requests made by Olympias, rather than as a result of any personal animosity between Antipater and the king. Craterus' standing in the Macedonian Court as one of Alexander's most loyal supporters and friends<sup>618</sup> suggests that, once given the regency, Craterus would be able to represent Argead interests in Macedon. This was the exact reason the influence of Olympias had been suppressed during

---

<sup>617</sup> cf. Ch. 5.2. pp. 135-136.

<sup>618</sup> cf. Plut. *Alex.* 47.10; Heckel, 1992. p. 107; Ashton, *Makedonia*. 5. (1993). p. 126; Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 49; Ashton, in Wheatley and Baynham, 2015. p. 111.

Antipater's regency, leading to her desire for a new regent to be installed.<sup>619</sup> It must be noted that neither the ability of Craterus to represent an Argead voice in the court at Macedon, nor his links to the royal family ended with Alexander's death in 323. These connections to Alexander's original appointment in 324 and the authority it carried were significant factors that stayed with Craterus for the remainder of his life as they would affect, and be exploited by, both Olympias and Antipater.

As Carney correctly highlights,<sup>620</sup> the primary concern of Olympias, after her son's death in 323, was the welfare of her grandson, Alexander IV. In order to secure some influence over her grandson's welfare, she would need to engage with members of the Diadochoi who held a pro-Argead position. One of those would have been the Macedonian patriot, Craterus.<sup>621</sup> At the same time she attempted to extend her influence into Babylon through her relationship with Perdiccas, in another attempt to subvert Antipater's influence.

In addition to fulfilling Olympias' desire for greater Argead representation within the court at Macedon, Craterus may have been able to ingratiate himself with the royal mother via an intermediary. The most likely person to facilitate this was Eumenes of Cardia. Eumenes had maintained close ties with Olympias since his time as Philip II's servant within the Macedonian Court,<sup>622</sup> and has been aptly described as "*...a lifelong supporter of the royal family.*"<sup>623</sup> Eumenes was also well acquainted with Craterus. Although they would become adversaries during the First War of the Diadochoi, a friendship between the two had been forged during Alexander's life.<sup>624</sup> These factors suggest that Olympias would have welcomed the news that a pro-Argead regent had been installed in Macedon, one who could act as a potential and very powerful ally.

---

<sup>619</sup> cf. Ch. 3. p. 72; Carney, 2000. p. 88.

<sup>620</sup> Carney, 2006. pp. 70-71.

<sup>621</sup> Anson, *AHB*. 26. (2012). p. 57.

<sup>622</sup> Diod. 18.58.1-4; Plut. *Eum.* 1.1-2; Nepos. *Eum.* 13.1; Anson, 2004. pp. 35-37; Carney, 2006. p. 54, 70-1.

<sup>623</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 120.

<sup>624</sup> cf. Diod. 19.59.3; Plut. *Eum.* 5.6, 7.12; Nepos. *Eum.* 4.4; Anson, 2004. p. 47.

For Polyperchon, it can be argued that the same favour that Olympias and her supporters extended to Craterus would extend to him. Certainly if he was intended as a potential substitute for Craterus as Alexander had wished in 324, he would share the same affiliations to which his superior had access. The pro-Argead bias of Polyperchon prior to 319 has been tentatively suggested by Carney.<sup>625</sup> It should be noted however, that Carney's proposal is based upon Polyperchon's later efforts to align himself with the royal family after Alexander's death and once hostilities had begun with Cassander. If Polyperchon's appointment in 324 is taken into consideration however, further support for the possibility that Olympias and Polyperchon could work together can be considered. It should be noted however that, after 319, Olympias seems to have been unsure of the intentions of Polyperchon. She consulted Eumenes who urged caution in her interactions with Polyperchon, advice that may be connected with Polyperchon's unattested campaign into Asia Minor.<sup>626</sup> It should also be remembered that although Craterus was pro-Argead, this does not mean that he would automatically agree with and support Olympias. Craterus could represent Argead interests without elevating her within the court, an approach to the royal mother that would have found favour with Antipater.

Antipater would have been well aware of the Pro-Argead stance of the returning Craterus, and following the Settlement of Babylon and their joint-appointment to the regency of Macedon, he would begin to cement ties with his counterpart. By doing so, Antipater would minimise the criticism from his detractors, reaffirming his position in Macedon. Once Craterus had returned to Macedon, and the turmoil among the Greek cities resulting from the Lamian War was suppressed, Antipater intensified his efforts to build a close relationship with Craterus. In order to accomplish this end, he facilitated the marriage alliance between Phila, his daughter, and his younger colleague.<sup>627</sup>

---

<sup>625</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 54.

<sup>626</sup> cf. Ch. 7.1.

<sup>627</sup> Diod. 18.18.7; Memnon, *FGrH*. 434. F. 4.4; Plut. *Demetr.* 14.2; Heckel, 1992. p. 131; Carney, 2000. p. 165.



The alliance was no doubt important for Antipater to establish, but it is clear that Craterus also placed significant importance upon it. This is evident by his willingness to separate from his current wife Amastris in order to allow the integration between the families to occur.<sup>628</sup> Craterus had married Amastris in 324 at Susa, as part of Alexander's series of marriages between his companions and noble Persian and Mede women. At this time Craterus was married to Stateira, a marriage that was dissolved to allow the new alliance encouraged by Alexander.<sup>629</sup> The divorce between Craterus and Amastris took place in late 322, just prior his marriage to Phila,<sup>630</sup> suggesting that there was only a brief interval before Craterus took Antipater's daughter as his wife.<sup>631</sup> The role of marriage as a means of creating and maintain strategic alliances is clear, but the question remains of what Craterus had to gain from this most recent marriage. That he was content in his marriage to Amestris and was concerned for her welfare is suggested by his willingness to allow her to remarry. Amestris was the wife given Craterus by Alexander; the benefits to come from the alliance with the family of Antipater through marriage must have been regarded as significant for Craterus to end a marriage supported by the recently deceased Alexander III. It is important to remember that Craterus was not a passive object upon whom Antipater was exerting pressure; he was also active in the continuing play for power.

Though part of Antipater's greater efforts to establish marriage alliances with various members of the Diadochoi, one aspect of this endeavour to be highlighted is the intention by the regent to create strong alliances covering an extended period of time. While in the case of Perdiccas' intended marriage to Nicaea this was an abject failure that resulted, in part, to the initiation of the First War of the Diadochoi in 322, the marriage alliances themselves imply a desire to forge amicable relations not just for the immediate period thereafter,

---

<sup>628</sup> Memnon, *FGrH* 434. F. 4.4; Heckel, 2006. p. 21.

<sup>629</sup> Arr. 7.4.4-6; Diod. 20.109.7; Memnon, *FGrH*. 434. F. 4.4; Heckel, 2006. p. 21.

<sup>630</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 21.

<sup>631</sup> Amastris was allowed by Craterus to marry one Dionysius of Heraclea (Memnon, *FGrH*. 434. F. 4.4; Strab. 12.3.10; Step. Byz. s.v. "*Amastris*"), which implies that there was little animosity or hostility between Craterus and his now former wife.

but for an extended period of time. To this end Craterus appears ready and willing to enter into the arrangement with Antipater, and a long-term alliance between the pair was created in 322.

There were several benefits for Craterus resulting from the alliance with Antipater. He was more than a passive participant in the arrangement, but actively contributed to creating the bonds with the Antipatrid house. The marriage itself would facilitate a close bond between the two *strategoi*, easing the management of Greece and Macedon. Additionally, the possibility of Craterus assuming the regency if his father-in-law died is substantial. The most likely choice for the regency if one of the two *strategoi* were to die in office, would be for the other to assume the office in full. Given that this is exactly what happened when Craterus died, it seems feasible to assume that the opposite may have occurred if the fortunes of the two men had been different. If no benefit existed for Craterus in marrying Philia, it is difficult to see why the powerful and popular general would choose his course of action. To see Craterus as a passive actor after the death of Alexander, one helplessly manipulated by the scheming Antipater, would be to ignore or dismiss Craterus' long career in Macedonian politics since the initiation of Alexander's expansion east in 334.

Antipater's reaffirmation to the regency of Macedon, albeit with the addition of a friendly Craterus would not have been welcome news to Olympias. Despite her efforts to remove a significant political adversary from Macedon, and seemingly succeeding in this endeavour after years of self-imposed exile in Epirus, the Settlement of Babylon dashed any hope she had of returning to Pella while Antipater still lived. For the foreseeable future, Olympias would remain away from Macedon.

Plans are not always realised and the death of Craterus in 321 while on campaign in Asia Minor dashed any further plans Antipater had for him. With one regent dead, the other assumed the regency of Macedon in full. Antipater's hold on Europe was confirmed shortly after the conclusion of the First Diadoch War at the council of Triparadisus in 321. If fortunes were different, and

Antipater had died during the conflict, it is inviting to entertain the notion that Craterus would have received the same treatment. The death of Craterus could be initially seen as advantageous to Antipater, as it removed a popular and powerful potential rival for him to contend with in the post-323 Macedonian Empire.

There does however exist an issue with the interpretation that Antipater would have welcomed this death, in that the significant problem that had plagued Antipater's regency since 331 would now re-emerge, that of pro-Argead supporters spearheaded most notably by Olympias. Craterus had brought a brief measure of security to Antipater's position due to his popularity within the Macedonian Empire and his connections to Alexander that would placate the concerns of Argead under-representation in the court at Macedon as well as help alleviate the anti-Antipatrid sentiment in Greece. With Craterus gone, Antipater would once again have to contend with his lack of popularity in Greece, a problem that had been festering throughout his tenure. He would also need to confront the difficult issue of considering who would be best to take over the position of regent in his stead. With his failing health, in 319, Antipater would be required to find another candidate for his office.

After Alexander's death, Antipater had actively engaged in preventing members of the Diadochoi from seizing the throne of Macedon for themselves. When Perdiccas accepted the offer made to him by Olympias to marry Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander the Great, he would enter the royal house, a decision which cost him his alliance with Antipater. As the custodian of the two kings, Philip III and Alexander IV, and the supposed recipient of Alexander the Great's royal signet ring during the king's final days,<sup>632</sup> Perdiccas was well positioned to seize the throne of Macedon for himself, a situation familiar to that presented to Philip II in 359 during his successor usurpation of the monarchy.<sup>633</sup> As one of Philip's

---

<sup>632</sup> Curt. 10.5.4, 10.6.4, 10.6.17; Diod. 17.117.3, 18.2; Heidl. Epit. *FGrH*. 155. F.1.2; Just. 12.15.12; Nepos, *Eum.* 2.1; *LM*. 112; cf. Wheatley, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 24.

<sup>633</sup> cf. Ath. 13.557B; Diod. 16.1.3, 2.1; Just. 7.5.9-19; Griffith, in Hammond & Griffith, 1979. pp. 699-701; Heckel, 2006. p. 208.

closest advisors, Antipater would have been well aware of the possibility of aspirations for the throne being held by Perdiccas. Once his intention to marry Cleopatra became known, Antipater and his allies sought to remove Perdiccas from power.

By not only engaging in the effort to halt the expansion of Perdiccan power, but in fact leading the cause, Antipater's action may be viewed as an expression of his desire to maintain the integrity of the Macedonian Empire in 322, the year after Alexander's death. For the members of the Diadochoi, the fracturing of the Empire, at least in theory, would not be tolerated. Once the Settlement of Triparadisus had concluded, Philip III and Alexander IV were both relocated back to Macedon and placed under Antipater's authority.<sup>634</sup> While the dissolution of the Empire itself was well underway, officially the Diadochoi were ostensibly operating in a caretaker capacity until either Philip III or Alexander IV could rule in their own right, an open ruse that needed to be defended and upheld if it was to work. During this time, the regent made no attempt on the throne nor did he engage in any overtly monarchical acts.

Regardless of why Antipater chose Polyperchon over Cassander, the death of Craterus in 321 forced Antipater to find a new heir apparent. With Polyperchon's promotion to control of Macedon, European affairs and the Argead family and the apparent slight that it showed Cassander, the stage was now set for the forthcoming conflict in the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire, with Cassander wasting little time in readying himself against the new regent.

---

<sup>634</sup> Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 1.42, 1.44, 1.45; Heidl. *Epit. FGrH*. 155. F. 2.1; Diod. 18.39.7; Heckel, 2006. p. 18, 52; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 180-181.

## **Chapter 6: ‘Cry Havoc!, and let slip the dogs of war’: 319 – 318.**

This chapter is devoted to the initial stages of the conflict between Polyperchon and Cassander, following the death of Antipater in the summer of 319 concluding with the defeat of Polyperchon’s fleet during a series of naval conflicts that took place near Byzantium in the summer of 318. In order to cover this period, the chapter is divided into two separate sections. The first discusses the immediate responses by both Cassander and Polyperchon to the decision made by Antipater prior to his death and the actions each man undertook thereafter.

It is with these initial actions and reactions that distinct differences begin to emerge between the methods of building support used by Cassander and Polyperchon. Cassander, as Polyperchon’s subordinate, did not accept the position given to him by Antipater. Shortly after his father’s death, Cassander fled from Macedon for Asia Minor and the court of Antigonus. From here he began his efforts to build a base of support for his return to Europe. Cassander’s allies came from two main groups, the pro-Macedonian oligarchies installed during Antipater’s tenure from which he could draw upon his familial connections for support, and several members of the Diadochoi. In particular Cassander sought and received support from Lysimachus in Thrace, Ptolemy in Egypt and most notably from Antigonus in Asia Minor. These two groups would form the core of Cassandrian support in the conflict against Polyperchon. A group conspicuously absent from Cassander’s base of supporters in the struggle for domination in Greece and Macedon was the royal family. At no point during this period of time did Cassander make any effort to win the favour of the royal family, rather choosing to actively distance himself from Argead support.

Following Antipater’s death, Polyperchon began his regency in much the same way as Craterus may have done had he survived to take the position. Given Polyperchon’s original appointment as Craterus’ second in command it is not unexpected that his approach to leadership would be similar. As guardian of the kings, Polyperchon chose to align himself with the royal family and their

supporters as closely as he could. With royal backing leading to legitimisation of his authority, Polyperchon could then continue to wield significant power within the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire. Though Cassander chose to find a substantial portion of his support from various members of the Diadochoi, Polyperchon would only engage with those who still maintained Argead sympathies, such as Eumenes. Having Eumenes as a supporter would provide several advantages for Polyperchon's position in 319. It would aid in keeping Antigonos occupied in Asia Minor and out of Europe and, more significantly for Polyperchon's regency, Eumenes' favour would aid in creating and strengthening ties with Olympias, ties which would ultimately result in facilitation of her return to Macedon in 317.

While Cassander would seek alliances with the oligarchies of Greece, Polyperchon went to great effort to undermine these groups via implementation of the Exiles Decree initially proposed by Alexander the Great in 324. Proclamation of this decree had been delayed due to the possibility of increasing unrest that the return of these exiles could mean for Antipatrid control of the region but it was ultimately proclaimed, though not enacted, by Antipater. By using his influence with the royal family and implementing the proclamation, thereby allowing the return of the exiles, Polyperchon simultaneously undermined Cassander's oligarchic supporters and attracted sympathy from the cities themselves.

The second section of this chapter engages with the movements of Cassander and Polyperchon once hostilities began between the two during the Second Diadoch War. The changeover of power following the death of such a powerful figure in the Macedonian Empire brought with it an expectation of conflict, violence and death.<sup>635</sup> Macedonian succession was rarely a straightforward process, and the period that followed Antipater's death was no exception. It is clear that Cassander did not accept his father's arrangements,<sup>636</sup> and shortly

---

<sup>635</sup> cf. Ch. 3. pp. 56-58.

<sup>636</sup> Diod. 18.49.1; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1-2; Fortina, 1965. p. 24; Heckel, 1992. p. 193-194; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 39; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 215; Heckel,

after Antiater's death, he began to lay the groundwork for a future attempt to seize power in Macedon.<sup>637</sup>

## 6.1 Cassander 319

Plutarch's *Phocion* conveys some of Cassander's first activities in the late summer of 319,<sup>638</sup> which were designed to effect greater influence within the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire. These included the dispatching of Nicanor to Athens, replacing Menyllus as the commander of the garrison at Munychia.<sup>639</sup> This departure took place almost immediately after Antipater's death and Nicanor must have travelled with speed as he reached the garrison and took on his command before news of the death became public knowledge in Athens.<sup>640</sup> Such a move could not have escaped the notice of Polyperchon. While Polyperchon's reaction to Nicanor's appointment is not recorded, modern scholars have interpreted this silence as an apparent lack of reaction indicating either a lack of confidence in his ability to respond effectively or that Cassander's swift actions took Polyperchon by surprise.<sup>641</sup>

---

2006. p. 79; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 212; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). pp. 10-11.

<sup>637</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 78; Heckel, 1992. p. 194; Heckel, 2006. p. 79, 178, 227; Hughes, 2008. p. 217; Adams, 2010. p. 212; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 11.

<sup>638</sup> Bosworth, *CQ.* 44. (1994). p. 62.

<sup>639</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 31.3; Tritle, 1988. p. 139. There is some uncertainty over which Nicanor was sent by the *chiliarch*. The two central candidates proposed are either Nicanor of Stageira, the adopted son of Aristotle, which is the traditional assumption (See for example: Droysen, Vol. II<sup>2</sup>, 1878. p. 186; Beloch, IV<sup>2</sup>, 1927. p. 100, 457; Berve, Vol II. 1926. pp. 276-7; Hammond & Walbank, 1988. p. 209; cf. Heckel, 2006. p. 177. s.v. *Nicanor* [4]). The alternative, cautiously, but persuasively proposed by Bosworth (*CQ.* 44. (1994). pp. 57-65) is that the reference is to the son of Balacrus, making him Cassander's nephew and Antipater's grandson via Philia's marriage to the Satrap of Cilicia (Bosworth, *CQ.* 44. (1994). pp. 60-61; cf. Heckel, 2006. p. 68. s.v. *Balacrus* [2], p. 177. s.v. *Nicanor* [4], [9], p. 207. s.v. *Philia* [3]). However Heckel (2006. p. 177; further expanded on in *GRBS.* 47. (2007) pp. 401-412, particularly 409 - 412) highlights the uncertainty of both interpretations and caution must be employed with either interpretation. For a more comprehensive evaluation of Nicanor's identity, see: Heckel, *GRBS.* 47. (2007). For more on Menyllus, see: Heckel, 2006. p. 292. n. 85.

<sup>640</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 31.2; Bosworth, *CQ.* 44. (1994). p. 62.

<sup>641</sup> Hughes, 2008. p. 217.

Both Diodorus<sup>642</sup> and Plutarch<sup>643</sup> describe Cassander's actions immediately after Antipater's death as calculated schemes, designed to undermine Polyperchon's authority in his desire for power.<sup>644</sup> There is no reference to Polyperchon's inability to manage Greece. In fact Diodorus goes so far as to suggest that Polyperchon held the support of the majority of influential Macedonians *before* he left for Asia Minor,<sup>645</sup> implying that during the initial phases of his tenure in 319, he was a capable and respected leader.

Certainly the notion that Cassander was already planning to secure power for himself before Antipater died is not new,<sup>646</sup> and Cassander's hope that Nicanor would be able to secure Athens is an appealing interpretation, when placed in the context of his later actions. Plutarch affirms that Cassander was entirely responsible for Nicanor's appointment,<sup>647</sup> a position upheld by Bosworth who suggests that as a means to effect the change he would "*have claimed that he had Antipater's mandate.*"<sup>648</sup> However a possibility that has gone without investigation that also needs consideration is that Nicanor's command did, in fact, have Antipater's authorisation from the outset. If this were so, it would account for the speed at which Nicanor was able to arrive in Athens, as he would have already begun preparation for the journey south. It would also explain the lack of reference to Polyperchon's reaction to the change of office in the narratives of the ancient sources. The exact circumstances of Nicanor's dispatch to Athens can only be left to speculation. What can be more firmly stated, however, is that Cassander had a supporter in Nicanor whom he could use to create a base of support for his cause in southern Greece. Additionally, the

---

<sup>642</sup> Diod. 18.49, 18.54; cf. Landucci Gattinoni (2004. p. 215) highlights that these two sections of Diodorus' narrative are duplicated by the historian. Most likely the repetition is the result of source authority used by Diodorus.

<sup>643</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 31-32.

<sup>644</sup> These positions may be influenced by the hostile literary tradition against Cassander and his father emanating from Hieronymus' bias (Walsh, *AHB.* 26. (2012). p. 156.).

<sup>645</sup> Diod. 18.54.1. cf. Diod. 18.48.4; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 228.

<sup>646</sup> cf. Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 212.

<sup>647</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 31.1: "εὐθὺς διαναστὰς ὁ Κάσανδρος καὶ προκαταλαμβάνων τὰ πράγματα."

<sup>648</sup> Bosworth, *CQ.* 44. (1994). p. 62.



replacement of such an important position following the tumultuous Demades affair and the possible reaction from Athens, as well as the recent death of Antipater, would suggest that Polyperchon was aware of Nicanor's movements shortly after he assumed the regency. If Polyperchon did disapprove of the appointment, he seems to have done nothing to stop it, suggesting that he accepted the appointment as one initiated by Antipater.

While Nicanor would prove to be a useful asset for Cassander in Southern Greece, especially for his return to the region in 318,<sup>649</sup> this alone would not be strong enough support. So, in order to facilitate a serious attempt to seize power in Greece and Macedon, Cassander would need to forge alliances with various members of the Diadochoi. Cassander was aware that, following Antipater's death, Polyperchon held the majority of support among the Macedonian aristocracy.<sup>650</sup> There is no evidence within the sources that tensions had previously existed between the regent and his *chiliarch*. Therefore, Cassander needed to exercise caution and maintain a guise of secrecy when approaching groups within the empire so as not to disrupt the delicate balance within the court.

Cassander's caution can be seen in the members of the Diadochoi he contacted - Ptolemy, Lysimachus,<sup>651</sup> and Antigonus.<sup>652</sup> While all of them were in relatively close geographical proximity to Macedon by land or sea, there is an aspect for each that explicitly connects them to Cassander. Each of these men already held either direct ties with the Antipatrid family, or extended familial ties in the case of Antigonus, stemming from their respective marriages to daughters of Antipater following the death of Alexander in 323. Ptolemy had married

---

<sup>649</sup> For further discussion of Cassander's return to Greece, see p. 179.

<sup>650</sup> Diod. 18.49.1-3.

<sup>651</sup> Diod. 18.49.3. It must be noted that there is no mention of Cassander's contact with Lysimachus at this time. However there is little doubt that he was part of Cassander's alliance from early on. Lysimachus must have been one of the commanders to whom Cassander dispatched envoys for support as referred to in Diodorus' narrative (Diod. 18.49.3; Lund, 1992. p. 55). By the summer of 318, Lysimachus was actively participating in the war against Polyperchon (Diod. 18.79.9; Billows, 1990 p. 84-85. n. 7.)

<sup>652</sup> Caroli, 2007. p. 48.

Cassander's sister Eurydice in 321/0,<sup>653</sup> and had maintained his connection with the family over the previous years.<sup>654</sup> Lysimachus too held a connection via marriage with Cassander's family. Following her rejection by Perdiccas and subsequent flight from Babylon in 321, Nicaea, like her sisters, was once again used as a political tool serving her father's interests. At much the same time as Eurydice's marriage to Ptolemy, Nicaea married Lysimachus.<sup>655</sup> With the marriage in place, Antipater had a strategically well-placed ally in Thrace who could manage the potentially problematic crossing point into Asia at the Hellespont.

For Cassander, making contact with both Lysimachus and Ptolemy, his brothers-in-law, would not in itself arouse suspicion within the Macedonian Court. However, it was still necessary to maintain a level of secrecy during this mustering of support. To further this aim, Cassander chose to remove himself from the court in Macedon and Pella under the guise of a leisure trip away from the suspicion and intrigue of the court. Although Cassander was able to contact both Lysimachus and Ptolemy for support while still within Macedon, the same was not possible when he made contact with the man who would become the key supporter of his efforts to gain supremacy in Greece and Macedon, Antigonus Monophthalmus. Though the two had worked together for a short period of time following the Partition of Triparadeisus in 320, the direct familial connection that Cassander shared with Lysimachus and Ptolemy did not exist with Antigonus.<sup>656</sup> However if any tension existed between Cassander and

---

<sup>653</sup> App. Syr. 62; Paus. 1.6.8; Carney, 2000. p. 178; Heckel, 2006. p. 122, 238.

<sup>654</sup> cf. Diod. 18.14.1-2; 25.4; Heckel, 2006. p. 238.

<sup>655</sup> Strabo. *Geo.* 12.4.7; Heckel (2006. p. 155, 175) provides a suggested date for the marriage taking place in 321/0 during Antipater's life; Lund. 1992. p. 54; Carney, 2000. p. 160.

<sup>656</sup> There was still a connection to the Antigonids via the marriage between Cassander's sister Philia and Antigonus' son Demetrius that took place at much the same time as Cassander was appointed as Antigonus' *chiliarch* in 320 (Diod. 19.59.3; Plut. *Demetr.* 14.2-3 cf. 27.4; Wheatley, 1997. p. 33; Carney, 2000. p. 165; Heckel, 2006. p. 109.). If this did act a vehicle via which Cassander made contact with the Antigonids, there is no record of it taking place within the ancient accounts. Diodorus' narrative does at least suggest that no prior contact regarding an alliance was made before Cassander had departed Europe.

Antigonus following Cassander's return to Macedon in 320, it was no longer a factor in 319.

It must be stated though, before continuing discussion of Cassander's approach to Antigonus in 319 and their subsequent alliance that a temporal gap occurs within the ancient accounts. There are at least two distinct phases in which Cassander sought support against Polyperchon, the first when he was still located in Macedon where he made contact with Lysimachus and Ptolemy as well as the oligarchies in Greece, and the second following his crossing of the Hellespont later in the same year. While Diodorus' account states that Cassander left Macedon unobserved and at a time of his choosing,<sup>657</sup> it is clear from Antigonus' willingness to ally with the son of Antipater that once Cassander had left Macedon, Polyperchon was aware of his intentions and responded to this new threat. The abrupt departure of Polyperchon's *chiliarch* was a clear rejection of the new regent's authority and indicated that Cassander was unwilling to work under his jurisdiction. If Diodorus' narrative can be trusted, the period between Cassander's journey over the Hellespont and his arrival in Antigonus' court in Phrygia saw a number of significant political machinations implemented by the new regent of Macedon. These include the implementation of Philip III's Exiles Decree in Greece as well as Polyperchon's correspondence with Eumenes of Cardia. However, in order to gain a better understanding of events and maintain the integrity of the thematic nature of this portion of investigation, these factors are discussed later in the chapter. What is important to note at this time in Cassander's search for support is that it did not occur as one single effort. While it is likely that it was constantly underway during this time, when applied to the members of the Diadochoi, it appears to have occurred in two distinct phases.

Cassander had made contact with both Lysimachus and Ptolemy via intermediaries, who acted on his behalf,<sup>658</sup> however this does not appear to have occurred with Antigonus. It is not known whether this was done out of necessity to maintain the secrecy of his plans, whether his efforts were discovered by

---

<sup>657</sup> Diod. 18.54.3.

<sup>658</sup> Diod. 18.53.2.

Polyperchon (something that is not suggested in the compressed account of Diodorus) or whether Cassander was confident that Antigonus would at the very least provide him with asylum. What can be said though is that Cassander travelled directly to Antigonus following his departure from Macedon in late 319.<sup>659</sup>

Once Cassander had arrived in Phrygia, Antigonus did not require much convincing to support him. Once again, Diodorus provides the most detailed account, describing Antigonus readily accepting Cassander's approaches on account of the friendship he had with Antipater as well as in response to Polyperchon's support of Eumenes' continued efforts against his position in Asia Minor. Curiously, Diodorus implies that Cassander was not privy to Antigonus' desire to keep Polyperchon occupied in Europe and out of Asia Minor, particularly in light of their apparent shared cause, that being the desire to remove Polyperchon as a threat to their respective positions.

At the time of Cassander's arrival at the court of Antigonus, relations between Polyperchon and the Satrap of Phrygia were at an all time low, verging on open warfare between the two,<sup>660</sup> stemming from the regent's support for Eumenes of Cardia.<sup>661</sup> In Cassander, Antigonus had a man of whom he had experience commanding in 320 and who was willing to combat Polyperchon, this in addition to the authority he carried as the son of Antipater. Therefore, Antigonus provided his new ally with the two things he needed to bring the war to Greece and Macedon, financial support and a military force.<sup>662</sup> It has been suggested previously that Antigonus held few expectations of Cassander beyond distracting Polyperchon, tying up his resources in Greece and out of Asia Minor,<sup>663</sup> and this may be so. What is important to note is the comparatively minor risk that supporting Cassander in Greece posed for Antigonus. Following the regent's backing for Antigonus' main adversary in Asia, Eumenes, the

---

<sup>659</sup> Diod. 18.54.3.

<sup>660</sup> Billows, 1990. p. 84.

<sup>661</sup> See Ch. 6.2. pp. 169-170.

<sup>662</sup> Diod. 18.54.4.

<sup>663</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 80. n. 2; cf. Diod. 18.54.4.

expectation that both military and financial support would begin to flow from Macedon was certain. By aligning with Cassander, it was possible for Antigonus to end a potential problem without having to invade Greece himself. Because Polyperchon had already declared himself for Eumenes against Antigonus, the risk for Antigonus of incurring further hostility from Pella had now increased.

Caution, however, is required here with Diodorus' depiction of Antigonus' intentions. Antigonus' hidden agenda could stem from Diodorus' authority source, Hieronymus and his hostile portrayal of Cassander's family, as his patron Antigonus may not have wished to be shown to accept an alliance with Cassander for any reason other than that of convenience.

One group conspicuously absent from those that Cassander approached for support was the royal Argead house and their sympathisers. While there is reference to the Greek oligarchies and garrisons, as well as various members of the Diadochoi, there exists no evidence in the ancient sources for any attempt by Cassander to gain support from the royal family. There seems little chance that Cassander sought royal backing following Antipater's death, or that he even entertained the prospect of doing so. Numerous factors would explain Cassander's aversion to the royals in 319. Apart from his concerted effort to maintain secrecy while building his base of support, something that would be jeopardised should his proposal be rejected, it is likely that Cassander was still wary of the impact of his perceived involvement in the death of Alexander four years previously. A practical answer too exists for Cassander's search for backing from non-royal groups in that he was aware that both the royal family, and the elites of Macedon had already gathered around the new regent, Polyperchon,<sup>664</sup> meaning that he could neither rely on them, nor expect to win them over to his cause. Because of this, if Cassander wanted to take control of Macedon and Greece, he needed to build his support base outside Macedon.

By the end of 319, Cassander had formed an alliance which included the closest and arguably most powerful members of the Diadochoi and several of the Greek

---

<sup>664</sup> Diod. 18.54.2; For further discussion on the initial support base of Polyperchon, see Ch. 6.2.

garrisons, but what value was he to those allied with him? Unfortunately, save for Antigonus,<sup>665</sup> no reference to the motivation of Lysimachus and Ptolemy for entering into an alliance with Cassander is recorded. Antigonus may have viewed Cassander as simply the means to an end, as one who could keep Polyperchon's attentions and resources fixed on and in Europe. However there were also substantial benefits that would apply to him, as well as to Lysimachus and Ptolemy. If Cassander were able to gain control of Macedon and Greece, then he may also be able to take custody of and exert influence over the royal family. The Diadochoi were all acting, in theory if not in practice, as custodians of the empire until the kings were able to take their place as rulers of the new empire.<sup>666</sup> Keeping control of the kings would offer a measure of security for Cassander and for his allies if they chose to maintain the guise of royal authority.

However, fear of incurring the wrath of, or retribution from, the royal factions did not appear to have been cause for concern for Cassander's allies. Indeed, aligning themselves with Cassander against Polyperchon would actively incite exactly that. As Adams has noted,<sup>667</sup> this must have influenced the members of the Diadochoi whom Cassander chose to approach for support, especially in the case of Antigonus and Ptolemy. Antigonus, as previously discussed, had already been placed in a position of conflict by Polyperchon's support for Eumenes. Ptolemy too had been operating aggressively outside his satrapy of Egypt, having conquered both Syria and Palestine following the Partition of Triparadeisus.<sup>668</sup> While the expansion of Ptolemaic power in the Levant does not equate to a rejection of Argead authority, it does indicate that Ptolemy was willing to act in his own interests, independently from Pella.

In order to build the foundation necessary for the coming war against Polyperchon, Cassander knew that he could not rely solely upon the support of

---

<sup>665</sup> Antigonus' reasoning was most likely recorded by Diodorus' because of the connection his authority, Hieronymus of Cardia, had during his time within the Antigonid Court. cf. Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 228-229.

<sup>666</sup> cf. Bosworth, 1988. pp. 174-175.

<sup>667</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 79.

<sup>668</sup> Diod. 18.43; Adams, 1975. p. 79; Fortina, 1965. p. 26; Billows, 1990. p. 85; Wheatley, *CQ.* 45. (1995). p. 437-9.

groups within the homeland of the empire. Instead, he chose to employ the connections and alliances established by his father during his time as regent of Macedon between 334 and 319 BC. This does not however mean that Antipater explicitly created these ties for a future civil war in Greece and Macedon against the royal house. As previously discussed, the installation of garrisons and oligarchies with sympathies to Antipater was most likely done out of the practical necessity of maintaining Macedonian hegemony in the region following the depletion of the military reserves at Antipater's disposal, rather than because of any monarchical aspirations on the part of the former regent. However, Cassander was able to exploit the connections made by his father to create his support base. While inviting to view the original installation of these oligarchies as a grand scheme on the part of Antipater to rebel against Argead authority, it is prudent to avoid employing hindsight to interpret these as a direct attempt on the throne of Macedon. It has been previously identified by Adams that viewing Cassander's departure from Macedon in 319 as the deliberate first steps on the road to his future as king in Macedon<sup>669</sup> is very much the result of looking back on these events with understandings made possible by later knowledge. However, with this understanding in mind, Cassander was still able to build himself a support base that would prove vital to his forthcoming conflict with Macedon's new regent.

## **6.2: Polyperchon 319**

While Cassander chose to distance himself from the royal family and their supporters, seeking instead to associate himself with Antipatrid supporters from the oligarchies in Greece and various members of the Diadochoi, Polyperchon travelled a radically different path. As Antipater's successor, and the understudy for Craterus, Polyperchon adopted what could be described as a traditional approach to support for his regency. In doing so he aligned himself closely with the royal family as well as their supporters. Of particular importance to Polyperchon were the kings, Philip III and Alexander IV and Olympias, who had

---

<sup>669</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 77.

continued to reside in Epirus since her departure in 331/0.<sup>670</sup> The support of the royal family, or possibly Polyperchon's ability to exploit their image rather than their actual support, was integral to his regency and his efforts against Cassander. Without them, he would lose his main avenue of political and military support. Because royal backing was vital to his campaign, Polyperchon would need to placate and serve the royal interests during the initial years of conflict with Cassander.

It is important to note that, while possible to view Polyperchon's support base in contrast with Cassander as this study does, it should not, in the autumn of 319, be viewed as a reaction to Cassander's dissatisfaction and future departure from the court in Macedon. Rather, for the initial period of Polyperchon's regency, it appears that he conducted himself in much the same manner that would have been expected of Craterus, that being as a regent who could work more closely with the royal family and represent their interests to a greater extent than was perceived of Antipater's regency. While Cassander made explicit efforts to build a support base in 319 with several members of the Diadochoi, Polyperchon embarked on only one such effort to ally with a member of the Diadochoi, that being his alliance with Eumenes of Cardia. Once again this was not done as a means to combat Cassander, but rather in order to gain the favour and trust of Olympias, with whom Eumenes held close ties throughout his life.<sup>671</sup>

Following Cassander's departure from Macedon to Asia Minor and Antigonus, Polyperchon was aware of the threat that the son of Antipater now posed.<sup>672</sup> In response, he reacted swiftly to negate the immediate threat posed by the Greek oligarchies that held personal allegiance to Cassander's family. This came in the form of Philip III's Exile's Decree, which was enacted by early 318.<sup>673</sup> Not only was the decree aimed at weakening Cassander's supporters among the Greek cities, it also provided the chance of simultaneously increasing his own presence

---

<sup>670</sup> cf. Ch. 3. p. 76.

<sup>671</sup> Anson, 2004. pp. 42-43; cf. Diod. 18.58.2.

<sup>672</sup> Diod. 18.55.2; Anson, 2004. p. 140

<sup>673</sup> Diod. 18.56; Heckel, 1992. pp. 194-5. and n. 118; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 231-233; Heckel, 2006. p. 52; Boiy, 2007. p.137; Dmetriev, 2011. p. 95.



in the region by tapping into pre-existing Argead sympathies within southern Greece. The offer on the table for the Greeks for a goal they had desires for years, as Dmetriev notes, the acts, “*appealed to Greek cities by promising to restore the same mode of government they had under Philip and Alexander and to return to the “original stance” (τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς προαίρεσιν) of Alexander.*”<sup>674</sup> While Polyperchon was the first of the Diadochoi to extend such an offer to Greeks in return for their favour,<sup>675</sup> he was by no means the last, nor would this be the last time that Polyperchon employed the notion of freedom to gain further political traction with his Greek allies.<sup>676</sup>

As in the case of Cassander, there are only sparse records of Polyperchon’s movements covering the year of 319. As a consequence, no record of Polyperchon’s location leading up to, or at the time of, Antipater’s death survives. Nor is there record of his immediate actions once he assumed the regency. However, it is still possible to gain some insight into his endeavours from accounts found later in the literary sources. What can be understood from Diodorus’ account is that Polyperchon was able to gain significant support from the Macedonian nobility swiftly, and seemingly, with ease. This can be inferred from Cassander’s unwillingness to engage in open hostilities against the regent prior to his flight from Macedon as well as his need to maintain the secrecy of his endeavours to build a powerbase solely among those he trusted.<sup>677</sup>

There are several scenarios that emerge when considering the way in which Polyperchon was able to assemble his initial support base. While all of these are based on some level of speculation and hypothesis, it is still advantageous to engage with these possibilities. It must be remembered that Polyperchon’s official position in Macedon following his first, short tenure as regent during the First Diadoch War is unknown, but it is likely that he remained in the region

---

<sup>674</sup> Dmetriev, 2011. p. 97.

<sup>675</sup> Dmetriev, 2011. p. 113. Note that Dmetriev dates this decree to the summer of autumn of 319, immediately after Antipater’s death.

<sup>676</sup> See below, Ch. 8.1, 8.2. also: Dmetriev, 2011. pp. 112-124 for an overview of freedom as a slogan under the Diadochoi during the period of time covered by this investigation.

<sup>677</sup> Diod. 18. 54. 2.

after Antipater returned from Asia Minor until the regent's death. This would result in Polyperchon being familiar with a significant section of the Macedonian nobility, and vice-versa and as he assumed the regency in 319, he may have been able to exploit these ties to create his early powerbase. Polyperchon's initial regency too would provide a level of understanding of his capacity to hold the office in 319. Though short, his management and suppression of the Aetolian led uprising, with limited resources and without the realistic possibility of support from Antipater and Craterus, demonstrated that he would be a competent regent.

Another explanation of Polyperchon's initially strong powerbase may also be found in the legitimacy of his appointment that emanated from the authority of Antipater's decree as well as the connections he held to Craterus during his career. As Heckel has previously suggested, in 324 Alexander intended Polyperchon to act as a substitute for Craterus, not just for the return march of the Opis veterans, but also for the regency as well.<sup>678</sup> When Antipater was dying, attention again turned to Polyperchon as an approved option for the regency. Events elsewhere in the empire, particularly in the case of Antigonus and Ptolemy, began to show signs that the authority of the Argeads had begun to waver as a result of the Diadochoi's ambition and self-interest; despite this strong, pro-monarchical support still existed in Macedon in 319 and beyond.<sup>679</sup> It is likely that Alexander's approval of Polyperchon as the substitute regent should Craterus be unable to hold office, would have impacted on his ability to draw support from the pro-Argead contingent of the Macedonian nobility. In addition to Alexander's approval, another possible explanation for Polyperchon's early support base may stem from Antipater's appointment. Antipater's choice, as this study has previously suggested<sup>680</sup> was a calculated and deliberate one. It sent a strong message to groups throughout the empire

---

<sup>678</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 192-193.

<sup>679</sup> This can be seen in the authority carried by Olympias during her return in 317 and the battle fought against Philip III and Eurydice on the borders of Epirus and Macedon (Ath. 13.560F = *FGrH* 76. F. 52; Diod. 19.11.1-8; Just. 14.5.1-10; Paus. 1.11.3-4; Plut. *Alex.* 77.2) For further discussion of Olympias' return, see Ch. 7.2.

<sup>680</sup> cf. Ch. 5.3.

that Polyperchon was the man that Antipater believed to be most suitable to continue the governance of Macedon and Greece, rallying any neutral groups within Macedon that did not have strong ties to either the royal house, or the Antipatrid family.<sup>681</sup> It is true that Cassander relied heavily on those factions, who were loyal to his father, but this in itself does not equate to Cassander having the support of the entirety of the pro-Antipatrid groups in Macedon. While Antipater had spent a significant amount of time and effort to foster personal loyalties, the fact that Cassander was not confident of holding enough backing to push his own cause would suggest that at least some pro-Antipatrid groups had followed the dying regent's choice and thrown their support behind Polyperchon in 319.

It is impossible with the surviving evidence to know the exact reason for, and composition of, Polyperchon's initial internal support base following his promotion to the regency of Macedon. The most likely scenario is that there is no single answer, but a combination of several factors explaining Polyperchon's early powerbase in 319. What is clear is that, by the time of Cassander's flight from Macedon, Polyperchon was able to draw on significant levels of support.<sup>682</sup> Once Cassander chose his moment to depart from Macedon, Polyperchon reacted with speed to his second in command's absence. Diodorus' account makes it clear that Polyperchon had understood the implications of Cassander's flight and that conflict with the son of Antipater was to come.<sup>683</sup> He was able to identify the groups from which that Cassander would be able to draw the majority of his support, including the oligarchies in Greece as well as the alliances to both Ptolemy and Antigonos.<sup>684</sup>

Like Cassander, who knew that there was little support for his efforts within Macedon, Polyperchon too knew that he could expect little aid from Greece so

---

<sup>681</sup> Adams, *Makedonia*. 3. (1977). pp. 18-19.

<sup>682</sup> Diod. 18.55.1; Heckel, 1992. p. 195.

<sup>683</sup> Diod. 18.55.2.

<sup>684</sup> Diod. 18.55.2.

long as the pro-Antipatrid oligarchies held sway in the south.<sup>685</sup> In order to organise his opposition to Cassander, Polyperchon demonstrated his ability to work within his regency, assembling a council of his officers, friends and influential men in Macedon. In doing so he was following the official procedures of his office to implement the most effective strategy to bring against his rival.<sup>686</sup> Throughout this, Polyperchon's connections with the royal family were of utmost importance. Because of his connections to Craterus, as well as his willingness to engage with the official channels afforded by the regency, Polyperchon began to expand on his initial base of support. Most of the surviving members of the Argead family were located in Macedon in 319, including the two kings, Alexander the IV and Philip III, who had returned there following the Partition of Triparadisus the previous year.<sup>687</sup> This however, does not mean the entire family was present. A conspicuously absent member of the family, whose favour would provide significant political, as well as financial and military aid to Polyperchon's cause, was Olympias, who was still ensconced in Epirus. The timing of his initial contact with Olympias, and where it should be placed within the sequence of events immediately after Antipater's death in 319 is difficult to define with certainty, particularly in regards to whether it took place before Cassander had departed from the court in Macedon for the countryside, while he was still located in Macedon, or during his flight to Asia Minor. Diodorus' narrative is unclear in this regard, vaguely stating that contact with Olympias was made after Polyperchon had assumed the regency.<sup>688</sup> It is clear that Polyperchon had planned and made efforts to align himself with Olympias early on in his career, but there is nothing in Diodorus' narrative to clarify the matter beyond the section in which this initial contact is made. It may be possible that Polyperchon's contact with Olympias was what forced Cassander's departure,<sup>689</sup> but general consensus among modern scholars holds that the more likely scenario is that the initial contact took place during Cassander's sojourn in the

---

<sup>685</sup> This is not to say that there was no support for Polyperchon in Greece, as he appears to, in 319, have received popular support from Athens, despite the close proximity of the garrison at Munychia (Nepos. *Phoc.* 3.1; Syll.<sup>3</sup> = IG II<sup>2</sup> 387).

<sup>686</sup> Diod. 18.55.2; cf. Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 230

<sup>687</sup> cf. Hiedl. Epit. *FGrH.* 155. F. 2.2.

<sup>688</sup> Diod. 18.49.4; Caroli, 2007. p. 49.

<sup>689</sup> cf. Adams, 1975. p. 76.

country, but before his departure for Asia Minor.<sup>690</sup> Polyperchon's early contact with Olympias, in the short period of time before explicit hostilities with Cassander began demonstrates that his desire was to restore amicable ties between the royal family and the office of the regency, in an attempt to repair the damage resulting from Antipater's extended tenure as regent. This initial contact with Olympias has been perceived as a deliberate insult, directed towards Cassander.<sup>691</sup> While Cassander must have found the notion of Olympias returning to Macedon unpalatable,<sup>692</sup> it is likely that it would not have come as surprise. If Polyperchon was acting, as Craterus' replacement, to represent Argead interests in Macedon as Alexander had intended in 324, clearly it must have been expected that the ties between the regent and the surviving royals were to strengthen. Landucci Gattinoni correctly identifies that Polyperchon's appointment to the regency was a watershed moment for the political *status quo* in Macedon.<sup>693</sup> Polyperchon was not going to operate in his office the same way that Antipater had, or as Cassander would have. Therefore Cassander must have expected an attempted reconciliation with Olympias, headed by Polyperchon to take place shortly after his father's death. What is more certain, however is that Polyperchon had made contact with both Olympias and Eumenes by the time Cassander had reached Antigonus, as Polyperchon's support for Eumenes was a significant factor for Antigonus to ally with Cassander.<sup>694</sup>

While there was no chance of Olympias returning to Macedon while Antipater was alive, with her old adversary for over a decade now gone, the prospect of her return became more realistic. Carney has suggested the possibility that Polyperchon and Olympias may have known each other prior to Alexander's

---

<sup>690</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 75; Carney, 2006. p. 69; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003, p. 39; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 218.

<sup>691</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 75; Adams, 1977. p. 19; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 39; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 218.

<sup>692</sup> Indeed the same could also be expected of Olympias' feelings towards Cassander. Anson, 2004. pp. 141-142. n. 83.

<sup>693</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 39; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 218.

<sup>694</sup> For Cassander's arrival in Asia Minor, see Ch. 6.1. p. 157. For the circumstances of Polyperchon's contact with Eumenes, see Ch. 6.2. pp. 168-169.

death in 323.<sup>695</sup> This may be true, and there is nothing in the ancient sources that would suggest otherwise, however this position is admittedly reliant on their later contact in 317 and the alliance they entered into at that time. Given the relatively small size of the Macedonian aristocracy as well as Polyperchon's age and length of service within the upper echelons of the Macedonian court,<sup>696</sup> it is likely that the two would be familiar with each other. What can be stated with greater certainty is that, as the various factions began to emerge following the Settlement of Babylon in 323, Olympias was cautious of anyone who attempted to ally themselves with her, including those with whom she may have been previously been familiar.<sup>697</sup> Despite Polyperchon's efforts to gain her trust, Olympias would not leave her Molossian home for the Macedonian Court solely in response to the regent's request. In order to facilitate both Olympias' return and her support, Polyperchon needed to offer the mother of Alexander III something of value. Therefore, Polyperchon offered Olympias the custody (*ἐπιμέλειαν*) of her grandson, Alexander IV, until the young king came of age.<sup>698</sup> As Carney notes, it is difficult to define what Polyperchon was offering to Olympias once the conflict with Cassander had begun.<sup>699</sup> Along with care of Alexander IV, Polyperchon must have also offered some official role within the Macedonian Court, as it is unlikely that Olympias would have been persuaded to return to Macedon without this.<sup>700</sup> Should Polyperchon win the trust of the mother of Alexander the Great, he would have a powerful member of the Argead family with whom he could work co-operatively, rather than impose upon. This was important, as both Philip III Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV were not able or,

---

<sup>695</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 54.

<sup>696</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 189; Adams, *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993). p. 200.

<sup>697</sup> Diod. 18.58.3-4; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 13.2; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 242; Carney, 2006. p. 70; Heckel, 2006. p. 227; Adams (*Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993), p. 201.) suggests that Olympias may also have been unsure of Polyperchon's intention given his association with Antipater over the previous years.

<sup>698</sup> Diod. 18.49.4, 18.57.2, cf. Diod. 18.65.1; Carney, in Worthington, 1994. p. 362; Carney, 2006. pp. 69-70; Heckel, 2006. p. 183; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 11.

<sup>699</sup> Carney, 2006. pp. 69-70.

<sup>700</sup> See Carney, 2006. p. 70 for a further discussion on the possible position Olympias was to occupy upon her return to Macedon.

in Philip's case perceived as being able, to rule in their own right.<sup>701</sup> The contact with Olympias had further flung implications for the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, as while Cassander had chosen to distance himself from the royal family, Polyperchon instead chose to explicitly align himself with the royals and their supporters.<sup>702</sup> This would maintain the pro-Argead stance that was the mandate given to him as Craterus' second in command in 324. It was from these groups that Polyperchon would draw the majority of his support for at least the next three years.

Despite these initial efforts, Olympias was unsure of Polyperchon's true motives and whether or not she would be able to trust this new regent. Soon after receiving Polyperchon's offer, Olympias contacted her trusted confidant, Eumenes, asking for his evaluation of Polyperchon's offer.<sup>703</sup> It appears that Polyperchon may have been aware of this contact, or possibly of the importance Olympias placed on Eumenes's advice. Polyperchon too had ties with Eumenes and sought to contact his old colleague from Alexander's campaign.<sup>704</sup> Because of the long, close ties between Olympias and Eumenes,<sup>705</sup> if Polyperchon were able to win Eumenes over to his cause, it would demonstrate to Olympias that his offers to the royal mother and his intentions of forging an alliance with her were genuine.

As with Olympias, Polyperchon's offer to Eumenes needed to be significant, and it was.<sup>706</sup> The regent offered the former royal scribe the opportunity of

---

<sup>701</sup> Indeed, as Carney notes, Macedonian royal women were used as appropriate stopgap rulers without issue during times when no acceptable royal male was available (Carney, *CJ.* 90. (1995). p. 381).

<sup>702</sup> Adams, *Makedonia.* 3. (1977). p. 19.

<sup>703</sup> Diod. 18.57.2-3, 18.58.3; cf. Plut. *Eum.* 12.2, 13.1.

<sup>704</sup> Heckel, 1992. pp. 188-9. Anson, 2004. p. 142. n. 84.

<sup>705</sup> cf. Diod. 18.62.2; Carney, 2006. p. 70.

<sup>706</sup> It appears that Diodorus has glossed over much detail in the correspondence between Polyperchon and Eumenes. Following the death of Perdiccas, the faction he headed had been given a death sentence by the victors of the First War of the Diadochoi (Westlake, 1969. pp. 228-29; Hadley 1996. p. 135, 142; Anson, *CPh.* 103. (2008), p. 144; Meeus, in, Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 88;). We also know that, in 320, Eumenes had sought to make amends by returning the satrapies put under his control in 323 to Antigonus and Antipater

becoming joint regent of Macedon in much the same fashion that Antipater and Craterus were able to successfully manage the region. Alternatively Eumenes could choose to remain in Asia Minor and continue his efforts against Antigonus with significant military support from the regent.<sup>707</sup> It is clear that Eumenes was still a stalwart supporter of Olympias as is evident in the proposed oath he wished to take following the siege of Nora.<sup>708</sup> If Polyperchon could persuade Eumenes to join his cause, it would help sway Olympias, dispelling the anxieties she still had in 319.<sup>709</sup>

Polyperchon's contact with Eumenes was not without unintended drawbacks, as this contact was a significant factor in Antigonus' alliance with Cassander against the regent. This stemmed from the cessation of hostilities between Antigonus and Eumenes at the siege of Nora, where the combatants reaffirmed their friendship.<sup>710</sup> The timing of Polyperchon's letter to Eumenes appears to be a case of bad timing, something outside the control of the regent, as Diodorus' narrative implies that the correspondence to both Olympias and Eumenes was sent at much the same time, soon after Antipater's death in the late summer or

---

and to absolve his prior offences (Diod. 18.41.7. cf. Meeus, in, Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 88). No rescinding of Eumenes' death sentence is recorded, leading to the assumption that it was still in effect (Westlake, 1969. pp. 228-29; Hadley 1996. p. 135, 142; Anson, *CPh*. 103. p. 144). If this were so, Polyperchon either chose to ignore it as Anson suggests (Anson, *CPh*. 103. p. 144) or much more likely, offered Eumenes a reprieve, at an early point in their contact in order to gain his allegiance (Heckel, 1992. p. 195). Because Eumenes was so vital to Polyperchon's cause, it is inconceivable that the regent would maintain his death sentence, even if other members of the Diadochoi did (Meeus, in, Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 88; *contra*: Westlake, 1969. pp. 228-29; Hadley 1996. p. 135, 142; Anson, *CPh*. 103. p. 144).

<sup>707</sup> Diod. 18. 57. 3-4. For record of Polyperchon fulfilling the promises to support Eumenes see Diod. 18.58.1; Heckel, 1992. p. 195. n. 1; Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). pp. 238-239.

<sup>708</sup> Plut. *Eum.* 12. 3; Carney, 2006. pp. 70-71; For more on events at Nora, see below.

<sup>709</sup> It must also be noted that Eumenes was not the only person that Polyperchon contacted in Asia Minor, as the regent also sent word to Argyaspids stationed at the treasury in Cilicia (Diod. 18.58.1), whose leader Antigones was known to Polyperchon (cf. Heckel, 1992. p. 195).

<sup>710</sup> Diod. 18. 41. 6-7; Plut. *Eum.* 10. 6; Anson, *GRBS*. 18. (1977) pp. 251-6; Anson, 2004. p. 131, especially n. 53. Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 242 who suggest a *terminus ante quem* of March or April for the arrival of Polyperchon's letter.



early autumn of 319.<sup>711</sup> If this is so, then hostilities between Antigonus and Eumenes were active<sup>712</sup> at the time Polyperchon's letter to Eumenes was sent in 319. This would mean that the letter of alliance arrived to Eumenes either during the siege, or shortly after Antigonus had ended the siege. As Anson observed, Polyperchon's contact with Eumenes, and the offer of either asylum in Macedon, or support in Asia Minor were intended as gestures of good faith, rather than to anger Antigonus.<sup>713</sup> In addition, this initial contact took place prior to Cassander's arrival in Asia Minor, which provides a further level of precision in dating Polyperchon's offer to Eumenes. Whether intended or not, Antigonus was displeased with Polyperchon's offer of support against him, leading to him being in, as Billows states, near open war with the regent at the time of Cassander's arrival.<sup>714</sup> Eumenes appears to have accepted Polyperchon's offer of an alliance and support, thereby breaking his recent pact with Antigonus,<sup>715</sup> and was eager to resume the conflict against Antigonus,<sup>716</sup> which took place shortly after the siege of Nora had concluded.<sup>717</sup> Eumenes would, in 319, be the only member of the Diadochoi that Polyperchon actively pursued for an alliance. With this association, Polyperchon displayed his political ability by identifying the people with whom he needed to ally himself in order to gain Olympias' favour, trust, and ultimately, her return to Macedon.

While the alliance between Polyperchon and Eumenes did antagonise Antigonus, which resulted in making him more receptive to Cassander's approaches, the hostility itself may have been of less importance to Polyperchon than the immediate concern of gaining the support of Olympias and that of Cassander's

---

<sup>711</sup> cf. Ch. 6.2. p. 161, 163.

<sup>712</sup> Boiy, 2007. p. 51, 118. The initiation of the siege at Nora is unanimously agreed upon as taking place during the summer of 319, regardless of chronological methods. The siege would conclude in early 318 (cf. Anson, 2004. p. 137. Boiy, 2007. p. 138, 149.)

<sup>713</sup> Anson, 2004. pp. 142-3. n. 86.

<sup>714</sup> Billows. 1990. p. 84. cf. Diod. 18.54.4.

<sup>715</sup> Anson, in Tronsoco & Anson, 2013. p. 100.

<sup>716</sup> Anson, 2004. p. 147.

<sup>717</sup> For further discussion on events in Asia Minor after the Siege of Nora and Polyperchon's involvement, see: Ch. 7.1. For a more general discussion of event, see: Billows, 1990. pp. 81-109; Anson, 2004. p. 147-190.

allies in Greece. Polyperchon must have expected Eumenes to keep Antigonus occupied in Asia Minor and out of Europe with the second front being created by his new ally against the Antigonids. While the alliance would require substantial commitment by Polyperchon, including his presence in the region in 318,<sup>718</sup> what the alliance provided to Polyperchon was an influential and powerful ally in Asia Minor who would also aid in cementing his ties to the royal Argead family.

Once Cassander had chosen his moment to depart from Macedon, Polyperchon acted swiftly. Diodorus' narrative makes it clear that Polyperchon was immediately aware of the implications of Cassander's departure as well as the threat he now posed to the political stability in Macedon.<sup>719</sup> In addition to understanding the threat posed by his new rival, Polyperchon was also able to identify the groups from which Cassander would draw his support, those being the oligarchies set up by his father in Greece, as well as Antigonus, Lysimachus and Ptolemy.<sup>720</sup> Just as Cassander knew there was little support for his cause in Macedon in 319, so too did Polyperchon know that he could expect little aid from the south so long as the pro-Antipatrid oligarchies maintained their grasp on the Greek cities.

In order to build his stratagem against Cassander and his supporters, Polyperchon continued to operate within the traditional power structures and channels afforded to his office. He summoned a council of officers, eminent members from within Macedonian society and loyal friends.<sup>721</sup> Polyperchon was aware of Cassander's lack of popularity in Greece, stemming from Antipater's policies there during his time as regent of Macedon. As previously discussed, during the course of his regency, Antipater had become the face of Macedonian hegemony during Alexander's expansion of the Macedonian Empire into the

---

<sup>718</sup> See Ch. 7.1.

<sup>719</sup> Diod. 18.55.1-2; Adams, *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993). p. 202; Anson, 2004. p. 140; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 229.

<sup>720</sup> Diod. 18.55.2. For Lysimachus, see above, p. 149. n. 635.

<sup>721</sup> Diod. 18.55.1; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 230. Polyperchon's council likely contained members of the returning Opis veterans from 324, hence Heckel, 1992. p. 194.

east.<sup>722</sup> Polyperchon chose to exploit the feelings of these dissatisfied groups and attempted to rally them to his cause, thus weakening the position of Cassander's oligarchs in Greece.

The method by which this was facilitated was via the implementation of a new decree in southern Greece in March of 318.<sup>723</sup> In a clear statement that the era of Antipatrid dominated rule was over, Polyperchon compelled Philip III Arrhidaeus to announce a new Exile's Decree within the Greek cities.<sup>724</sup> In a rare case of fortune, Diodorus' account includes an extensive record of the decree presented to the various cities.<sup>725</sup> Most likely this can be explained by Diodorus' authority Heironymus having access to copies of the decree that were distributed amongst the Greeks.

There was little confusion as to the aims of the decree Polyperchon had engineered. While the regent was not offering freedom to the Greeks, he was offering them the restoration of the statutes implemented under the rule of Philip II,<sup>726</sup> removing the unpopular policies enacted by Antipater during his time in office,<sup>727</sup> including the repatriation of those exiled to their homelands.<sup>728</sup>

---

<sup>722</sup> Pitt & Richardson, *CQ* 67 (Forthcoming 2017); cf. Ch. 4.

<sup>723</sup> Tritle, 1988. p. 139; Heckel, 1992. pp. 195-196.

<sup>724</sup> Diod. 18.56; Adams, 1975. pp. 82-83; Heckel, 1992. p. 194; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 231-232; Heckel, 2006. p. 227; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 213; Dmetriev, 2011. p. 113; cf. Carney (*Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 11.) who makes passing reference to Polyperchon's political efforts in Greece.

<sup>725</sup> Diod. 18.56; Adams, *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993), p. 202. For commentaries, see. Rosen, *AClass.* 10. (1967); Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 231-233.

<sup>726</sup> Diod. 18.56.2-3; Adams, *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993). p. 202; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. ca. 231-232; Dmetriev, 2011. p. 113.

<sup>727</sup> Adams, *Balkan Studies* 34. (1993). p. 203.

<sup>728</sup> There were however, multiple cities exempt from this decree, including: Megalopolis, Amphissia, Triica, Pharcadon and Heraclea (Diod. 18.56.5-6). Adams has suggested that the cities were not included in the decree due to their strategic locations within Greece and their likely, though unattested, support of, or control by, pro-Antipatrid oligarchies (Adams, *Balkan Studies* 34. (1993). pp. 203-205). While a likely scenario, the fact that Polyperchon was trying to build his support base in Greece must also be taken into consideration, particularly in the case of the return of Samos to Athenian control (Diod. 18.56.7.) although the explicit reason that the island was returned to Athens was that Philip II had

This sentiment echoed the Exiles Decree enacted in 324,<sup>729</sup> albeit with Antipater as the arbiter of wrongdoing rather than Alexander. Though not explicitly named, it is clear that Antipater, and by extension Cassander, are the targets for Philip's decree in early 318. This can be deduced in two ways. Firstly a time marker is present within the text stated that those affected by this new proclamation are people who were exiled from their homelands after Alexander's departure from Europe into the East,<sup>730</sup> in other words, from the time of Antipater's installation as regent in 334. Secondly, the perpetrators of the wrongdoing following Alexander's departure are clearly signposted, those being the Macedonian generals in charge of the region.<sup>731</sup> This reference has clear links to Antipater as the man in charge of Greece at the time, as well as to Cassander. While the indictment of Antipater and Cassander was a clear aim of Polyperchon, he was flirting dangerously with implicating himself with the matter of Greek oppression after his short but volatile time as acting regent during the First War of the Diadochoi.<sup>732</sup> This was mitigated by the designation of Polyperchon as the man to deal with any unrest and disruption to the peace stated by the decree. No doubt this was a not so thinly veiled threat to

---

previously given it to them during his reign (Diod. 18.56.7. cf. Diod. 18.8.7, 18.9.). The recent concern that Athens had expressed in 324 with the potential loss of Samos under Alexander's decree must too have played a role in Polyperchon's consideration. If he were willing to demonstrate that he would listen and engage with Athenian requests and their concerns, the chances of gaining their support would increase. Athens was a powerbase for Cassander should he return to Greece, demonstrated by his appointment of Nicanor as Munychia's commander around the time of his father's death. If Polyperchon could wrestle Athens away from Cassander via the offer of Samos then the independence of Samos would have been of little concern. While the significance of Athens as an entity in the ancient world can become over-emphasised due to the amount of surviving literary sources from the region, in the case of the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, Athens' central role in the early stages of the conflict cannot be overstated. Cassander's indication of the city as his base of future operations too made the city a focal point for Polyperchon's attention. It therefore would come as no surprise that Athens received a special status within the policies of the Exile Decree put forth in early 318.

<sup>729</sup> See: Pitt & Richardson, *CQ*. 67 (Forthcoming, 2017).

<sup>730</sup> Diod. 18.56.4.

<sup>731</sup> Diod. 18.56.4.

<sup>732</sup> cf. Ch. 5.2. pp. 137-138.

Cassander's supporters and neutral groups in Greece that they could expect reprisals should they side with the son of Antipater.<sup>733</sup>

What the decree hoped to achieve was, that by offering the Greek cities the policies of Philip and Alexander, instead of the iron grip that had been the hallmark of Antipater's style of Macedonian hegemony, with the emphasis on the generous authority of the royal family as evidenced by Philip III's promulgation of the decree itself, Polyperchon could expect a simultaneous growth in his presence in Greece as well as agitation by those dissatisfied with the oligarchies that formed the core of Cassander's powerbase in the region. However, as Heckel has previously stated,<sup>734</sup> Polyperchon was in fact, in a strong position before the initiation of hostilities with Cassander. Not only did he hold the Macedonian homeland, but he also had Eumenes as an ally, providing him with support outside Europe from which he hoped to draw.

Antipater's choice of Polyperchon as his successor set in place the conflict between the new regent and Cassander that would rage throughout Greece over the next decade. The groups that formed the pillars of each of the protagonist's support base reflected not only their backgrounds coming into the conflict, but would also define the ways in which they operated during the opening phases of the struggle. As a result of Antipater's long-running hostility with Olympias, tensions with Alexander during the final years of the great king's life, combined with the presence of Macedonian garrisons whose authority lay in the backing of the Antipatrid house, Cassander chose not to approach or align himself with the royal house to build the momentum he required to create support for his cause. Despite holding a significant and powerful office in Macedon as Polyperchon's *chiliarch*, Cassander did not have influence or control over any member of the royal Argead family, but instead chose to seek his support from less traditional avenues through his contact with Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Antigonus as well as to employ the Greek oligarchies installed by his father to conduct the war.

---

<sup>733</sup> Diod. 18.56.7-8.

<sup>734</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 195.

In contrast Polyperchon's approach followed more official and orthodox channels in forming his powerbase. While he was already engaging with the royals to a greater extent than his predecessor, once Cassander had fled from Macedon to Asia Minor, the need for the regent to align himself further to the Argeads and in turn be seen as acting on behalf of Philip III and Alexander IV increased. This was demonstrated by his multiple correspondences with Olympias as well as to Eumenes. In order to destabilise Cassander's foothold in Greece, Polyperchon employed Philip III to announce a new Exile's Decree thereby demonstrating that Cassander did not carry royal favour in the south and that the regent was the official representative of authority.

Both Cassander and Polyperchon's actions in 319 and early 318 demonstrate the difference between the two. While it is appealing to view their searches for support as polar opposites, they are intrinsically linked to each other. As the situation developed, even over a short period of time, both Cassander and Polyperchon adapted and reacted to best position themselves against their rival. This close course of action and swift reaction would continue throughout the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, characterising the struggle and would continue after Cassander made his return to Greece in the spring of 318 B.C.

### **6.3: The Second Diadoch War**

This section of investigation is devoted to the period of time immediately before Cassander's return to Greece in the spring of 318, with Nicanor's occupation of the Piraeus and Athens until the defeat of Polyperchon's fleet at Byzantium in the summer of the same year. This was the point in time when the conflict between Polyperchon and Cassander moved beyond political alliances and posturing with hostilities between the two forces coming into direct and deadly contact with each other. In order to combat Cassander's hold on southern Greece, Polyperchon decided to launch an invasion of the region alongside his son Alexander, first into Attica, and then onto the Peloponnese and the infamous disaster at the siege of Megalopolis. The siege of Megalopolis was, quite

understandably, the most prominent event during Polyperchon's initial venture into the Peloponnese,<sup>735</sup> however, despite the sizable focus of both ancient and modern writers, it must not be mistaken as being representative of the overall success of the regent's campaign.

During this time, both Polyperchon and Cassander began to build on their previously established support structures, employing them against each other. In order to highlight his position as the official, legitimate regent of Macedon, Polyperchon endeavoured to maintain a close proximity to the kings, thereby continuing to link his public image to that of the royal family. This would demonstrate that Cassander was actively waging a war not against Polyperchon, but against the royal family. In contrast Cassander began to employ what Adams has aptly described as a "*policy of coalition*,"<sup>736</sup> to cement his position in Greece and combat Polyperchon. This approach emphasised the importance Cassander placed on working in cooperation with other members of the Diadochoi during military actions. By operating in conjunction with eminent figures such as Antigonus, Lysimachus and Ptolemy and adding their military strength to his own, Cassander would be able to operate with greater effectiveness and increased military footprint against the regent. Cassander's return to Greece, with a fleet supplied to him by Antigonus, would see him focus on bringing Athens itself under his control. From here, Cassander would use the city as a launching point to expand and shore up his influence throughout Greece. Direct military conflict between Polyperchon and Cassander would eventuate with the naval conflicts off Byzantium, where Cassander and his coalition were ultimately victorious.

In southern Greece, it was imperative for the commander of Munychia's garrison, Cassander's supporter Nicanor, to secure Athens for the man to whom

---

<sup>735</sup> See for example: Fortina, 1965. p. 32; Adams, 1975. p. 86; Billows, 1990. p. 86; Bosworth. *Chiron*, 22. (1992). pp. 69-70; Heckel, 1992. p. 198; Carney, 2006. p. 126; Heckel, 2006. p. 228; Dixon, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. p. 168; Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 240; Adams, in Roisman & Errington, 2010. p. 213.

<sup>736</sup> *passim* Adams. 1975. more specifically for the events of 318, see Adams, 1975. pp. 78-87.

he had given his allegiance.<sup>737</sup> This needed to be done with haste as he expected that, now that Cassander was no longer in the Peninsula, Polyperchon would move down from Macedon into Attica with an army in order to attack the supporters of Cassander.<sup>738</sup> To facilitate Athenian acceptance, Nicanor played upon the same sentiment that Polyperchon had used with Philip III's exile decree, offering Athens friendlier and more favourable circumstances should they join the son of Antipater. The Athenians, however, rejected Nicanor's overtures. In order to keep the stability of Cassander's powerbase intact, Nicanor responded by launching an attack on Athens. By the winter of 319/18 B.C. he had secured the Piraeus.<sup>739</sup> The successful acquisition of the Piraeus was vital for Cassander. Possession of the harbour afforded him an entry point through which he could return from Asia Minor with the military forces and fleet given to him by Antigonus.

During the course of 318, a public relationship between Polyperchon and Olympias began to emerge. While it appears that Olympias was still unwilling to return to Macedon in 318, either because she was still assessing the intentions of Polyperchon, or because she was unable to make the journey, she was willing to engage with diplomatic affairs beneficial to Polyperchon's cause. Whether her goal was to demonstrate her support for Polyperchon, or as a means to attack Cassander and his family for their perceived role in her son's death, Olympias became an active figure in Greek politics and the siege of Athens. She made a formal request for Nicanor to respect the Athenians' right to sovereignty and to leave. Her actions were an explicit expression of Argead involvement in the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, an involvement which positioned Olympias in support of Polyperchon.<sup>740</sup> Within Diodorus' narrative of the involvement in siege of Athens by Olympias, the historian states that "*Nicanor*

---

<sup>737</sup> Tritle, 1988. p. 139.

<sup>738</sup> Diod. 18.64.1-2; Fortina, 1965. pp. 31-32; Adams, 1975. p. 85; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 111; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 254, 255-256; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 213.

<sup>739</sup> Diod. 18.64.3-4. Though the city itself did not finally capitulate to Cassander until the winter of 318/7 B.C. Plut. *Phoc.* 38.2; cf. Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 245.

<sup>740</sup> Diod. 18.65.1.



had heard that the kings and Polyperchon were going to bring Olympias back to Macedonia..."<sup>741</sup> This may be the result of the benefit of hindsight on the part of the historian given that Olympias would eventually return to Macedon in the autumn of 317 B.C.<sup>742</sup> Whether this is so or not, the letter sent to Nicanor demanding he resign from his office in Munychia and leave the Piraeus was a clear statement of Olympias' desire to weaken Cassander's position and to support Polyperchon.

Polyperchon was not idle in the time Cassander was absent from Greece. Just like Cassander, Polyperchon understood the importance of the Piraeus in relation to allowing easier movements of his military and naval resources.<sup>743</sup> In combination with the letter that Olympias wrote to Nicanor, Polyperchon sent his son Alexander to Attica with an army, in the spring of 318 B.C.<sup>744</sup> This was done with the goal of winning the support of the Athenians at the same time as gaining control of the Piraeus. For Polyperchon, the support of the Greeks was of vital importance, and he embarked on a propaganda campaign into the Peninsula in an attempt to accomplish this.<sup>745</sup> Now that Cassander had the open support of Antigonos, Polyperchon would not have been able to draw on support from Asia. This meant his only source of potential alliances and additional strength would come from the Greek cities.<sup>746</sup> The Athenians welcomed Alexander. This was the result of a combination of the decree issued by Philip III, which offered the city-states their freedom, and the respect the Athenians had for Olympias,<sup>747</sup> who the Athenians now saw as being in alliance with Polyperchon. Polyperchon was now seen as a liberator who would return

---

<sup>741</sup> Dod. 18.65.1. trans, Geer (1947): "ὁ [δὲ] Νικάνωρ ἀκούων ὅτι μέλλουσιν οἱ βασιλεῖς καὶ Πολυπέρχων κατάγειν εἰς Μακεδονίαν τὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα..."

<sup>742</sup> Diod. 19.11.2; Fortina, 1965. pp. 35-36; Adams, 1975. pp. 90-91; Heckel, 1992. p. 199; Carney, 2006. pp. 75-76; Heckel, 2006. p. 183; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. pp. 213-214; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 12; cf. Ch. 7.2. pp. 213-214.

<sup>743</sup> Diod. 18.66.2.

<sup>744</sup> Diod. 18.66.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.1; cf. Nepos. *Phoc.* 3.2-3; Adams, 1975. p. 85; Heckel, 1992. p. 196; Heckel, 2006. p. 20, 228.

<sup>745</sup> Errington, 2008. p. 23.

<sup>746</sup> Green, in Palagia & Tracey, 2003. p. 6; Errington, 2008. p. 23; cf. Dmitriev, 2011. pp. 113-114.

<sup>747</sup> Diod. 18.65.2; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 256.

Munychia and the Piraeus to them.<sup>748</sup> When Alexander had arrived near the Piraeus, he held a series of diplomatic meetings with the Athenians, discussing whether Polyperchon meant to deliver the city and Munychia back into Athenian hands.<sup>749</sup> It was made clear to Nicanor, via secret negotiation, that Polyperchon had no intention of returning either the Piraeus or Athens itself back into Athenian hands.<sup>750</sup> This demonstrated that, even though Polyperchon wanted Greek support, he was not willing to hand them their independence in return. If the Greeks were to work with him, it was to be on his terms and in accordance with the exile's decree proclaimed by Philip III earlier in the year. While it could appear that Polyperchon was merely offering hollow promises of freedom to the Athenians in order to gain their allegiances,<sup>751</sup> he must have hoped that the special status he had given to the region with the return of Samos would have been enough to secure their support without giving the city independence. If Polyperchon allowed Athens to shake off Macedonian influence, he ran the very real risk that the city may claim neutrality from the conflict, be overrun by Cassander's forces and lost to his own efforts, or worse begin to actively support Cassander against him. While the possibility of Cassander receiving popular support from Athens is highly unlikely, given Athenian sentiment towards previous forms of Macedonian subjugation headed by Antipater,<sup>752</sup> it must have been a priority for Polyperchon to secure Athens, but at the same time maintain Macedonian control, albeit in a less rigid form than it had experienced in recent years. However, it is clear that true Greek freedom and independence was of little concern to either Cassander or Polyperchon.<sup>753</sup> It was the intention of both

---

<sup>748</sup> Diod. 18.65.3; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 257.

<sup>749</sup> For an account of these events and Polyperchon's time in Athens, see Diod. 18.65.4-6, 18.66; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.

<sup>750</sup> Diod. 18.65.5; Plut. *Phoc.* 33.2-3. Dixon (in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 161-162) stresses the unlikelihood of Polyperchon ever truly offering autonomy to Athens. Tritle, 1988. p. 139; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 257; cf. Dmetriev, 2011. pp. 113-115.

<sup>751</sup> Green, in Palagia & Tracey, 2003. p. 5; Errington, 2008. p.24.

<sup>752</sup> Particularly in light of the popular support for the regent as recorded by Nepos (*Phoc.* 3.1). cf. Blackwell, 1999. p. 75. n. 128.

<sup>753</sup> Green, in Palagia & Tracey, 2003. pp. 5-6.

men to use the southern Greek cities for their personal gain,<sup>754</sup> to simultaneously build their own influence while detracting from that of their opponent.

It was during these negotiations between Alexander and the Athenians that Cassander arrived from Asia Minor to the Piraeus, with the fleet and army given to him by Antigonos. From here he took over command of the Piraeus and allowed Nicanor to return to his governorship of Munychia.<sup>755</sup> When news of Cassander's arrival reached Polyperchon, he moved with his large army from Phocis where he had been staying with the kings to Athens, to the Piraeus, with the intention of laying siege to Cassander, denying him access into the interior of Greece.<sup>756</sup> Polyperchon had been travelling with the kings in order to maintain support for the Macedonian monarchy and by extension, build support for himself,<sup>757</sup> from royal sympathisers within the Greek Peninsula in his role as regent.<sup>758</sup>

Polyperchon realised that he would not be able to maintain the siege against Cassander in the Piraeus. Due to the scale of his military forces, he was unable to draw on enough supplies to feed his troops in order to continue the pressure he was exerting on the harbour. Therefore, he left Attica with the majority of his troops and marched to the Peloponnese, with the goal of finding fresh supplies from among the city-states located there.<sup>759</sup> Diodorus uses the phrasing "*to force obedience of the kings upon the Megalopolis*."<sup>760</sup> This reliance on the authority conferred by the kings and military might, supports the view that the

---

<sup>754</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 32; Adams, 1975. p. 85; Hughes, 2008. pp. 219-220; Dmitriev, 2011. pp. 114-115.

<sup>755</sup> Diod. 18.68.1.

<sup>756</sup> Diod. 18.68.2-3. Diodorus states that Polyperchon had an army of around 25,000 troops, when he ventured south (cf. Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 213).

<sup>757</sup> In much the same manner as Perdikkas had done with the kings when he journeyed to Asia Minor in 323 (cf. Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 11; Ch. 5.1. p. 116).

<sup>758</sup> Diod. 18.68.3.

<sup>759</sup> Diod. 18.68.3; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 213.

<sup>760</sup> Diod. 18.68.3. trans, Geer. 1947: "...συναναγκάσων τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν..."

Peloponnese contained several pro-Cassandrian oligarchies. In order to facilitate his demands,<sup>761</sup> Polyperchon needed to call on past understandings of what it meant to be regent and to work within the capacity of his office as regent to the kings in order to further his own personal goals.

Polyperchon now focussed his attention on the Peloponnese. The majority of the cities either gave him their support or were destroyed by his army.<sup>762</sup> It seems that Polyperchon was neither able nor willing to take the time necessary for lengthy negotiations with the cities, instead electing to take drastic action against them. Megalopolis was the only city in the Peloponnese that held out against Polyperchon and refused to submit to his demands. The oligarchy of the city had been installed by Antipater and was supportive of Cassander.<sup>763</sup> This pro-Antipatrid support does at the very least suggest that Megalopolis was the sole city within the region that was hostile to Polyperchon. Due to their resistance, Polyperchon chose to lay siege to the city.<sup>764</sup> The siege was a disaster. He was unable to take the city within a short period of time and suffered substantial losses, including the loss of several of his war elephants.<sup>765</sup> Realising that he would not be able to take the city as quickly as he wished, Polyperchon split his forces, leaving some to continue the siege, while taking the remainder with him and leaving.<sup>766</sup> Diodorus states that Polyperchon left in order to pursue more necessary business,<sup>767</sup> though he does not say exactly what this business was. Possibly the business alluded to could have been Polyperchon returning to

---

<sup>761</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 197.

<sup>762</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 197; Diodorus' account of Polyperchon's campaign in the Peloponnese is brief and does not name the cities in question that turned over to Polyperchon or were destroyed.

<sup>763</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 197.

<sup>764</sup> Diod. 18.69.4. For the account of the siege of Megalopolis, see Diod. 18.70 – 72.

<sup>765</sup> Diod. 18.70.1-5. For the importance and role of elephants in Hellenistic warfare, see: Epplert, in Heckel, Tritle, & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 209 – 232.

<sup>766</sup> Diod. 18.72.1.

<sup>767</sup> Diod. 18.72.1. *“ἐφ’ἐτέρας ἀναγκαιοτέρας πράξεις ἐτρέπετο.”*

Macedon in preparation for the planned expedition into Asia Minor to aid his ally Eumenes.<sup>768</sup>

Polyperchon's inability to gain either control of or influence over Megalopolis would have a devastating effect upon his relationship with, and support from, the city-states. As a result of this failure, he lost face among many of his allies in Greece. He was treated with contempt, with many former allies deciding to abandon their support, instead positioning themselves in support of Cassander.<sup>769</sup> However, as Beloch identifies, Diodorus' narrative regarding the number of cities lost to the regent's cause, is exaggerated.<sup>770</sup> Certainly Polyperchon may have lost a number of supporters due the failure of the siege of Megalopolis, but Diodorus' assertion that most cities were lost is overly accentuated.<sup>771</sup> However loss of support from the Greek cities is important because, without the ability to draw on military forces and resources from within Greece, Polyperchon was restricted in his movements in Greece. Additionally, by losing support to Cassander, Polyperchon would now face a stronger Cassander while his own position was greatly weakened.

There is no question that the siege of Megalopolis was a failure for Polyperchon's efforts to secure the entirety of the Peloponnese against Cassander and his allies, but it must be remembered that the regent's Peloponnesian Campaign in 318 was, on the whole, a success. Far from being a total disaster, as has been previously suggested,<sup>772</sup> Polyperchon was able to sway the majority of the cities in the region to his cause, creating a solid,

---

<sup>768</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 240; cf. Diod. 18.57.3-4; For more discussion on Polyperchon's unattested campaign into Asia Minor, see: Ch. 7.1.

<sup>769</sup> Diod. 18.73.1.

<sup>770</sup> Beloch, IV<sup>2</sup> 1924. p. 440; cf. Heckel, 1992. p. 198. n. 139.

<sup>771</sup> Indeed it was around this time that Polyperchon had been able to build bases of support in mainland Greece that would prove invaluable as the conflict against Cassander progressed. This is especially so with the Aetolians, who would play a pivotal role against Cassander following his successful invasion of Macedon in 317/16. cf. Heckel, 1992. pp. 197-196. For more discussion, see: Ch. 7.2.

<sup>772</sup> see for example: Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 213; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 11.

committed area of support. The perception that the campaign was an overall disaster may lie in the sole account of the action as recorded by Diodorus.<sup>773</sup> However the historian's account of Polyperchon's time in the Peloponnese is brief, transmitting only minimal information. No city other than Megalopolis is mentioned, resulting in a distortion in the importance of the failed siege to the campaign overall. Whether the reason for Peloponnesian dissatisfaction was with Cassander's rule, Polyperchon's appeal or a combination of the two, is not known.<sup>774</sup> But what is more certain is that, despite the numerous, substantial efforts Cassander would embark upon to extricate Polyperchon from his position in southern Greece,<sup>775</sup> the Peloponnese would remain a stronghold of influence and stalwart support for Polyperchon, which would exist for the remainder of the conflict with Cassander.

During the time that Polyperchon was campaigning in the Peloponnese, Cassander was also acquiring Greek support in much the same fashion as his rival, that is through military force. Using the Piraeus as his base of operations, Cassander sailed his fleet to Aegina where he was able to secure the allegiance of the city.<sup>776</sup> Cassander subsequently moved on with a well-equipped army to besiege Salamis.<sup>777</sup> Polyperchon could not afford to allow Cassander to further his influence in southern Greece and sent a relief force to Salamis, breaking the siege. Cassander chose to abandon his operations for the time being and return to the relative security of the Piraeus, where he would remain until after the siege of Megalopolis had concluded.<sup>778</sup> Cassander's expedition out from the Piraeus was not a successful one.<sup>779</sup> However it did demonstrate the strength of the opposition that Polyperchon offered. Even though he was on campaign, with

---

<sup>773</sup> Diod. 18.69.3-18.72.

<sup>774</sup> Dixon (in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 159-60) does suggest that Polyperchon may have achieved some support via diplomatic means with the *synedroi* of the League of Corinth.

<sup>775</sup> See Ch. 7.1. for the unsuccessful invasions of 317 and 316, Ch. 8.1. for Cassander's failed efforts of 315.

<sup>776</sup> Diod. 18.69.1; Polyae. 4.11.1-2; Adams, 1975. p. 85; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 261.

<sup>777</sup> Diod. 19.69.1.

<sup>778</sup> Diod. 18.69.2.

<sup>779</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 85.

forces in both the Peloponnese and in Athens, Polyperchon was still able to draw on enough military strength to force Cassander to retreat to his base of operations in the Piraeus.

Knowing that Lysimachus, who controlled the Hellespont, was an ally of Cassander, Polyperchon could expect additional reinforcements for Cassander to come from Antigonos, entering into Europe from Asia Minor. In the summer of 318, and in order to prevent this happening, Polyperchon sent his admiral Cleitus with his entire fleet to the vicinity of the Hellespont in order to ambush any crossing troops.<sup>780</sup> Polyperchon wanted to show that he was both defending and acting on behalf of the royal house. To demonstrate that Antigonos and Cassander were working against the royal family and simultaneously that he was working for their benefit, Polyperchon ordered Cleitus<sup>781</sup> to collect Philip III and his forces and take them with him to the Hellespont.<sup>782</sup> This was done so that Phillip could be seen as an active participant in any action against Cassander's troops.<sup>783</sup>

Cassander reacted to this by sending the entirety of his own fleet under the command of Nicanor to confront Polyperchon.<sup>784</sup> The ensuing naval actions would be pivotal to both Cassander and Polyperchon in their battle for domination of Greece and Macedon itself. Because the entirety of each man's fleet would confront each other, naval supremacy would be the result for the victor. This would mean that if Cassander's forces were victorious, he would be able to draw on forces from Antigonos without obstruction. Conversely, if the victory went to Polyperchon, it would restrict Cassander's movements and troop numbers, potentially allowing Polyperchon to drive Cassander out from Greece and cement his hold on the Regency of Macedon.

---

<sup>780</sup> Diod. 18.72.2.

<sup>781</sup> For more on Cleitus, see Heckel, 2006. p. 87 s.v. "Cleitus [3]".

<sup>782</sup> Philip III had withdrawn with his forces to Cianoï (Cius), presumably from the siege at Megalopolis (cf. Diod. 18.72.2.).

<sup>783</sup> Diod. 18.72.2.

<sup>784</sup> Diod. 18.72.2.

The two fleets met near Byzantium, where at first Cleitus was the victor and was able to capture many of Nicanor's ships.<sup>785</sup> Despite his initial success, Cleitus was thwarted the night after the battle when Antigonus and Nicanor were able to combine their forces and attack under the cover of darkness.<sup>786</sup> Because of this action during the night by the forces of Nicanor and Antigonus, Polyperchon's fleet was either sunk or captured. Cleitus was killed by Lysimachus' soldiers during his flight from the field.<sup>787</sup> Once Nicanor had defeated Polyperchon's naval forces, Cassander achieved greater control in the Aegean, and would now be able to bring in more troops to bolster his presence in Europe and further support his claim to the regency of Macedon.

The defeat of Polyperchon's naval forces off Byzantium would go down as one of the regent's major defeats over the course of the conflict with Cassander, and if hindsight is employed, can be seen as the beginning of the end for Polyperchon's effort to maintain his hold on the Macedonian homeland. It must be noted however, that if the approach of hindsight is used, the expectation that Polyperchon would emerge victorious from the might of Cassander, Antigonus, Lysimachus and Ptolemy once their forces combined is unrealistic. As Hughes has already noted, Polyperchon was aware that he was not on an equal military footing to Cassander,<sup>788</sup> which required him to take a more diplomatic approach to undermine Cassandrian support, as well as to embark upon military endeavours against individual Greek cities which did not choose to side with the regent. While there were examples of Polyperchon being unsuccessful in securing an extensive support base in southern Greece, particularly in the examples of Athens and Megalopolis, it must be noted that he was in fact able to build a body of support in southern Greece, centred around the Peloponnese, which would remain loyal to his cause for the entirety of the conflict. What the conflict at Byzantium does mark however, is the last reference to Polyperchon's

---

<sup>785</sup> Diod. 18.72.3. Diodorus claims that forty of Nicanor's ships were captured by Cleitus. For Diodorus' complete account of the battles, see Diod. 18.72.

<sup>786</sup> Diod. 18.72.3.

<sup>787</sup> Diod. 18.72.3.

<sup>788</sup> Hughes, 2008. p. 219.



whereabouts until his journey to Epirus in 317 to accompany Olympias back to Macedon.<sup>789</sup>

The period of time following the installation of Polyperchon as the new regent of Macedon following Antipater's death demonstrated stark differences in the way Polyperchon and the rebellious Cassander would choose to structure their respective efforts in the struggle for Europe. Polyperchon, as the regent of Macedon and Argead supporter, chose to engage with the royal family as well as to draw on groups sympathetic to the Macedonian monarchy. In an almost diametrically opposed approach, Cassander sought support from the members of the Diadochoi, forming strong alliances with Lysimachus, Ptolemy and for the time being, Antigonus, as well as relying upon the oligarchies established by Antipater during Alexander III's expansion of the Macedonian Empire. By the time of Cassander's return to the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire, he was able to return to a region where support structures were already in place, while Polyperchon was forced to react to Cassander's movements rather than pre-emptively forcing Cassander's response. While Cassander would continue to build upon the achievements of 319/318, Polyperchon would do the same, and the coming year would see him attempt to strike against Cassander's main military and financial backer, Antigonus. It would also see the entry of Olympias into the fray, bringing with her a fundamental shift in the approaches of both Polyperchon and Cassander in their struggle for control in Greece and Macedon.

---

<sup>789</sup> For more on Olympias' return to Macedon, see: Ch. 7.2.

## Chapter 7: The Changing of the Guard.<sup>790</sup>

This chapter is devoted to the events following Cassander's victory over Polyperchon's forces at Byzantium and his successful return to Macedon in the winter of 317/16 after Olympias has returned to the region. The interval between the summer of 318 and the winter of 317/16 would see a massive shift in the balance of power in the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, eventuate in the deaths of Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adea Eurydice, and culminate in the expulsion of Polyperchon from Macedon to his supporters in the Peloponnese. As with previous chapters, this segment of investigation is divided into three sections. This first of these covers the period of time directly after the defeat of Polyperchon's fleet by Cassander and his allies in the summer of 318 until Cassander's return to southern Greece following his first incursion into the Macedonian homeland in the summer of 317. The second segment is devoted to the events surrounding Cassander's successful conquest of Macedon after the return of Olympias from Epirus and the spate of executions within the Macedonian Homeland that took place in the region soon after her arrival. The final section of the chapter engages with the way in which Cassander consolidated his position within Macedon after the execution of Olympias, marking this as a drastic shift in his interactions with the Argead family. It was during this time that Cassander shifted from one who had distanced himself from the royal family, to actively engaging with, and integrating himself within this family. However, the situation for Cassander was not entirely favourable, as friction within the alliance with Antigonos began to emerge, culminating in the termination of the Antipatrid-Antigonid alliance in 315 with *casus bellorum* being levelled by both sides.

---

<sup>790</sup> Portions of this chapter have been presented at the ASCS. 34. Conference held at Macquarie University in 2013, the *AMPHORAE*. 9. Conference held at the University of Sydney in 2013, the ASCS. 35. Conference held at Massey University in 2014 and the ASCS 36. Conference held at the University of Adelaide in 2015. I extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to all those who attended and the feedback they provided.

Now that he had lost his supporter in Olympias, Polyperchon departed Macedon for the support base he had developed in southern Greece in 319/18, from where he continued his struggle against Cassander for the remainder of the conflict. Polyperchon's cause was by no means lost as, even though Antigonus and Cassander had ended their friendship, this did not result in the cessation of Antigonid interests in Europe. As a result, Antigonus dispatched his officer, Aristodemus, to the Peloponnese with the intention of creating a new alliance, this time with Polyperchon.

### **7.1 Cassander's first attempt at Macedon**

Following Polyperchon's defeat at Byzantium, with the loss of a substantial portion of his naval forces and more importantly, the loss of prestige among the Macedonian nobility and several of the Greek cities, the regent and his movements disappear from the extant ancient literary accounts, and remain absent from the records until his reappearance in Epirus and the return of Olympias to Macedon in the autumn of 317.<sup>791</sup> During this time, in the summer of 317,<sup>792</sup> Cassander was able to launch his first venture into the Macedonian homeland from Athens.<sup>793</sup> There is sparse reference to this action, with only Diodorus as an authority, conveying the endeavours in a highly compressed fashion providing little detail on the events that took place. One piece of information conveyed from Diodorus' narrative is that Cassander was able to take possession of a significant number of Polyperchon's war-elephants.<sup>794</sup> The campaign itself has received little attention from modern scholars who, when engaging with Cassander's actions in the summer of 317, view his first

---

<sup>791</sup> Diod. 19.11.2; cf. Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 81; Boiy, 2007. p. 141, 149.

<sup>792</sup> Fortina, 1965. p. 35; Adams, 1975. pp. 88-89; Bosworth, *Chiron*, 22 (1992). p. 81; Adams, *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993). p. 210; Boiy, 2007. p. 141; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 42-43; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 273; cf. Adams, 2010. pp. 213-214; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25 (2014). p. 12.

<sup>793</sup> Diod. 18.75.1, 19.35.7.

<sup>794</sup> Diod. 19.35.7: These in addition to already depleted numbers of Polyperchon's elephantine troops that resulted from the failed siege at Megalopolis. cf. Ch. 6.3. pp. 181-182.

expedition into the region as a failed invasion by the son of Antipater.<sup>795</sup> The brevity of the account by Diodorus, our only authority on the matter, means that all evaluations of the events at this time in Europe are reliant on some level of hypothetical reconstruction and speculation. While an *argumentum ex silentio* is never a desirable endeavour, if the limitations are kept in mind,<sup>796</sup> it is possible to suggest a more satisfactory understanding of the events after the summer of 318 and Cassander's return to the south in the autumn of the same year.

So what information can be gleaned from Diodorus' account that could allow for discussion and evaluation of Cassander's first campaign into Macedon? While the historian makes reference to Cassander's first venture into Macedon on two separate occasions,<sup>797</sup> in neither instance does Diodorus elaborate on the action beyond mentioning its occurrence.<sup>798</sup> In the first reference, Cassander's movements north are contained within the concluding chapter of Diodorus' Eighteenth Book. Here, the historian heavily compresses the period of time following Nicanor's victory off Byzantium and Cassander's first campaign, resulting in little information being transmitted from his authoritative sources into his text. Regarding the campaign, Diodorus states, "...he [Cassander] campaigned into Macedon and brought many of those there, because they were there, over to him."<sup>799</sup> The timing of this section of the *Bibliothēke* can be dated to the first half of 317 by the execution of Nicanor by Cassander following his return to Athens after the Bosphorus engagements on the grounds that Nicanor had now fallen into disrepute with the son of Antipater.<sup>800</sup> This provides a

---

<sup>795</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22 (1992). p. 64; Boiy, 2007. p. 141; Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 243. Certainly Diodorus uses the term *στρατεύω* (Diod. 18.75.2, 19.35.7) to describe the action by Cassander, which may lead to the interpretation of Cassander's action as being an outright invasion.

<sup>796</sup> See chapter 2.3 on the limitations and possibilities of so called "arguments from silence."

<sup>797</sup> Diod. 18.75.1-2, 19.35.7.

<sup>798</sup> As noted by Anson, 2014. p. 99.

<sup>799</sup> Diod. 18.75.1: "ἐστράτευσε δὲ καὶ εἰς Μακεδονίαν καὶ πολλοὺς ἔσχε τῶν ἐγγωρίων ἀφισταμένους πρὸς αὐτόν." cf. trans. Geer. 1947. "He also made a campaign into Macedonia where he found many of the inhabitants coming over to him." cf. Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. p. 273; Anson, 2014. p. 99.

<sup>800</sup> Beloch, IV.<sup>1</sup> 1924. p. 106; Fortina, 1965. p. 34; Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 64; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 111; Heckel, 2006. p. 178; Boiy, 2007. p. 69. with

relatively firm *terminus post quem* for Cassander's first venture north as taking place after Nicanor's death.

No record of how successful the campaign was exists in this specific section of Diodorus, but Cassander's reappearance in the sources in the Peloponnese during the siege of the city of Tegea,<sup>801</sup> makes it clear that he was not able to conquer the Macedonian homeland. A reason for Diodorus' brevity in regards to Cassander's movements during the summer of 317 is available. Whether or not more information existed regarding the matter in Diodorus' source material is not possible to answer with any satisfaction, but it is clear that Diodorus' interests no longer lay in events occurring in Europe during the middle of 317. Rather his aim was to bring his eighteenth book to an end in order to shift his focus away from Macedonian and Greek affairs over to Agathocles and events taking place in Syracuse and Italy.<sup>802</sup> This shift of focus results in the loss of vital information that could shed further light on Cassander's first mission into Macedon. The only other reference to Cassander's movements in the summer of 317 is found later in Diodorus' history where events of the winter of 317/16 are discussed. Here the reference is contained within the context of events preceding the siege of Pydna and Cassander's second campaign into Macedon, when Cassander had confined Olympias and her forces in the city.<sup>803</sup>

The lack of information provided by Diodorus's brief references, as well as the absence of corroborating evidence from other ancient sources, means that there has, understandably, been little thorough discussion by modern scholars regarding Cassander's first venture into Macedon during the summer of 317. The majority of evaluations of this event fall into two categories; either the event is glossed over in favour of a focus on Cassander's successful invasion of

---

the installation of Nicanor's successor, Demetrius of Phalerum. cf. Pol. *Strat.* 4.11.2; Marmor Parium, *FGrH.* 239. B. 13.

<sup>801</sup> Diod. 19.11.1, 19.35.1. Presumably Tegea was one of the cities that turned over to Polyperchon's cause during his Peloponnesian campaigns in 318 (cf. Ch. 6.2.).

<sup>802</sup> Diod. 18.75.3, 19.1; Bosworth, *Chiron.* 22. (1992). p. 71; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. pp. 273-274; Paschidis, *Tekmeria.* 9. (2008). p. 240.

<sup>803</sup> Diod. 19.35.7. For further discussion of Cassander's return to Macedon, see Ch. 7.2.

Macedon during the winter of 317/16, or the event is ignored entirely.<sup>804</sup> There has been a level of moderate evaluation, most notably by Bosworth,<sup>805</sup> and more recently by Paschidis.<sup>806</sup> However, it must be stated that Cassander's movements in 317 are not central to either Bosworth's or Paschidis' arguments.

The lack of attention that Cassander's first campaign into Macedon has received by both ancient and modern writers is understandable. The time he spent in Macedon was short and on the whole, unremarkable, as Bosworth summarises "*Cassander's invasion had been inconclusive. He failed to gain control of the country and withdrew, but he withdrew alive and in possession of a good number of Polyperchon's elephants.*"<sup>807</sup> Paschidis echoes Bosworth's evaluation and highlights the short time he spent in Macedon, "*We know that he [Cassander] enjoyed some success, since he captured some of Polyperchon's elephants, but obviously failed to consolidate his sway over Macedonia, otherwise he would not return so hastily to the Peloponnese.*"<sup>808</sup> Cassander's first campaign took place between two significant events within Greek and Macedonian politics, the high profile execution of Nicanor and Cassander's conquest of Macedon, some six months after this initial venture. Both of these events drastically altered the political landscape in Greece and Macedon and would draw the attention of the ancient sources.<sup>809</sup> Because of the perceived banality of the first campaign, with no significant victories or gains other than Cassander's gains in support from various cities in Greece taking place or being recorded by the ancient sources, the venture itself can easily be overlooked.

---

<sup>804</sup> But also see: Beloch, IV.<sup>1</sup> 1924. pp. 105-106; Fortina, 1965. pp. 33-36; Adams, 1975. pp. 89-91, though Adams later explicitly acknowledges that the expedition took place (Adams, *Makedonia*. 3. (1977). p. 20; Adams, *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993). p. 210;); Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977), p. 495; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003, p. 42; Heckel, 2006. p. 80; Landucci Gattinoni, 2008. pp. 273-274.

<sup>805</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). pp. 55-81.

<sup>806</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). pp. 233-250.

<sup>807</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 64.

<sup>808</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 243.

<sup>809</sup> For an in-depth investigation of Athens under the rule of Demetrius of Phalerum, see O'Sullivan, 2009.

When placed in proximity to the later events during the winter of 317/16, Cassander's first venture into Macedon can, and has, been viewed as a failed attempt by the son of Antipater to launch an invasion of the region in order to wrest control from Polyperchon and his allies.<sup>810</sup> The invasion had some initial success, however it soon stagnated, forcing Cassander's return to the south and onto the Peloponnese where he re-emerges into the source tradition at the siege of Tegea.<sup>811</sup> The nature of Cassander's mission is not in question; Diodorus' use of the verbs *στρατεύω*<sup>812</sup> and *έμβολή*<sup>813</sup> make it clear that this was a military action, although the hypothesis that the action was explicitly an *invasion* is not the only interpretation available.

While the outline of events set out by Bosworth and expanded upon by Paschidis is not in question, there are a number of unhelpful issues that arise from such an interpretation, which require careful consideration if it is chosen to view Cassander's action specifically as an invasion. Interpretation of Cassander's actions as an invasion may employ a collapsing of the son of Antipater's ventures into Macedonian territory, taking his successful subjugation of Macedon later in 317 as an authority to engage with his earlier actions. While a return to Macedon is certainly a contral concern to Cassander during his conflict with Polyperchon, a precise timeframe within which he wished to achieve this is not known. Certainly the driving factors that saw him march north in the winter of 317/16 were not based upon a meticulously planned and organised invasion strategy, but rather in reaction to Olympias' return to Macedon in the autumn of 317 and the spate of political executions and assassinations directly aimed at Cassander's friends and family as well as the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice,<sup>814</sup> all of which were impossible for Cassander to know of in the middle of 317. Additionally, if Cassander had planned the invasion of Macedon, he did so without active

---

<sup>810</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 64; Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). pp. 241; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 197.

<sup>811</sup> Diod. 19.35.1

<sup>812</sup> Diod. 18.75.1.

<sup>813</sup> Diod. 19.35.7.

<sup>814</sup> Diod. 19.35.1; Just. 14.5.9, 14.5.10; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 203, 204. For further discussion on Cassander's successful conquest of Macedon in the autumn on 317, see Ch. 7.2.

assistance from any of his allies among the Diadochoi, a policy that Adams has previously demonstrated was an integral part of Cassander's strategem for domination in Macedon and Greece.<sup>815</sup> If Cassander had planned an invasion, the apparent lack of support from his allies is difficult to explain. The interpretation of invasion also implies Cassander had a level of security in his base of operations in southern Greece, at least enough to allow a significant portion of his military strength to depart the region north. While it is clear that ever since his return to Greece in 318, Cassander had expanded his influence in Athens and the regions surrounding Attica, the loss of almost the entire Peloponnese must have weighed heavily on his security concerns should he leave his base of operations in a weakened military state. Finally, the assessment of Cassander's first venture into Macedonian territory fails to engage with concurrent events occurring in other areas of the empire that must have been influential on his actions. Macedon and Greece do not operate in a vacuum, be it economically, militarily or, of particular importance for this investigation, politically. If Cassander's perceived invasion of Macedon in the summer of 317 is placed within the greater context of simultaneous events in other areas of the Macedonian Empire, then a more satisfactory interpretation of the venture may be possible.

As with previous phases of Cassander's and Polyperchon's conflict, it is impossible to discuss the action of one without reference to the other. While little discussion has been devoted to Cassander's movements during the middle of 317 by both ancient and modern writers, even less exists for Polyperchon. It is not the case that evidence is totally lacking; epigraphic evidence provides some indication of events. In order to gain a better understanding of Cassander's first venture into Macedon, it is also vital to know what Polyperchon, a man conspicuously absent from Diodorus' account, was doing, and more importantly, where he was doing it. As previously stated, no record of Polyperchon's whereabouts exists within the entire ancient literary corpus following his failure at the siege of Megalopolis in the summer of 318, until the return of Olympias to

---

<sup>815</sup> *passim* Adams, 1975.



Macedon in the autumn of 317.<sup>816</sup> This means that no reaction to Cassander's advance is recorded and a gap in Polyperchon's biography exists of around twelve months that requires discussion. Following his involvement with the siege of Megalopolis, Polyperchon departed the city with the majority of his forces for, as Diodorus states "*other, more necessary business.*"<sup>817</sup> The historian does not specify exactly what this "other business" is, and frustratingly does not clarify the matter later in his work.

Unfortunately, little can be stated with any certainty regarding Polyperchon's movements during the temporal gap due to the lack of evidence from our literary sources.<sup>818</sup> It has been suggested that following the Peloponnesian campaign of 318, Polyperchon journeyed north, where he attempted to reaffirm his hold on Macedon and the royals until Olympias' return in 317, this at a time when Cassander's influence was spreading throughout Greece and Macedon.<sup>819</sup> Paschidis however has highlighted the unlikelihood of this interpretation.<sup>820</sup> It makes little sense that Polyperchon would have remained inactive, while his standing in Greece diminished, while Cassander invaded (Paschidis' phrasing) Macedon in the summer of 317 and while he began to lose his influence over the royals with an increasingly problematic Eurydice.<sup>821</sup> Polyperchon's apparent inactivity in Diodorus' account may be the result of the compression at the end of Book Eighteen. Whatever the reason for the absence of detail here, Polyperchon's lack of response between the autumns of 318 and 317 is suspect. Ever since Cassander's flight from Macedon in 319 and the initiation of hostilities, Polyperchon had acted and reacted to Cassander's movements and strategies

---

<sup>816</sup> Diod. 19.11.2 cf. Just. 14.5.1, which states Polyperchon was absent from Macedon and in Greece until his simultaneous return to Macedon with Olympias. Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 241; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. pp. 196-197.

<sup>817</sup> Diod. 18.72.1-2: *αὐτὸς δ' ἐφ' ἑτέρας ἀναγκαιοτέρας πράξεις ἐτρέπετο.*

<sup>818</sup> To limit our available sources further, Paschidis also identifies that the years of 318/17 are absent from the *Marmor Parium* (Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 241. cf. *FGrH* 239.)

<sup>819</sup> Heckel, 1992. pp. 197-198.

<sup>820</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria* 9. (2008). p. 241.

<sup>821</sup> For Eurydice's rise to prominence, see Ch. 7.1.

with speed and diligence. Though this is clear from the *events* in the ancient sources, their overt comments give him little credit.<sup>822</sup>

There is an alternative explanation that exists in opposition to Polyperchon's lethargy and incompetence, and that may shed more light on the regent's movements in 318/17. This theory too sets a plausible geographical location for him, which in turn aids in contextualizing Cassander's first venture into Macedon in the summer of 317. The alternative comes in the form of a fragmented decree from Nesos, championed by Paschidis, promulgated in honour of their distinguished citizen, Thersippos.<sup>823</sup> The inscription contains a reference to activities Polyperchon conducted in Asia: *καὶ Πολυπέρχοντος εἰς τὰν Ἀσί[αν] ... [..5..]ντος διώκησε φίλον αὐτον τᾷ πό[λι] ὑπά[ρχ]ην.*<sup>824</sup> The core of Paschidis' argument relies upon restoration of the fragmented verb in line 24. He proposes, instead of the traditionally accepted reconstruction proposed by Paton of *[στάλε]ντος*,<sup>825</sup> that a reading of *[διάβα]ντος* is preferable.<sup>826</sup> If his theory is correct, then it is possible to assert that Polyperchon had embarked on some form of military action into Asia at some point in his career.

Fortunately, the timing of such a venture is relatively straightforward. As this study has evaluated, Polyperchon's movements prior to 318 are known with a level of certainty, meaning that there was no chance for him to depart the European sphere of the Macedonia Empire before the autumn of 318. A *terminus ante quem* too is readily accessible from the inscription with a reference to kings in the plural (βασιλέων).<sup>827</sup> This would lead to the conclusion that Philip III and Alexander IV were both alive during Polyperchon's time in Asia.<sup>828</sup> News

---

<sup>822</sup> Indeed, Theophrastus uses Polyperchon's ability to succeed in military endeavors as an unfortunate punch line to a joke (Thphr. *Char.* 8.6-7.).

<sup>823</sup> *IG. XII<sup>2</sup> 625*. For more on Thersippos, see Paschidis, 2008. pp. 408-413.

<sup>824</sup> *IG. XII<sup>2</sup> 625*. II. A. 23-25.

<sup>825</sup> *IG. XII<sup>2</sup> 625*. II. A. 24.

<sup>826</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 234. For the specificities of Paschidis' reasoning, see pp. 232-235, particularly n. 5 and n. 6 on p. 234.

<sup>827</sup> *IG. XII<sup>2</sup> 625*. II. A. 27. cf. Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 236. n. 9.

<sup>828</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 236. n. 9. Paschidis does concede that while unlikely, it is feasible Polyperchon's mission to Asia could have taken place at the time of, or shortly after, the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice in the autumn

of the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice travelled fast,<sup>829</sup> so it could be argued that, should the decree of Nesos have been made after the Autumn of 317, there would only be a requirement to make reference to a single living king and not the plural that exists in the inscription. What is significant is that this inscription coincides with the period of time that Polyperchon vanishes from the literary sources and provides a geographical location, outside of Macedon in Asia, some time between the autumns of 318, and 317 B.C. Paschidis has offered a possible time of departure for Polyperchon on his Asian campaign, in early 317 after a brief period of preparation to amass the required forces.<sup>830</sup> While admittedly reliant upon hypothetical reconstructions,<sup>831</sup> the proposed scenario would account for the presence of Polyperchon's name in the decree of Nesos. The next issue is how to connect these nodal points of understanding into a satisfactory narrative.

It must be stressed that this section of discussion delves into Paschidis' aptly termed "*unstable realm of hypothetical reconstructions*,"<sup>832</sup> but if this understanding and limitation is maintained, a contextualisation of concurrent events may provide greater insight into the events of 318/17. No explicit reason for Polyperchon's time in Asia Minor is found within the inscription, however the purpose may lie in a promise to his chief ally in the region, Eumenes of Cardia, made in 318, to come to his aid with the royal Macedonian army should it be required.<sup>833</sup> Since the resumption of hostilities with Antigonos following

---

of 317 (cf. Diod. 19.11.3-8; Just. 14.5.9-10; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 18; Carney, 2006. pp. 75-76; Heckel, 2006. p. 4, 52-53, 183; Yardley, Wheatley, Heckel, 2011. p. 204; Anson, 2014. p. 106; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 12.). However, it is more likely that Polyperchon would have been in or near Macedon at the time of Olympias' arrival to work closely with the ally he had been attempting to secure for the past two years. For further discussion of Olympias' return and circumstances revolving around the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice and the effect they had on Cassander and Polyperchon, see Ch. 7.2.

<sup>829</sup> cf. Diod. 19.35.1; Just. 14.5.8; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 202, 206-209.

<sup>830</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 245.

<sup>831</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 242.

<sup>832</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 242.

<sup>833</sup> Diod. 18.57.4; Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 63. n. 40; Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008) p. 245; cf. Ch. 6.2. pp. 168-169.

Polyperchon's original letter of support in 319, Eumenes had been hard pressed by Monophthalmus and had fled from Cappadocia to Cilicia.<sup>834</sup> During the course of his journey, Eumenes had embarked upon a massive effort to procure further reinforcements to his army from various regions throughout the Empire.<sup>835</sup> The army he was able to raise while on the road was substantial. While the specific numbers need to be treated with caution, they are able to provide an indication of the overall scale of military strength now at Eumenes' disposal. Following the conclusion of the siege at Nora, Diodorus reports that Eumenes' forces totaled two thousand infantry with a compliment of five hundred cavalry.<sup>836</sup> He could also expect a further reinforcement of three thousand men comprising of the famed Silver Shields who had been ordered by Polyperchon to assist Eumenes in his efforts.<sup>837</sup> Finally the expansive recruitment campaign that Eumenes undertook during his journey eastwards amassed him some ten thousand infantry with a further two thousand cavalry,<sup>838</sup> totaling a combined fifteen thousand footmen with two thousand five hundred mounted troops.

Though there is no specific mention of Polyperchon within Eumenes' recruitment efforts, there is reference made to mercenaries from the Greek mainland travelling to join his forces.<sup>839</sup> While this may be an attractive invitation to locate Polyperchon into the recruitment drive of Eumenes in 318, this interpretation should however be avoided. Diodorus specifically highlights that these men came from the Greek cities of their own volition,<sup>840</sup> rather than as part of a greater body of Macedonian troops from Polyperchon's royal army. This movement does however demonstrate that Greek military forces were venturing into the East 318,<sup>841</sup> which in turn shows that the physical movement of troops into Asia Minor was possible. If Polyperchon were able to supplement

---

<sup>834</sup> Diod. 18.59.1-3; cf. Nepos. *Eum.* 5.7; Anson, 2014. p. 150.

<sup>835</sup> Diod. 18.61.4-5; Nepos. *Eum.* 7.1; Plut. *Eum.* 16.3-4.

<sup>836</sup> Diod. 18.59.1

<sup>837</sup> Diod. 18.58.1, 18.59.3

<sup>838</sup> Diod. 18.61.5.

<sup>839</sup> Diod. 18.61.5

<sup>840</sup> Diod. 18.61.5: "πολλοὶ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος πόλεων ἐθελοντὶ κατήντων καὶ πρὸς τὴν στρατείαν ἀπεγπάφοντο."

<sup>841</sup> cf. Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). pp. 62-64, especially n. 35 on p. 62.

Eumenes' army with contingents of his own, a significant threat to Antigonos' position would be created.

Polyperchon could not risk the political backlash that he would incur if he chose to forgo his earlier offer of aid to Eumenes, despite the ever-increasing influence of Cassander in Greece and Macedon. While the office of regent afforded Polyperchon the support of the kings, a point that he emphasised whenever possible, Olympias and Eumenes were two key allies whose allegiance he needed to maintain. Though there had been much correspondence and even instances of co-operation between the regent and Olympias, Alexander's mother was yet to depart from Epirus to Macedon and would not do so until after Cassander's first venture into Macedon. As previously discussed, Olympias was wary of Polyperchon's endeavors to secure her support and unsure of his true intentions. Her confidant and advisor during this period of uncertainty was Eumenes. Should Polyperchon renege on his offer of military support to Eumenes, not only would it risk Eumenes' allegiance, it would also threaten the political, economic and military support of Olympias in the struggle against Cassander. While the only explicit evidence for Polyperchon's presence in Asia Minor comes from the decree of Nesos in honour of Thersippos, circumstantial evidence from Polyperchon's promise to Eumenes, and the intrinsic need to maintain good relations with Olympias do add further plausibility to the unattested Asian campaign of Polyperchon taking place sometime in early 317. Importantly for Cassander, Polyperchon's absence from Macedon took place during the time that his first venture into the Macedonian homeland took place in the summer of 317.

So what factors exist for Cassander immediately prior to his first venture into Macedon? With Polyperchon absent from Macedon, as well as the wish to continue the momentum following Cleitus' defeat at the Bosphorus, the son of Antipater could have decided to seize the opportunity to launch an opportunistic attack on a militarily weakened Macedon.<sup>842</sup> Certainly this must have been a consideration for Cassander, however it must not be forgotten that following

---

<sup>842</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 245.

Polyperchon's efforts the previous year, the majority of cities in the Peloponnese were still hostile to his cause. For Cassander to hold his position in Attica while operating in the north, he would be required to maintain a significant garrison against any potential threat from the south of Greece. Resistance to Cassander would continue and eventuate in direct military action later in 317, as he was required to journey into the Peloponnese where he would lay siege to the city of Tegea.<sup>843</sup> What can be said with confidence is that there was significant opposition to Cassander within the Peloponnese with forces that maintained their loyalty to Polyperchon following the conflicts of the summer of 318.

In addition to Polyperchon's absence from the European theatre and the hostility Cassander faced in the Peloponnese, the reason for Polyperchon's mission to Asia must be considered. If Polyperchon had travelled to Asia Minor and on to aid Eumenes, it must be assumed that the reason for this was to combine their forces in a joint effort against Antigonus Monophthalmus and to remove him as a threat. Should the combined forces of Eumenes and Polyperchon be successful and Antigonus defeated, then a major blow would be dealt to Cassander's support base with the loss of a man who had been a significant backer since 319.

For the past three years, Antigonus' support had been instrumental in Cassander's struggle against Polyperchon for domination in Greece and Macedon. From the initial asylum granted in 319 after the death of Antipater and Cassander's self imposed exile following his rejection of the office of *chiliarch* left to him by his father under Polyperchon's rule, to his arrival at the Bosphoros after Cleitus' success during the initial phases of the battles there, Antigonus was the driving force behind Cassander's growing success in the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire. Without support from Antigonus, Cassander had neither the military strength to return to Greece in the spring of 318, nor the means to enable his return to Europe. Antigonus had provided economic, military and political backing to Cassander's cause. If the combined might of Eumenes and Polyperchon were able to defeat Antigonus in Asia Minor, Cassander would lose

---

<sup>843</sup> Diod. 19.35.1.

those vital avenues of support as well as his staunchest supporter for his own efforts to take control in Europe.<sup>844</sup>

One of the reasons Diodorus provides for Antigonus' alliance with Cassander was the desire to keep Polyperchon in Macedon and out of Asia Minor.<sup>845</sup> It can be deduced from Diodorus' account that Antigonus did in fact appreciate the potential threat posed by Polyperchon once contact between the then new regent and Eumenes was made. Once he had learned of this, Antigonus was eager to engage with the two on an individual basis, rather than as a combined force, as well as keeping Polyperchon occupied in Europe and out of Asia Minor.<sup>846</sup> This may also account for Antigonus' involvement in the Bosphorus.<sup>847</sup> While maintaining the alliance with Cassander was desirable, the pragmatic need to keep the regent and the army he would lead out of Asia and Eumenes isolated was crucial. There is the possibility that the preoccupation of Polyperchon was one of the agreements reached by Antigonus and Cassander when negotiating their alliance in 319.<sup>848</sup> To win Antigonus' support, Cassander needed to keep Polyperchon in Europe. If he failed in this endeavour and Polyperchon was able to successfully cross into Asia, the onus may have been on Cassander to draw Polyperchon back to the European theatre and out of the east.

Because of the many factors facing Cassander drawing his focus in several directions, the prospect of his being able to amass a strong military force capable of launching a full-scale invasion of the Macedonian homeland in the summer of 317, while simultaneously maintaining his base of operations, is unlikely. There is no question that Cassander's first venture into Macedon was

---

<sup>844</sup> Antigonus would ultimately shift his support from Cassander over to Polyperchon in 315, when he dispatched his officer Aristodemus to the Peloponnese (cf. Ch. 8.2).

<sup>845</sup> Diod. 18.54.4: "...βουλόμενος τοὺς περὶ Πολυπέρχοντα πολλοὺς και μεγάλους περισπασμοὺς ἔχειν..."

<sup>846</sup> Diod. 18.54.4.

<sup>847</sup> Diod. 18.72.7-8. cf. Ch. 6.3. pp. 184-185.

<sup>848</sup> Diod. 18.49.1-3; cf. Ch. 6.1. pp. 156-157.

not a mistake on the behalf of Diodorus and that it did in fact take place,<sup>849</sup> and it has been suggested that this first action into Macedon was the reason for Polyperchon's return from Asia,<sup>850</sup> however there is room to discuss the scale of the military force that Cassander led into the north during this time.

It is possible that, instead of a large-scale invasion that would necessitate the deployment of a significant segment of his military strength, Cassander may have opted to march north with a smaller raiding force. By doing so, Cassander would be able to venture far into Macedonian territory, threatening the absent Polyperchon's base of operations without risking an uprising from the Peloponnese. This would have the same effect of drawing Polyperchon back from Asia Minor to Macedon, ending his aid mission to Eumenes of Cardia against Antigonus without jeopardizing Cassander's primary goal, that of containing Polyperchon within Europe.

There is precedence for the exact scenario described above, as such an action took place prior to 317, during the First War of the Diadochoi in 321 at a time when Polyperchon had acted as overseer of European events on behalf of Antipater and Craterus, the incumbant *strategoi*. Cassander may have modeled his first venture into Macedon on the Aetolian led uprising of 321 that was orchestrated by the then regent of Macedon, Perdiccas.<sup>851</sup> Diodorus states that Perdiccas' reasoning for supporting and encouraging the Greek coalition against Antipater was to "*draw off Antipater*."<sup>852</sup> The action was designed to ease the threat Perdiccas faced in the greater allied forces of Antipater, Craterus, Antigonus and Ptolemy. The Aetolians were unsuccessful in diverting Antipater back to Europe and he remained in Asia to continue his campaign against Antigonus. The revolt was swiftly put down by the presence of significant military reserves<sup>853</sup> left in Macedon to safeguard against the possibility of such

---

<sup>849</sup> Anson, 2014. p. 99.

<sup>850</sup> As suggested by Paschidis (*Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 245).

<sup>851</sup> cf. Ch. 5.2. pp. 138-139.

<sup>852</sup> Diod. 18.38.1: "...ἀντιπερισπάσαι βουλόμενοι τὸν Ἀντίπατρον."

<sup>853</sup> Antipater had left enough forces to comprise at least two armies, the first led by Polycles that was defeated (Diod. 18.38.2-3) and the second commanded by



unrest. Given his previous experience tackling such an event, Polyperchon must have been conscious of Cassander's potential to enter into Macedonian territory during his absence, as well as the threat such an action would pose to his position in Macedon. However, Polyperchon did not, after a year of conflict and military setbacks, have the same extensive military resources that were at Antipater's disposal in 321.

Maintaining the alliance to Eumenes, and by extension the alliance with Olympias, was vital to Polyperchon's effort against Cassander and could not be placed at risk. Supporting Eumenes was fundamental to gaining Olympias' trust and support. Polyperchon may have gambled on Cassander's attentions being focused on a hostile Peloponnese, where he would expend his military efforts in an attempt to secure the region during the time that Polyperchon was absent from Europe.<sup>854</sup> If so the gamble failed, and as previously discussed, news had the ability to travel quickly throughout the empire,<sup>855</sup> when news reached Polyperchon of Cassander's move north, he could break off any action in Asia and return to Macedon. A swift return could feasibly mitigate the damage caused by his adversary's move north. The Aetolian campaign does not prove the motivation and intentions of Cassander's first expedition into Macedon during the summer of 317, but it does show that Macedon and Greece were active areas of conflict in the eastern region of the Macedonian Empire and that such diversionary tactics, interconnecting the theatres of war, were present prior to 317.

No conflict between Polyperchon and Cassander is recorded by the sources between the conflict off Byzantium in the summer of 318 and Cassander second venture in Macedon in the spring of 316, but there are two explanations that could account for what took place. Either Diodorus, in an attempt to shift his

---

Polyperchon, which was successful in subduing the rebelling Greek forces (Diod. 18.38.6).

<sup>854</sup> Indeed this could account for Cassander's reappearance in the narrative of Diodorus in the Peloponnese at Tegea.

<sup>855</sup> In this instance, from Pella across the Aegean. Compare with chapter 5.2 and the news of Alexander's death travelling from Babylon to Europe.

historiographical focus to Syracuse omitted the events, or more likely, as word reached Cassander of Polyperchon's transit back to Macedon, he broke off his operations in the north and returned to Attica with the prize of Polyperchon's war elephants now in his possession.<sup>856</sup> Cassander's position in southern Greece and the hostilities from the Peloponnese meant that he could not safely dedicate his entire military strength to an expansive northern invasion. When this is considered along with the risks posed to Antigonos by the combined forces of Polyperchon and Eumenes, it may be more appropriate to view Cassander's actions in the summer of 317 as a raid designed to draw Polyperchon off from Asia, rather than as an invasion of Macedonian homeland.

The difference between the interpretation of invasion and raid may be a semantic debate. The view of Polyperchon's actions as an invasion and my own understanding of it as a raid both depend of some speculation. Once more we can only give a probable account of the events in Macedon and Greece during 318/17. If Cassander's actions are contextualized within concurrent events in Greece and Asia Minor, the interpretation of raid appears more plausible than viewing them with a *veni, vidi, non vici* perspective. Not only does the interpretation of raid show that, while seizing control of Macedon was an obvious aim for Cassander, he was willing to forgo the opportunity to commit himself entirely to the effort in favour of maintaining a hold on southern Greece. It may also go some way to dispelling the image of Polyperchon as an inept military and political figure in the Macedonian Empire, and further supports Plutarch's evaluation of his military acumen.<sup>857</sup> If this version of events is accepted, then Polyperchon was able to identify the source of much of Cassander's support in the form of Antigonos and attempt to remove him as a threat, while simultaneously strengthening and building his alliances with Eumenes and Olympias. When news arrived of Cassander's invasion, at least what from his perspective appeared to be an invasion, Polyperchon could feasibly end his time in Asia and returning to Macedon to stop Cassander's advance north. Cassander's venture into Macedon in the summer of 317 did not

---

<sup>856</sup> Diod. 19.35.7.

<sup>857</sup> Plut. *Pyr.* 8.3

win him the country, however by the winter of 317/16 he would return, resulting in a massive shift in the dynamic of the conflict with Polyperchon.

The scenario proposed by Paschidis and built upon in the discussion above offers some insight into the movements of both Cassander and Polyperchon between the autumns of 318 and 317. However a question that does present itself is in regard to the availability of time for these events to occur. The speed of communications within the Macedonian Empire was swift, especially when the news was pressing. This is evident from the initiation of the Lamian War in 323 occurring not with the rumours of Alexander's death in June 323, but with later confirmation arriving in Athens.<sup>858</sup> Conflict was underway by the autumn of 323,<sup>859</sup> with the actual conflict beginning some time in the summer.<sup>860</sup> While this does not definitively state that Polyperchon's campaign in Asia Minor did in fact take place, what it does show is that, even if the same timing of, at most, two months employed for correspondences to travel between Babylon and Athens is applied to travel times between Pella and Polyperchon's last attested location in Nesos in western Anatolia,<sup>861</sup> a much shorter distance across the Aegean Sea, it may be possible that Polyperchon received word of Cassander's movements within a short period of time, allowing him to return to Macedon from Asia. Paschidis has suggested that Polyperchon embarked upon his mission to Asia in early 317,<sup>862</sup> which provides the regent with a maximum of some six months in Asia before his return to Macedon and the onward journey to Epirus by the autumn of the same year. It must be remembered that early 317 is the earliest likely opportunity Polyperchon had to travel east, and it is entirely possible that his journey could have occurred later in 317. No detail exists for how long Polyperchon spent in Asia, whether he was able to spend a significant period of time in Asia or was forced to return to Macedon almost immediately. Cassander's mission north could have occurred almost immediately after the

---

<sup>858</sup> Plut. *Phoc.* 22.3-4; cf. Ch. 5.2. p. 132.

<sup>859</sup> Bosworth, in Palagia & Tracy, 2003. p. 19. cf. Miller, *Hesperia Supplements*. 20. (1982). p. 102.

<sup>860</sup> cf. Ch. 4.

<sup>861</sup> For geographical issues, see Stauber, 1996. pp. 198-213.

<sup>862</sup> Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 245.

regent's departure, affording Polyperchon only enough time to reach Anatolia and Nesos before he was forced to return to Macedon. None of this is concrete evidence that definitively proves Polyperchon's unattested campaign in Asia Minor between the autumns of 318 and 317, but it does aid in understanding Polyperchon's perceived inaction during Cassander's first venture into the Macedonian homeland and suggest the feasibility of such an campaign taking place.

Following Polyperchon's return to the Macedonian homeland as well as Cassander's withdrawal to southern Greece, the regent would soon depart from Macedon once again, but not as part of a military campaign against Cassander or his allies. Polyperchon still needed supplementation to his forces, even more so now that the campaign to cut Cassander's supply lines from Asia Minor and Antigonos was underway. However, help was on hand and soon after his return to Macedon, Polyperchon would depart for Epirus and the awaiting Olympias.

## **7.2: The Winter of 317/16 and Cassander's Consolidation of Power**

The previous section of this chapter engaged with the events surrounding Polyperchon's possible involvement in Asia Minor as well as Cassander's first venture into Macedon during the summer of 317. This section of investigation continues with events following Cassander's return to southern Greece and the siege of Tegea and Polyperchon's journey to Epirus to secure the resources of Olympias until Cassander's successful conquest of Macedon in the winter of 317/16 and his consolidation of power within the region. Many pivotal events took place during the hectic period of time between the autumn of 317 and early 316 that would forever change the relationship of both Polyperchon and Cassander with the royal family and with other members of the Diadochoi as well as with each other. While in Epirus, Polyperchon would have his regency stripped from him by the wife of Philip III, Eurydice, who had risen to prominence within the Macedonian court over the previous year. The office was not to remain vacant, as Eurydice offered the regency to Cassander, marking the first point in time since the initiation of hostilities with Polyperchon in 319 that

Cassander actively engaged with, rather than against, the royal family. After much persuasion, Polyperchon convinced Olympias to return to Macedon. Soon after her arrival, the mother of Alexander embarked upon a spate of executions. These resulted in the deaths of Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice as well as numerous executions of the Macedonian aristocracy, directed against Cassander's family and friends. These actions by Olympias would see Cassander respond by launching an invasion and successful conquest of Macedon in the winter of 317/16 against Polyperchon and the mother of Alexander. Following their defeat, Cassander began to consolidate his power in Macedon in a series of actions viewed by both ancient and modern scholars as proto-monarchical. While there is little doubt that Cassander did desire control over Macedon, it is important to understand the context of the accounts that refer to Cassander's actions at this time. Additionally, the way in which Cassander wished to represent himself following his return to Macedon offers further insight into his approach to domination with the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire. This section of investigation engages with the factors leading to Cassander's return to Macedon in the winter of 317/16 as well as the establishment of his position within the heartland of the decaying Macedonian Empire.

After much persistence, Polyperchon had finally convinced Olympias to end her self-imposed exile in Epirus where she had remained since 331, exile stemming from the enmity that had existed between her and Antipater, and return to Macedon.<sup>863</sup> Following his return from Asia Minor, a return made necessary by Cassander's diversionary raid into Macedon, Polyperchon journeyed to Epirus in order to accompany the mother of Alexander the Great and the army at her disposal back to Pella.<sup>864</sup> The reasons for Olympias' change of mind are difficult to state with any certainty. It may be that Polyperchon's endeavour to aid Eumenes in Asia was demonstrative of his intent to maintain the alliances that he had initiated in 319, or that, given her age, she wished to see that her

---

<sup>863</sup> Diod. 19.11.1-2; Just. 14.5.1; cf. Ch. 3. p. 76.

<sup>864</sup> Diod. 19.11.2; cf. Carney, 2006. p. 71; Paschidis, *Tekmeria*. 9. (2008). p. 241.

grandson's position as king of Macedon was secure.<sup>865</sup> Whatever her reasons, Olympias decided that the autumn of 317 was the time to mark her return to Macedon. Following the defeats at the Siege of Megalopolis, the naval battles off Byzantium and the constriction of his area of influence after Cassander's raid in the summer, this new region from which Polyperchon could draw upon for both men and resources would have been welcome support for the regent's efforts. Not only would he be able to legitimise his position as the regent of Macedon with further Argead support, but he would also be able to forge an alliance with the King of Epirus, Aecides.<sup>866</sup>

However, while Polyperchon was away from Pella, building his partnership with a faction of the royal family in Olympias, he was simultaneously losing the association with Philip III and Eurydice. During the previous year, Eurydice appears to have taken a more active role within the Macedonian Court,<sup>867</sup> going so far as to take over the administration of the regency during Polyperchon's time in Asia.<sup>868</sup> She had become increasingly hostile toward Polyperchon as the regent of Macedon. In addition to this hostility, Olympias' return to Macedon was in the interests of neither Eurydice nor Philip III, as tensions between the dual kings would certainly become exacerbated. The authority of both Olympias and Eurydice lay with the king with whom they were most clearly connected, Olympias to her grandson Alexander IV, and Eurydice to her husband Philip III,

---

<sup>865</sup> By 317, Olympias was advancing in age, being into her fifties by the time of her acceptance of Polyperchon's offer of alliance (Carney, 2006. p. 71).

<sup>866</sup> Diod. 19.11.2; Just. 14.5.9; Aeacides' support could have been further initiated by the offer of marriage between Alexander IV and Deidameia, Aeacides' daughter (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 4.2; Carney, 2006. pp. 169-70. n. 34; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 12.)

<sup>867</sup> Diod. 19.11.1. Eurydice certainly was no stranger to public involvement within Macedonian politics; she had been an active participant during the Partition of Triparadeisus in 321 (Diod. 18.39.1-4; Arr. *Succ. FGrH.* 156. F 9.30-33). Carney, 2000. p. 133; Heckel, 2006. p. 4. s.v *Adea.*; Carney, *Syll. Clas.* 25. (2014). p. 11, 12.

<sup>868</sup> Diod. 19.11.1 "...κατὰ γὰρ τὴν Μακεδονίαν Εὐρυδίκη, τῆς βασιλείας προεστηκυῖα..."; Just. 14.5.3; For discussion of Eurydice's *coup d' état*, see: Carney, in Worthington, 1994. p. 367, 2000. pp. 135-136; Carney, 2006. pp. 73-74; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 198.

with both women striving to elevate their respective king within the Macedonian court at the expense of the other.<sup>869</sup>

Since the initiation of his regency, Polyperchon had made extensive efforts to lure Olympias back to Macedon, meaning that Eurydice must have had some advance warning of the possibility of a return to Macedon by Olympias and would have been aware of the threat that this posed to the lives of both herself and Philip. In turn, Olympias would have been aware of the threat posed by Eurydice to the welfare of Alexander IV,<sup>870</sup> as he matured within the court and would take on more official responsibilities as expected of the young king. This must have concerned Olympias in Molossia, giving her impetus to return to Macedon once she could be certain of Polyperchon's intentions.<sup>871</sup> Macedonian succession was rarely a bloodless affair, and while the paranoia among the members of the Macedonian royal family resulting from attacks and assassinations from within the family itself may have led to Olympias' return as well as Eurydice's subsequent actions, it was Polyperchon's desire to maintain Argead support for his regency from all sections of the family that drove a further wedge between Olympias and Eurydice.

On face value, losing the trust of Eurydice and Philip III was a mistake by Polyperchon, a mistake that would cost him the regency of Macedon and ultimately, drive him from the country. While this can, and has, been seen as a foolish blunder on the part of Polyperchon which would cost him swathes of support in the Macedonian Homeland,<sup>872</sup> in 317, there may have been some immediately pressing practical reasons that forced Polyperchon's hand in retrieving the mother of Alexander III and the forces she could draw upon back to Macedon. Since 319 and the outbreak of hostilities against Cassander, Polyperchon's main supply of men for the war effort came from the Royal

---

<sup>869</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 137, highlights that both Eurydice and Olympias were engaged in the same jostling for supremacy that typified Argead royal succession.

<sup>870</sup> Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 12.

<sup>871</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 120; Carney, 2006. p. 68; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 12.

<sup>872</sup> Adams, 1975. pp. 91-92; Heckel, 1992. p. 199; Carney, 2000. p. 135; Heckel, 2006. p. 229; Anson, 2014. p. 91; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25 (2014). p. 12.

Macedonian Army, a body he had employed extensively throughout the conflict. While Cassander could draw on various pools of resources militarily, both from his alliances with other members of the Diadochoi and from the Greek garrisons, Polyperchon was more limited than the son of Antipater with fewer avenues for practical, military support than his adversary. Eumenes was an important alliance for Polyperchon to maintain, however the possibility of Eumenes being able to depart Asia Minor and come to his aid while simultaneously facing Antigonus was non-existent.<sup>873</sup> While the support of Philip III and Eurydice was pivotal to Polyperchon's endeavours, this did not afford the regent more resources in 317 than were already at his disposal in 319. With Cassander's strength ever on the increase, Polyperchon needed to find new groups from which he could draw fresh levies. Olympias and her membership in the royal family of Epirus provided such an avenue. Given the rough estimates of Polyperchon's age,<sup>874</sup> he had lived through several phases of Macedonian royal succession.<sup>875</sup> The tumultuous and violent nature of the dynamic within the Argead dynasty must have been familiar to the regent of Macedon. Polyperchon's alignment with Olympias in 317 would result in the loss of the support of Eurydice and Philip III, but it would provide him the practical support to continue the war against Cassander, a war that he was currently losing. Regardless of Polyperchon's reasons for securing Olympias' return to Macedon, it did cost him his standing with Eurydice and Philip III. While Polyperchon was away in Epirus in the autumn of 317, Eurydice stripped him of the regency of Macedon.<sup>876</sup>

---

<sup>873</sup> When Polyperchon had initially made contact with Eumenes offering him either support or asylum following the siege of Nora, Eumenes made it clear that his priorities lay in maintaining his presence in Asia Minor and not in Europe (Diod. 18.53.6; Billows, 1990. pp. 83-84; Heckel, 1992. p. 195; Anson, 2004. p. 137 Heckel, 2006. p. 227; cf. Ch. 6.2. pp. 168-169).

<sup>874</sup> Between born at some point between 390 and 380 (Heckel, 2006. p. 226.)

<sup>875</sup> From the reign of Amyntas III, which ended in 370/369 (March, *Historia*. 44. (1995). p. 280).

<sup>876</sup> Just. 14.5.3; Adams, 1975. p. 89; Carney, 2000. pp. 135-136; Carney, 2006. p. 73; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. pp. 198-199. Whether or not Eurydice had the authority to make such a decision is unclear, Diodorus asserts that she assumed the regency "...τῆς βασιλείας προεστηκυῖα..." (Diod. 19.11.1). However as Carney notes the abstract manner in which Macedonians engaged with the concept of monarchy (Carney, *CJ*. 90. (1995). p. 378.) may have allowed Eurydice



Orosius' account suggests that Cassander and Eurydice had become romantically involved.<sup>877</sup> However it is far more likely that the alliance was born out of practical necessity rather amorous endeavours.<sup>878</sup> Polyperchon had, in effect, cast his lot in with Olympias once he either had lost, or dissolved, the alliance with Eurydice and Philip. This could mean that the loss of the regency of Macedon may not have come as a great surprise to him. If Eurydice had indeed seized the power in Macedon away from Polyperchon as both Diodorus and Justin assert, it makes the damning statement that she had either lost all confidence in Polyperchon's ability to administer the Macedonian homeland, or that the connections that Polyperchon was forging with Olympias posed too great a threat to the position which she and Philip III held within the court in Macedon. If either of these were the case, then the next step would have been for Eurydice to strip Polyperchon of the office of regent of Macedon and this is just what she did. In turn, faced by the prospect of losing the support of Eurydice in exchange the support of Olympias, Polyperchon must have expected as a result, to maintain the position he had had since 319 and be reaffirmed in his position as regent by the mother of Alexander III.

The issue facing Eurydice, now that the decision to remove Polyperchon as regent had been taken, was who would replace him. If there was any deliberation on the issue, it was not for long, as within the communication to Polyperchon from the queen that informed him of his removal, Eurydice also informed him to deliver up his forces to Cassander, who would assume the now vacant role.<sup>879</sup> As Polyperchon's chief adversary in Europe, a man whose family had a long-standing animosity with the returning Olympias, Cassander was the obvious choice for Eurydice's new regent. The offer made to Cassander marked the first point, since the initiation of hostilities against Polyperchon in 319

---

to cement her edict on more pragmatic ground. Also note p. 381, "*In practice, royal women functioned as the reserve troops of the dynasty, ready to be called into active service when no male adult Argeads were available.*"

<sup>877</sup> Oros. 3.23.29

<sup>878</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 136; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 198.

<sup>879</sup> Just. 14.5.3.

where Cassander participated in an agreement with a member of the royal Argead family. Cassander's reaction to the offer is not recorded, but it requires little to no leap of faith to accept that Cassander did indeed agree to take the position he had been vying for over the course of two years and accepted the appointment. The alliance with Eurydice and Philip III would have appealed to Cassander on a number of levels. Not only would it afford him the support of one of the Argead factions positioned against Polyperchon and Olympias as Eurydice became a more active participant within Macedonian politics, but it would also lend Cassander a level of legitimation in his struggle against Polyperchon for command of Macedon and Greece.

Cassander's appointment was not a mere swap of one powerful general for another. In addition to the office of regent, Eurydice begged Cassander to end his campaigning efforts in southern Greece and march north immediately to protect her against the retaliation that she and Philip III would face from the returning Polyperchon and Olympias.<sup>880</sup> Unfortunately for Eurydice and Philip III, and despite the request for aid, Cassander remained immovable in the Peloponnese, prioritising his efforts against Tegea over the welfare of the royal couple.<sup>881</sup> Cassander's lack of response to Eurydice's requests offers some intriguing insight into how he may have viewed the new alliance. Until the autumn of 317, Cassander had shown little or no interest in entering into any alliance with any member of the royal family in his struggle against Polyperchon. It may be possible that Cassander and Eurydice came into contact during Cassander's time in Macedon in the summer of 317, however the scant information existing for

---

<sup>880</sup> Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.4.

<sup>881</sup> The delay in Cassander's action is determined by the speed at which he could have returned to Macedon if he had indeed chosen to do so. Following Olympias' return, and her subsequent actions, Cassander was able to end the siege of Tegea via diplomatic means and move north with great speed (Diod. 19.35.1). Bosworth has identified that Cassander's response to events in Macedon during the winter of 317/16 was swift, taking place over the space of, at most, a matter of weeks (Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 62. *contra*. Errington, *Hermes*. 105. (1977). p. 495. cf. Dušančić, *BCH*. 89. (1965). p. 134.). If, in the autumn of 317 when Cassander received word of his new appointment, he had wished to travel to the aid of Eurydice and Philip III, it was well within his capacity to arrive in Pella in advance of the winter of 317/16. For more discussion of Olympias' return and events thereafter, see below.

this period of time does not provide definitive information to confirm or deny the possibility of this. If they did indeed meet during Cassander's brief foray into Macedon, it appears that either no binding understanding was reached between the two or that, if promises were made, Cassander had little interest in fulfilling them.<sup>882</sup>

Carney has rightly identified that the safety of Eurydice and Philip III was of little concern to Cassander, despite the certain peril they faced from the returning Olympias.<sup>883</sup> Similar to Polyperchon throughout his career as regent, Cassander was, in 317, willing to engage with the royals as long as it served his purpose. However, where Cassander differed from Polyperchon was that if the plans of his royal allies were not in sympathy with his own, he would maintain a focus upon his own actions rather than overextend his forces. Rather than being bound by royal authority, Cassander would instead exploit his Argead alliances.

Soon after Eurydice's decision to strip Polyperchon of the regency of Macedon, and the subsequent offer to Cassander was made, Olympias departed from Molossia for Macedon accompanied by Aecides and Polyperchon.<sup>884</sup> In order to halt Olympias' advance east, and in an attempt to protect her own position, as well as that of her husband, Eurydice led an army to the border of Macedon and Epirus at Euia.<sup>885</sup> Duris, via Athenaeus, states that the ensuing combat between Olympias and Eurydice was the first battle led on both sides by women,<sup>886</sup> however, whether a battle took place or not is unclear.<sup>887</sup> What is more certain is that soon after the two armies met, Eurydice's forces began to desert her in favour of the returning Olympias.<sup>888</sup> The reason for the shift in allegiance by the Macedonian forces as recorded by both Diodorus and Justin was due to

---

<sup>882</sup> cf. Carney, 2000. pp. 135-136.

<sup>883</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 135; Carney, 2006. p. 73; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 12.

<sup>884</sup> Diod. 19.11.2; Just. 14.5.9; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 203.

<sup>885</sup> Ath. 560. F; Carney, 2000. p. 121; Carney, 2006. p. 74.

<sup>886</sup> Ath. 560. F: "... Δοῦρις δ' ὁ Σάμιος καὶ πρῶτον γενέσθαι πόλεμόν φησι δύο γυναικῶν τὸν Ὀλυμπιάδος καὶ Εὐρυδίκης."

<sup>887</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 122; cf. Diod. 19.11.2; Just. 14.5.9-10.

<sup>888</sup> Diod. 19.11.2-3; Just. 14.5.10; Carney, 2000. p. 122; Carney, 2006. p. 74; Heckel, 2006. p. 4, 52, 183.

Olympias' connections to Alexander III.<sup>889</sup> As a result of the mass defections to her cause, the royal mother was able to take both Eurydice and Philip III into her custody,<sup>890</sup> paving the way for her continued journey onto Macedon.

The aura surrounding Olympias must have been a powerful factor within Polyperchon's considerable efforts to gain the support of Alexander's mother. Her support was especially important considering the circumstances that had occurred over the previous year, where Polyperchon's support base within Macedon had begun to disintegrate while Cassander's was increasing. The traction that Olympias' return could gain in reaffirming the support of his followers within the Macedonian homeland was key to his efforts. However, this desire to maintain the support of Olympias would come at a cost and the events after Olympias' return to Pella may be indicative of the relationship between the royal mother and Polyperchon.

Once Philip III and Eurydice were under Olympias' control, she had little interest keeping the pair alive. Therefore, soon after their capture, Olympias put Philip III Arrhidaeus and Adeia-Eurydice, a king and queen of Macedon, to death.<sup>891</sup> Whether this was done because of the threat a living Eurydice and Philip would present to both her own position<sup>892</sup> and that of her grandson,

---

<sup>889</sup> Diod. 19.11.2-3: "...οἱ Μακεδόνες ἐωτραπέωτες τὸ τῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ἀξίωμα καὶ τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου μετεβάλοντο."; Just. 14.5.10: "...seu memoria mariti seu magnitudine filii et indignitate rei moti Macedones ad Olympiada transiere...". Adams (*Makedonia*. 3. (1977). p. 21; *AncW*. 10. (1984), p. 86.) suggests that another possible reason for the mass defection to Olympias' cause lies in Philip III's inability to command an army in the field. In opposition to this position however, Carney (2006. p. 171. n. 54.) highlights that if this were so, their original commitment to following Eurydice and Philip III and their journey to Euia explicitly to face Olympias is perplexing.

<sup>890</sup> Diod. 19.11.3; Carney, 2006. pp. 74-75.

<sup>891</sup> Diod. 19.11.4-7; Just. 14.5.10; Adams, *Makedonia*. 3. (1977). p. 21; Bosworth (*Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 71) states the acts of regicide took place during October of 317 (cf. Boiy, 2007. p. 58, 149); Carney, 2000. p. 140; Carney, 2006. p. 75; Heckel, 2006. p. 4, 52-3, 183; Caroli, 2007. p. 49; Adams, in Roisman and Worthington, 2010, p. 214.

<sup>892</sup> Certainly the manner in which Philip III and Eurydice were treated during their final days, as recorded by Diodorus, did result in sympathy for them and

Alexander IV, part of the Argead's bloody history of succession and domination in the court of Macedon, or simply the act of a conqueror is not certain, and has been the focus of significant evaluation by modern scholars.<sup>893</sup> What is more sure is that the royal pair were not the only ones to die at the hands of Olympias during the closing stages of 317.

Diodorus provides the most thorough account of what took place next.<sup>894</sup> Immediately following the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice, Olympias embarked upon a series of executions in Macedon, executions clearly directed against Cassander and perpetuating the enmity between Olympias and the Antipatrids that had been raging for at least the last fourteen years.<sup>895</sup> First Olympias had Nicanor, Cassander's brother put to death.<sup>896</sup> She also ordered the desecration of the tomb of Iolaus, another of Cassander's brothers.<sup>897</sup> Next came the deaths of a significant number of the Macedonian aristocracy, those whom Olympias deemed to be either friends of Cassander or sympathetic to his cause.<sup>898</sup> Olympias explained these actions as being part of a response to Cassander's supposed involvement in the death of Alexander III back in 323.<sup>899</sup> These actions were perceived as illegal transgressions by ancient writers,<sup>900</sup> and as being excessively violent by some sections of modern scholarship.<sup>901</sup> However, as Carney astutely observes, Olympias' actions were not atypical for this

---

dissatisfaction with Olympias from sections of the Macedonian aristocracy (Diod. 19.11.5.).

<sup>893</sup> See below.

<sup>894</sup> Diod. 19.11.8-9. cf. Just. 14.6.1.

<sup>895</sup> Contrast with Just. 14.5.10, who suggests that the killings were more wholesale "*nam cum principum passim caedes muliebri magis quam regionis more fecisset...*"

<sup>896</sup> Diod. 19.11.8; Adams, *Makedonia* 3. (1977), p. 21; Carney, 2006. p. 75; Heckel, 2006. p. 80, 177, cf. p. 183; Adams, in Roisman and Worthington, 2010, p. 214.

<sup>897</sup> Diod. 19.11.8; presumably this is the cupbearer referred to by Justin (12.14.9); Heckel, 2006. p. 143.

<sup>898</sup> Diod. 19.11.8: states that the numbers of those killed was one hundred. cf. Just. 14.5.10; Heckel, 2006. p. 183.

<sup>899</sup> Diod. 19.11.8.

<sup>900</sup> Diod. 19.11.8; Just. 14.6.1. For Olympias' general reception by the ancient sources, see: Carney, 2006. pp. 125-137.

<sup>901</sup> See for example, Adams, *Makedonia*. 3. (1977). p. 21; Heckel, 1992. p. 199; Errington, 2008. p. 27; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 214; cf. Carney, 2006. p. 79.

tumultuous period in time,<sup>902</sup> and atrocious acts conducted by male protagonists are recorded with little criticism from ancient scholars.<sup>903</sup> As conquering forces secure a region, political murders and a change in the administrative dynamic were sure to follow.<sup>904</sup> Whether the actions of Olympias fell within the normal course of events and have been judged more harshly because of her sex is for others to debate. Of key significance to this investigation is the part that Polyperchon may have played in these events.

As almost to be expected, Polyperchon is not referred to in the recording of these events, other than that he had accompanied the mother of Alexander the Great back from Epirus.<sup>905</sup> Are we to expect that Polyperchon remained impotent against Olympias' desire for revenge against her enemies in order to satiate her bloodlust as this is represented in the ancient sources? The omission of Polyperchon in the source tradition is not new.<sup>906</sup> Hindsight suggests that it would have been wise for Polyperchon to attempt to restrict the numbers of those killed as well as the manner in which Philip III and Eurydice were treated.<sup>907</sup> This would in turn minimize the growing animosity against the conquering forces of Olympias and himself within the influential sections of Macedonian society. However, it must be highlighted that silence from the sources does not equate to Polyperchon's inaction nor in his possible participation in the political killings and these factors should not be dismissed out of hand. It must be remembered that those killed were connected to Cassander, either biologically or as being politically sympathetic to his cause, and were a faction that could ferment unrest within Macedon, should Cassander attempt another venture into Macedonian territory. If Polyperchon was an active participant in the executions, the analytical eye of hindsight could

---

<sup>902</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 76.

<sup>903</sup> See for example: Arr. *Succ. FGrH*. 156. F. 9.30); Curt. 10.9.11-18; Diod. 18.37.2, 19.44.1, 19.63.2, 22.12; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.6-7.

<sup>904</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 76.

<sup>905</sup> Diod. 19.11.2

<sup>906</sup> For example, in this particular case Justin (14.5.3.) only refers to Polyperchon's notification from Eurydice to hand over the royal army to Cassander and omits him from the entire account of Olympias' return.

<sup>907</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 199; cf. Diod. 19.11.4-7.

interpret these deaths as justifiable acts, conducted by Olympias and Polyperchon against their most substantial opponent in Europe, Cassander. It must not be forgotten that it was Polyperchon who orchestrated the alliance with Olympias and while Olympias was in no doubt returning to Macedon with the primary desire to oversee the welfare of Alexander IV, she was only able to return to Macedon because Polyperchon had made the initial overtures to her. This suggests that the alliance between them was close and that he was therefore connected, at least *de facto*, in her actions.

Alternatively, Polyperchon may have, in order to maintain Olympias' support in a pseudo-Faustian manner, allowed her to act in the very manner so much resented in the narratives of both Diodorus and Justin. Polyperchon's journey to Epirus indicates that his support base from within Macedon was insufficient to continue the war against Cassander and his allies. It also suggests that his departure from Eurydice and Philip III was political, rather than purely geographical and that he had now aligned himself with the Olympias led Argead faction. Again, shifting allegiances in a short period of time is by no means a new concept to historical examination of the Early Hellenistic World.<sup>908</sup> An issue with this interpretation however is that if, in 317, Polyperchon had secured Olympias' support in order to expand his support base within Macedon itself, knowingly allowing Olympias to act in a manner that would strengthen hostility to his cause is perplexing. Unfortunately, it is impossible to state with any certainty what role Polyperchon had in Olympias' actions once she returned to Macedon. However if Olympias' motivation for the spate of killings that took place in the autumn of 317 was politically based, it is likely that Polyperchon would have played some part in their facilitation.

Carney is most likely correct in her analysis of Olympias' actions as being in step with other atrocities that took place during the breakdown of Alexander's great empire as well as that Olympias has faced a hostile reception from the ancient

---

<sup>908</sup> Indeed, the following year would see a massive restructure in Polyperchon's alliances in the struggle against Cassander and the alliance with Antigonos. See below.

literary sources that has transitioned into more modern academic thought. It is neither the focus nor intention of this study to defend or condemn Olympias' actions in the autumn of 317. What is key is that her attacks against Cassander's friends and family show that the hostility between Olympias and the Antipatrids was still present. Even if the spate of executions ordered by Olympias, alongside Polyperchon, were part of solidification of their control in Macedon, conducted against the sympathisers of their main rival within the country, these were actions that Cassander could not, and would not, let go unanswered. Due to the long running hatred that existed between the mother of Alexander and the Antipatrid house, it would have been expected that Cassander take the attacks personally. As soon as word reached him of the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice, and more importantly the death of Nicanor, the destruction of the tomb of Iolaus and the deaths of many friends, Cassander's priorities immediately shifted from the Peloponnese to Pella.

Cassander was enraged by the actions of Olympias,<sup>909</sup> and his rapid response once word reached him in the Peloponnese shows not only that he had the ability to move north with speed when pressed, meaning that he could have come to the aid of Eurydice and Philip III if he so desired, it also lends weight to his return to Macedon in the winter of 317/16 being based upon the attacks conducted against his family and friends, rather than out of a desire to avenge the deaths of Eurydice and Philip III as may have been expected given his recent appointment to the regency of Macedon. However, his newly found position as regent of Macedon now gave Cassander the perfect excuse to launch an invasion into Macedon against those who had attacked the royal family. He would be able to legitimise his actions by asserting they were in reaction to the deaths of Eurydice and Philip III, this despite not demonstrating any prior interest in their welfare. This would mean Cassander could act with theoretically greater authority as regent of Macedon, but without having to contend with the politically active members of the royal family to whom he was already hostile.<sup>910</sup> While Cassander had spent a significant amount of time and effort attempting to

---

<sup>909</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 79

<sup>910</sup> e.g. Alexander IV, who by 317 was less than six years of age.



subdue the city of Tegea via military endeavours,<sup>911</sup> once he received word of the attacks against his family, he understood the need to retaliate as soon as possible. Because of this, Cassander ended the siege by diplomatic methods<sup>912</sup> and began hasty preparations to travel north.

The time between learning of the return of Olympias and Cassander's departure for the north was short. Following hastily made preparations to muster an army and secure a fleet to transport it,<sup>913</sup> after a period of no more than a month, Cassander was on the move north.<sup>914</sup> Following some brief engagements, Diodorus states that most of Polyperchon's forces were lost to Cassander's general Callas at Perrhaebia in Thessaly.<sup>915</sup> Despite losing much of his strength, Polyperchon does appear to have still had a number of loyal supporters by his side, and withdrew to the city of Azorius in order to hold out against the army led by Callas.<sup>916</sup> With his rival occupied for the moment, Cassander was able to

---

<sup>911</sup> If as Bosworth suggests Eurydice and Philip III were killed during October of 317 (*Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 71), news of Eurydice's decision to strip Polyperchon of the regency and offer it to Cassander must predate this, at the very latest in September. Thus Cassander's return to Macedon is placed in the winter of 317/16 (Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 72; Boiy, 2007. p. 141, 149). This would give Cassander as much as a month where he continued the siege of Tegea, before initiating his plans to march north. See: Bosworth, *Chiron* 22. 1992. p. 72. n. 85. for discussion of Cassander's departure point for his invasion.

<sup>912</sup> Diod. 19.35.1: no record of the terms reached with Tegea is recorded, however it appears the departure was abrupt as Cassander left his allied forces in the region to face Polyperchon's son Alexander "...καταλιπὼν τοὺς συμμάχους ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ." (Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992) p. 62. n. 30)

<sup>913</sup> Diod. 19.35.2. states that the Aetolians had sided with Polyperchon and Olympias and had blocked the pass of Thermopylae and instead of attempting to force the pass, adding further delay to the progression of his movement north, Cassander chose instead to bypass the area entirely.

<sup>914</sup> Bosworth, *Chiron*. 22. (1992). p. 62. n. 30.

<sup>915</sup> Diod. 19.36.6; Carney, 2006. p. 80; cf. Diod. 19.35.3; Diodorus claims that Callas was able to win over Polyperchon's men with bribery "...διέφθειρε τῶν μετ' αὐτοῦ στρατιωτῶν τοὺς πλείστους χρήμασιν..." (19.36.6).

<sup>916</sup> cf. Diod. 19.52.5-6. Polyperchon re-enters Diodorus' narrative here after the Cassander's execution of Olympias (Diod. 19.51.5-6; Just. 14.6.6-12) which is dated to the spring of 316 (Boiy, 2007. p. 142, 149). Presumably his absence from Diodorus' account is explained by little change occurring during the siege, as well as the more pressing events concerning Cassander's engagement with Olympias that culminated with the siege of Pydna and Olympias' death. If

focus upon Olympias and the man she had designated to lead the fight against him, Aristonous.<sup>917</sup> Olympias herself thought it prudent to depart for the city of Pydna, there to await the outcome of the confrontation. With her, she took the now sole king of Macedon, Alexander IV, his mother Rhoxane and his bride to be, Deidameia.<sup>918</sup> Significant for future events and Cassander's consolidation of power in Macedon, Olympias also brought Thessalonice, the daughter of Philip II to Pydna to await resolution of the conflict.<sup>919</sup>

It appears that Olympias did not intend for Pydna to serve a significant military role in the conflict against Cassander.<sup>920</sup> We are once again reliant on Diodorus who offers the most extensive account regarding the inhabitants of Pydna and the events covering the winter 317/16 and the spring of 316, the time in which the siege of Pydna occurred.<sup>921</sup> The historian asserts that the occupants of the city were not fit for war,<sup>922</sup> and a distinct lack of supplies required for a long siege existed.<sup>923</sup> This would suggest that Olympias and her allies had intended to engage with Cassander in the field far from Pydna rather than via protracted sieges. However Polyperchon had been isolated in Azorius and despite some early success,<sup>924</sup> Aristonius had been pushed back to Amphipolis.<sup>925</sup> Additionally, the army led by Aeacides was driven back to the border of Epirus and Macedon by Cassander's general Atarrhias following an attempt to relieve Pydna.<sup>926</sup> There was now little hope of another attempt to relieve Pydna and despite a lack of adequate provisions, the city was forced to settle into a protracted siege in the winter of 317/16.

---

Diodorus' sequence can be trusted, Polyperchon was then able to defend his position within the city for several months.

<sup>917</sup> Diod. 19.35.3-5. For Aristonous, see: Heckel, 2006. p. 50.

<sup>918</sup> Diod. 19.35.5. Carney, 2006. p. 80; Heckel, 2006. p. 183.

<sup>919</sup> Diod. 19.35.5; Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley & Hannah, 2009. pp. 261-262.

<sup>920</sup> cf. Carney, 2006. p. 80; Caroli, 2007. p. 49.

<sup>921</sup> Diod. 19.35.6-7, 19.49-50. cf. Just. 14.6.2, 14.6.4-6; Poly. *Strat.* 4.11.3.

<sup>922</sup> Diod. 19.35.5: "... ἀρχαίων δ' εἰς πόλεμον τῶν πλείστων."

<sup>923</sup> Diod. 19.35.5-6: "...οὐδε γὰρ τροφῆς ἱκανὸν ἦν πλῆθος τοῖς μέλλουσι πολιορκίαν ὑπομένειν πολυχρόνιον."

<sup>924</sup> Diod. 19.50.7; Heckel, 2006. p. 50.

<sup>925</sup> Diod. 19.50.3.

<sup>926</sup> Diod. 19.35.4-5; Heckel, 2006. p. 5.

The situation within the city soon became dire, as the lack of supplies resulted in starvation and death becoming rampant among the inhabitants of the city as the winter of 317/16 progressed.<sup>927</sup> By spring, Olympias' position had now become untenable, and following a vain attempting to escape the city,<sup>928</sup> as well as the dismissal of a sizable segment of the small garrison that had survived the winter, Olympias was forced to seek terms with Cassander that would end the siege.<sup>929</sup> Cassander was clearly in a position of power. The isolation of Pydna from relief forces and the desperate position Olympias was now in meant that he did not need to compromise with her to any real extent. The only term Olympias was able to negotiate was her personal safety.<sup>930</sup> With this granted, Cassander secured Pydna and the royal family.<sup>931</sup> This in turn led to the acquisition of both the capital Pella, which surrendered once news of Olympias' defeat reached the city,<sup>932</sup> and Amphipolis, whose commander Aristonus was continuing to hold out against Cassandrian forces in the hope that a relief force may come to his aid.<sup>933</sup> Cassander now had possession of Macedon, but more importantly, the victory at Pydna put the king Alexander IV, Roxane, Thessalonice and Olympias under his direct control. He could now begin to use the royal family for his own interests. Soon after taking her prisoner he forced Olympias to write to Aristonus in order to secure Amphipolis, thereby removing the largest pocket of resistance within Macedon itself.<sup>934</sup> Once Aristonus surrendered, Cassander had him murdered to avoid any possibility of insurrection.<sup>935</sup>

Additionally, Eurydice's decision to appoint him to the office in the autumn on 317, meant that Cassander, as both the regent of Macedon and the most powerful man in the region, could act on behalf of the royal family and try

---

<sup>927</sup> Diod. 19.49; Just. 14.6.5.

<sup>928</sup> Diod. 19.50.4.

<sup>929</sup> Diod. 19.50.1-6; Just. 14.6.5; Carney, 2006. p. 82; Heckel, 2006. p. 183.

<sup>930</sup> Diod. 19.50.5-6.

<sup>931</sup> Diod. 19.50.5-6; Just. 14.6.5; Poly. *Strat.* 4.11.3

<sup>932</sup> Diod. 19.50.7.

<sup>933</sup> Diod. 19.50.7-8.

<sup>934</sup> Diod. 19.50.8.

<sup>935</sup> Diod. 19.51.1.

Olympias with impunity.<sup>936</sup> While Cassander's regency had occupied tentative legal status, there was no one within Macedon who could challenge his position, nor stop him from acting within this capacity. Just as with Olympias' return to Macedon the previous year and the deaths of Philip III and Eurydice, keeping Olympias alive, now that he had secured Amphipolis, was not of interest to Cassander. In turn, it is likely that Olympias was well aware that she would not survive long in Cassander's custody.<sup>937</sup> The removal of Nicanor and more recently Aristonus clearly demonstrates that Cassander was no stranger to quiet execution of his potential political rivals. Cassander could easily have simply ordered Olympias' death directly, however he chose instead to simultaneously increase his standing among the Macedonian elites as well as to remove Olympias as a threat. This was achieved by putting Olympias on trial for her actions against the Macedonian aristocracy the previous year.<sup>938</sup> Olympias' attacks against those she deemed sympathetic to Cassander's position, combined with her maltreatment of Philip III and Eurydice, had fermented dissatisfaction at best,<sup>939</sup> and hatred at worst<sup>940</sup> within Macedon. By handing the fate of Olympias over to the families of those affected by her actions in the autumn of 317, rather than summarily executing her once she was captured, Cassander exploited anti-Olympian sentiments within Macedon. At the same time he indicated to the elites that he would act in their interests, further building his support base in the Macedonian homeland.

The trial itself was little more than a formality. Olympias was not allowed to attend, nor have representation during its course.<sup>941</sup> She was soon condemned.<sup>942</sup> There is a discrepancy in the ancient sources as to how exactly how Olympias met her fate. Both Diodorus and Justin offer embellished accounts

---

<sup>936</sup> Anson, *CPh*. 108. (2008). p. 136, 140.

<sup>937</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 82; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25 (2014). pp. 12-13.

<sup>938</sup> Diod. 19.51.1-2; Just. 14.6.6.

<sup>939</sup> Diod. 19.11.3-9, 19.35.1; Just. 14.5.10.

<sup>940</sup> Diod. 19.11.8-9; Just. 14.6.7-8.

<sup>941</sup> Diod. 19.51.1-2; also implied by Justin (14.6.6); Carney, 2006. p. 83, pp. 174-5 for some discussion of Olympias' legal right to representation during her trial (cf. Adams, *Makedonia*. 3. (1977). p. 22. n. 23; Hatzopoulos, 1996. pp. 273-276; Anson, *CPh*. 103. (2008). pp. 139-140.).

<sup>942</sup> Diod. 17.118.2, 19.51.1; Just. 14.6.7; Porphyry, *FGrH*. 260. F. 3.3.

that appear to employ Homeric literary tropes.<sup>943</sup> What is certain however is that Olympias was, with the support of the Macedonian aristocracy, murdered under Cassander's jurisdiction soon after her show trial in the spring of 316,<sup>944</sup> thus bringing an end to the animosity between her and the Antipatrid families that had dogged them both since at least 334.

The murder of Olympias and the capture of Alexander IV also had a massive impact upon Polyperchon's position. Gone were the royals upon whom he relied to support his cause and who had been key to his support base during the struggle against Cassander. While still entrenched in Azorus at the time of Olympias' death, when news arrived at the city, Polyperchon broke out of the city and fled south to Aetolia, which had pledged support to Olympias and himself the previous year.<sup>945</sup> After arriving in Aetolia, Polyperchon would continue south to his stronghold in the Peloponnese, held by his son Alexander.<sup>946</sup> From here, Polyperchon would set about rebuilding his position in southern Greece.

### **7.3: Cassander's Assumption of Power**

Following the death of Olympias Cassander embarked on a program that, over the course of 316 and 315, would aid in cementing his control in Macedon. It must be noted that the following series are recorded by Diodorus<sup>947</sup> and Justin<sup>948</sup> in highly compressed fashions, meaning that defining an exact sequence of events, and the amount of time that each event required, is highly problematic. While the death of Olympias can be seen as the first phase within

---

<sup>943</sup> Diod. 19.51.2-5; Just. 14.6.7-12; cf. Carney, 2006. pp. 80-81.

<sup>944</sup> Carney, 2006. p. xii, 83-84; Boiy. 2007. p. 149; cf. Anson (*CPh.* 103. (2008). p. 139) who favours the Low Chronological dating of 315.

<sup>945</sup> Diod. 19.52.5-6. cf. 19.35.1-2, where the Aetolians held out against Cassander on his march north, blocking the pass at Thermopylae.

<sup>946</sup> Diod. 19.53. 1; cf. Diod. 19.57.5, which marks Polyperchon's next appearance in the source accounts. Note Justin's error in 15.1.1, where he once again confuses Polyperchon [sic] with Craterus (Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 218).

<sup>947</sup> Diod. 19.52.

<sup>948</sup> Just. 14.6.13.

this endeavor, Cassander continued to expand his hold on, and influence over, the royal family. In order to stop Alexander and his mother from participating in any part of public life, he removed the pair from the administrative capital of Pella to Amphipolis where they were kept confined by Cassander's men.<sup>949</sup> The imprisonment of Alexander and Rhoxane would eliminate the possibility of the boy king and his mother being used as a rallying point for Cassander's political rivals. For Thessalonice, the daughter of Philip II, Cassander had other plans; he made her his wife.<sup>950</sup> Thessalonice's feelings regarding the marriage with Cassander are unrecorded, and it is likely little concern was paid to them. What she represented to Cassander was a strong connection to Alexander the Great's father, a connection that he could exploit for further political traction within Macedon. Carney has noted that, just as with Alexander IV and Rhoxane, Thessalonice's life following Pydna was one of isolation from public life.<sup>951</sup>

In addition to the imprisonment of Alexander IV and the marriage to Thessalonice, Cassander continued his engagement with the royal family in his new office of regent. He arranged and oversaw the burials of the murdered Philip III and Eurydice at the traditional Argead burial ground in Aigai.<sup>952</sup> This was done with great fanfare, with fitting royal dignity and funeral games, honouring the pair killed by Olympias the previous year. Finally, Cassander embarked upon an ambitious building campaign in Macedon and Greece. Diodorus states that he ordered the reconstruction of at least three cities. He rebuilt the city of Thebes that had been destroyed by Alexander III in 335.<sup>953</sup> Additionally, Cassander also ordered that two new cities be built, named after himself and his wife, Cassandreia and Thessalonica.<sup>954</sup>

---

<sup>949</sup> Diod. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13, 15.1.3; Heckel, 2006. p. 19.

<sup>950</sup> Diod. 19.52.1, 19.61.2; Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3, 8.7.7; Porphyry, *FGrH*. 260. F. 3.4; Fortina, 1965. p. 40; Carney, 2000. p. 145; Heckel, 2006. p. 80, 265; Boiy. 2007. p. 142.

<sup>951</sup> Carney, 2000. p. 157.

<sup>952</sup> Diod. 19.52.5: "...ἐθαψεν ἐν Αἰγαιαῖς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι."; Palagia, in Howe & Reames, 2008. p. 206; Adams, in Roisman, J & Worthington, I, 2010. p. 214.

<sup>953</sup> Diod. 19.53.2; 19.61.1; cf. Diod. 17.12.

<sup>954</sup> Diod. 19.52.2; Heid. Epit. *FGrH* 156. F. 2; Livy. 44.11.2; *Marmor Parium* *FGrH* 239. B. 14; Strab. 7.21, 24; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 215.

All of these acts are without question linked to notions of Cassander's royal aspirations, with Diodorus stating outright that Cassander was in fact already acting as a king following his the victory at Pydna.<sup>955</sup> This sentiment has rightly permeated into modern scholarship.<sup>956</sup> Certainly all these actions are indeed linked to the Argead family and the Macedonian throne. But, while Cassander's future as the next king in Macedon following the murder of Alexander IV in 310/09 seems certain,<sup>957</sup> it does encourage an early reading into the security of his position in Macedon. Once again, neither Cassander's actions in regard to his royal aspirations, or the acts themselves are open to question. However, an area that does require further investigation is the space of time within which these monarchical acts took place.

Cassander's control following his hastily prepared invasion of Macedon in the winter of 317/16 has been understood as being total conquest of the region and the confirmation of his dominance within Macedon and Greece.<sup>958</sup> It must be noted though that the implementation of Cassander's control within the region should not so quickly be separated from his ongoing struggle with Polyperchon. Instead of viewing the two efforts as separate entities, a more thorough understanding of events within the Macedonian Empire is made possible by engaging with both Cassander's efforts to implement his control of Macedon and the ongoing effort against Polyperchon as intrinsically linked to each other. When this is done, Cassander's position as the dominant actor *par excellence* may be called into question. Rather than a conqueror installing his new junta in the Macedonian heartland, Cassander occupied a more tentative position. In contrast to the concise methodical effort supplied by the literary sources, Cassander embarked upon a far more drawn out, subtle approach to securing

---

<sup>955</sup> Diod. 19.52.1: "...Κάσανδρος δέ, κατὰ νοῦν αὐτῷ τῶν πραγμάτων προχωρούντων, περιελάμβανε ταῖς ἐλπίσι τὴν Μακεδόνων βασιλείαν."

<sup>956</sup> see for example: Carney, 2006. p. 83; Errington, 2008. p. 28; Palagia, in Howe & Reames, 2008. p. 206; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 215. Kosmin, 2014. p. 218

<sup>957</sup> See Ch. 8.3.

<sup>958</sup> Fortina, 1965. p. 43; Adams, 1975. p. 97; Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley & Hannah, 2009. p. 261; cf. Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25 (2014). p. 12.

Macedon over the space of at least eighteen months. Anxious of losing his new foothold in Macedon, that he was able to create for himself following Olympias' abrupt return to Macedon in the winter of 317/16, Cassander began a series of actions in response to immediate concerns in securing his position in Macedon.

The marriage between Cassander and Thessalonice had a number of benefits for the regent. Not only did it align himself to the royal family, but it also integrated himself within it.<sup>959</sup> This would afford him a greater degree of flexibility to act within his capacity as regent of Macedon. This strategy allowed Cassander to create symbolic links to the two great kings of Macedon, Philip II and to a lesser extent, Alexander III as well as to use the imagery and royal prestige of the Argead house to further his aim of controlling the Macedonian homeland.<sup>960</sup> The links were not just ceremonial, but also very practical. As both Carney and Landucci Gattinoni highlight, Cassander would now be able to tap into the pro-Argead sentiment among the disaffected Macedonian elites following Olympias' return the previous autumn.<sup>961</sup>

The burial of Philip III and Eurydice in the traditional Argead burial grounds at Aigai has also drawn the attention of both ancient and modern writers.<sup>962</sup> Along with the royal couple, Cassander also buried Cynna, the mother of Eurydice at much the same time. The burial of Macedonian royalty was a highly political issue.<sup>963</sup> The burial of Philip III and Eurydice at Aigai with fitting ceremonial practices conveyed great political prestige upon the person conducting the

---

<sup>959</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley & Hannah, 2009. p. 262. Landucci Gattinoni also highlights the practical benefits that marriage would have for Thessalonice, which may problematise the hostility that Carney (*Historia*. 37. (1988). p. 388. n. 7) suggests the daughter of Philip II had for her new husband.

<sup>960</sup> Stewart, 1993. p. 278; Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley, & Hannah, 2009. p. 262.

<sup>961</sup> Carney, 2006. p. 84; Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley & Hannah, 2009. p. 263.

<sup>962</sup> Diod. 19.52.5; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010, p. 214. Landucci Gattinoni, in Howe, Edward Garvin & Wrightson, 2015. p. 137.

<sup>963</sup> As can be seen in the treatment of Alexander the Great's body following his death in 323 by the Diadochoi as evident in Diodorus's narrative (Diod. 18.28-29).



ceremonies.<sup>964</sup> It was also a practice usually denoting the next successor to the Macedonian throne.<sup>965</sup> This placed Cassander as the dominant figure in Macedon, stamping his authority following the defeat of Olympias. Whether Cassander had any actual authority to conduct these ceremonies in his given capacity as the newly appointed regent of Macedon or not may have been of little concern to him. It would appear likely that Cassander did not conduct the burial of Philip III and Eurydice in his guise as regent or on behalf of Alexander IV as the boy-king and his mother Rhoxane appear to have been hurried north to Amphipolis soon after Cassander's victory at Pydna in the custody of one of his supporters, Glaucias.<sup>966</sup> This would then mean that apart from Thessalonice, there was no living Argead representation at Aigai other than the recently inducted Cassander.

Cassander also began a construction campaign centered on, but not limited to, northern Macedon and Chalcidice. If Diodorus' sequence is employed as a rough guide, shortly after his marriage to Thessalonice Cassander ordered the construction of a new city within southern Chalcidice, which was to bear his own name, the city of Cassandreia.<sup>967</sup> The city, located on the plain of Pallene was to syncretise with the city of Potidaea as well as surrounding villages, providing a home for, amongst others, the Olythians, whose city had been destroyed by Philip II.<sup>968</sup> Following this, Cassander also ordered the foundation of Thessalonica in honour of his new wife.<sup>969</sup> In addition to these two cities, he ordered the city of Thebes in central Greece to be rebuilt, having been destroyed by Alexander III in 336.<sup>970</sup> These three cities would form the core of Cassander's construction campaign covering the years of 316 and 315 respectively.

---

<sup>964</sup> cf. Diod. 18.28.4.

<sup>965</sup> Anson. 2014. p. 127

<sup>966</sup> Diod. 19.52.4; Just. 14.6.13; for Glaucias, see: Heckel, 2006. p. 126. s.v. *Glaucias* [2].

<sup>967</sup> Diod. 19.52.3; Marmor Parium. FGrH 239. B. 14; Livy. 44.11.1; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 96; Caroli, 2007. p. 49; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 214; Anson, 2014. p. 127

<sup>968</sup> Diod. 19.52.3. cf. Diod. 16.53; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 96.

<sup>969</sup> Heidl. Epit. *FGrH*. 155. F. 2.4; Strab. 7.2.1; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 98, 104; Anson, 2014. p. 127;

<sup>970</sup> Diod. 19.53.2; Anson, 2014. p. 127; cf. Diod. 17.12-13; Paus. 9.7.1-2.

An issue then presents itself as to the sequence and dating of Cassandreia, Thessalonica and Thebes. Frustratingly, the precise timing of each of these city's foundations is not known and difficult to state with any certainty beyond the period of time when Cassander concentrated upon cementing his position in Macedon. In regard to the construction of Cassandreia, the most likely possibility is that orders were given at some point during the year of 315.<sup>971</sup> Landucci Gattinoni has identified that the cause of this uncertainty, especially in regard to Thessalonica's construction, is the result of the lack of historical context within the ancient sources that further complicates the matter of defining an accurate sequence of construction.<sup>972</sup> If it were possible to define an exact sequence of events within Cassander's construction campaign, it may have been possible to gain greater insight into his approach and desire to build up his support base within northern Greece and central Greece. The reconstruction of Thebes may have begun following Cassander's return to the Peloponnese in the latter half of 316 as he journeyed through Boeotia at the time.<sup>973</sup> However, beyond the geographical locations and the confines of the roughly eighteen months between mid 316, following the death of Olympias and 315, it appears that further precision may not be possible due to a distinct lack of information with the surviving source accounts.

Within a Macedonian context, the construction of new cities bearing the name of those who ordered their foundation held distinctly royal attributes,<sup>974</sup> with the precedent set by both Philip II and Alexander III creating a pure Argead pedigree to the naming of cities after those who commissioned them. When Cassander's implementation of power within Macedon over the course of 316 and 315 is seen solely from the perspective provided by the ancient literary sources, a one-

---

<sup>971</sup> This is reinforced by the record found in the Marmor Parium (*FGrH*. 239. B. 14); cf. Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 214 implies, but does not specifically state that Cassandreia, along with Thessalonica were constructed by the end of 315 and before 314; cf. Anson, 2014. p. 127.

<sup>972</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 96; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 214 simply place the construction of Thessalonica "[a]t some point in his [Cassander's] reign." For more discussion, see Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. pp. 95-104.

<sup>973</sup> Diod. 19.54.1-2.

<sup>974</sup> Caroli, 2007. p. 49; Errington, 2008. p. 128; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 214; Anson, 2014. p. 127; Kosmin, 2014. p. 218.

sided view of focused intent on the throne of Macedon begins to emerge. Others, particularly Diodorus, represent him as a man already acting as a king in all but name. However, the way in which Cassander chose to represent himself may complicate matters to a greater degree. This is particularly so in regard to Cassander's issue of coinage from the mints under his control, as the coins appear to offer a different representation, one that contrasts dramatically with that of the literary sources.

Following Cassander's conquest of Macedon, in addition to taking control of the royal family, he also gained authority over the mints within Macedon at Pella, and Amphipolis,<sup>975</sup> and by extension, control over the iconography upon coins issued from those mints. If Cassander was already aiming for the throne as indicated by the explicit actions of marrying into the Argead family, the burial of Philip III and Eurydice as well as the foundation of not one, but two cities in Cassandreia and Thessalonice, the control of the mints would provide him a vehicle by which he could relay his image throughout Macedon. However, Cassander made no alteration to the coinage under his control until 305, when he, along with other members of the Diadochoi, began to assume the royal title.<sup>976</sup> Indeed, Cassander would continue to mint unaltered posthumous coinage of Philip II and Alexander the Great, the former of which he continued for the rest of his life.<sup>977</sup> The lack of alteration to Cassander controlled coinage during a time of explicitly royal acts appears to contradict the representations found within the accounts of Justin, and especially of Diodorus, and raises questions as to the exact intentions of the son of Antipater following his successful return to Macedon in the winter of 317/16. It would appear that Cassander did not represent himself as royalty during this time. Indeed

---

<sup>975</sup> Mørkholm, 1991. p. 42, 59, 79; Valassiades, *XIII Congress International de Numismatica*, 2003. p. 405. Mørkholm also raises the possibility of a third mint at Aigai (Mørkholm, 1991. p. 42.) that would have also come under Cassander's control at the same time as those at Pella and Amphipolis.

<sup>976</sup> Billows, 1990. 159; Mørkholm and Valassiades both note that Cassander did add his name to bronze coins under his control (Mørkholm, 1991. pp. 59-60; Valassiades, *XIII Congress International de Numismatica*, 2003. p. 405. But this did not take place until 310, after the Peace of the Dynasts in 311 when Cassander's authority in Europe as *strategos* was confirmed. cf. Ch. 8.2.

<sup>977</sup> Mørkholm, 1991. p. 60

references from within Plutarch's *Life of Demetrius* tell us that Cassander would shy away from the title of *basileus* even during later phases of his rule.<sup>978</sup> If Plutarch's excerpt provides any insight into the way in which Cassander approached the Macedonian monarchy, it may provide grounds for viewing Cassander's consolidation of power over the course of 316 and 315 on a more nuanced level, exploiting the links he had created for himself to the royal Argead family.

So how can these seemingly diametrically opposed representations be remedied? Were alterations of the coinage under his control one step too far for his monarchical aspirations, while the foundation of cities, reconstruction of those previously destroyed and marriage into the Argead family was deemed to be more acceptable? Was Cassander's sole focus in 316 and 315 on the throne of Macedon or were his actions part of a more multifaceted approach to not only secure the Macedonian homeland, but also to combat the still dangerous Polyperchon in the Peloponnese? There can be little doubt that Cassander's goal was total control of Macedon as its sole ruler,<sup>979</sup> but this does not immediately equate to a desire to be king. Additionally, it must be noted,<sup>980</sup> that the application of secure dating for Cassander's actions during this time is problematic.

An answer to the single natured, monarchical approach may be found, so much as it is possible to define, in the growing tensions between Cassander and his key ally, Antigonus Monophthalmus and the animosity developing as a result of the growing power of Antigonus in Asia Minor and the actions of Cassander, Ptolemy and Lysimachus in cementing their respective positions. Many of the accusations of Cassander's monarchical aspirations came as Antigonus initiated the possibility of constructing an alliance with Polyperchon against the son of Antipater and the support base which this was hoped to provide Polyperchon

---

<sup>978</sup> Plut. *Dem.* 18.2.

<sup>979</sup> cf. Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 246, with accompanying bibliography.

<sup>980</sup> As done by Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 246.

from among the Greek cities.<sup>981</sup> This in turn led to the Third War of the Diadochoi in 314.<sup>982</sup> These growing tensions also had resulting impact on the accounts within the literary sources. This particularly concerns the account of Hieronymus of Cardia, who following the defeat of Eumenes by Antigonos' forces in 316, had taken up residence within the Antigonid court. It was during his time here that Hieronymus embarked upon the composition of his *magnus opus* that went on to become one of the central authorities for subsequent ancient writers,<sup>983</sup> and may provide a retroactive distortion of Cassander's consolidation of power after the defeat of Olympias. What this bias source perspective does to the transmission of information through the millennia is to highlight the monarchical aspect of Cassander's endeavours between 316 and 315, while simultaneously suppressing any other feature that had an impact upon his thinking. It must however be highlighted that it is not the intention of this investigation to dismiss the monarchical aspects of Cassander's consolidation of power, but rather to incorporate these acts within more immediately pressing events in Europe.

There may be other driving factors behind where Cassander ordered his new cities be built. The main routes of entry into his area of influence were likely to come from the Peloponnese and Polyperchon's position there, or alternatively via the Hellespont and Thrace through Lysimachean held territory. By building both Thessalonica and Cassandreia between Pella and Thrace, Cassander may have sought to create a strong basis of support to his cause against potential hostile forces venturing west on land from Asia Minor.<sup>984</sup> While Cassander had control of Athens, the addition of Thebes to his cause, along with the personal loyalty of the inhabitants,<sup>985</sup> would act as another strategic city that could aid in

---

<sup>981</sup> For a more thorough discussion of Antigonos' alliance and the propaganda campaign he embarked upon against Cassander, see below.

<sup>982</sup> cf. Adams, 1975. pp. 115-117; Billows, 1990. pp. 114-115; Boiy, 2007. 60-63; Errington, 2008. p. 31; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. pp. 215-216.

<sup>983</sup> cf. Hornblower, 1981. pp. 11-14.

<sup>984</sup> Diodorus suggests that Cassander was keen, and subsequently successful in building Cassandreia into one of the largest, cities, both geographically and presumably in terms of population in Macedon (Diod. 19.52.2-3).

<sup>985</sup> See Diod. 19.53.2-3.

the war effort against Polyperchon.<sup>986</sup> It is true that the precedent for naming cities after those who ordered their construction was up until this point in time, a purely Argead affair. As Anson has previously noted,<sup>987</sup> the Diadochoi were prolific builders, employing the foundation of new cities as another avenue to extend their various spheres of influence throughout the Macedonian Empire and to suppress troublesome areas in their control resulting in the example set by Philip II and Alexander III, an example followed initially by Cassander during his period of consolidation and shortly thereafter by other members of the Diadochoi.<sup>988</sup> This may provide grounds to argue that, in addition to Cassander cementing his position within Macedon and Greece as the new ruler of the Macedonian homeland, the immediate threats to his position may have also influenced his building program.

Over the course of 316 and 315, while Cassander was embarking upon consolidation of power within Macedon, Antigonus initiated a propaganda campaign directed against Cassander based upon the numerous actions conducted by the son of Antipater that Antigonus perceived as being explicitly royal.<sup>989</sup> The exact sequence of events regarding who was the cause for these tensions is difficult to ascertain with any strong conviction due to the compressed and problematically non-contextualised nature of the source tradition covering this period of time, particularly in the case of Diodorus' narrative. Whether the tensions originated in the actions of a single individual that set in place an unstoppable escalation of hostilities appears too simplistic an understanding of the complex events during the opening stages of the still emerging Hellenistic World.

Eighteen months is a not inconsiderable period of time for the dynamic of alliances among the Diadochoi to shift and adapt as the situation dictates. However, the exact sequence of events that led to the development of hostilities

---

<sup>986</sup> Diod. 19.53.1 for the threat posed by both Polyperchon and his son Alexander; Anson, 2014. p. 127.

<sup>987</sup> Anson, 2014. p. 127. cf. Billows, 1990. pp. 292-305.

<sup>988</sup> Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 104.

<sup>989</sup> Diod. 19.61.1-3; Billows, 1990. p. 114.

between Antigonus and Cassander is not of central concern to this investigation.<sup>990</sup> Of greater importance is the result of these tensions, that being the shift in allegiance of Antigonus from being Cassander's ally to his enemy. From 314, Antigonus and Polyperchon would enter into an alliance against Cassander, Ptolemy and Lysimachus.<sup>991</sup> For Antigonus, the alliance with Polyperchon served much the same purpose as his original alliance with Cassander in 319 against Polyperchon.<sup>992</sup> It would keep Cassander and his military resources out of direct confrontation against Antigonus in Asia Minor and occupied within the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire. For Polyperchon, this newly forged link to Monophthalmus provided him with a vital lifeline to continue the war against Cassander from his stronghold in the Peloponnese.<sup>993</sup> However, Polyperchon would need to survive one more conflict with Cassander in the Peloponnese in the later stages of 316 before he cemented Antigoniid support.

While it is easy to dismiss Polyperchon as a dominant political and military figure within Macedonian politics following his removal from the regency of Macedon in the space of roughly two years after the death of Antipater, it is clear that Cassander did not do so. Almost immediately after taking Macedon, and during his consolidation of power, Cassander once again turned his attention to the Peloponnese and began to reorganise an invasion of the region.<sup>994</sup> Though it is easy with the advantage of hindsight to see that Polyperchon would never again have the influence and power that was at his disposal in 319 after the death of Antipater, he was however still Cassander's greatest rival in Greece and remained a real threat to his position. Cassander had been unable, despite considerable effort, to destroy Polyperchon's support base in the Peloponnese during his first venture into the region in 317. He was forced to break off the

---

<sup>990</sup> For debate on this issue, see Adams, 1975. p. 104-106; Billows, 1990. pp. 107-108; Errington, 2008. pp. 28-30; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 215

<sup>991</sup> Diod. 19.57.2; Just. 15.1.1-4.

<sup>992</sup> cf. Ch. 6.1. pp. 152-153.

<sup>993</sup> Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 215.

<sup>994</sup> Diod. 19.52.5-6.

engagement at Tagea and head north against the coalition between Polyperchon and Olympias returning from Epirus.

As previously stated, little information can be gleaned from the ancient sources in regards to Cassander's first invasion of the Peloponnese other than that he was unable to raise Tagea during the city's besiegement. Cassander was also unable to crush Polyperchon's support base in the Peloponnese. His sudden departure to Macedon once word reached him of Olympias's actions against Philip III and Eurydice, the spate of executions among the Macedonian elites and the attacks against his family afforded the cities loyal to Polyperchon a period several months where they could rebuild their defences in preparation for the likely return of Cassandrian forces should he emerge victorious from the conflict during the winter of 317/16.

Cassander would soon return. By the second half of 316, his forces were once again on the march south.<sup>995</sup> It was clear that Polyperchon had expected his rival's second attempt on the Peloponnese and in response to this, had stationed his son Alexander on the isthmus that connects the Peloponnese to mainland Greece, guarding the pass.<sup>996</sup> However, Cassander was able to employ transportation across the water and bypassed Alexander's position without conflict. From here, he resumed his war on Polyperchon and his allies.

Unfortunately, no specific reference to Polyperchon's whereabouts or his actions during Cassander's second invasion of the Peloponnese in 316 exists. Once again, historical evaluation of Cassander's campaign is at the mercy of the compressed account found in Diodorus's narrative.<sup>997</sup> Polyperchon's last attested location is fixed to Aetolia in the spring of 316 after his flight from the siege at Azorius in the northern Thessaly once news of Olympias' execution had reached the city.<sup>998</sup> Diodorus writes that Polyperchon was to stay in Aetolia

---

<sup>995</sup> Diod. 19.54.3-4; Beloch, places the second invasion to the summer of 316 (IV<sup>2</sup> 1924. p. 441); Heckel, 1992. pp. 200-201; Heckel, 2006. p. 20, 228.

<sup>996</sup> Diod. 19.54.3

<sup>997</sup> Diod. 19.54.3-4.

<sup>998</sup> cf. Diod. 19.52.5-6.



among local supporters in the region<sup>999</sup> and await further developments of the conflict against Cassander before deciding on the next course of action he was to take. Following this reference, the next marker of Polyperchon's location is within the Peloponnese in 315 with the arrival of Antigonus' emissary Aristodemus and the initiation of alliance and friendship between Antigonus and Polyperchon.<sup>1000</sup> Diodorus does appear to suggest that at the time Cassander departed south, Polyperchon had not entered into the Peloponnese. This is on the basis that Cassander's stated goal for the campaign, as Diodorus asserts, was to throw Alexander out of his position in the region,<sup>1001</sup> without making mention of Polyperchon himself. It could be argued that at the point in time Cassander had marched south through Boeotia, Polyperchon withdrew from Aetolia, possibly leading his army into the Peloponnese without conflict. Once there, he could turn his attention back to directing the war effort and supporting his son Alexander against Cassander as it would be unlikely that, as Cassander's chief rival along with his Epirote dominated army, Polyperchon would be allowed to remain active and unmolested in mainland Greece. However, it must be stated that it is entirely plausible that Polyperchon maintained his position in Aetolia throughout the period of Cassander's second campaign into the Peloponnese.<sup>1002</sup> From what can be gleaned from Diodorus' narrative, it appears that Alexander, not Polyperchon, was the military and political head of the effort against Cassander in the region during 316, and that Alexander was the only person in the Peloponnese who had an army at his disposal to combat Cassander's invading forces.<sup>1003</sup> This does not explicitly discount Polyperchon's position in either Aetolia or within the Peloponnese; it is possible that Polyperchon could have been located in either location in southern Greece.

---

<sup>999</sup> These Aetolian supporters actively aided Polyperchon and Alexander against Cassander, notably holding the pass at Thermopylae against Cassander's march south, delaying him for a period of time (Diod. 19.53.1-2.)

<sup>1000</sup> Polyperchon's presence is implied in Diod. 19.57.5, and explicitly stated in 19.60.1.

<sup>1001</sup> Diod. 19.53.1: "...σπεύδων Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Πολυπέρχοντος ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου."

<sup>1002</sup> As suggested by Billows (1990. p. 108).

<sup>1003</sup> Diod. 19.53.1.

Cassander's time in the Peloponnese was brief, but within this short period of time he was able to deliver a series of blows to Polyperchon's influence in the region. In quick succession, Argos, the cities of Messenia<sup>1004</sup> and Hermionis all fell to Cassander. Cassander's success in his second campaign in the Peloponnese was significant, but once again he was unsuccessful in driving Polyperchon and Alexander and their supporters from the Peloponnese. His gains were hardly surprising considering the successive defeats sustained by Polyperchon's cause during the previous year. Cassander, with the momentum he was able to build during his successful return to Macedon and the new avenues that control of the Macedonian homeland could provide following the unpopularity of Olympias' brief reign, opened new avenues of support from which he could draw, affording him significantly greater military resources at his disposal than those available to his rival. The limited resources may help to explain the lack of military engagement by Alexander against Cassander during his army's gains during the second half of 316. For the entire duration of the campaign, instead of engaging Cassander and his army on the field of battle, Alexander and his forces maintained their original position on the strategic isthmus between mainland Greece and the Peloponnese.<sup>1005</sup> Cassander too seems to have chosen to avoid a direct military encounter with the only sizable military force within the region in favour of attacking the more vulnerable cities in the Peloponnese.

As with much of Diodorus' narrative concerning events in Europe spanning the years of 317-315, little information is available in regard to specifics in the return to the Peloponnese by Cassander in 316. Especially in regards to Cassander's return to mainland Greece, nothing is said of the reasons for his departure, other than that he left a garrison of two thousand men near Megara to guard against Alexander's force on the isthmus.<sup>1006</sup> However, Polyperchon was still an active figure in southern Greece, meaning that Cassander had once again failed to bring the Peloponnese under his control.

---

<sup>1004</sup> Apart from the city of Ithome, which appears to have held out against Cassander's forces.

<sup>1005</sup> cf. Diod. 19.53.1, 19.54.3.

<sup>1006</sup> Diod. 19.54.3-4; Heckel, 1992. p. 201

It was in the following year after Cassander's departure north in 315, that news from Asia Minor reached Polyperchon via Aristodemos, Antigonus' general, concerning the possibility of forging a new alliance against Cassander, Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Seleucus.<sup>1007</sup> With him, Aristodemos brought a vital lifeline to Polyperchon's struggle against Cassander, both politically in the establishment of cooperation against the son of Antipater but more immediately important in a military capacity, with the employment of 8,000 mercenary troops Aristodemos was able to acquire from Sparta,<sup>1008</sup> thus bolstering the diminished forces of Polyperchon and Alexander.

In order to put the alliance between Antigonus and Polyperchon into effect, Alexander departed from his father in the Peloponnese, travelling to Antigonus in Asia Minor, where he had established himself near the city of Tyre in 315, following his defeat of Eumenes of Cardia the previous year.<sup>1009</sup> As part of their pact, the former adversaries would now officially recognise each other's authority and position. Polyperchon was confirmed as *strategos* of the Peloponnese.<sup>1010</sup> In return, Polyperchon would not only recognise Antigonus' authority in Asia, but also implied within the treaty was the general authority of Antigonus into Europe and Macedon as the new regent of Macedon.<sup>1011</sup> Indeed, as Billows highlights, Polyperchon, as Antipater's named successor in 319, may have actually appointed Antigonus as his own successor to the regency of Macedon, providing Antigonus with a level of valid authority in European affairs, albeit a tenuous and inconsistent one considering their previous hostility.<sup>1012</sup> The alliance between Antigonus and Polyperchon has been noted by modern

---

<sup>1007</sup> Diod. 19.57.5, 19.60.1.

<sup>1008</sup> Diod. 19.57.5, 19.60.1; Billows, 1990. p. 111; Heckel, 1992. p. 201

<sup>1009</sup> Diod. 19.54.7, 19.60.1, 19.61.1; Adams, 1975. p. 109; Billows, 1990. p. 109, 113; Heckel, 1992. p. 201; Heckel, 2006. p. 20, 230; Anson, 2014. p. 100, 133; cf. Billows, 1990. p. 114.

<sup>1010</sup> Diod. 19.60.1; Billows, 1990. p. 115; Heckel, 1992. p. 201

<sup>1011</sup> Diod. 19.61.3; Billows, 1990. p. 115, in particular n. 41; Heckel, 1992. p. 201. n. 155; Heckel 2006. p. 230; Dmetriev, 2011. p. 115.

<sup>1012</sup> Billows, 1990. pp. 114-115.

scholars,<sup>1013</sup> however an aspect that does require further emphasis is the very initial phases of the alliance and the possible permutations that may have been in play during Aristodemus' arrival, as well as subsequently during Alexander's time at Tyre when the formal alliance took place. While it is correct that within a short period of time, the tide would turn against Polyperchon with the defection of Alexander to Cassander's forces as well as the increase in the Antigonid presence with Greece,<sup>1014</sup> these were events conducted in reaction to the developing situation in the region that could not have been known during the establishment of the alliance between the Polyperchon and Antigonus prior to the initiation of the Third War of the Diadochoi in 314.

Little can be stated definitely due the focus of Diodorus' narrative on Antigonus' plans for Europe, resulting in Polyperchon's presence becoming suppressed within the account. But considering the state of Polyperchon's position in the Peloponnese and the successive blows dealt to his cause over the previous years, it is likely that Polyperchon may have relinquished his direct authority and claim over the Macedonian homeland as its regent in order to secure Antigonus' far more substantial support and resources from across the Aegean.<sup>1015</sup> What authority and position Polyperchon was to hold beyond his command of the Peloponnese is unclear and certainly the command of the Peloponnese should not be confused with the command of the entirety of Europe. No mention of the governance of Macedon itself survives, if this was even contemplated before the result of the oncoming conflict was known. If the information from Diodorus' narrative is all that can be employed to gain insight into this matter, it would suggest that Polyperchon's role as *strategos* of the Peloponnese may have been either a temporary or strictly military appointment. Part of Antigonus' strategy against Cassander and the coalition was to destabilise Cassander's support base among the Greek cities. This was to be achieved by Monophthalmus' offer of

---

<sup>1013</sup> See for example: Adams, 1975. p. 117; Billows, 1990. pp. 113-115; Heckel, 1992. p. 201; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 13.

<sup>1014</sup> See Ch. 8.1.

<sup>1015</sup> cf. Billows, 1990. p. 115. n. 41; Heckel, 1992. p. 201. n. 155; Heckel, 2006. p. 230. *contra* Simpson, *Historia*. 6. (1957). pp. 372-3.

freedom and autonomy from foreign occupation to the Greek cities,<sup>1016</sup> echoing Polyperchon's Exiles Decree and its own use in early 318.<sup>1017</sup> If Antigonus was indeed sincere in providing all the Greeks with their freedom from Macedonian rule, this must have also included the Peloponnese and Polyperchon's authority in the region along with it. Once the hostilities were concluded, this would then in turn deny Polyperchon any future office of influence in Greece if what Diodorus records within his narrative is all that existed in the treaty. However, it is possible that Antigonus' overtures to the Greeks may have been purely on the basis of political agitation of old anti-Antipatrid sentiments among the cities and designed to gain further influence for himself within the region.<sup>1018</sup> As he had no practical authority within Greece, his promises of freedom to the cities were still only appealing propositions designed to gain traction in Europe.<sup>1019</sup> However, there was little risk to Antigonus if his proclamation failed. If he were successful, both he and his allies would have a new, not insignificant, body of support among the Greek cities that had not been open to him before.<sup>1020</sup> If this was the case, then Polyperchon would be able to continue in his capacity as Antigonus' general in the Peloponnese, or even reassume his position in Macedon itself as Antigonus' representative. It must be remembered that Greece's governance and its future may not have been of central concern to Antigonus.

Of more immediate concern was the growing combined threat from the coalition of Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus and the military strength they could bring against him if they were able to unite their forces.<sup>1021</sup> Antigonus needed to build an alliance within Greece in order to divert Cassander's attention from Asia to nearer events in Europe.<sup>1022</sup> This approach would then aid in breaking up the effectiveness of the allied coalition in bringing their

---

<sup>1016</sup> Diod. 19.61.3: "εἶναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἅπαντας ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, αὐτονόμους."; Dmetriev, 2011. p. 50, 115; Strootman, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. p. 317.

<sup>1017</sup> See: Ch. 6.2.

<sup>1018</sup> Diod. 19.61.4.

<sup>1019</sup> Simpson, *Historia*. 8. (1959). p. 391.

<sup>1020</sup> cf. Billows, 1990. p. 116.

<sup>1021</sup> Diod. 19.57.1; Just. 15.1.2; Adams, 1975. pp. 105-106; Billows, 1990. pp. 109-110; Errington. 2008. p. 29; Anson, 2014. p. 135.

<sup>1022</sup> Billows, 1990. p. 114, 116.

combined might solely against Antigonid holdings in Asia. Antigonus' desire to break up the coalition, thereby allowing him to tackle each member on a more individual and manageable basis, has already received significant academic attention, explanation and investigation.<sup>1023</sup> However, Antigonus would be unable to engage with each member of the coalition simultaneously, so an alliance with Polyperchon would provide a perfect opportunity to recreate a similar scenario to the one he had constructed in 319, when the alliance with Cassander had almost entirely succeeded in keeping Polyperchon fixed in Greece and Macedon and away from providing significant support to Eumenes of Cardia in Asia Minor.<sup>1024</sup>

While Antigonus' alliance with Polyperchon bears striking similarities to his initial pact with Cassander in 319 in that for Monophthalmus they both provided convenient distractions for his enemies in Europe,<sup>1025</sup> there were key aspects that differed in the alliance of 315. One key area of distinction was in the amount of support Antigonus provided Polyperchon as opposed to Cassander. In 319, Cassander had received significant support with Antigonus providing the son of Antipater with both an army and a navy to transport it back to Europe the following year.<sup>1026</sup> By contrast, Antigonus provided a far smaller amount of support to Polyperchon in 315. In addition to the funds that Aristodemus had brought to the Peloponnese the previous year when initial contact was made with Polyperchon and Alexander along with the Spartan mercenaries they were able to procure, Antigonus had allotted to Alexander the sum of five hundred talents in order to continue the war effort against Cassander in Europe.<sup>1027</sup> Vital for this study is that the alliance between Antigonus and Polyperchon marked the first point in the struggle against Cassander where Polyperchon was operating without any level of Argead support, though it must be noted that he

---

<sup>1023</sup> See for example: Adams, 1975. pp. 113-129; Billows, 1990. pp. 109-134; Errington, 2008. pp. 28-35; Anson, 2014. pp. 125-163.

<sup>1024</sup> cf. Ch. 6.1. pp. 157-158.

<sup>1025</sup> Simpson, *Historia*. 6. (1957). p. 373.

<sup>1026</sup> cf. Ch. 6.3.

<sup>1027</sup> Diod. 19.61.5; Billows, 1990. pp. 115-116; Heckel, 1992. p. 201; Heckel, 2006. p. 230.

would continue to use Cassander's imprisonment and treatment of Alexander IV and Rhoxane for political leverage against his rival.

In addition to the financial aid and the offer of freedom to the Greek cities, Antigonus began to agitate groups within Macedon and Greece that may have been dissatisfied with Cassander's actions of the previous two years in consolidation of his control over the Macedonian homeland following Olympias' defeat and Polyperchon's expulsion. Before an audience of supporters and sympathisers, Antigonus made a declaration that Cassander's actions over the years of 316 and 315, the execution of Olympias, his marriage to Thessalonice,<sup>1028</sup> the imprisonment of both Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane in Amphipolis, the burial of Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice with royal ceremony and the construction of Cassandreia and reconstruction of Thebes were explicitly those of one aspiring to seize the throne of Macedon for himself.<sup>1029</sup> Antigonus' terms for Cassander to avoid conflict were clear: Cassandreia and Thebes were to be destroyed,<sup>1030</sup> Alexander IV and his mother were to be freed and given over to the Macedonians and Cassander was also to submit to Antigonus as the legitimate regent of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>1031</sup>

Antigonus must have known that these terms were entirely unacceptable. For Cassander to submit to this total loss of prestige and position, despite all the

---

<sup>1028</sup> Which Antigonus asserts, most likely correctly, was forced upon Thessalonice. (Carney, *Historia*. 37. (1988). p. 388. n. 7, though also note Landucci Gattinoni, in Wheatley & Hannah, 2009. p. 262, who highlights Thessalonice's role in the court following the marriage.)

<sup>1029</sup> Diod. 19.61.1-2; cf. Ch. 7.3. pp. 223-224.

<sup>1030</sup> Notably absent from both the accusations of Cassander's monarchical aspirations as well as the cities that were to be destroyed was that of Thessalonica. However, it is highly likely that Thessalonica has simply been omitted from Diodorus' list. Conveniently for Antigonus and given its geographical location, near the isthmus to the Peloponnese, the demolition of Thebes would also provide Polyperchon, the largest hostile group in Greece, with an easier entry into mainland Greece, should he, or Antigonus, decide upon such an action.

<sup>1031</sup> Diod. 19.61.3: "... τὸν βασιλέα καὶ τὴν μητέρα τὴν Ῥωξάνην προαγαγὼν ἐκ τῆς φυλακῆς ἀποδῶ τοῖς Μακεδόσι καὶ τὸ σύνολον ἐὰν μὴ πειθαρχῇ τῷ καθεσταμένῳ στρατηγῷ καὶ τῆς βασιλείας παρειληφότι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν Ἀντιγόνῳ."

efforts he had gone to in order to secure dominance over Greece and Macedon for the past four years against Polyperchon, was unthinkable. Indeed, Cassander's capitulation was likely neither the intent nor even a realistic expectation of Antigonus. In the highly unlikely scenario that Cassander did in fact choose to forsake his long held alliances with Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus in response to Antigonid accusations, then Antigonus would have been successful, at least in part, in breaking up the coalition without effort, lessening the size of the monumental combined force he was facing from the allies. However, Cassander was not expected to bow to these demands. Nor would Antigonus have genuine concern for Cassander's motives in Europe beyond the threat he may pose to his own sphere of influence. What Antigonus' propaganda campaign against Cassander may have hoped to achieve was a destabilisation of Cassander's base of operation by exploiting the anti-Antipatrid sentiment that had existed within the region ever since Antipater's tenure as regent of Macedon. It was also designed to undermine Cassander's ability to implement his control over his area of influence. As Anson has correctly identified, the construction of new cities by the members of the Diadochoi and by Philip II and Alexander III acted as a means to secure problematic areas of influence and suppress unrest in newly conquered territories.<sup>1032</sup> While Antigonus asserted that the reconstruction of Thebes was a particularly grievous act as it defied the orders of Alexander the Great, the practical benefits its destruction would provide to groups hostile towards Cassander must not have gone unnoticed. The destruction of these cities would have undermined Cassander's strength and would once again act as a means of isolating Cassander away from the coalition and activities in Asia Minor.

As the situation stood after the declaration at Tyre in 315, a strong alliance had been built between Antigonus and Polyperchon, providing Polyperchon with a lifeline to continue the war against Cassander. However, whatever security Polyperchon had gained following the arrival of Aristodemus was not to last, and it was not long before he would once again find himself in a vulnerable position against the son of Antipater.

---

<sup>1032</sup> Anson, 2014. p. 127.



This final section of this chapter has engaged with the way in which Cassander cemented his authority in the Macedonian homeland following his successful conquest of the region and the execution of Olympias in the winter of 317/16. In order to achieve this, Cassander employed a nuanced, multifaceted approach, burying the murdered Philip III and Eurydice in the traditional burial grounds at Aigai, wedding the daughter of Philip II Thessalonice as well as ordering the construction of Cassandreia, Thessalonica and the reconstruction of Thebes that would serve as greater bastions of support within his new domain. Reaction to Cassander's actions was swift, as the growing tensions between the allies eventuated with Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy demanding concessions from the growing power of Antigonus, while in response, Antigonus levelled accusations against Cassander and his perceived desire to seize the throne of Macedon for himself.

For Polyperchon, a drastic shift in the way he approached the war against Cassander was required. With Olympias gone, and the support base he could draw upon from within the Macedonian homeland along with it, Polyperchon and his son Alexander headed south to the other greater body of support created during the opening stages of the conflict against Cassander, the Aetolians, and the Peloponnese. The situation was dire for Polyperchon as for the first time he was unable to rely upon explicit Argead support. Despite this he was still the most significant threat to Cassandrian supremacy within Europe, a fact that appealed to Antigonus, who began to make overtures of friendship with Polyperchon and Alexander, via his intermediary, Aristodemus. While it is inviting to perceive Polyperchon as an already defeated man, who would never again rise to the prominence he had achieved in 319 and 318, he was still a dangerous threat to Cassander's cause, and would remain a significant opponent for the coming years.

This chapter has covered the events following the Cassandrian victory over Polyperchon's navy off Byzantium in 317, until the expulsion of Polyperchon from Macedon down into the Peloponnese in 316 and the events precluding the

initiation of the Third War of the Diadochoi in 314. This period of time saw the greatest amount of military conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, highlighting the interconnectivity of the numerous conflicts in the fragmenting Macedonian Empire. While the combined forces of Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Antigonos defeated Polyperchon's navy, the regent of 317 and his war against Cassander and his allies was by no means halted.

As Paschidis had previously postulated, following his withdrawal from the Peloponnese, Polyperchon was able to launch a short lived campaign into Asia Minor in order to aid his chief ally, and most significant threat to Antigonos, Eumenes. In reaction to Polyperchon's movements east, and to draw his rival back to the European theatre, Cassander temporarily ceased his Peloponnesian efforts, striking north to threaten Polyperchon's base of operations in the Macedonian homeland in the summer of 317. While later scholars have viewed this action as a failed invasion of the region, and a concerted effort by Cassander to win Macedon for himself, it appears more likely that this was never the intention of Cassander. In a manoeuvre echoing the attempts of the Aetolians in 321, the son of Antipater struck north in order to relieve the pressure against Antigonos in the east. Once word reached him across the Aegean, Polyperchon chose to depart from Asia to mitigate the threat posed by Cassander and had returned to Macedon by the autumn of 317. Following his return to Macedon, Polyperchon continued on to Epirus to escort Olympias back to Pella, ending her self imposed exile in Molossia.

In addition to the military actions by both Cassander and Polyperchon, there were also drastic shifts in the political alliances that had been set in place during the initial phases of the conflict. While Polyperchon was absent in Epirus, and in order to secure the safety of her husband, as well as herself, Eurydice stripped Polyperchon of the Macedonian regency and offered the office to Cassander, ordering that Cassander cease his operations at Tagea and march to protect the royal pair. The offer made by Eurydice marked the first time that Cassander engaged with the concept of royal support during the war against Polyperchon. While it appears that Cassander did accept the office offered by Eurydice,

instead of heading north, he chose to remain in the Peloponnese to continue exerting pressure against Polyperchon's support base in the south at Tagea, demonstrating that while he was willing to accept the political status the regency afforded him, he would only act in the royal interests if they suited his own.

Cassander would only venture north following the return of Olympias, Polyperchon and the Epirote army they led back to Macedon and the acts of reprisal that Olympias conducted in the autumn of 317. The murders of Eurydice and Philip III, the spate of executions among the Macedonian elites and the ill treatment of the bodies of the royal pair, as well as of Cassander's family would cost Polyperchon's cause dearly. Whether he was complicit in Olympias' conduct or not, her actions still resulted in a massive loss of support for the former regent within the Macedonian homeland. Once news reached Cassander of the events in Macedon, he broke off his action in the Peloponnese and marched north, reaching the north by the winter of 317/16, capturing Olympias at the siege of Pydna and relegating Polyperchon to his Aetolian, Boeotian and Peloponnesian allies in southern Greece.

The multiple efforts Polyperchon made to secure the support of Olympias were, from the cold, analytical eye of hindsight, mistakes that resulted in his expulsion from Macedon. However, as the actions were unfolding, Polyperchon's reasoning may have more based on practical necessities than on political incompetency. While the tacit support of Olympias' execution of her Argead adversaries should not, and cannot be excused, the resources that Adeas-Eurydice and Philip III Arrhidaeus could offer Polyperchon were exhausted and clearly not enough to drive out the threat Cassander, along with his allies, posed to the regent, and he was forced to seek other avenues of support and supply. Indeed he had been doing so since 319. This he was successful in securing, as evidenced by Olympias' final acceptance of Polyperchon's invitation to move back to Macedon.

The deaths of Eurydice and Philip III after Cassander accepted the office of regent, as well as the swift execution of Olympias were all positives for the new

regent. Now he was able to represent, even if merely on a superficial level, the interests of the royal family without having a powerful, influential, living royal problematising his efforts to secure Europe for himself.

By the spring of 316, Olympias was dead. Instead of simply murdering the mother of Alexander, which may have been an appealing option given the long standing antipathy with Olympias and the Antipatrids, Cassander instead used her actions the previous year to gain leverage with the Macedonian elites whom she had attacked, parading her in front of a public trial and allowing those who held grievances against the matriarch to decide on her fate, simultaneously removing her as a future issue while conveniently building upon his support base in Macedon. With Olympias gone, Cassander turned his attentions to cementing his hold on the Macedonian homeland with a programme that would occupy the next two years.

Employing a multifaceted approach, Cassander built upon the influence his new appointment as regent afforded him by burying Eurydice and Philip III at the traditional Argead burial grounds at Vergina, integrating himself into the royal family itself by marrying the daughter of Philip II, Thessalonice and the embarkation of his building programme with the foundation of Cassandreia and Thessalonica as well as the reconstruction of Thebes. While this programme was successful in building Cassander's support base within Macedon, external tensions among the allies began to come to the surface. These tensions between Antigonos and Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy resulted in monarchical accusations levelled against both factions. The friendship between Cassander and Antigonos would end and a dramatic shift in the European political sphere would take place, with Polyperchon becoming the Antigonid backed player, first with the arrival of Aristodemus in the Peloponnese in 315, and cemented with Antigonos' declaration of war against Cassander at Tyre in 315.

Polyperchon had lost the Macedonian homeland, however, this by no means equates to the end of his cause, nor to the significance of the threat he posed to Cassander. Cassander, by his concerted efforts to crush Polyperchon's support

base in the Peloponnese during 317, demonstrates that he was well aware of the significance of Polyperchon's hold in the south, and the coming years would see further efforts by the new regent of Macedon to defeat Polyperchon in southern Greece. However, Polyperchon, with his new Antigonid ally would continue to act as a thorn in the side of Cassander and serve as the most significant threat to his new hold on Macedon.

## Chapter 8: The Beginning of the End.

This chapter of investigation covering the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon is devoted to the period of time following the foundation of the alliance between Polyperchon and Antigonos in 315 with Alexander's return to the Peloponnese from Tyre and concludes in 309, with the pact the two combatants entered into after the death of Herakles and Polyperchon's final recorded campaign against Cassander. In order to cover the events that took place during this timeframe, the chapter is separated into three sections, each with a focus on a distinct topic.

The first section covers the period from the initiation of the First War of the Diadochoi in 315 until the call for peace between Antigonos and the coalition of Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy, which would eventuate in the Peace of the Dynasts in 311/10. During this time, Cassander faced the combined strength of Polyperchon and his new ally in Antigonos. That Cassander regarded Polyperchon's stronghold in the Peloponnese as dangerous is suggested by the way in which he would continue to focus on the region. Following a series of unsuccessful attempts in 317 and 316 to secure the region via military means, once again during the initial phases of the conflict,<sup>1033</sup> it seems that Cassander instead chose a more politically canny method of gaining influence in the region. He did so by facilitating the defection of Alexander, Polyperchon's son and the most prominent of his supporters in Greece and forming an alliance with him. While the military consequences of Alexander's defection from his father may not have been as significant as they initially appear, it did deal a significant political blow to Polyperchon, and by extension to the efforts of Antigonos in Greece and Macedon. As a result, and in order to maintain Cassander's focus on Europe and out of Asia, an increase in the Antigonid presence in the region was required. Most markedly, this is seen the arrival into Greece of Antigonos' general, Telesphorus and later by the arrival of Polemaeus in 313. The first section of this chapter concludes with the closing stages of the Third Diadoch

---

<sup>1033</sup> Diod. 19.62.9.

War in Europe that led to the initiation of negotiations for peace between the coalition and the Antigonid forces.

The second area of investigation evaluates the events during the peace negotiations. These would result in the Peace of the Dynasts and the declaration of peaceful status quo among the delegates. It was at this time that the position of both Cassander and Antigonus within the fragmenting Macedonian Empire would be officially recognised by their adversaries. Of particular importance were those combatants during the Third Diadoch War who were not present during the dialogue. Notable by their absence were both Polyperchon and Seleucus. In addition to the peace negotiations, the deaths of Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane and the impact of these on the empire are discussed.

The third and final section of the chapter moves on to cover Polyperchon's final effort against Cassander for control of the Macedonian homeland and Greece in 309. During this time, Polyperchon reverted to his traditional support base, the royal family, to add weight to his claim within Macedon. As has been previously discussed, by this time, the majority of the Argead family were either dead, or married to members of the Diadochoi. However, there was one man who held links to the royal family whom Polyperchon could employ to support his claim - Herakles, the illegitimate son of Alexander the Great and Barsine, the daughter of the former satrap of Phrygia, Artabazus. While the potential for Herakles to play a role within the Macedonian court had been raised in the days after the death of his father in 323 and immediately dismissed, now that he was the sole living male relative of Alexander the Great, his political appeal had increased. Polyperchon's efforts against Cassander in 309 were short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful, but it cannot be overlooked that, even as late as 309, Polyperchon was still able to pose a significant threat to Cassander, especially if his efforts were able to gain traction and popular support in Greece and Macedon. Much like the defection of Alexander in 314, Cassander decided against a military intervention in the Peloponnese. Instead, as he did in 314, he chose to put an end to Herakles' claim before it gained too much political traction, ending the uprising via the political manoeuvring and canniness that had typified his efforts

over the previous decade in a manner that both facilitated the death of Herakles and ended the now decade long conflict with Polyperchon in one fell swoop.

With the Third War of the Diadochoi declared, the combatants once again readied their forces for war. It must be highlighted, as Wheatley has,<sup>1034</sup> that Polyperchon's movements following 315 become difficult to define with any certainty. Because of this, caution is required when attempting to do so. For the events in Greece and Macedon during the early phases of the Third Diadoch War prior to the arrival of Demetrius Poliorcetes into Athens in 307 and Plutarch's accompanying biography,<sup>1035</sup> historical evaluation is once again predominantly limited to the compressed narrative of Diodorus Siculus.<sup>1036</sup> Therefore, much of what follows should be viewed as informed academic speculation based upon available evidence, rather than as a recount of historical fact.

Cassander made yet another attempt to expel Polyperchon and Alexander from their positions in the Peloponnese. This was done via the order sent from Cassander to his appointed commander of Argos, Apollonides, to venture into the heart of the Peloponnese to conduct raiding missions within Arcadia.<sup>1037</sup> Cassander's efforts during this time were not solely based on military means, and he diversified his approach. In addition to the raids by Apollonides in Arcadia, Cassander also began to employ diplomacy to finally gain control of the Peloponnese. His aim appears clear. The threat posed by Polyperchon's hold on the south was geographically his most immediate problem but despite several attempts to wrestle control from him over the previous years, the possibility that Antigonus could use his new ally's position in the Peloponnese as a launch pad into the European theatre seems to have been Cassander's primary focus. Should Antigonus be able to enter into Greece, the combined strength of

---

<sup>1034</sup> Wheatley, *Antichthon*. 32. (1998), p. 12; Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 257; Wheatley, 2000. p. 222; See also: Anson, *Phoenix*. 60. (2006). p. 226; Meeus, *Phoenix*. 66. (2012). p. 74.

<sup>1035</sup> Plut. *Demetr.* 20.46.1; For more discussion on Demetrius' time in Athens, see: Wheatley, 1997. pp. 165-198.

<sup>1036</sup> Diod. 19.63-69.

<sup>1037</sup> Diod. 19.63.1



Polyperchon, the Greek cities and the forces he brought with him would surely result in a devastating blow to Cassander's own position.

### 8.1: The First War of the Diadochoi – 315

Cassander and Polyperchon's rivalry had to this point been a bitter and hotly contested one, but in 315, a new dynamic between the pair began to emerge. While even in the previous year the notion of an alliance between them was unthinkable, Polyperchon's new pact with Antigonus had given Cassander pause for thought. During Apollonides' actions in the central Peloponnese, Cassander made contact with Polyperchon, and made endeavouring to turn him and his faction from their friendship with Antigonus.<sup>1038</sup> Diodorus does not record exactly what it was that Cassander offered to Polyperchon in order to lure him away from his new alliance with Antigonus, but there are a number of possibilities which can be considered. It is possible that what Cassander offered Polyperchon was the same as he was to shortly offer Alexander, that being the command of the Peloponnese under his greater authority.<sup>1039</sup> If this was so, there was little incentive for Polyperchon to accept the offer, as he would merely be exchanging a previous overseer and former foe in Antigonus, for a new, more recent enemy in Cassander, a man who was simultaneously conducting military action at the time he was making efforts to make peace. Though, given the rejection made by Polyperchon to the offer, it may be possible that Cassander attempted to offer Polyperchon a lower position in his regime in an attempt to concede less authority in the Peloponnese. Conversely, Cassander may rather than providing an alliance with Polyperchon, merely have sought to dissolve the conflict and attempt to reach some other mutually acceptable arrangement. Unfortunately, Diodorus either omits this information or it was not in his source. In either case, precisely what Cassander was willing to concede to end Polyperchon's alliance with Antigonus in 315 can only be a matter of conjecture.

---

<sup>1038</sup> Diod. 19.63.3: "... ἐπεχείρησεν ἀφιστάναι τοὺς περὶ Πολυπέρχοντα τῆς Ἀντιγόνου φιλίας."; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 13.

<sup>1039</sup> cf. Diod. 19.64.3; See below.

Whatever the case, Cassander's offer was not enough to gain Polyperchon's defection from Monophthalmus, and his approaches were swiftly rejected.<sup>1040</sup> Whether Polyperchon ever entertained the notion of a new alliance is unknown and highly unlikely, given the conflict of the past half-decade. However, a factor of which he must have been aware was that, should he chose to renege on his pact with Antigonus, Polyperchon would almost certainly face an immediate response from Aristodemus and the forces at his disposal. Even within the environment of ever-changing and fluid concepts of alliances that existed among the Diadochoi, a shift in allegiance such as great and swift as the one Cassander proposed to Polyperchon in 315 appears too great a change for Polyperchon to accept.

Shortly after Polyperchon's rejection of his offer, Cassander launched yet another invasion of the south, travelling through Thessaly and Boeotia, briefly stopping at the newly reconstructed Thebes to shore up the defences of the city, and then on to the Peloponnese.<sup>1041</sup> Echoing the campaign of the previous year, Cassander's time in the Peloponnese was short.<sup>1042</sup> Following the crossing of the Isthmus, Cassander and his army achieved a measure of success, razing the port and agricultural areas of Corinth and then into Arcadia. During his time there he was able to secure the city of Orchomenus,<sup>1043</sup> and venture towards Polyperchon's position at Messenia.<sup>1044</sup>

It is here, at Messenia, that one of the rare occasions when Cassander and Polyperchon came into direct contact with each other took place. Diodorus confirms that Polyperchon was situated within the city when Cassander arrived.<sup>1045</sup> While this was an opportunity finally to defeat Polyperchon, no conflict between the adversaries took place. Instead of direct military conflict, Cassander instead chose to leave the city and head further into Polyperchon-

---

<sup>1040</sup> Diod. 19.63.4

<sup>1041</sup> Diod. 19.63.3-4.

<sup>1042</sup> cf. Ch. 7.1.

<sup>1043</sup> Diod. 19.63.4-5.

<sup>1044</sup> Diod. 19.64.1.

<sup>1045</sup> Diod. 19.64.1.

held territory in the Peloponnese.<sup>1046</sup> While Diodorus' narrative does suggest that Cassander was planning on returning to lay siege to the city at some point in the future,<sup>1047</sup> this event never took place. Instead, Cassander moved to Argolis, and presided over the Nemean Games, before departing from the south and venturing back to Macedon, no doubt in order to shift his focus west and on to the expeditionary force that was soon to depart for Caria under the command of Asander.<sup>1048</sup> Once again, Cassander was unable to dislodge Polyperchon from his position in the Peloponnese before, now for the third time, he departed north.

Certainly the prospect of removing Polyperchon as a threat soon after his reaffirmation of hostile intentions following the rejection of Cassander's initial approaches must have been appealing to the son of Antipater. There is, however, a possibility that Cassander's time was limited and the idea of a potentially long drawn out siege at Messenia may have affected his decision-making. Additionally, the example of Polyperchon's failed siege of Megalopolis and the losses he sustained during the endeavour in 318 may have represented a scenario that Cassander did not wish to re-enact. However, Diodorus' narrative does not transmit enough information to reveal the truth on the matter. What can be said with more confidence is that Cassander continued a multifaceted approach to gaining greater control in the Peloponnese. Despite the failed attempt to persuade Polyperchon to abandon his alliance with Antigonus, Cassander continued to make efforts to draw off Polyperchon's supporters via political means designed to not only lessen the influence of his adversary, but also to increase his own presence. Certainly there were factions present in the Peloponnese who were hostile to both Polyperchon and his son Alexander, who were open to subverting their position in southern Greece.<sup>1049</sup> But it seems clear that Cassander was not content with gaining support from these groups alone. Following his departure from the Peloponnese, Cassander made contact with Alexander, arguably one of the most powerful figures hostile to him in the region.

---

<sup>1046</sup> Diod. 19.64.1.

<sup>1047</sup> Diod. 19.64.1: "...τὸ μὲν πολιορκεῖν αὐτήν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἀπέγνων."

<sup>1048</sup> Diod. 19.64.1-2; cf. Diod. 19.67-68.

<sup>1049</sup> cf. Diod. 19.63.5.

The timing of this initial contact between the combatants has previously received identification and a measure of evaluation. The narrative of Diodorus would suggest that Cassander made initial contact with Polyperchon prior to his invasion of the Peloponnese and at the time of Aristodemus' venture into the region in order to propose the Antigonid alliance to him.<sup>1050</sup> Unlike the previous offer made to Polyperchon before Cassander's third invasion of the region, information is available regarding his approach to Alexander that allows a more critical evaluation of events. As Cassander departed from the Peloponnese, Alexander, accompanied by Aristodemus, ventured into the areas in which Cassander had been able to install bastions of support against Polyperchon and attempted to regain favourable support for both Polyperchon and Antigonus.<sup>1051</sup> This sequence of events has been followed by Adams and Anson, who both accept a literal reading of Diodorus' account.<sup>1052</sup> While there is little issue with this reading, alternatives are available. Heckel has suggested, albeit tentatively, that Cassander, rather than making contact prior to his invasion of the Peloponnese in reaction to Polyperchon's rejection, as Diodorus transmits, attempted to dissuade Polyperchon from the alliance with Antigonus as he was departing the region and after he had conducted his third invasion of the Peloponnese.<sup>1053</sup> If Heckel is correct in his suggestion that Cassander's initial request to Polyperchon occurred after his departure from the Peloponnese, a possible change in the way Cassander conducted his diplomatic efforts may be revealed. The timing would bring the efforts to turn both Polyperchon and

---

<sup>1050</sup> Diod. 19.63.2-3; cf. Diod. 19.60.1; Ch. 7.3.

<sup>1051</sup> Diod. 19.64.2-3. Diodorus suggests that Alexander and Aristodemus were both motivated to reestablish the freedom among the cities where Cassander had placed garrisons (*“τούτου δὲ χωρισθέντος Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπιὼν τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πόλεις μετ’ Ἀριστοδήμου τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ Κασάνδρου καθεσταμένας φρουράς ἐκβαλεῖν ἐπειρᾶτο, ταῖς δὲ πόλεσιν ἀποκαθιστᾶν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.”*) However, the likelihood that this was a true sense of freedom from foreign influence is minimal. The freedom on offer refers back to the initial decree made by Antigonus at Tyre the previous year, which was embroiled in political machinations to destabilise Cassander's position in Europe. It is more plausible to suggest that instead of true autonomy, the pair wished to reinstall favourable conditions within the cities.

<sup>1052</sup> Adams, 1975. pp. 116-117; Anson, 2014. p. 136.

<sup>1053</sup> Heckel, 1992. p. 201; Heckel, 2006. p. 230.

Alexander away from Antigonus closer together. Should Heckel's timing be correct, then Cassander's effort to nullify the threat from Polyperchon via explicitly non-military avenues may suggest that the military resources at his disposal were not sufficient to subdue either Polyperchon, Alexander or Aristodemus, resulting in a necessary change to Cassander's approach to the increasingly troublesome Peloponnese issue. If Cassander's initial contact with Polyperchon occurred at much the same time as the celebration of the Nemean Games, and his subsequent contact with Alexander, which occurred after Cassander had departed north to Macedon,<sup>1054</sup> this may be a more sporadic and seemingly less considered political strategy in Cassander's efforts to bifurcate Polyperchon's support base in the south. It could be regarded as an offer of good intentions to Polyperchon by Cassander and his sudden, and seemingly unexplained, departure could demonstrate that he was willing to conduct negotiations without having the entirety of his military strength so close to the centre of Polyperchon's base of support. While Heckel's suggestion is entirely plausible, there is little evidence to support either interpretation due to the single compressed account of Diodorus. Consequently one must be cautious when attempting any definitive assertions.

The position which Cassander offered to Alexander, the son of Polyperchon, was the command of the Peloponnese, albeit under Cassander's authority.<sup>1055</sup> It is at this point within Diodorus' narrative that offers possible insight into Alexander's political aspirations within the European sphere of the Macedonian Empire. While no mention is made of this aspect of Alexander's life prior to the meeting with Cassander in 314, Diodorus asserts that the position of *strategos* was one that Alexander had desired and it was this which gave him cause to enter the war against Cassander.<sup>1056</sup> The brief assertion does not allow certainty, however it may refer to a possible agreement made between either Polyperchon and his

---

<sup>1054</sup> Diod. 19.64.2-3; Adams, 1975. pp. 116-117; Billows, 1990. p. 117; Wheatley, *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). p. 265; Dixon, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 171-172; Meeus, *Phoenix*. 66. (2012). p. 84; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 13.

<sup>1055</sup> Diod. 19.64.2-3.

<sup>1056</sup> Diod. 19.64.3-4.

son for distribution of authority within Europe once hostilities with Cassander had concluded, or alternatively between Alexander and Antigonos himself.

For the majority of the conflict against Cassander, Alexander had operated as one of Polyperchon's key military supporters in Southern Greece and was a key political figure in the region because of this.<sup>1057</sup> As Heckel states following the year of 318 and despite his temporary departure from the ancient sources, "*...it appears that Alexander was near or in the Peloponnese when Cassander directed his attentions to Macedonia in 317*",<sup>1058</sup> following Olympias' return to the Macedonian homeland.<sup>1059</sup> By 314, Alexander had been located in the Peloponnese for a sufficient period of time to have become an eminent political figure in the region, forming alliances,<sup>1060</sup> as well as enmities with various factions operating therein<sup>1061</sup> and with Cassander, who via Diodorus' interpretation, viewed Alexander as the most significant threat in the south from 316 onwards.<sup>1062</sup> Despite Alexander's prominence in his father's cause and in Southern Greece and regardless of the timing of Cassander's initial approach to Polyperchon, it seems clear that Alexander was not Cassander's first choice in his efforts to mitigate the threat in the south via diplomatic means. He had first approached Polyperchon and had been rejected. After his father, however, Alexander was the most influential hostile figure in Europe, making him the obvious next candidate for Cassander's political approaches following Polyperchon's rejection of his overtures.

Whether or not Alexander took time to consider Cassander's proposition is unknown, however he did ultimately accept and was appointed to the command of the Peloponnese on Cassander's behalf, defecting from his father's cause. Alexander's switch from Polyperchon to Cassander has received a number of

---

<sup>1057</sup> cf. Diod. 18.65.3-5, 18.66.1, 18.68.3; Wheatley, *Antichthon* 38 (2004). p. 3. n. 10; Heckel, 2006. p. 20.

<sup>1058</sup> Heckel, 2006. p. 20.

<sup>1059</sup> cf. Ch. 7.2.

<sup>1060</sup> Made during Polyperchon's initial venture into the Peloponnese in 318, cf. Diod. 18.66.1, 18.69.3-4; cf. Ch. 6.2.

<sup>1061</sup> cf. Diod. 19.66.6-19.67.1.

<sup>1062</sup> cf. Ch. 7.3.

interpretations from modern scholars, ranging from simple identification of the event with little discussion beyond it, to more in-depth analyses.<sup>1063</sup> The account found in Diodorus suggest that Alexander's change in allegiances was because Cassander was offering him the exact position he desired. A number of other possibilities have been presented in efforts to explain his shift in loyalty.

Fortina has implied that, in addition to Alexander's ambition to hold the command of the Peloponnese, the son of Polyperchon may have become disenfranchised as a result of the alliance forged between his father and Antigonus following Aristodemus' arrival the previous year. From the initial phases of the Antigonid alliance, it appears that Alexander became increasingly dissatisfied with the situation and his father's contracting political influence following the series of defeats at the hand of Cassander during 317-316.<sup>1064</sup> Fortina continues by suggesting that Alexander decided casting his lot in with Cassander and becoming his southern commander, would serve his own endeavours better than maintaining the alliance with his father and the Antigonids, who were increasing their foothold in Europe.<sup>1065</sup> While Fortina is correct in his identification that over the course of the oncoming years Antigonus would increase his presence and therefore his influence in Greece,<sup>1066</sup> this appears to have been done in reaction to Alexander's defection, rather than in expectation of the loss of his support.<sup>1067</sup> Certainly the presence of Aristodemus in the Peloponnese seems to indicate that Antigonus desired to increase his influence in the region. Nevertheless, it appears more likely that, considering the level of cooperative engagement of both Polyperchon and Alexander with their Antigonid counterparts, the alliance may have been on a

---

<sup>1063</sup> See for example: Beloch, Vol. IV<sup>2</sup> 1924. p. 443; Fortina, 1965. p. 67; Adams, 1975. p. 118; Billows, 1990. p. 117; Heckel, 1992. p. 201; Errington, 2008. p. 32; Wheatley, *Antichthon* 38. (1998). p. 12; Heckel, 2006. p. 230; Dixon, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. p. 172; Anson, 2014. p. 136; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 13.

<sup>1064</sup> Fortina, 1965. p. 67.

<sup>1065</sup> Fortina, 1965. p. 67.

<sup>1066</sup> Particularly around Aetolia and the city of Aegium (Diod. 19.66.3-4)

<sup>1067</sup> Diod. 19.66.2-5.

more cooperative basis than such as would result in the loss of Alexander to their cause.

Beloch offers another perspective on Alexander's defection, suggesting that it may in fact be a misnomer. Instead Beloch suggests that Alexander's new alliance with Cassander was symptomatic of a desire by the aging Polyperchon<sup>1068</sup> to put an end to the conflict that had been raging since 319 and to retire from military and political life.<sup>1069</sup> Beloch argues that Polyperchon could not and would not submit himself to serve under the direct command of his younger adversary. It was presumably because of this that he relinquished his position of command in the Peloponnese as well as his position of authority within Southern Greece to Alexander.<sup>1070</sup> The possibility that Polyperchon, on account of his age, may have desired to end his hostilities against Cassander is one that deserves some consideration. The argument may carry more weight if we place his desire for peace, not in 314 with the defection of Alexander, but instead later in 308/9 after the promulgation of the Peace of the Dynasts and the murder of Herakles. However, there is not enough available from the brief account found in the ancient sources to support Beloch's position beyond consideration as a possibility. Alexander's imminent death means that there was little time for Polyperchon to enter into retirement before taking back the position he had left to his son and continuing the war against Cassander.<sup>1071</sup>

The reasons for Alexander's acceptance of Cassander's offer beyond those found in Diodorus' account are unknown. It is likely that the new alliance was based on a number of factors. While interesting to consider, the various permutations and possibilities accounting for Alexander's defection to Cassander's cause are based on little to no evidence. Hence, it is appropriate to heed Wheatley's warning regarding the uncertainty surrounding Polyperchon's movements following

---

<sup>1068</sup> Heckel identifies his age as around seventy by 314 (Heckel, 2006. p. 230.)

<sup>1069</sup> Beloch, Vol. IV<sup>2</sup> p. 443: "*Er [Polyperchon] zog sich also vom Kommando zurück, und überließ die Strategie seinem Sohne.*"

<sup>1070</sup> Beloch, Vol. IV<sup>2</sup> p. 443.

<sup>1071</sup> A position that Beloch asserts (Beloch, Vol. IV<sup>2</sup> p. 443).



315.<sup>1072</sup> What can be said with confidence is that the event was a sizable political victory for Cassander in mitigating the threat offered by one of his most prominent adversaries in Southern Greece and dealt a major political blow to both Polyperchon and the Antigonid alliance in 314.

A consideration that further problematises any discussion of Alexander, particularly his relationship with Polyperchon, was that his death occurred not long after he had sided with Cassander's cause. No direct military conflict appears to have taken place between father and son, but following his appointment as Cassander's *strategos*, Alexander departed for the northern Peloponnese into Archaia, where he led a victorious assault on the city of Dyme,<sup>1073</sup> and then moved on to the city of Sicyon. When he chose to depart from the city, Alexander met his end at the hands of a citizen of the city, Alexion.<sup>1074</sup> Alexander's death appears to have been a prelude to a greater uprising by Sicyon,<sup>1075</sup> however against whom this revolt was intended is unclear. Diodorus simply relates that the people of Sicyon desired their freedom. Whatever the case, Sicyon was soon subdued by Alexander's widow, Cratesipolis, who had taken control over her husband's army and, following a bloody conflict, re-established authority over the city.<sup>1076</sup> Now that the city was under her control, the issue of where were Cratesipolis and her army's allegiances to be directed? Was she to maintain her husband's recent alliance with Cassander, or was she to return to Polyperchon's side? That she could hold the city as an independent faction within the Peloponnese does not seem a reasonable possibility. We do know, however, that by the following year of 313, Sicyon had returned to Polyperchon's control, forming a central bastion of his base of support.<sup>1077</sup> Careful consideration is required when evaluating the

---

<sup>1072</sup> Wheatley, 1997. p. 222; Wheatley, *Anticthos* 38. (1998). p. 12.

<sup>1073</sup> Diod. 19.66.5-6.

<sup>1074</sup> Diod. 19.67.1

<sup>1075</sup> cf. Diod. 19.67.2; Macurdy, *AJPh* 50. (1929). p. 274; Heckel, 1992. p. 202. n. 159; Heckel, 2006. p. 20.

<sup>1076</sup> Diod. 19.67.12; Macurdy, *AJPh* 50. (1929). p. 274; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). pp. 13-14.

<sup>1077</sup> Diod. 19.74.2-3: "ἐν ταύταις γὰρ Πολυπέρχων διέτριβεν δυνάμεις ἀδράς ἔχων καὶ πιστεύων ταύταις τε καὶ ταῖς τῶν τόπων ὀχυρότησιν." There are a number of

return of Sicyon to Polyperchon's control, as available evidence is limited. The alliance between Polyperchon and Cratesipolis can be deduced from their joint occupation around Sicyon during this time. No record of conflict between the pair is recorded Cratesipolis maintained amicable relations with Sicyon during this period of time,<sup>1078</sup> and continued to do so until at least 309 and 308 BCE and Ptolemy Soter's brief foray into the region.<sup>1079</sup> While not definitive, the absence of overt hostility between the pair during a period when Polyperchon was vulnerable would suggest that Polyperchon and Cratesipolis had renewed their former ties following Alexander's death.

While it is tempting to suggest yet another defection or revolt within the ever-evolving realm of political alliances among the Diadochoi to explain Alexander's death, there is not enough surviving information to know. It may be possible that Alexion's actions were in response to Alexander's defection to Cassander, whose successive military campaigns had plagued the region for years. Conversely, Sicyon may have desired to remove itself from the conflict entirely, as Diodorus suggests the city was willing to fight for its freedom against Cratesipolis and her army.<sup>1080</sup> One possibility is that Cratesipolis and her army still held a greater measure of loyalty to Polyperchon than to other groups. Now that Alexander was dead, they simply returned to, and were welcomed back into,

---

possible reasons that may have lead to the return of Alexander's former army, now under the control of Cratesipolis, to Polyperchon's cause; Cratesipolis may have disagreed with Alexander's defection to Cassander, she may have been influence by the general sentiment of her troops, she may have had a prior amicable relationship with Polyperchon or a general aversion to Cassander. We simply do not know and this can only be left to the shaky realm of hypothetical reconstruction and speculation (cf. Ch. 2.3). It is not a great leap of judgment to suggest that Cassander's recent treatment of prominent women may have had some bearing on her decision, with the execution of Olympias in early 315, his forced marriage to Thessaloniki soon afterwards and the imprisonment of Rhoxane, the mother of Alexander IV. However, given the lack of guidance by the available evidence, Cratesipolis' motivations can only be speculated upon.

<sup>1078</sup> Poly. 8.58.

<sup>1079</sup> Diod. 20.37.1-2; cf. Plut. *Demtr.* 15.1; Diog. Laert. 2.115; Bosworth, in Bosworth & Baynham, 2000. p. 216; Wheatley, *Antichthon* 38 (2004). p. 4. n. 13; Caroli, 2007. p. 59.

<sup>1080</sup> Diod. 19.67.2: "τῶν γὰρ Σικυωνίων...συνδραμόντων μετὰ τῶν ὀπλων ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν."

Polyperchon's forces once again, re-implementing the military power he had held prior to his son's murder.<sup>1081</sup> When this took place, or whether Polyperchon held any hostility towards his son or the army now under the control of his daughter-in-law is not known, though by 314/3, Polyperchon clearly could not enjoy the luxury of turning away any supporters who presented themselves.

This first section of investigation of this chapter has discussed the initial phases of the First War of the Diadochoi in Europe with a primary focus on Cassander's reaction to the new alliance between Polyperchon and Antigonus as well as his entry into the Peloponnese for the fourth time in another unsuccessful attempt to implement his control over the region. In addition to Cassander's European movements in 315 and 314, this section of investigation discussed the shift in Cassander's approach to the struggle against Polyperchon now that he had lost the support of Antigonus. This shift is seen in the evolution of Cassander's purely military approach to combating Polyperchon to incorporation of political elements to mitigate the growing threat that Polyperchon now posed. However, when Polyperchon rejected the proposal by Cassander, Cassander shifted his focus to the other eminent members of his adversary's support base, notably to Polyperchon's son, Alexander. Here Cassander was successful in facilitating the defection of Alexander shortly before his death in the city of Sicyon in the northern Peloponnese in 314. The loss of Alexander had significant political impact upon Polyperchon's prestige, however, from a military perspective, it appears that following Cratesipolis' victory over Sicyon, Polyperchon was able to reabsorb both the city and this army into his support base. However, the defection and subsequent death of Alexander meant that Polyperchon and Antigonus both lost a significant figure in the struggle against Cassander. This would force Antigonus to change the way in which he would approach events in Europe, not only in regards to Polyperchon, but also to Cassander.

---

<sup>1081</sup> cf. Wheatley, *Antichthon* 38 (2004). p. 3. n. 10.

## 8.2: War and Peace of the Dynasts

This section of investigation discusses the events leading up the negotiations that eventuated in the Peace of the Dynasts in 311/0, when a secession of hostilities was called for between the coalition of Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy with Antigonus. In order to gain an understanding of what led to the negotiations, it is necessary to discuss the events, albeit briefly, in Europe and Anatolia and the respective actions of the combatants. Of central concern to this investigation is the way the dynamic in the alliance between Antigonus and Polyperchon changed following Alexander's death at Sicyon. Now that one of the key power figures opposing Cassander was gone, Antigonus was forced to shift a greater amount of resources to Europe in order to concentrate Cassander's immediate attentions in Greece, rather than allowing him the ability to move with strength against Antigonus in Asia Minor. This addition to the Antigonid presence in Europe can be seen first with the arrival of Telesphorus in 314, and the following year with the arrival of another of Antigonus' officers, Polemaeus.

The negotiations that would result in peace for the western reaches of the Macedonian Empire did not include all of the principal participants. A key absence from the discussions was Polyperchon, who stubbornly maintained a foothold in the Peloponnese. While it has been argued that, by 311, Polyperchon had lost all credibility as a military and political leader in Europe, resulting in his absence from the negotiations near the Hellespont, there is evidence to suggest that he still presented a significant threat to Cassander and the reason for his absence from negotiations may lie in the political machinations of Antigonus who was keen to reach a swift peace before turning his own attentions west to the growing threat posed by Seleucus. In order to ascertain Polyperchon's standing in 310, close evaluation of Antigonus' famous letter to Scepis following the Peace of the Dynasts is necessary. Though the letter is well known to scholars, Polyperchon's place within the text has been neglected, thereby missing a vital insight into the relationship between Monophthalmus and his Peloponnesian ally. By re-evaluating the letter, greater understanding of

Polyperchon's standing during the latter stages of the conflict against Cassander is possible.

Following the death of Alexander, the representatives in Greece of both Cassander and Antigonus continued the struggle for dominance in Europe. Ascertaining Polyperchon's movements during the remaining years of the First War of the Diadochoi is difficult, however it would appear, from what scant references to him exist within the literary tradition, he maintained his position in the Peloponnese and did not undertake a prominent role in the conflict.<sup>1082</sup> Cassander's actions are more certain. After returning from the campaign in the Peloponnese the previous year, he forged an alliance with the Acarnians, and in the summer of 314, embarked upon an aggressive military campaign, launching an invasion into Aetolia once he became aware of their alliance to Aristodemus.<sup>1083</sup> From here, Cassander continued into Illyria, where he defeated the Illyrian king, Glaucis, and established a garrison within the region before returning back to Macedon.<sup>1084</sup> It is once Cassander returned to the Macedonian Homeland that he embarked upon his only trans-Aegean military endeavour since his return to Attica in 318.

Despite Antigonus' concerted efforts to keep Cassandrian forces out of Asia, in the winter of 314/3 Cassander was able to send a body of reinforcements from Macedon as well as from the Munychia garrison to Caria under the command of Asander and Prepelaus. The forces sent were in aid of the Seleucid and Ptolemaic forces in the region which was beset by Antigonid troops.<sup>1085</sup> With Alexander dead, and the military and political weight of Polyperchon restricted

---

<sup>1082</sup> Diod. 19.74.2 places Polyperchon's location between Sicyon and Corinth during the year of 313, most likely alongside Cratesipolis who had remained in the area since the reprisal against Sicyon the previous year following her husband's death until 308 and Ptolemy's invasion of the Peloponnese (cf. Diod. 20.37.1; Plut. *Demtr.* 8.1; Fortina, 1965. p. 90; Adams, 1975. pp. 150-152; Wheatley, 1997. pp. 168-169; Caroli, 2007. p. 59; Errington, 2008. p. 46; Hauben, in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 251-257). No mention of Polyperchon's location is made until his elevation of Herakles as a political tool in 309 (See: Ch. 8.3.).

<sup>1083</sup> Diod. 19.67.1-5.

<sup>1084</sup> Diod. 19.67.6-7.

<sup>1085</sup> Diod. 19.68.2-3, 19.68.5; Adams, 1975. p. 121, 123; Billows, 1990. p. 119.

by this, Cassander's forces were now available to do exactly what Antigonus had hoped his alliance with Polyperchon would stop, that is to present a direct threat to Antigonid holdings within Asia Minor itself.<sup>1086</sup> It is interesting to note, when placed in contrast to Antigonus' motivations for the alliance with Polyperchon, that Cassander's reasons for the Carian expedition were, in addition to aiding his allies in the region, to keep Antigonus located in Asia and prevent him from entering Europe. This would allow Cassander, as Adams has identified, to keep the worst of the fighting as far as possible from his base of operations in Macedon.<sup>1087</sup> Should Cassander be able to establish a foothold within Asia centred on Caria he would be able to expand directly into Antigonid held territory in Anatolia. The expedition was ultimately unsuccessful, and Cassander's troops were crushed by the Antigonid general Polemaeus, who led a night attack on Cassander's troops, either destroying or capturing the force.<sup>1088</sup> The loss of the expeditionary force into Caria must certainly have been a blow to Cassander's military resources and checked his trans-Aegean aspirations, however it was by no means a significant enough defeat to force Cassander out of the conflict. However, it may be at this point in time that the tide of Cassander's fortunes began to turn against him.

In response to Cassander's engagement in Caria, and in order to re-establish the scale of the threat against him in Greece and Macedon, Antigonus dispatched his officer Telesphorus to the Peloponnese.<sup>1089</sup> From here, Telesphorus set about securing the factions within the region that were previously loyal to Alexander,<sup>1090</sup> thereby helping to bolster the pro-Antigonid presence within the Peloponnese to the levels they were following the return of Alexander from Tyre in 315 and the implementation of the Polyperchon-Antigonid alliance. It seems clear that Telesphorus was keen to generate good will with Antigonus during his movements as he ventured throughout the Peloponnese; once again he

---

<sup>1086</sup> Diod. 19.68.2-3; 19.69.1; Fortina, 1965. p. 70; Adams, 1975. pp. 120-121; Billows, 1990. pp. 119-120; Anson, 2014. p. 159; cf. Ch. 8.1.

<sup>1087</sup> Adams, in Roisman & Worthington. 2010. p. 216

<sup>1088</sup> Diod. 19.68.5-7; Heckel, 2006. p. 224.

<sup>1089</sup> Diod. 19.74.1; Billows, 1990. p. 121.

<sup>1090</sup> Diod. 19.74.1-2.

conveyed to the Peloponnesian factions previously loyal to Alexander Antigonos' desire to implement freedom among the cities as Antigonos had promised at Tyre. By 313, Telesphorus' efforts resulted in Cassander losing his position in the Peloponnese,<sup>1091</sup> and from here a general contraction of Cassander's holdings within Greece as Antigonos continued to exert more pressure in the west. It must be noted that, while Telesphorus' orders were to establish freedom for the Greek cities, this seemingly did not apply to the territory held by Polyperchon as both Corinth and Sicyon would remain under Polyperchon's control.<sup>1092</sup>

Telesphorus was not the only officer Antigonos sent to Greece during the Third War of the Diadochoi. In the summer of 313, he sent his nephew Polemaus, along with a fleet of some 150 warships to Boeotia, where he received both political and military support from the Boeotian League.<sup>1093</sup> However, Antigonos' efforts did not run entirely smoothly. Telesphorus viewed the appointment as insulting to his own position and, in reaction to Polemaeus' arrival into Greece as Antigonos' overall commander, chose to rebel against Antigonos and struck out for himself.<sup>1094</sup> Telesphorus' rebellion against Antigonos was short lived, as Polemaeus, upon learning of his subordinate's actions, moved his forces into the Peloponnese and after a short period of time, was able to resecure Telesphorus' allegiance for the Antigonid cause.<sup>1095</sup> While it appears that Telesphorus was forgiven for his insurrection,<sup>1096</sup> it is demonstrative of the fragile and even at times petty nature of political alliances in the extremities of the Macedonian Empire, even during times of success and advancement.

---

<sup>1091</sup> Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216.

<sup>1092</sup> This interpretation is further supported by Polemaeus' subsequent entry into the Peloponnese to wrestle control away from the now rebellious Telesphorus (Diod. 19.87.) Despite the ability to take the cities away from him should this have been the desire of either Antigonos or Polemaeus, Polyperchon's holdings in the region were once again left unmolested (Diod. 19.74.2; cf. Billows, 1990. p. 131.)

<sup>1093</sup> Diod. 19.77.2-4. For discussion regarding the spelling of Polemaeus' name, see: Hauben, *EA*. 9. (1987). p. 32; Heckel, 2006. p. 224.

<sup>1094</sup> Diod. 19.87.1-3; Billows, 1990. p. 131.

<sup>1095</sup> Diod. 19.87.3; Billows, 1990. p. 131.

<sup>1096</sup> As has been identified by Billows (1990. p. 131) with Telesphorus's later presence within the Demetrius' court at Athens in 307/6 (cf. D.L. 5.79.).

In addition to the Carian expedition, Cassander continued his aggressive military policy, first against the city of Oreus in Euboea where he learnt of Polemaeus' arrival into Greece. In response Cassander moved his forces to Chalcis in order to check the new threat from Polemaeus.<sup>1097</sup> However, the move further south made Macedon and Cassander's base of support there vulnerable to attack, and this was accentuated by Antigonus, who moved his forces towards the Hellespont, presenting Cassander with the choice of maintaining a stronger position in Euboea, or returning to Macedon.<sup>1098</sup> Not wishing to jeopardise his position in Macedon, Cassander withdrew from Euboea, leaving his brother Pleistarchus in command of the garrison<sup>1099</sup> and moved back to his position in Macedon before the winter of 313/12,<sup>1100</sup> leaving Polemaeus relatively free to move against Cassandrian held territory and gain control of Greece.<sup>1101</sup>

Cassander made one final campaign during the Third War of the Diadochoi. Now that Southern Greece was almost completely lost to him,<sup>1102</sup> maintaining the garrisons that remained loyal to him was vital. In the summer of 312, Cassander marched into Epirus in aid of his general, Lyciscus, to re-establish control in the region following the coronation of the new Epirote king, Alcetas.<sup>1103</sup> Once Epirus was stabilised, albeit temporarily,<sup>1104</sup> Cassander moved against the city of Apollonia in Illyria.<sup>1105</sup> However the Illyrian campaign was a disaster. Cassander suffered substantial losses while laying siege to Apollonia and was forced to retreat to Macedon before the winter of 312.<sup>1106</sup> Cassander's military efforts over 313 and 312 had little to no success, and saw an overall contraction of his military and political influence within the European Sphere of the Macedonian

---

<sup>1097</sup> Diod. 19.77.4-5.

<sup>1098</sup> Diod. 19.77.5.

<sup>1099</sup> Diod. 19.77.6. cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 30.1; Pau. 1.15.1

<sup>1100</sup> Diod. 19.77.6.

<sup>1101</sup> For Polemaeus' campaigns, see: Diod. 19.78.

<sup>1102</sup> Save for Athens, which remained under his control. cf. Billows, 1990. p. 131.

<sup>1103</sup> Diod. 19.88.1

<sup>1104</sup> Following a brief rule, Alcetas was deposed by an Epirote uprising. Though brief, stability in Epirus still afforded Cassander precious time to turn his attentions south. cf. Diod. 19.89.3; Paus. 1.11.5; Adams, 1975. p. 133.

<sup>1105</sup> Diod. 19.89.1-2.

<sup>1106</sup> Diod. 19.89.2-3.



Empire. With Polemaeus in a strong position with a firm grasp on areas of Mainland Greece as well as the Peloponnese divided between the control of Antigonos and Polyperchon, Cassander began efforts to negotiate terms of peace with Antigonos the following year.<sup>1107</sup>

Cassander's decision to approach Antigonos for peace came at a convenient time for Antigonos, as although he was making significant advances into Europe, events in his eastern territories were not as successful. Antigonos' son Demetrius had suffered a serious defeat at Gaza at the hands of Ptolemaic and Seleucid forces. This defeat and the growing threat that Seleucus was beginning to pose to Antigonos' position in Babylonia appears to have been a motivating factor for him to end the hostilities in the west with Cassander and the allied coalition in order to refocus his attentions east.<sup>1108</sup>

Accompanied by Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Cassander met with Antigonos who still maintained the position he had occupied near the Hellespont from the previous year in order to discuss the cessation of hostilities. A glimpse into Antigonos' mindset during the deliberation and negotiations is fortuitously available in addition to the ever-present narrative of Diodorus. This comes in the form of a letter Antigonos sent to the city of Scepsis in North West Anatolia that was later recorded into an inscription that transmits Antigonos' reasoning when facilitating the peace process with Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy.<sup>1109</sup> In addition to Diodorus's narrative, Antigonos' letter to Scepsis has become one of the pivotal authorities for historical analysis of the peace treaty. While the insight offered is intrinsic to understanding the peace of 311, Antigonos' letter needs to be read with caution. If the inscription does indeed record the words of

---

<sup>1107</sup> Diod. 19.105; Fortina, 1965. p. 77; Adams, 1975. p. 133; Billows, 1990. p. 131; Errington, 2008. p. 35; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216.

<sup>1108</sup> cf. Diod. 19.90.1; Plut. *Demtr.* 7.2; Billows, 1990. p. 136; Lund. 1992. p. 61; Boiy, 2007. pp. 145-147; Errington has also suggested that there may have been a general war weariness among the Diadochoi who wanted to end the conflict and focus on internal affairs (Errington, 2008. pp. 33-34.)

<sup>1109</sup> *OGIS*. 5. = RC. 1; Munro, *JHS* 19. (1899) pp. 330-340; Errington, 2008. p. 35.

Monophthalmus,<sup>1110</sup> then a level of political distortion by Antigonos can be expected.<sup>1111</sup> This can result in some areas becoming advantageously prominent for Antigonos' political aspirations while other, less advantageous issues become vague or are even omitted. While it is not the intention of this investigation to critique the entirety of the letter, the sections concerning Cassander and in particular, Polyperchon are of key importance and deserve attention.

The final results of the Peace of the Dynasts were put into place by the end of 311,<sup>1112</sup> and echoed much of what had been decreed during the Partition of Triparadisus in 320.<sup>1113</sup> Lysimachus was placed in command of Thrace, Ptolemy received Egypt and areas of Libya and Arabia, while Antigonos' position in Asia gave him supreme command of the region.<sup>1114</sup> Cassander would be formally recognised as the *strategos* of Europe until the maturing Alexander IV came of age, the same position that Antipater had received in 320.<sup>1115</sup> The issue of defining who was and was not in attendance has been the focus of significant academic discussion and debate, particularly in regards to Seleucus.<sup>1116</sup> Seleucus' presence at the meeting would seem unlikely, given that he was cause for Antigonos' desire to conclude hostilities so that he could refocus his attentions west, Seleucus' participation in the proceedings or whether he had representation is outside the scope of this investigation. Of greater concern is

---

<sup>1110</sup> As asserted by Munro (*JHS*. 19. (1899) p. 339), and is an area with little cause for doubt. Harding, 1985. n. 132; Hauben, *EA*. 9 (1987). p. 29; Austin, 2006. p. 85.

<sup>1111</sup> cf. Errington's identification of the ambiguity that Antigonos employs within the inscription (2008. p. 35).

<sup>1112</sup> Diod. 19.105.1-3; Billows, 1990. pp. 131-133; Heckel, 1992. p. 201; Boiy, 2007. p. 150; Errington, 2008. p. 35.

<sup>1113</sup> Errington, 2008. p. 34. cf. Ch. 5.3. p. 149.

<sup>1114</sup> Diod. 19.105.1: "Ἀντίγονον δὲ ἀφηγεῖσθαι τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης."

<sup>1115</sup> Diod. 19.105.1: "...ἐν δε ταύταις ἦν Κάσανδρον μὲν εἶναι στρατηγὸν τῆς Εὐρώπης μέχρι ἂν Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ ἐκ Πωξάνης εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθῃ." It must be noted that this temporal limitation did not only apply to Cassander, but also to the other members of the Diadochoi.

<sup>1116</sup> See for example: Welles, 1934. p. 7; Adams, 1975. p. 136; Hauben, *EA*. 9 (1987). p. 33; Billows, 1990. p. 132; cf. Errington, 2008. p. 34; Anson, 2014. pp. 148-150.

Polyperchon's impact on, and influence over, the peace talks and how the convening dynasts engaged with him during this time.

The conventional academic interpretation holds that Polyperchon was neither present, nor had representatives engaged with the peace talks of 311.<sup>1117</sup> Certainly this position is implied by Antigonus' letter to Scepis, relating to the city that measures were taken to deprive Polyperchon of allies, because of his political isolation. This would further reinforce the notion that Polyperchon was not present at the negotiations at the Hellespont.<sup>1118</sup> While it can be seen that, as Antigonus increased his influence in Greece as the conflict progressed, Polyperchon became a less vital ally, this does not equate to his dismissal from Antigonus' side.<sup>1119</sup> Antigonus must have known, perhaps more than anyone else, that a shift in allegiances could have monumental unintended consequences upon the political environment. Without question, in 311/0, Polyperchon's influence and political strength was waning, but if Antigonus had rejected the alliance with Polyperchon outright, it risked prolonging the war in Europe at a time when his attentions were being drawn back to the west and the oncoming war with Seleucus in Babylon. Instead of abandoning Polyperchon and potentially prolonging war in Europe, Antigonus may have taken the same approach he had with Telesphorus in 313, and chose to end the hostilities via a more political process, assuring Polyperchon's compliance. Polyperchon had proven himself a stubborn adversary and a significant thorn in Cassander's side from his position in the Peloponnese for over half a decade and from what information is available he still held a strong position around Corinth and

---

<sup>1117</sup> Beloch, IV<sup>2</sup> 1924. p. 443; Will, 1984. p. 50; Bengston, 1987. pp. 43-44; Billows, 1990. p. 132; Heckel, 1992. p. 202; Heckel, 2002. p. 230; Caroli, 2007. p. 55; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). p. 14; also Wheatley (*Antichton.* 32. (1998). p. 13.), who exercises necessary caution, and while not explicitly referring to Polyperchon's participation in the peace talks, tentatively implies Polyperchon may have remained in the Peloponnese until 310.

<sup>1118</sup> *OGIS.* 5. = *RC.* 1.36-41: "οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοῦτον συντελεσθέντων : τὰ πρὸς Πολυπέρχοντα. θᾶσσον ἂν διοικηθῆναι, μηθενὸς αὐτῷ συνορκοῦντος." See Appendix 1. pp. 297-300.

<sup>1119</sup> The relationship between Antigonus and Polyperchon may have continued in an unofficial capacity following the promulgation of the Peace of the Dynasts as Polyperchon's campaign in 309 with Herakles appears to bear the hallmarks of Antigonid approval (cf. Ch. 8.3. p. 280).

Sicyon. In addition, there was the possibility that Polyperchon could, if spurned by Antigonus, change sides to join Cassander, who had already approached him to do so in 315, a turn of events that would divert more time and resources to Europe than Antigonus wished to expend. Keeping Polyperchon onside, but out of any key participation in the peace talks as Antigonus' letter to Scepis<sup>1120</sup> suggests, implies that he was still important enough to, at the very least, warrant discussion during the negotiations for peace.

The decision to leave Polyperchon alone and isolated in his diminished, yet still defensible, position in the Peloponnese, abandoned by Antigonus and the alliance they made in 315, would ease the negotiation process. This was particularly so with Cassander, and further increased by the withdrawal of Antigonal forces from Greece as a demonstration of Antigonus' sincerity. It is clear from his presence within Antigonus' letter that Polyperchon was still a significant enough figure within the Greek political sphere to warrant discussion during the peace negotiations and mention to the Troad city in Monophthalmus' letter, despite the zenith of his power and influence having passed after his expulsion from the Macedonian homeland, in 317. There may, however, be further implications that can be taken from Polyperchon's inclusion in Antigonus' letter to Scepis. The topic of Polyperchon's political isolation in Antigonus' letter may not be the only area within which he was a factor. He may indeed have been the focus of a greater amount of attention than previously allotted to him and the following portions of Antigonus' letter to Scepis may be the key to revealing the level to which Polyperchon was a factor during the peace negotiations. The following lines of Antigonus' correspondence read:

*“καὶ διὰ τὴν οἰκειότητα τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἡμῖν  
πρὸς αὐτόν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες κα[ὶ] τοὺς  
ἄλλους συμμάχους ἐνοχλουμένους ὑπὸ τε τῆς  
στρατείας καὶ τῶν δαπανημάτων, ὥμιεθα  
καλῶς ἔχειν συνχωρῆσαι καὶ τὰ[ς δ]ιαλ[ύς]εις  
ποιήσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον.” – . 5. RC. 1. 41-46.*

---

<sup>1120</sup> *OGIS*. 5. = RC. 1.

“...since no-one would be allied to him  
[Polyperchon] and at this same time seeing that  
you and the allies were suffering from the  
campaign and from the cost of the war, we  
thought we might make an agreement and to  
bring about an end also with this man  
[Polyperchon]...”<sup>1121</sup>

The issue within these rather ambiguous lines<sup>1122</sup> centres on just who is being referred to in lines 42 (“πρὸς αὐτόν”) and 46 (“πρὸς τοῦτον”), a matter that is further complicated by the somewhat inelegant language employed by Antigonus as noted by Munro upon the letter’s discovery.<sup>1123</sup> Nonetheless, if treated with due caution and awareness of these ambiguities, the letter does provide valuable evidence for the political dynamics of the time. Antigonus has previously been taken to refer to Ptolemy as a participant in the peace negotiations, or to Polemaeus, the Antigoniid general.<sup>1124</sup> While it is true that Ptolemy is explicitly referred to twice within the letter,<sup>1125</sup> proximity and context would suggest that another, more plausible identity and one that has been largely overlooked for the person of whom Antigonus speaks. I suggest that he is, in fact, Polyperchon.<sup>1126</sup> If this alternative reading is taken, then Polyperchon’s participation within the talks as well the way in which the other members of the Diadochoi perceived him requires a radical shift in perspective regarding his prominence. Polyperchon’s

---

<sup>1121</sup> See Appendix for the complete translation that this study employs.

<sup>1122</sup> An issue identified and possibly further complicated by Dittenberger’s somewhat unclear comment “*Ptolemeum, non Polyperchonta intellegi vix est quod moneam.*” (OGIS. p. 18. n. 16). The Latin is awkward but seems to be intended to mean: “*It is tentatively that I advise that Ptolemy, not Polyperchon, is to be understood.*”

<sup>1123</sup> Munro, JHS. 19. (1899). p. 337: “*Antigonus writes a rough Macedonian soldier’s Greek.*” It must also be stressed that αὐτῶι in Line 40 can only refer to Polyperchon, further emphasising that Polyperchon, and not Ptolemy is the subject of this section of the passage. See Appendix for a more literal English translation of Antigonus’ writing.

<sup>1124</sup> Hauben, EA. 9. (1987). pp. 31-32.

<sup>1125</sup> OGIS. 5. RC. 1. 30, 50; Hauben EA. 9 (1987). p. 29, 32-33; Caroli, 2007. pp. 55-56.

<sup>1126</sup> cf. OGIS. 5. RC. 1. 40. cf. Welles, 1934. p. 6, who pioneered this interpretation of Polyperchon; Heckel, 1992. p. 202.

involvement moves from that of a passive player within the peace deliberations to one who actively participated in the negotiations, forging an agreement to maintain the peace with Europe and with Cassander.

The position that Lines 41-46 of Antigonus' letter explicitly refer to Ptolemy was first argued by Welles, suggesting an ambiguous prior relationship between the pair as evidence that the person to whom the reference is made is Soter himself.<sup>1127</sup> This prior relationship has been the focus of some academic evaluation. It has been proposed that the prior relationship referred to by Antigonus is the connection between the Antigonid and Ptolemaic families via the Antipatrid family.<sup>1128</sup> Following the First War of the Diadochoi, Antipater had embarked upon a series of politically motivated marriage alliances between eminent families within the Macedonian Empire and his own.<sup>1129</sup> One of these marriages was between Ptolemy Soter and Antipater's daughter Eurydice, thereby supplying the Ptolemaic connection proposed by Harding and by Bagnall and Derow. The Antigonid connection appears later with the marriage between Antigonus' son Demetrius and another of Antipater's daughters, Phila, the former wife of Craterus.<sup>1130</sup> This marriage is loosely dated to the period of time after the partition of Triparadisus in 320.<sup>1131</sup>

The historicity of the marriages is not in doubt, however their political prominence in late 311 may be exaggerated. Certainly it can be expected that there did exist a measure of affection between the two daughters of Antipater,

---

<sup>1127</sup> Welles, 1934. p. 10. Which was subsequently accepted and built upon. Harding (1985). p. 132. n. 14) and Bagnall & Derow (2004) p. 10.), both suggest this is possibly an allusion to the marriages between Soter and Poliorcetes and Antipater's daughters; cf. Hauben, *EA*. 9. (1987). pp. 32-33. Certainly there is nothing to preclude such an arrangement, as Cassander may have used the marriages of his sisters to form his own alliances with Lysimachus and Ptolemy in 319 (cf. Ch. 6.1).

<sup>1128</sup> Harding, 1985. 132. n. 14; Bagnall & Derow, 2004. p. 10. Both Billows (1990. p. 132) and Heckel (1992. p. 203) use the reference in the letter as support for Polyperchon's absence from the peace negotiations.

<sup>1129</sup> cf. Ch. 5.2. pp. 135-136.

<sup>1130</sup> cf. Ch. 5.2. p. 136.

<sup>1131</sup> cf. Diod. 19.59. which places Phila in the east; Plut. *Demtr.* 14; Wheatley, 1997. p. 37; Carney, 2000. p. 165.

which may have eased communication between the Antigonid and Ptolemaic families. Unfortunately the roughness of Antigonus' Greek does little to clarify the matter.<sup>1132</sup> It is feasible, although curious, that Antigonus was alluding to the marriage between his son to Phila and Ptolemy's Antipatrid wife, Eurydice as the relationship in the surviving letter to Scepsis. Reminding the empire of the connection between the families could fulfil a political desire in the highly propagandistic letter to affect an easier transition to peace within both the Antigonid and Ptolemaic spheres of influence. However, when placed within the context of the letter, the proximity to Polyperchon's location in the letter and the greater historical context would suggest, as Lenschau has identified,<sup>1133</sup> that this prior relationship to which Antigonus refers, may instead be the alliance between Antigonus and Polyperchon. This reading in no way impacts upon the connection between the Antigonid and Ptolemaic Houses and still provides a more fitting account of Polyperchon's fate in 311. It must be remembered that Antigonus was supporting Polyperchon's cause against Cassander both financially and militarily up until the days immediately prior to the initiations of peace negotiations and the reference to peace also being made with Polyperchon would provide an explanation to Antigonus' support base of what had come of their expenditure in Greece against Cassander's hold on Macedon now that the war had been brought to an end.<sup>1134</sup>

Both interpretations, for either Ptolemy or Polyperchon, require greater historical context to attempt an identification as to whom Antigonus refers. However, there is little evidence specifically in Lines 41-46 that would lead the reader to reject the understanding that the person under discussion is Polyperchon, rather than Ptolemy. The reading of Polyperchon would appear a more likely option given the prominent support he received from Antigonus throughout the Third War of the Diadochoi over an extended marriage alliance between opposing factions and does not put into jeopardy the existence of the

---

<sup>1132</sup> Nor does Hauben's insightful investigation (*EA*. 9 (1987). pp. 29-36), who only notes Polyperchon's presence within the names recorded in the latter (p. 29).

<sup>1133</sup> Lenschau, *RE*. 1805.

<sup>1134</sup> See below.

relationship between Ptolemy and Antigonos, as this is evident in other parts of the letter.<sup>1135</sup> So with this alternative reading of Antigonos' Scepis letter, how does the perception of Polyperchon change within the context of the Peace of 311? Lines 44-45 state that Antigonos had been funneling support to Polyperchon's position within the Peloponnese from Scepis and "*other allies*," presumably other cities within Anatoila, in order for Polyperchon to continue the war effort against Cassander. In order to end the hostilities in Greece and relieve the pressure that had been exerted upon Scepis, both Antigonos and the other members of the Diadochoi deemed it necessary to reach an agreement with Polyperchon.<sup>1136</sup> The exact nature of the agreement is unknown and interpretation of the possible clauses relies heavily upon speculation, however it may be possible to suggest at least two criteria to which Polyperchon may have agreed.

As it was a key tenant of the peace itself, Polyperchon must have been expected to agree that peace was to be declared within Greece and that a general *status quo* be enacted.<sup>1137</sup> The second aspect is less clear, but given the context of the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, it may have informed one outcome of the Peace of the Dynasts, that being the limitation put upon Cassander's tenure as commander in Europe. Cassander's position as *strategos* in Europe was only valid until the time at which Alexander IV came of an age at which he could take an active role in the governance of the Macedonian Empire.<sup>1138</sup> Given Alexander's age, Cassander's official time in office could feasibly be limited to a few short years,<sup>1139</sup> offering the opportunity once against for an Argead to hold sway over Macedon. Whether the meeting Dynasts truly intended that Alexander IV should ever hold the throne in his own right is highly doubtful, as this would

---

<sup>1135</sup> As implied by *OGIS* 5. RC. 1. 29-31.

<sup>1136</sup> *OGIS* 5. = RC. 1. 46.

<sup>1137</sup> This is indicated by the agreement of the dynasts to declare freedom and autonomy among the Greek cities (Diod. 19.105.1; *OGIS* 5. = RC. 1. 53-56; Dmetriev, 2011. p. 120), once again, echoing the offer of freedom for compliance that Polyperchon has initiated back in 318.

<sup>1138</sup> Diod. 19.105.1; Heckel, 2006. p. 19; Caroli, 2007. p. 56.

<sup>1139</sup> By 311, Alexander IV would have been around the age of twelve or thirteen. If his father is used as an indication Alexander may have been able to actively undertake official duties within as little as three years time.



automatically invalidate their own holdings in the empire. What it may have achieved was the placation of Polyperchon in the Peloponnese, who in his support of Olympias had cast his lot entirely behind the rule of Alexander IV since abandoning Philip III and Eurydice in 317.

A possible explanation for the term set upon Cassander's tenure may have been to secure Polyperchon's acceptance of the peace to be installed in Greece. In order to counter the loss of allies, as well as the supplies provided to him by Antigonos, limiting Cassander's time as *strategos* with a clear indication that Alexander IV was to assume the throne once he came of age may have been a measure enacted to secure Polyperchon's willingness to maintain peace and bring an end to the conflict with Cassander. However, this also placed a fixed end to the short life of Alexander IV.

The Peace of the Dynasts of 311/10 played a pivotal role in the post-323 Macedonian Empire. It served as an opportunity for the signatories to focus on strengthening their hold on their own dominions rather than the infighting that had plagued the increasingly fragmenting integrity of the Macedonian empire. For Cassander, it provided him with official recognition of his position in Europe as regent until the coming of age of Alexander IV. In doing so he was given the office to which he believed he was entitled, one for which Antipater had passed over him in favour of Polyperchon. Cassander was finally coming to the position for which he believed he was most suited and for which he had embarked upon a war that lasted nearly a decade.

Polyperchon's position in 311/10 during the meeting of the dynasts on the Hellespont is much less clear. Conventional thought has held that he had remained languishing in the Peloponnese since 316, a defeated man whose ability and cause was all but destroyed. However, with the revaluation of Antigonos' Letter to Scepis, and its placement within the historical context of European events, this position requires reconsideration. Far from being the defeated former regent, Polyperchon and his cause were still receiving military and financial support from Antigonos and his dominions in Anatolia in order to

continue the war against Cassander. Given his steadfast position in the Peloponnese, Polyperchon could not, and did not, go overlooked during the parlay among the dynasts. Polyperchon was still not defeated, and his capitulation was required with haste. If he was overlooked or ignored, his hostile actions could easily unsettle the tenuous peace installed in the western segments of the Macedonian empire, threatening not only his enemy Cassander, but also diverting the attentions of his ally Antigonus, whose focus was required in the east against the threat posed by Seleucus. Therefore, given the contents of Antigonus' letter, Polyperchon was indeed an influential, even if absent, participant in the peace negotiations. While impossible to know, this influence may even have impacted on the temporal limit that the Diadochoi agreed upon, that the time they were to spend in their respective offices would only last as long as the young Alexander IV was unable to take an active role in the rule of the Macedonian empire.

### **8.3: The Aftermath of 311 and the Claim of Herakles**

The final section of investigation for this thesis on the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon and their struggle for supremacy in Europe is devoted to the period following the Peace of the Dynasts in 311 until the conclusion of the conflict between the pair in 309/8 following the murder of Herakles by Polyperchon. During this period of time, a number of significant events occurred that highlight the distinctive ways in which the two combatants approached the war and their relationships with the royal family. The Peace of 311 provided a measure of security for both Cassander in his seat at Pella and Polyperchon in his entrenched position in the Peloponnese. If the implemented terms from the peace talks as recorded by Diodorus were upheld and saw Alexander IV's transition onto the throne in the coming years, it can be argued that the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon would have ended in 311 with an uneasy cessation of active hostilities between the pair. However Alexander IV's assumption of power did not take place, and soon after the peace was enacted in 311, Cassander set about ensuring that his present, temporary hold on the governance of Europe for a time until the young king reached

maturity, would become a more permanent office. While the exact timing is uncertain, shortly after the promulgation of the Peace of the Dynasts in 311, Cassander ordered that both Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane, who were still imprisoned in Amphipolis, be murdered, thereby removing any possibility of Alexander the Great's son taking the throne in his own right and freeing Cassander from the limitations placed on the Diadochoi by the peace agreement. The death of Alexander IV, the last male Argead who held direct links to Alexander III, appears to have been of little concern to the members of the Diadochoi.

While Polyperchon's immediate reaction to the news of the young king's death is unrecorded, his next move was to resume the conflict with Cassander. In what is possibly one of Polyperchon's most notable ventures, he facilitated the arrival of Alexander the Great's illegitimate son Herakles in Europe from Asia. From there, he launched the final campaign in his conflict against Cassander in order to place a son of Alexander on the throne of Macedon. Herakles' campaign was short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful. Instead of risking another potentially risky and expensive invasion in southern Greece, Cassander chose, as he had done with Alexander in 314, to end the conflict via diplomatic means. This resulted in both the death of Herakles and an alliance between Cassander and Polyperchon and offers an intriguing insight into the political environment in Europe and the amount of support available to the Polyperchon-backed campaign of Herakles.

The Peace of 311 had a number of explicit and implicit effects upon the Macedonian Empire in the emerging Hellenistic World. One person they centred upon was Alexander IV, who was elevated back into prominence in the political sphere.<sup>1140</sup> As long as the young king lived, the temporal limitations set upon the tenure of the Diadochoi would still be in effect. While this self-imposed limitation would initially seem counter-intuitive, with the benefit of historical hindsight, it can be seen that the measures would assist in maintaining the

---

<sup>1140</sup> Fortina, 1965. p. 86; Adams, 1975. pp. 136-137; Billows, 1990. p. 135; Carney, in Worthington, 1994. pp. 377-379; Caroli, 2007. p. 56; Errington, 2008. p. 34; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216.

integrity of the empire as a single entity on behalf of the young king. It is possible that this temporal limitation may never have been intended to come to fruition and was a political farce that was merely a means to an end. It may have been expected that Alexander would be removed as a potential future threat, instead of taking the throne when he came of age.<sup>1141</sup> It is highly unlikely that any of the participants in the peace talks of 311 held a genuine interest in seeing this decree fulfilled and allowing Alexander IV to take control of the empire as it would mean that the conflicts since 323 to establish their own bases of power had been for naught. As Adams highlights, Alexander IV was a particular problem for Cassander on the grounds that he held control of the Macedonian homeland and had the young king in his custody.<sup>1142</sup> Additionally, the notoriously stubborn Polyperchon must have been a factor for Cassander when assessing what was to be done with Alexander IV as Polyperchon in his effort to maintain his regency in Macedon had allied himself to the royal family and more specifically to Alexander's grandmother, Olympias in 317. Though not explicitly recorded as part of the peace negotiations as recorded by Diodorus or contained within Antigonus' letter to Scepis, it is possible that Alexander's death may have been informally agreed upon during the meeting of the dynasts in late 311.<sup>1143</sup> Alternatively, as Diodorus relates, the murder of Alexander IV was in response to the young king's developing maturity,<sup>1144</sup> while Pausanias ties the murders to Cassander's loathing of the royal Argead family.<sup>1145</sup> Whatever the case, planned or not, Alexander IV's days were numbered following the declaration of peace in the western empire.

Following the declaration of peace, Cassander sent word to Glaucias, the man he had placed in Amphipolis to oversee the young king and his mother, to quietly

---

<sup>1141</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 136; Billows, 1990. p. 135; Adams, *Anc. World*. 22. (1991). p. 30; Carney, in Worthington, 1994. p. 378; Adams, 2010. p. 216; Heckel, 2006. p. 19; Anson, 2014. p. 149.

<sup>1142</sup> Billow, 1990. p. 135; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 126; Adams, 2010, p. 216.

<sup>1143</sup> cf. Adams, 1975. pp. 137-138.

<sup>1144</sup> Diod. 19.105.2; Adams, *Anc. World*. 22. (1991). p. 29.

<sup>1145</sup> Paus. 9.7.2.

murder the pair and preserve their bodies for future burial.<sup>1146</sup> The exact dating of this is somewhat unclear, and has been much discussed.<sup>1147</sup> All parties agree that the murder of the pair took place following the Peace of 311,<sup>1148</sup> however what expanse of time occurred between these events has received a number of interpretations.<sup>1149</sup> The year in which Alexander IV's death took place is divided into a number of schools of thought, each reliant upon one of the ill-defined references made by the ancient accounts. The majority of ancient sources that record Alexander IV's death only mention its occurrence in passing,<sup>1150</sup> which has in turn led, understandably, to less specific dating by modern scholarship.<sup>1151</sup> The only two surviving sources that provide a clearer delineation of time regarding Alexander's murder are Diodorus' narrative, and the Parian Marble.<sup>1152</sup> Diodorus' reference to the murder locates it within the period of time immediately following the Peace of the Dynasts, leading to the possibility that Cassander's orders to Glaucias in Amphipolis took place some time prior to the end of the winter in 311/0.<sup>1153</sup>

---

<sup>1146</sup> Diod. 19.105.2; Heidl. Epit. *FGrH*. 155. F. 2.3; Just. 15.2.5; Marmor Parium, *FGrH*. 239. B. 18; Pau. 9.7.2; Adams, 1975. p. 137; Adams, *Anc. World*. 22 (1991). pp. 29-31; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 130; Caroli, 2007. p. 56; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. pp. 235-236.

<sup>1147</sup> See for example: Adams, *Anc. World*. 22. (1991). p. 30; Carney, in Worthington, 1994. p. 378; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216.

<sup>1148</sup> Save for Hammond & Walbank (1988. p. 165.) who follow a more strict adherence to Justin's narrative (cf. Heckel, 1992. p. 203. n. 160)

<sup>1149</sup> Adams, *Makedonia*. 3. (1983). p. 28; If a general agreement to murder Alexander was made by the Dynasts, it would further compound the problem in understanding the murder of the royal pair and the period of time Cassander was able to keep the murders secret and out of the public forum. For further discussion regarding this issue, see below.

<sup>1150</sup> Just. 15.2.1-3; Paus. 9.7.2; Heidl. Epit. *FGrH*. 155. F.1; App. Syr. 54.

<sup>1151</sup> See for example: Adams, *Anc. World*. 22 (1991). p. 30; Carney, in Worthington, 1994. pp. 377-378; Wheatley, *Limina*. 3. (1997). p. 70. n. 45; Heckel, 2006. p. 19; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216;

<sup>1152</sup> Diod. 19.105.2; Marmor Parium, *FGrH*. 239. F. 1.

<sup>1153</sup> Diod. 19.105.2; Wheatley, *Antichthon* 32. (1998). p. 16; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 129; A dating that has also been accepted by Adams (1975. p. 144. n.1; *Anc. World*. 22 (1991). p. 30; in Roisman & Worthington, 2010. p. 216), who accepts the murder of Alexander and Rhoxane took place as a direct consequence of the Peace of the Dynasts the previous year; Heckel, 2006. p. 19; Errington, 2008. p. 45.

The Parian Marble however, records the death of Alexander in the year of 310,<sup>1154</sup> and has received the bulk of academic support over the last century.<sup>1155</sup> The issue of the notoriously problematic chronology of the Marble has been noted,<sup>1156</sup> meaning that supplying a date for Alexander's death beyond 310 with information solely from the Marble is difficult. Wheatley, however, has thoroughly and convincingly argued, on the grounds of Diodorus' compressed narrative as well as the historical context of Polyperchon's subsequent actions, that the murder of Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane may be more appropriately set at a period of time between mid to late 310.<sup>1157</sup> For the purposes of this study, the exact dating of Alexander IV's murder is superseded by the need to maintain a coherent sequence of events, specifically that Cassander's orders to Glaucias, and the murder of the royal pair predates Polyperchon's final campaign with Herakles against Cassander.

From Diodorus' account, it can be inferred that Cassander had maintained correspondences with Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Antigonus regarding the removal of Alexander IV.<sup>1158</sup> However, if this was not the case and Cassander had acted independently, without the consent or knowledge of the other members of the Diadochoi, the result was much the same. Instead of receiving a negative reaction from the other dynasts or raising the ire of the greater population within Europe, the death of Alexander IV, the last legitimate male member of the Argead family and a sitting king of Macedon, along with his mother, seems to have been met more with relief than tension.<sup>1159</sup> With the last Argead king of Macedon gone, the various offices held by the Diadochoi were liberated from the temporal limitations set upon them by the Peace of the Dynasts. Now it was possible for them to build further upon their individual

---

<sup>1154</sup> Marmor Parium, *FGrH*. 239. B. 18.

<sup>1155</sup> See for example: Beloch, IV<sup>1</sup> 1924. p. 138; Wheatley, 1997. p. 137; Wheatley, *Anticthron*. 32 (1998). p. 14. n. 13; Caroli, 2007. p. 56.

<sup>1156</sup> cf. Wheatley, *Anticthron*. 32 (1998). p. 15. n. 15.

<sup>1157</sup> For a full discussion, see: Wheatley, *Anticthron*. 32 (1998). pp. 14-19. Note that Wheatley does suggest the murders could feasibly have taken place as late as 309.

<sup>1158</sup> Diod. 19.105.3.

<sup>1159</sup> Billows, 1990. p. 135.

powerbases, as well as to place their monarchical aspirations into effect without contending with the Macedonian Royal House.

Word of Alexander IV's death spread slowly and certainly not on the scale or with the rapidity that news of his father's death had spread in 323. One key reason for this was the secretive nature of the royals' deaths and Cassander's ability to restrict the release of information. His control of information may also explain the relatively vague indications in our sources regarding the timing of the murders. This seems to have been especially so in the eastern extremities of the Macedonian Empire, where Alexander IV would continue to hold regal status in the years after his death.<sup>1160</sup> In Diodorus' case, it may have resulted in a greater compression of his narrative following the promulgation of the peace treaty in 311. Considering the supposed involvement of his family in the assassination plot to murder Alexander the Great in 323,<sup>1161</sup> as well as Antigonos' successful propaganda campaign against him following the execution of Olympias in 316, it seems likely that Cassander would attempt to keep the death of the king of Macedon secret and control the way in which the empire as a whole would learn that the king was dead in order to avoid inciting unnecessary political backlash.

In apposition to his father's death, news of which raced through the empire, and whether or not it was designed to do, it appears that Alexander IV's death was known within the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire in the months following. While his reaction is not known, nor when exactly he received word that Alexander was indeed dead, the preparations made by Polyperchon for his next and final manoeuvre against Cassander would suggest that it was in reaction to the vacancy of the Macedonian Throne rather than as a precursor to it. Following Alexander's death, Polyperchon sent word to the city of Pergamon,

---

<sup>1160</sup> Adams, *Anc. World*. 22 (1991). p. 30; Wheatley, *Anticthron*. 32. (1998). p. 17. n. 23; Boiy, *ZPE*. 138. (2002). pp. 250-251, 254; Boiy, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 7-8; For an in-depth evaluation of the respective records in the east, see Boiy, 2007. pp. 84-89.

<sup>1161</sup> cf. Ch. 4.

where the illegitimate son of Alexander the Great, Herakles, resided.<sup>1162</sup> Polyperchon's aim was to facilitate Herakles' passage from western Anatolia over the Aegean to the Peloponnese, from where he could lead a campaign north to reinstall an Argead on the Throne of Macedon. The question of Herakles' parentage and the legitimacy of his connection to Alexander the Great is not the focus of this investigation.<sup>1163</sup> Clearly Herakles did not have enough support to claim the throne in 323 during the deliberations of the Partition of Babylon in the wake of his father's death. However by 310 and with a radically diminished royal family, as the last surviving male member of the Argead family, his claim could possibly gain greater traction within Europe with royal sympathisers than would have been possible while Alexander IV was alive. Polyperchon may have been able to expedite Herakles on his own, yet as has been previously suggested, it is likely that Antigonus was aware of the young pretender's movements as well as Polyperchon's motives for bringing him west.<sup>1164</sup> However, it would appear that Monophthalmus' support was not explicit, remaining tacit throughout the campaign, as any open support of Polyperchon's efforts would place the peace terms at jeopardy risking a resumption of hostilities in the west. It seems more likely, that his support was designed to occupy Cassander's attentions away from any possible action against the Antigonid sphere of influence.

Herakles was not the only focus of Polyperchon's preparations. Diodorus relates that, while central to Polyperchon's efforts to install another member of the royal house, Polyperchon's support for Herakles was part of a more dynamic plan to remove Cassander from his position in Macedon. In addition to securing

---

<sup>1162</sup> Diod. 20.20.1-2; Fortina, 1965. pp. 87-88; Adams, 1975. p. 145; Billows, 1990. p. 140; Heckel, 1992. p. 203; Wheatley, *Antichthon*. 32. (1998). p. 12; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 128; Heckel, 2006. p. 138; Adams, in Roisman & Worthington. 2010. p. 216; Anson, 2014. p. 150; cf. Howe, in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. p. 58.

<sup>1163</sup> For discussion on this topic, see: Tarn, *JHS*. 41. (1921). pp. 22-25; Berve, Vol. II, 1926. p. 168; Adams, 1975. p. 145; Brunt, *RFIC*. 103. (1975). pp. 22-34; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 128. n. 204.

<sup>1164</sup> Adams, 1975. p. 145; Billows, 1990. p.140; Wheatley, *Antichthon* 32. (1998). pp. 14-15; Anson (2014. p. 150.) suggests that Herakles may have arrived in the Peloponnese by the Autumn of 310; Carney, *Syll. Class*. 25. (2014). pp.18-19.



Herakles, Polyperchon also made contact with disaffected groups within Greece, most notably the Aetolian League, and was able to secure significant financial and military aid.<sup>1165</sup> The amount of time Polyperchon spent planning the invasion is unknown. Given what can be gleaned from Diodorus' narrative regarding Polyperchon's efforts, it can be inferred that the campaign in support of Herakles was long in the making, rather than a hastily implemented venture.<sup>1166</sup> Once completed, Polyperchon had been able to accumulate substantial forces for the journey north, numbering in excess of 20,000 infantry and over 1,000 cavalry troops.<sup>1167</sup> In 309, far from being the defeated, isolated, aging statesman languishing in the Peloponnese, Polyperchon was still able to present a real threat that Cassander would not be able to ignore.<sup>1168</sup>

Once ready, Polyperchon, Herakles and their army departed north from the Peloponnese. The dating of this embarkation, as with most of Polyperchon's movements during this time, is difficult to ascertain. Though the majority of scholars place the campaign in the year of 309,<sup>1169</sup> Wheatley has argued that the campaign could just as feasibly be inserted into the following year of 308.<sup>1170</sup> As previously stated for the goals of this study, the sequence of events are more important to an understanding of the struggle between Cassander and Polyperchon than providing a definitive chronology for this period of time. Instead of marching directly into Macedon itself, Polyperchon marched his troops to Epirus.<sup>1171</sup> As well as being a difficult region within which for Cassander to implement his authority, the detour into the homeland of his former ally Olympias may have allowed Polyperchon to add more support to his already substantial forces before entering into the Macedonian homeland.

---

<sup>1165</sup> Diod. 20.20.1-4.

<sup>1166</sup> Diod. 20.20.1: "Ἀμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Πολυπέρχων διατρίβων."

<sup>1167</sup> Diod. 20.20.4.

<sup>1168</sup> Carney, in Worthington, 1994. p. 378; Heckel, 2006. p. 230; Carney, *Syll. Class.* 25 (2014). p. 19.

<sup>1169</sup> Carney, in Worthington, 1994. p. 378; Wheatley, *Anticthron* 32. (1998). p. 12, especially n. 5 for further bibliography; Dixon, in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. p. 173; Paschidis, *Tekmaria*. 9. (2008). p. 246; Adams, 2010. p. 216.

<sup>1170</sup> Wheatley, *Anticthron* 32. (1998). p. 23: "*Chronographically, there is nothing whatever to preclude either 309 or 308 as the year for this event.*"

<sup>1171</sup> Diod. 20.28.1.

Cassander was clearly worried that his own troops may desert to Herakles' cause, reminiscent of Olympias' return to Macedon and her confrontation with the forces led by Eurydice and Philip III in 317.<sup>1172</sup> This concern could easily extend to the garrisons Cassander had placed within the region as well as to the Epirote population, whose support would not be difficult for Polyperchon to gain. Indeed, it is likely that the 20,000 men who left the Peloponnese with Polyperchon may have been comprised of an Epirote contingent originally from the troops Polyperchon absorbed on his escape south after Olympias' execution in early 316.

The prospect of leaving Polyperchon and Herakles unmolested, free to venture into the heart of his support base at will, would not have been an appealing one for Cassander. Therefore, in response to his rival's movements into neighbouring Epirus, Cassander too moved his own army into the region. With both armies camped near Stymphaea,<sup>1173</sup> the stage was set for a hostile military confrontation between the old rivals. However, as with Cassander's previous invasion of the Peloponnese in 315 at the siege of Messenia,<sup>1174</sup> no action is recorded to have taken place between the pair. Instead, Cassander is said to have sent emissaries to Polyperchon's camp in hope of reaching a diplomatic resolution, not just for the immediate action at hand, but for a permanent cessation of hostilities. Previously Polyperchon had demonstrated little interest in opening a dialogue with Cassander, as exemplified by the rejection of Cassander's overtures to abandon the newly forged alliance with Antigonos in 314, but by the time of the Herakles Campaign, Polyperchon was more amenable to a dialogue taking place.

The amount of the time that the negotiations took is unknown, however given Diodorus' account, it is suggested that there were multiple phases to the dialogue. Curiously, a point raised by Diodorus during Cassander's negotiations with Polyperchon was that, in order to dissuade his rival from continuing to

---

<sup>1172</sup> cf. Ch. 7.2.

<sup>1173</sup> Diod. 20.28.1; Talbert, 1985. p. 62. B2

<sup>1174</sup> cf. Ch. 8.1. p. 250.

support Herakles, Polyperchon would not be able to rule in his own right but that he would be ordered by others.<sup>1175</sup> It is doubtful that these ‘others’ to whom Cassander referred applied to Herakles himself, as Polyperchon must have been aware that, if he were to place the young claimant on the throne of Macedon, he would surely be under the direction of the young king’s authority.<sup>1176</sup> It is more likely that Cassander was referring to outside political influences that could have been brought to bear against Polyperchon and the new king of Macedon, most likely in reference to the seemingly ever-present influence of Antigonus in Greek politics during the time.<sup>1177</sup> It appears though that this offer was not enough to dissuade Polyperchon from his mission to install Herakles, as the negotiations between the pair would continue. While Antigonus was seemingly willing to outwardly abandon the alliance with Polyperchon during the Peace of 311, Polyperchon, as in 314, seems to have continued to maintain any formally held agreement he had made with Monophthalmus. With this point apparently stalled, Cassander went on to make more generous offers and concessions to Polyperchon. As Diodorus relays, Polyperchon would receive what had been previously his within the Macedonian homeland.<sup>1178</sup> In addition to this, and possibly as an admission of his inability to extricate Polyperchon from his entrenched position within the Peloponnese via military means, Cassander

---

<sup>1175</sup> Diod. 20.28.2.

<sup>1176</sup> Herakles was around the age of seventeen or eighteen by 309/8 (Just. 15.2.3: who cites Herakles’ age as fourteen, possibly in confusion with Alexander IV (cf. Adams, 1975. p. 147. n. 4; Wheatley, *Antichthon*. 32. (1998). pp. 18-19; Anson, 2014. p. 150); Diod. 20.20.1-2). As Develin notes: “...the fourteenth birthday is symbolic of reaching manhood, Herakles at the time of his death in 309 seventeen or eighteen years old.” Yardley & Develin, 1994. p. 139. n.4. This would mean that Herakles would have begun to transition from a passive regal position into a more active participant in the governance of Macedon. cf. Errington, 2008. p. 34.

<sup>1177</sup> Tarn, *JHS*. 41 (1921). p. 22; Adams, 1975. p. 145; Billows, 1990. p. 140; Anson, 2014. pp. 150-151; Though Carney (*Syll. Class*. 25. (2014). p. 19.) rejects this notion on the grounds that both Antigonus and Polyperchon had expelled too much an effort to facilitate Herakles’ claim to simply abandon the venture before it began. As Carney plausibly identifies, it would appear likely that Polyperchon and Herakles may have already begun their campaign north at the time that Cassander’s offer to end the hostilities reached Polyperchon’s camp.

<sup>1178</sup> Diod. 20.28.2; Adams (1975. p. 147) correctly identifies that this must refer to Polyperchon’s estate, which was likely confiscated following Polyperchon’s flight from Macedon during Cassander’s successful invasion in 316 (cf. Ch. 7.2).

chose instead to nullify this threat and simultaneously incorporate the region into his sphere of influence via diplomatic efforts. Should Polyperchon accept, Cassander would promote him to the position of *strategos* of the Peloponnese on Cassander's behalf, and he would be provided with additional military resources to compliment his own strength.<sup>1179</sup> Polyperchon's concessions were simple. He was to murder Herakles and along with him the threat posed to Cassander's hold on Macedon, abandon the campaign that he led and join with Cassander, thereby bringing the conflict to an end,<sup>1180</sup> terms that Polyperchon duly accepted.<sup>1181</sup>

Polyperchon's motivations for openly joining with Cassander by the murder of Herakles are difficult to ascertain. Certainly as a long time supporter of the Argead House with which he closely allied himself throughout the conflict with Cassander, the murder of the last male member of the family does appear to run in stark contrast to the standard model of Polyperchon's *modus operandi* since 319. Diodorus simply suggests that he was won over by the many promises of Cassander and that this was what brought an end to the conflict.<sup>1182</sup> This assessment however appears overly simplistic. It is far more likely that Polyperchon's acceptance of Cassander's overtures was the result of a number of factors. Being aged in his seventies by 309/8, Polyperchon may have wished to retire from active military life.<sup>1183</sup> The possibility too that Antigonos wished to supplant Polyperchon's authority in Europe may have struck a chord with the aging statesman, or that a successful installation of Herakles as ruler of Macedon would merely result in a perpetuation of hostilities that would see more years of

---

<sup>1179</sup> Diod. 20.28.2-4: These military resources comprised of 4,000 Macedonian foot troops and five hundred Thessalian cavalry.

<sup>1180</sup> Diod. 20.28.2-3; Just. 15.2.3; cf. Harding, 1985. p. 167. n. 13; Billows, 1990. p. 142; Wheatley, *Antichthon*. 32. (1998). p. 12; Landucci Gattinoni, 2003. p. 129; Yardley, Wheatley & Heckel, 2011. p. 237.

<sup>1181</sup> As Paschidis has identified, with the acceptance of Cassander's offer, Polyperchon disappears from the ancient sources (*Tekmeria*. 9 (2008). p. 246).

<sup>1182</sup> Diod. 20.28.2-3; A position that is supported by Carney, who makes pains to emphasize Polyperchon's gullibility and ineptitude as a political leader (in Worthington, 1994. p. 378.).

<sup>1183</sup> As has been previously suggested by Beloch for Alexander's defection to Cassander's cause in 314 (Beloch, IV<sup>2</sup> 1924. p. 443; cf. Ch. 8.1).

conflict in an already war-weary Europe,<sup>1184</sup> may have weighed on Polyperchon's mind. Given the provisions of the Peace of the Dynasts, Polyperchon would have little expectation of being able to draw on open support from other members of the Diadochoi and, save for the Aetolian League, many sympathetic groups in Europe may not have wished to jeopardize the tentative peaceful status-quo which appears to have resulted from the peace talks. Polyperchon may have accepted Herakles' death on these, purely pragmatic grounds, which, if carried out, would secure his life and recognise his position in both Macedon and the Peloponnese. While it is impossible to be sure of Polyperchon's motivations, it appears that he was not operating from a subordinate, inept position,<sup>1185</sup> but from one of strength and influence with which Cassander had to contend when proposing an end to the rivalry. What is known is that, with Herakles' death, Cassander was now without a direct challenge to his position in Macedon and that he possessed a new, powerful ally in the Peloponnese in Polyperchon.

This final section of investigation was devoted to the final phase of the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, following the deaths of Alexander IV and Rhoxane until the appointment of Polyperchon as Cassander's general in the Peloponnese by 308, following Polyperchon's murder of Herakles. While the death of Alexander IV and his mother shortly after the Peace of the Dynasts may have aided in further securing Cassander's hold over the Macedonian homeland, it jeopardised the peaceful *status quo* that the meeting at the Hellespont had been able to secure. Despite efforts to maintain these deaths as secret, Polyperchon had used his connection to Antigonus to secure the arrival of Alexander III's illegitimate son Herakles, following which in 309 the long time royal supporter used the last living son of Alexander III along with his Greek allies to once again threaten Cassander's position in the north. A long, protracted conflict was not in Cassander's interest, so measures to facilitate diplomatic negotiations were initiated and accepted. While the length of time that the negotiations took is not certain, the results are. Polyperchon was to become

---

<sup>1184</sup> cf. Adams, 1975. p. 146.

<sup>1185</sup> cf. Appendix 1. pp. 297-300.

Cassander's commander in the Peloponnese if he murdered the young Herakles, the last royal who could threaten Cassander's legitimacy to rule in Macedon. While Diodorus's simplistic evaluation of Polyperchon's motivation to murder Herakles as being little more than response to the bribery offered by the scheming Cassander, a more multifaceted explanation is available. Given his lack of previous success in extracting Polyperchon from his hold in the Peloponnese despite numerous unsuccessful military actions, and in order to expedite the cessation of hostilities, Cassander was required to provide Polyperchon with various successions, not to deceive Polyperchon, but out of sheer necessity. For Polyperchon, the position offered to him afforded allowed a convenient end to the decade long war against Cassander, along with a position of influence in the south and the retainment of his property within Europe.

This chapter of the investigation has covered the final stages of both military and political conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon. Following Cassander's successful conquest of Macedon and the initiation of his strategy to secure his control of the region, tensions were emerging among Antigonus Monophthalmus and the other allies, including Cassander. By 315, Antigonus had broken away from the allies and importantly for this study, levelled accusations against Cassander of monarchical intent based upon his methods to secure the homeland, precluding the outbreak of the Third War of the Diadochoi. This in turn resulted in Antigonus forsaking his alliance to Cassander and shifting his focus to support Cassander's greatest opponent in Europe, Polyperchon. Despite his flight from Macedon in 316, Polyperchon was still a real threat to Cassadorean interests in Greece, especially following the alliance that Polyperchon had been able to forge with Antigonus. After numerous failed attempts to expel Polyperchon and his supporters from the Peloponnese, Cassander knew he could not defeat Polyperchon simply through military strength, and therefore, tried to break the threat posed to him via alternative means. Shortly after Alexander's return from Tyre in 314, Cassander attempted to lure first Polyperchon, and then his son Alexander over to his cause. Though he was unsuccessful with the father, he was not with the son, and Cassander secured

Alexander's defection early in the conflict of the Third War of the Diadochoi in Europe.

Alexander's time with Cassander following his defection was short, as he died at the hands of the Sicylean, Alexion in 314. While the loss of his son, and the forces he commanded was a blow to Polyperchon, Alexander's widow, Cratesipolis, soon returned the troop formerly under her husband's command to Polyperchon. From here, little is known about Polyperchon's movements until the promulgation of the Peace of the Dynasts at the Hellespont in the winter of 311/10.

During the negotiations, Cassander was able to secure the office he had desired since the death of his father Antipater in 319, the recognised position of *strategos* in Europe in the stead of the Macedonian king, Alexander IV. Polyperchon's participation is less well defined, but it is clear from Antigonus' letter to the Troad city of Scepsis that he was discussed during the meeting. While it appears likely that neither Polyperchon, nor his representatives were in attendance at the Hellespont, he was not a passive, impotent factor that required no attention. While the western members of the Diadochoi were able to install an uneasy peace, Polyperchon was a man who, in his position in southern Greece, could easily jeopardise the cessation of hostilities if he did not receive a favourable outcome. The peace declared in Europe would allow Polyperchon to maintain his holdings in the Peloponnese, but it is possible that his long support of the Olympian faction of the Argead family may even have been a factor in the temporal limitation placed on the meeting Dynasts' offices to the time that Alexander IV came into adulthood. Whether or not Polyperchon was the cause of the restriction on Cassander's time in office or not, Alexander IV's days were numbered, and soon after the Peace of the Dynasts, the young king and his mother were dead, murdered by Cassander's man Glaucias.

Peace in Europe was not to last, as Polyperchon launched one final effort to remove Cassander from Macedon, and reinstall a male Argead, Herakles, onto the Macedonian throne. Once again, Cassander employed diplomacy, rather than

military might to end the threat posed by Herakles and Polyperchon's forces. A prolonged campaign was not in the interests of Cassander, nor of Antigonos, whose attentions were drawn to the east and the war with Seleucus. Therefore, Cassander, knowing that removing Polyperchon from the Peloponnese would once again be unlikely or would require more resources than he could afford, instead offered Polyperchon command of the Peloponnese in exchange for the death of Herakles. Polyperchon's allegiance would afford Cassander a strong and entrenched governor in the south, and would also remove Herakles as a rival before his cause gained traction with royal sympathisers in Greece and Macedon.

While Polyperchon had rejected Cassander's approaches in 314, although these had subsequently won over his son Alexander, this time he was more amenable to negotiations and by 308, Herakles was dead. Polyperchon's motives are uncertain, and following the murder of Herakles, he disappears from the ancient record. Though Diodorus asserts he was lured by the many offers of Cassander, the combination of his advancing age, the little hope he had left of continuing the war against Cassander now that Antigonos had been instrumental in the Peace of the Dynasts and the opportunity to end the conflict alive and in a position of authority cannot be ignored.

The war between Cassander and Polyperchon was not a war that was ended with either a great victory on the battlefield, or with a grand concession by the defeated man to his conqueror. It was a decade long conflict that ended via diplomatic compromise. Cassander was unable to extricate his foe from his stronghold in the Peloponnese, and Polyperchon was no longer able to continue the war with the same veracity that he was able to achieve in early phases of the conflict. Herakles' death secured a level of compromise and satisfaction for both men, ending the conflict that had begun in 319 shortly after the death of Antipater.



## Chapter 9: Conclusion

The death of Antipater in 319 sparked a long and bitterly fought war between two very different men, Polyperchon, whom the dying Antipater appointed as the next regent of the Macedonian Empire, and Cassander, Antipater's son, who had been overlooked despite his management of the regency during Antipater's period of declining health. The ensuing conflict and its consequences would fundamentally change the political landscape of the empire in terms of its governance, but also set precedents for engagements with the Greek cities by the Diadochoi. Previous investigations and interpretations viewed the conflict as a lop-sided, and concluded that Cassander dominated the inept Polyperchon. However, a careful and systematic re-evaluation of the ways in which both Cassander and Polyperchon acted, and re-acted to each other demonstrates that the decade of fighting was less clearly defined. While the power balance did shift between them, neither man was able to assert complete dominance in Europe. The conflict was brought to an end not by a great political or military victory, but by a mutually beneficial agreement following the stalemate created by the Peace of the Dynasts in 310.

As a stalwart supporter of the Argead house since the rise of Philip II, Antipater had played an integral role in Alexander III's succession to the Macedonian throne in 336 as well as in assisting the young royal during his reign. The trust placed in Antipater by Alexander was never more prominent than at the time of his appointment to the management of the Macedonian homeland during Alexander's great expansion of the empire into the East in 334. Despite the tensions that emerged between the king and his regent during these endeavours, tensions which ultimately resulted in Antipater's replacement by the popular Craterus in 324, there is little to suggest that Antipater swayed from his position as a strong Argead supporter.

Following Alexander's death in 323, Antipater and Craterus worked co-operatively, forming close ties between their families until the eruption of the First War of the Diadochoi in 321, when Craterus died fighting Eumenes of

Cardia near the Hellespont. With the loss of his son-in-law, Craterus, Antipater also lost a clearly identifiable and uncontroversial successor who could take over the regency in the event that he could not longer operate in such a capacity. Cassander, despite his service to his father during his journey to Babylon in 324, his military experience as Antigonos' *chiliarch* and his management of Europe on his father's behalf during his final days was always an unlikely choice, not because of his lack of ambition or ability, but because of his relationship to Antipater and his perceived inexperienced stemming from the Demades affair. Though Antipater did not alienate his son from political power and responsibility, Cassander was not given the role that he felt he deserved, and Polyperchon, Alexander's appointed replacement for Craterus in 324, who had demonstrated his ability to manage the Greek cities in times of crisis, took the position as regent instead. Polyperchon was also able to draw upon the approval of the great Macedonian king, and that of the popular Craterus under whom he had spent a significant period of his career.

Soon after Antipater's death and despite his appointment as Polyperchon's second in command, Cassander was determined to take control of Macedon for himself, soon departing from Macedon for Anatolia and the court of Antigonos. From there, Cassander built on his prior connections to members of the Diadochoi, namely Antigonos, Lysimachus and Ptolemy as well as connections with the oligarchies in Greek installed and supported by his father in the wake of the manpower shortage created by the demands of Alexander III's military expansion. These were the forces he brought in opposition to Polyperchon's new regency.

In stark contrast to Cassander's *modus operandi*, Polyperchon built his own support base from within Macedon, primarily on the foundation of legitimacy afforded to him by the members of the Argead family in Macedon, namely Philip III Arrhidaeus, his wife Eurydice as well as the young Alexander IV and groups sympathetic to the royal family. Not only did this place Polyperchon in a sufficiently strong position to force Cassander's departure from Macedon, but it also meant that Cassander was unable to seek support from the royal family

during the initial phases of the war. To complement internal Argead support, Polyperchon made concerted efforts to gain the support of the most prominent member of the royal family outside of Macedon, Olympias, who had confined herself to Molossia following her departure from Pella after her hostile interactions with Antipater. Wary of Polyperchon's intentions, Olympias was hesitant to return immediately to Macedon to aid the new regent.

Polyperchon's desire to foster amicable ties with Olympias was evident in the alliance he forged with Eumenes of Cardia, the close confidant of the royal mother and also Antigonus' most significant threat in Anatolia. With the successful acquisition of Eumenes' support and that of the Argead matriarch, Polyperchon would be able to bring the substantial force of Epirus into the war against Cassander as well as keep Antigonus from entering Europe. Polyperchon's pioneering efforts to combat Cassander's support base in Greece were not solely political with his use of freedom as a political tool, but also saw military expansion into the south. While he was unsuccessful in gaining Athenian support, which had fallen into Cassander's hands via the efforts of Nicanor, Polyperchon was highly successful in creating a powerful support base in southern Greece, centred on the Peloponnese, an example that was taken up by other members of the Diadochoi. Though the most prominent military action during Polyperchon's campaign in the Peloponnese was the unsuccessful siege at Megalopolis, the significance of Polyperchon's decision to raise the siege is overstated. Despite Cassander invading the region on at least three separate occasions Polyperchon maintained his control of the Peloponnese for the remainder of the war.

317 would see the greatest period of substantial military engagement in the conflict between Polyperchon and Cassander. The Cassandrian naval victory over Polyperchon's fleet, two years after the initiation of the conflict, marked the first point when the forces of Polyperchon and Cassander met in combat. The same year also saw Polyperchon's only departure from Europe into Asia Minor in aid of his ally, Eumenes. However, given the swift reaction of Cassander's raid into northern Greece, Polyperchon's time in Asia Minor was short and the regent

was forced to return west in order to protect his support base. The same year also saw Cassander's first engagement with the royal family as, following the threat posed by Polyperchon's desire to secure the support of Olympias, Eurydice stripped Polyperchon of the regency, giving the position to the son of Antipater. 317 also marked Olympias' decision to enter into the conflict, throwing her support behind Polyperchon in exchange for the guardianship of her grandson, Alexander IV. The period of time following Olympias' return to Macedon would see the greatest period of bloodshed within the Argead house during the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon. Eurydice and Philip III Arrhidaeus would perish during Olympias' reprisals in the winter of 317/16, with Olympias herself meeting her death following Cassander's successful invasion of Macedon and his reaction to her attacks against friends and family.

Following the conquest of Macedon, Cassander shifted focus to securing his position in the Macedonian homeland. He buried Philip III Arrhidaeus and Eurydice at the traditional Argead burial grounds at Aegae, married Thessalonice and began his building program which would eventuate in the reconstruction of Thebes and the foundation of Cassandrea and Thessalonica. While both ancient and modern writers have interpreted these actions as Cassander's first attempts on the Macedonian throne, when the ancient evidence is placed within its temporal context and with an understanding of Diodorus' hostile authority, Cassander's actions are more suitably ascribed to his multifaceted and careful approach to securing a position which was not yet secure against a still strong adversary in Polyperchon.

The successful conquest of Macedon by Cassander by the spring of 316 forced Polyperchon south to the bastion of support he had built in southern Greece. From the south, Polyperchon still presented a significant threat to Cassander's hold on Macedon, a threat magnified by Polyperchon's new alliance with Antigonus in 315. Cassander, knowing all too well the advantage that Antigoniid coffers would allow his opponent, sought to turn Polyperchon from his new ally via political incentives. While unsuccessful in securing Polyperchon's defection, Cassander was able to persuade Alexander to desert his father. Despite the

setbacks Polyperchon suffered in 316 and 315, he remained Cassander's most significant threat in Europe and was still receiving ample supply and support from Antigonos in Anatolia. This is made clear by Antigonos' letter to Scepsis, which not only highlights the Antigonid supplies diverted to Polyperchon's cause, but also details the discussion among those meeting parties concerning Polyperchon and the events that took place in 311/0, the promulgation of the Peace of the Dynasts and the uneasy peaceful status quo established in the western portion of the Macedonian Empire.

With peace installed, Cassander finally received external recognition of the office he had fought nearly a decade to secure, the regency of Macedon. Polyperchon's position following the peace is less well defined, beyond the assertion by Antigonos that he was without any explicit alliances among the signatories via Polyperchon's place within the Letter to Scepsis. What is known is that the signatories to the peace treaty desired peaceful stability in their respective spheres of influence, which an isolated and abandoned Polyperchon could disrupt. Another consequence of the Peace of the Dynasts, however, was the death of Alexander IV, whose maturity would officially end the positions held by the Diadochoi if he had lived to reach this age.

There would be one final phase in the conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon, the swift rise and fall of Alexander III's illegitimate son, Herakles. Following the treatment of Alexander IV and his mother Rhoxane, Polyperchon once again used Argead support to springboard an effort to remove Cassander from Macedon and prepared to launch an invasion north in 309/8 from his entrenched position in the Peloponnese. Cassander knew that ending the threat of Herakles by military means would be long, costly and given his experience with military actions in southern Greece, another potential failure. As in 315, Cassander attempted to end the conflict via the diplomatic manoeuvring that typified the Antipatrid family. In exchange for the death of Herakles, Cassander would give Polyperchon the command of the Peloponnese on his behalf, simultaneously ending the potential of another Argead threat in Macedon, as well as dissolving the threat Polyperchon posed in the south. With

Polyperchon's acceptance, the decade long conflict for control of Macedon and Greece was brought to an end.

The conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon ended without great victory or defeat for either man, but via a diplomatic middle ground between the belligerents, typifying the complex nature of the warring pair's interactions for the previous decade. Following Antipater's death in 319, the two men embarked on vastly different approaches for control of the region, the older Polyperchon employing mostly royally backed legitimisation against the younger Cassander, who chose to break away from the royal family and seek support from the Diadochoi and Antipatrid sympathisers in Greece. As one of the combatants made a move, the other would swiftly adapt and refocus their own efforts in order to achieve some advantage over their opponent. The vastly different manner in which Polyperchon and Cassander engaged with the royal family typifies this action-reaction dynamic between the two with the Argead family used as political pawns by each man, a strategy which ultimately sealed their fate as casualties in the conflict.

Traditional academic representation of the conflict has been one of the wily Cassander finally outclassing the bumbling, maligned, and inept Polyperchon, by engineering the assassination of Herakles in 309/8. However, this thesis has demonstrated that, far from being an outmatched and outclassed opponent, Polyperchon was in fact an enduring and dangerous threat to Cassander's cause throughout the entirety of the conflict. Despite his defeat at the naval battles near Byzantium, Polyperchon doggedly harassed Cassander, repelling several invasions from his base of operations in the Peloponnese, continuing to garner significant external support through the aid of Antigonos, until Cassander chose to reposition him as a friend, rather than a foe. This new interpretation also advances understanding of Cassander's road to dominance in Macedon, in that, far from being the driving dominant man in Greece and Macedon, his position was often more tenuous and fragile than has previously been thought, forcing him to adapt to and exploit opportunities as they developed. While the goal of each man was control of the European Sphere of the Macedonian Empire,

Cassander and Polyperchon conducted themselves in radically different ways. Polyperchon would continue to employ the Argead family as political support throughout the conflict, drawing in addition on Eumenes and Olympias, and later Antigonus, as external supporters. He revolutionised, moreover, the way in which the Diadochoi engaged with the Greek cities through the employment of freedom as a political mechanism. Conversely, Cassander opted for allied support from other members of Alexander's Diadochoi against the incumbent Polyperchon, choosing to take advantage of the pro-Antipatrid garrisons positioned in Greece by his father and only engaging with Argead support when he was able to dictate the alliance from a position of overt control over the family. By engaging with Cassander and Polyperchon together, rather than separately, this thesis has shown that the conflict between the two was not a one-sided affair, but an ever shifting, complex war that raged over Europe and across the Aegean, and offers increased understanding of events in Europe, following the death of Antipater in the middle of 319.

## Appendix 1: Antigonus' Letter to Scepsis.<sup>1186</sup>

A.<sup>1187</sup>

- πολλήν δὲ σπουδὴν] ἐποιού[μ]εθα [περὶ τῆς τῶν  
Ἑλλήνων ἐλ]ευθερίας, ἄλλα τε οὐ μικ[ρ]ὰ δι[ὰ  
τοῦτο συνχ]ωροῦντες καὶ χρήματα πρὸς δια-  
-πομπάς · κα]ὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων συναπεστείλαμε[ν  
5- μετὰ Δημάρ]χου Αἰσχύλον. ἕως δὲ συνωμολογ-  
-εῖτο, ἐν τ]ούτοις τὴν ἔντευξιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἑλλη[σ-  
-πόντου] ἐπ[ο]ιούμεθα· καὶ εἰ μὴ κωλυταί τι-  
-νες ἐγέ]νοντο, τότε ἂν συνετελέσθη ταῦτα.  
νῦν δὲ] γενομένων λόγων Κασσάνδρῳ καὶ Πτο-  
10- -λεμαί]ωι ὑπὲρ [δ]ιαλύσεων, καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πα-  
-ραγε]νομένων Πρεπελάου καὶ Ἀριστοδήμου  
ὑπὲ]ρ τούτων, καίπερ ὁρῶντές τινα ὧν ἡξί-  
-ου] Κάσσανδρος ἐργωδέστερα ὄντα, ἐπεὶ τὰ  
π]ερὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας συνωμολογεῖτο, ἀναγ-  
15- -κ]αῖον ὤμεθα εἶναι παριδεῖν, ἵνα τοῦ τὰ ὁ-  
-λα συντελεσθῆναι τὴν ταχίστην· ἐπεὶ πρὸ  
πολλοῦ γ' ἂν ἐποιησάμεθα πάντα διοικῆσα[ι  
τοῖς Ἑλλησιν καθὰ προειλόμεθα [:] διὰ τὸ δὲ  
μακρότερον τοῦτο γίνεσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ χρο-  
20- -νίζειν ἐνίστε πολλά καὶ παράλογα συμβαί-  
-νειν, φιλοτιμεῖσθαι δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τὰ πρὸς το[ῦς

<sup>1186</sup> I am deeply indebted to my supervisor, Dr Graeme Miles, for his constructive feedback and critique regarding translations, and to Ass Prof Pat Wheatley for his help regarding the prior academic treatment of the letter. Any errors that remain are entirely my own. The translation has aimed for a literal translation of Antigonus' "*rough Macedonian soldier's Greek*" as acknowledged by Munro (*JHS*. 19 (1899). p. 337), over an eloquent one. Making eloquent English out of awkward Greek is a dishonest way of translating and can lead to the suppression of ambiguities that reveal important information about the text and our understanding of it. For further discussion of this text, see: Ch. 8.2.

<sup>1187</sup> For the entirety of Antigonus' letter to the city of Scepsis, see: Munro, *JHS*. 19 (1899). pp. 333-336. For other recordings of the correspondence, see: *OGIS*. 5; Welles, 1966. *RC*. 1. For alternative translations, see: Harding, 1985. 132. pp. 165-167; Bagnall & Derow, 2004. 6. pp. 8-10; Austin, 2006. 38. pp. 86-88.



Ἑλληνας συντελεσθῆναι, ὥιμεθα δεῖν μηδὲ  
 μικρὰ κινδυνεῦσαι τὰ ὅλα μὴ διοικηθῆναι·  
 ὁσιν δὲ σπουδὴν πεποήμεθα περὶ ταῦτα φανε-  
 25- -ρὸν οἶμαι ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
 ἅπασιν ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν διοικημένων. ὄντων δ' [ἡ-  
 -μῖν τῶν πρὸς Κάσσανδρον καὶ Λυσίμαχον συν-  
 -τετελεσμένων, πρὸς Πρεπέλαον ἔπεμψαν αὐ-  
 -τοκράτορα· ἀπέστειλεν Πτολεμαῖος πρὸς ἡ-  
 30- -μας πρέσβεις ἀξιῶν καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸν διαλυ-  
 -θῆναι, καὶ εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὁμολογίαν γραφῆναι.  
 ἡ]με[ί]ς δὲ οὐ μικρὸν μὲν ἐ[ω]ρῶμεν τὸ μεταδιδό-  
 -ναι φιλ[ο]τιμίας ὑ[π]ὲρ ἧς πράγματα οὐκ ὀλίγα  
 ἐσχ[ή]καμεν κ[α]ί[ι] χρήματα πολλὰ ἀνηλώκαμε[ν],  
 35- καὶ τα[ῦ]τα τῶν πρὸς Κά[σ]σανδρον κ[α]ὶ Λ[υ]σίμα-  
 -χον ἡμῖν διωικημένων, καὶ εὐχερεσ[τέρ]ας  
 οὔσης τῆς λοιπῆ[ς] π[ρ]αγματείας· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ  
 διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμ[β]άνειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τοῦτον  
 συντελεσθέ[ν]των τὰ πρὸς Πολυπέρχοντα  
 40- θ]ᾶσαν ἂν διοικηθῆναι, μηθένος αὐτῷ συν-  
 -ορκοῦντος, καὶ διὰ τὴν οἰκείτητα τὴν ὑπάρ-  
 -χουσιν ἡμῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ ὑμᾶς ὁ-  
 -ρῶντες κα[ί] τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους ἐνοχλου-  
 -μένους ὑπὸ τε τῆς στρατείας καὶ τῶν δαπανη-  
 45- -μάτων, ὥιμεθα καλῶς ἔχειν συνχωρῆσαι καὶ  
 τὰ[ς] δι[α]λυ[ύ]σεις ποήσασθαι καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον·  
 σ[υ]νο[μ]ολογησόμενον δὲ ἀπεστείλαμεν Ἄρισ-  
 -τό[δ]ημον καὶ Αἰσχύλον καὶ Ἡγησίαν. οὗτοί  
 τε δὴ παρεγένοντο λαβόντες τὰ πιστὰ, καὶ οἱ  
 50- παρὰ Πτολεμαίου, οἱ περὶ Ἀριστόβουλον, ἧλ-  
 -θον ληψόμενοι παρ' ἡμῶν. ἴστε οὖν συντετε-  
 -λεσμένας τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ τὴν εἰρήνην γε-  
 -γεννημένην. γεγράφαμεν δὲ ἐν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ  
 ὁμόσαι τοὺς Ἑλληνας πάντας συνδιαφυλάσ-

- 55- -σειν ἀλλήλοις τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτ[ο-  
 -ν]ομίαν, ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἐφ’ ἡμῶν μὲν ὅσα ἀν-  
 -θ]ρωπίνωι λογισμῶι διαφυλάσσεσθαι ἂν τα[ῦ-  
 -τ]α, εἰς δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, ἐνόρκων γενο-  
 -μένων τῶν τε Ἑλλήνων πάντων καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς  
 60- π]ράγμασιν ὄντων, μᾶλλον ἂν καὶ ἀσφαλέστε-  
 -ρ]ον διαμένειν τοῖς Ἑλλησιν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.  
 κα]ὶ τὸ συνδιαφυλάξειν δὲ προσομνύναι, ἃ ἡ-  
 -μ]εῖς ὡμολογήκαμεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ ἄδο-  
 -ξον οὐδὲ ἀσύμφορον τοῖς Ἑλλησιν ἐωρῶμεν  
 65- ὄν. καλῶς δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν ὁμόσαι ὑμᾶς  
 τὸν ὅρκον ὃν ἀφεστάλκαμεν· πειρασόμεθα δὲ  
 καὶ εἰς τὸ λοιπὸν ὅτι ἂν ἔχωμεν τῶν συμφε-  
 -ρόντων καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλησιν πα-  
 -ρασκευάζειν. ὑπὲρ δὴ τούτων καὶ γράψαι μοι  
 70- ἐδόκει καὶ ἀποστεῖλαι Ἄκιον διαλεξόμε-  
 -νον· φέρει δὲ ὑμῖν καὶ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἧς πε-  
 ποήμεθα καὶ τοῦ ὅρκου ἀντίγραφα. ἔρρωσθε.

*“And with great haste we enacted the matter of freedom for the Greeks, and because of this we exported no small consessions and money, and for the sake of this matter we dispatched Demarchus along with Aischylus. As we collectively agreed in this matter, we enacted to meet at the Hellespont. And if it had not been for certain hinderers, the matter would have been settled then. And now with Cassander and Ptolemy beginning discussion about the cessation of hostilities, and with Prepelaus and Aristodemus being present with us about these things, although we saw some of Cassander’s issues being troublesome, and since there was agreement on the Greek issue, we saw it necessary to set this aside, so the issue of cessation of hostilities could be settled as quickly as possible. As we believed it would be good if the prior agreements for all the Greeks were as we desired. But because the issues were becoming drawn out, and spending much time on this issue, we were ambitious to speak together about resolving the things concerning the Greeks, we thought it necessary not to allow the small things to endanger the*

whole settlement. And what great zeal we showed will be seen by you and by all others from the arrangements themselves. With the matter regarding Cassander and Lysimachus having been completed by us, we sent a representative with authority to Prepalaus, Ptolemy sent envoys decreeing that he wished peace with me, as well as that he wished to be written into the same agreement. And we saw that it was not a small thing to give up ambition by which we had incurred no small trouble and much expenditure, and that too since the matters concerning Cassander and Lysimachus had been agreed upon by us and since the remaining matter would be easier. Because of the understanding and since things had been concluded with this man, we thought the things concerning Polyperchon would be concluded more rapidly, since no-one would be allied to him and at this same time seeing too that you and the allies were suffering from the campaign and from the cost of the war, we thought we might make an agreement and bring about an end also with this man [Polyperchon], and we sent Aristodemus, Aischylus and Hegesias to create the agreement. They returned to us bearing tokens of trust, and those from Ptolemy, and those in the company of Aristoboulos, came in order to take them from us. So know that an armistice had been made and peace has arisen. We have written into the pact that all the Greeks swear to preserve freedom for one another and autonomy, swearing to undertake to protect these things in our time as much as possible with human reasoning and for the rest of our time, since all the Greeks had sworn to this agreement, and those involved in their affairs, it would be easier for freedom to remain for the Greeks, and assist in protecting the oath for each other would appear to us neither unreasonable nor incongruous for the Greeks. It seems to me a good idea for you to make the oath which we have sent, and we will attempt to provide what we have that is beneficial for you and for the other Greeks. Therefore, on account of these things it seems good to me to send Akios to you to discuss these matters. He brings to you versions of the agreement which we made to the oath. Farewell."

## **Bibliography**

### **Ancient Sources**

Aelian, *Varia Historia*.

N, G, Wilson. (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1997.

Appian, *The Syrian Wars*.

H, White (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. II. London & Cambridge, 1912.

Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*.

E, Iliff Robson (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. I. London & Cambridge, 1929.

E. Iliff Robson (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. II. London & Cambridge, 1933.

Athenaeus, *The Deipnosophistae*.

C, B, Gulick (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. I. London & Cambridge, 1927.

C, B, Gulick (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. VI. London & Cambridge, 1937.

Cornelius Nepos, *The Life of Eumenes*

J, C, Rolfe (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1929.

Cornelius Nepos, *The Life of Phocion*.

J, C, Rolfe (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1929.

Curtius Rufus, *History of Alexander the Great of Macedon*.

J, C, Rolfe (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. I. London & Cambridge, 1946.

J, C, Rolfe (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. II. London & Cambridge, 1946.

Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*.

J, O, Burt (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1954.

Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*.

R, D, Hicks (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. I. London & Cambridge, 1925.

T, Dorandi (ed.) Cambridge Classical Text and Commentary 50. Cambridge, 2013.

Dio Chrysostom, *Discourses*.

H, Lamar Crosby (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. IV. London & Cambridge, 1946.

Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheca Historica*.

C, Bradford Welles (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol VII. London & Cambridge, 1963.

R, M, Geer (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. IX. London & Cambridge, 1947.

R, M, Geer (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. X. London & Cambridge, 1954.

Herodotus, *The Histories*.

A, D, Godley (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. III. London & Cambridge, 1922.

Hyperides, *In Defence of Euxenippus*

J, O, Burt (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1954.

Isocrates, *Epistles*.

L, V, Hook (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. II. London & Cambridge, 1945.

Justin, *Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogas*.

O, Seel (ed.) Teubner Edition. Stuttgart, 1971.

Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*.

A, C, Schlesinger (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. XIII. London & Cambridge, 1951.

Metz Eptiome, *Incerti Alexandri Magni*.

P, H, Thoman (ed.) Teubner Edition. Leipzig, 1965.

Orosius, *Historiarum adversum Paganos libri VII*

C, Zangemeister (ed.) Teubner Edition. Leipzig, 1889.

Pausanias, *Description of Greece*.

W, H, S, Jones (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. I. London & Cambridge, 1918.

W, H, S, Jones (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. IV. London & Cambridge, 1935.

Photius, *Bibliotheca*.

R, Henry (ed.) Les Belle Lettres Edition. Vol. I. Paris, 1959.

R, Henry (ed.) Les Belle Lettres Edition. Vol. II. Paris, 1960.

Plutarch, *The Life of Alexander*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1919.

Plutarch, *The Life of Camillus*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1914.

Plutarch, *The Life of Cleomenes*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1921.

Plutarch, *The Life of Demetrius*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1920.

Plutarch, *The Life of Demosthenes*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1919.

Plutarch, *The Life of Eumenes*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1919.

Plutarch, *The life of Phocion*.

B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1919.

Plutarch, *The Life of Pyrrhus*.

- B, Perrin (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1920.
- Plutarch, *Moralia*.
- F, C, Babbitt (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. III. London & Cambridge, 1931.
- F, C, Babbitt (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol IV. London & Cambridge, 1936.
- H, N, Fowler (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. X. London & Cambridge, 1936.
- Polyaenus, *Strategemata*.
- G. Woelfflin (ed.) Teubner Edition. Leipzig, 1860.
- Polybius, *Histories*
- W, R, Paton (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol IV. London & Cambridge, 1922.
- Pseudo-Callisthenes, *The Alexander Romance*.
- G, Kroll (ed.) Vol. I. Berlin, 1926
- Strabo, *Geography*.
- H, L, Jones (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. V. London & Cambridge, 1928
- Theoprastus, *Characters*.
- J, M, Edmonds (ed.) Loeb Edition. London & Cambridge, 1917.
- Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*.
- W, Miller (ed.) Loeb Edition. Vol. II. London & Cambridge, 1914.

## Modern Sources

- Adams, W, L, *Cassander, Macedonia and the Policy of Coalition, 323 – 301B.C.*  
(PhD Dissertation at the University of Virginia, 1975).
- Adams, W, L, 'The Dynamics of Internal Macedonian Politics in the Time of Cassander', *Ancient Macedonia/Αρχαία Μακεδονία* 3. (1977). pp. 17–30.
- Adams, W, L, 'Cassander and the Crossing of Hellespont.' *Anc. World*. 2. (1979). pp. 111-115.
- Adams, W, L, 'Antipater and Cassander: Generalship on Restricted Resources in the Fourth Century', *Anc. World*. 10. (1984). pp. 79-88.
- Adams, W, L, 'Cassander, Alexander IV and the Tombs at Vergina' *Anc. World*. 22. (1991). pp. 27-33.
- Adams. W, L, 'Cassander and the Greek City-States (319-317 B.C.)' *Balkan Studies*. 34. (1993). pp. 197-211.
- Adams, W, L, *Alexander the Great: Legacy of a Conqueror*. London, 2004.

- Adams, W, L, 'The Games of Alexander the Great', in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 125-138.
- Adams, W, L, 'Alexander's Successors to 221 BC', in *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia* (eds. J. Roisman and I. Worthington), Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford. 2010.
- Alonso-Núñez, J, M, 'An Augustan World History: The 'Historiae Philippicae' of Pompeius Trogus', *G&R*. 34. (1987). pp. 56-72.
- Alonso Troncoso, V, A, and Anson, E, M, *After Alexander: The Time of the Diadochi (323-281 BC)*. Oxford. 2013.
- Anson, E, M, 'The Siege of Nora: A Source Conflict', *GRBS* 18 (1977) pp. 251-6.
- Anson, E, M, 'Craterus and the Protasia', *CP* 87. (1992), pp. 38 – 43.
- Anson, E, M, *Eumenes of Cardia: A Greek among Macedonians*. Boston, 2004.
- Anson, E, M, 'The Chronology of the Third Diadoch War,' *Phoenix*. 60. (2006). pp. 226–235.
- Anson, E, M, 'Early Hellenistic Chronology: The Cuneiform Evidence,' in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007, pp. 193–198.
- Anson, E, M, 'Macedonian Judicial Assemblies', *CPh*. 103. (2008), pp. 135-149.
- Anson, E, M, 'Philip II, Amnytas Perdicca, and Macedonian Royal Succession.' *Historia*. 58. (2009). pp. 276-286.
- Anson, E, M, 'The Macedonian Patriot: the Diadoch Craterus', *AHB*. 26. (2012), pp. 49–58.
- Anson, E, M, 'The Battle of Gabene: Eumenes' Inescapable Doom?', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 99-109.
- Anson, E, M, *Alexander's Heirs: The Age of the Successors*. Oxford, 2014.
- Ashton, N, 'The Lamian War – A False Start?', *Antichthon*. 17. (1984). pp. 47-63.
- Ashton, N, 'Craterus from 324 – 321 BC', *Makedonia* 5. (1993). pp. 125 – 131.
- Ashton, N, 'Craterus Revisited', in, Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 107-116.
- Atkinson, J, E, *A Commentary of Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4*. Amsterdam 1980.
- Atkinson, J, 'Alexander Sources of the Early Empire', in Bosworth A, B, & Baynham E, J. (eds). *Alexander the Great: Fact and Fiction*. Oxford, 2000.
- Austin, M, M, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest*. Cambridge, 2006.

- Badian, E, 'The Death of Parmenio', *TAPA*. 91. (1960). pp. 324-338.
- Badian, E, 'Harpalus', *JHS*. 81. (1961). pp. 16-43.
- Badian, E, 'The Death of Philip II', *Phoenix*. 17. (1963). pp. 244-250.
- Badian, E, 'Agis III: Revisions and Reflections', in Worthington, 1994. pp. 258-292.
- Bagnall, R, S, & Derow, P. (eds.) *The Hellenistic Period: Historical Sources in Translation*. Blackwell, 2004.
- Ballesteros Pastor, L, 'Nullis umquam nisi domesticis regibus. Cappadocia, Pontus and the Resistance to the Diadochi in Asia Minor', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 183-198.
- Baron, C, A, 'Duris of Samos and a Herodotean Model for Writing History', in Priestley & Zail, 2016. pp. 59-82.
- Barron, J, 'The Tyranny of Duris of Samos', *CR*. 12. (1962). pp. 189-192.
- Baynham, E, J, 'Antipater: Manager of Kings', in Worthington, 1994. pp. 331 – 356.
- Baynham, E, J, *Alexander the Great: The Unique History of Quintus Curtius*. University of Michigan Press 1998.
- Baynham, E, J, (eds.) *Alexander the Great: Fact and Fiction*. Oxford, 2000. pp. 322 – 325.
- Baynham, E, J, 'Antipater and Athens', in Palagia and Tracy, 2003. pp. 23-29.
- Baynham, E, 'Appendix A: Arrian's Sources and Reliability', in Romm & Statler, 2010. pp. 325-332.
- Baynham E, 'Alexander's Argyraspids: Tough Old Fighters or Antigonid Myth?', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 110-120.
- Beck, H, 'Interne "synkrisis" bei Plutarch', *Hermes*. 130. (2002). pp. 467-489.
- Beloch, K, *Greichische Geschichte III*<sup>2</sup>. Berlin & Leipzig, 1904.
- Beloch, K, *Greichische Geschichte IV*<sup>2</sup>. Berlin & Leipzig, 1927.
- Bengston, H, *Die Diadochen – Die Nachfolger Alexanders des Großen (323-281 c. Chr.)*, München, 1987.
- Berve, H, *Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographischer Grundlage Vol. I*. Munich 1926.
- Berve, H, *Das Alexanderreich auf Prosopographischer Grundlage Vol. II*. Munich 1926.



- Billows, R, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. University of California 1990.
- Blackwell, C, W, *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority*. Peter Lang 1999.
- Blümel, W, 'Vertrag Zwischen und Pidasas', *EA* 29. (1997), pp. 135-142.
- Boiy, T, 'Early Hellenistic Chronography in Cuneiform Tradition', *ZPE*. 138. (2002). pp. 249-255.
- Boiy, T, *Between High and Low: A Chronology of the Early Hellenistic Period*. Oikumene 5, Frankfurt 2007.
- Boiy, T, 'The Diadochi in Cuneiform Documentation', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 7-17.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'The Death of Alexander the Great: Rumour and Propaganda', *CQ*. 21. (1971). pp. 112-136.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War', *Phoenix*. 9. (1975). pp. 27-43.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Arrian and the Alani', *HSPH*. 81. (1977). pp. 217-255.
- Bosworth, A, B, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander. Vol. I*. Cambridge 1980.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Review Article: History and Rhetoric in Curtius Rufus: A Commentary of Q. Curtius Rufus' "Historias Alexandri Magni" Books 3 and 4 by J. E. Atkinson'. *CPh*. 8. (1983), pp. 150-161.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon', *JHS*, 106 (1986). pp. 1-12.
- Bosworth, A, B, *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge 1988.
- Bosworth, A, B, *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation*, Oxford 1988.
- Bosworth, A, B, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander. Vol. II*. Oxford 1995.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Philip III Arrhidaeus and the Chronology of the Successors', *Chiron* 22, 1992, pp. 55-81.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Perdiccas and the Kings', *CQ* 43. (1993). pp. 420-427.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'A New Macedonian Prince', *CQ* 44. (1994). pp. 57-65.

- Bosworth, A, B, 'Review – Discussion: In Search of Cleitarchus', *Histos* 1. 1997. pp. 211–224.
- Bosworth, A, B, & Baynham, E, J, (eds.) *Alexander the Great: Fact and Fiction*. Oxford, 2000.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander', in Bosworth & Baynham, 2000. pp. 207-241.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Why did Athens lose the Lamian War?' in Palagia & Tracey, 2003. pp. 14-22.
- Bosworth, A, B, *The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda under the Successors*. Oxford, 2003.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Plus ça change..... Ancient Historians and their Sources', *ClAnt*. 22. (2003). pp. 167–198.
- Bosworth, A, B, 'Strabo, India and Barbequed Brahmins', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 71-83.
- Bowden, H, 'On Kissing and Making Up: Court Protocol and Historiography in Alexander the Great's 'Experiment with Proskynesis'', *BICS*. 56. (2013). pp. 55-77.
- Brown, T, S, 'Hieronymus of Cardia', *AHR*. 52. (1947). pp. 684-696.
- Brown, T, S, 'Clitarchus', *AJPh*. 71. (1950), pp. 134–155.
- Brunt, P, A, 'Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry', *JHS*. 83. (1963). pp. 27-46.
- Brunt, P, A, 'Persian Accounts of Alexander's Campaign', *CQ*. 12. (1963). pp. 141-155.
- Brunt, P, A, 'Alexander, Barsine, and Heracles', *RFIC*. 103. (1975). pp. 22-34.
- Buszard, B, 'Caesar's Ambition: A Combined Reading of Plutarch's "Alexander-Caesar" and "Pyrrhus-Marius?"', *TAPA*. 138. (2008). pp. 185-215.
- Carney, E, 'The Sisters of Alexander the Great: Royal Relicts', *Historia*. 37. (1988). pp. 385-404.
- Carney, E, D, 'The End of the Argead Dynasty', in Worthington, 1994. pp. 357-380.
- Carney, E, 'Women and Basileia: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia', *CJ*. 90. (1995). pp. 367-391.
- Carney, E, D, *Women and Monarchy in Macedonia*. University of Oklahoma Press, 2000.

- Carney, E, D, *Olympias: mother of Alexander the Great*. Routledge, 2006.
- Carney, E, D, 'The Role of the Basilikoi Paides at the Argead Court', in, Howe and Reames, 2008. pp. 145-164.
- Carney, E, & Ogden, D. (eds.), *Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives*. Oxford, 2010.
- Carney, E, D, 'Successful Mediocrity: The Career of Polyperchon', *Syll. Class.* 25. (2014). pp. 1-31.
- Caroli, C, A, *Ptolemais I. Soter: Herrscher zweier Kulturen*. Konstanz, 2007.
- Casson, L, *Travel in the Ancient World*. Baltimore, 1974.
- Cawkwell, G, *The Greek Wars: The Failure of Persia*. Oxford, 2006.
- Collins, A, W, 'The Office of Chiliarch under Alexander and the Successors', *Phoenix* 55. (2001). pp. 259-283.
- Dalby, A, 'The Curriculum Vitae of Duris of Samos', *CQ.* 41. (1991). pp. 539-541.
- Dixon, M, 'Corinth, Greek Freedom, and the Diadochoi, 323-301 B.C', in, Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 151-178.
- Drews, R, 'Diodorus and His Sources', *AJPh.* 83. (1962). pp. 383-392.
- Dreyer, B, 'The Arrian Parchment in Gothenburg: New Digital Processing Methods and Initial Results', in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 245-261.
- Droysen, J, G, *Geschichte der Hellenismus* Vol. II<sup>2</sup>. Gotha, 1878.
- Dušaníc, S, 'The Year of the Athenian archon Archippus II (318/7)', *BCH.* 89. (1965). pp. 128-41.
- Duff, T, *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*. Oxford 1999.
- Duff, T, E, 'Models of Education in Plutarch', *JHS.* 128. (2008). pp. 1-26.
- Duff, T, 'The Structure of the Plutarchan Book', *ClAnt.* 30. (2011). pp. 213-278.
- Dunn, C & Wheatley, P, 'Craterus and the Dedication Date of the Delphi Lion', *AHB.* 26. (2012). pp. 39-42.
- Ellis, J, R, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism*. Thames and Hudson 1976.
- Engels, J, 'Die historischen und kulturgeographischen Notizen über die Diadochenära (323-276 v.Chr.) in Strabons *Geographika*', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 9-32.
- Epplert, C, 'War Elephants in the Hellenistic World', in, Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 209-232.

- Errington, 'From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323 – 320 B.C.', *JHS* 90. (1970), pp. 49–77.
- Errington, R, M, *A History of the Hellenistic World: 323-30 BC*. Blackwell 2008.
- Errington, R, M, 'Diodorus Siculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320 – 311 B. C.' *Hermes*. 105. (1977). pp. 478–504.
- Erskine, A, 'Ruler Cult and the Early Hellenistic City', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 579-598.
- Fischer, C, T, *Diodori Bibliotheca historica: XVI-XIX*. Tuebner edition. Leipzig, 1906.
- French, D, 'Pre- and Early-Roman Roads of Asia Minor. The Persian Royal Road. *Iran*. 36. (1998). pp. 15-43.
- Fortina, M, *Cassandro, Re Di Macedonia*. Palermo 1965.
- Garnjobst, J, S, *The Epistles of Isocrates: A Historical and Grammatical Commentary*. (PhD Dissertation at the University of California, Santa Barbara) 2006.
- Geer, R, M, trans. (ed.), *Diodorus of Sicily in twelve volumes*. Vol. XI: *Books XVIII and XIX 1-65*, Loeb Classical Library. (Harvard, 1947).
- Graf, D, F, 'The Persian royal road system', *Achaemenid History* 8 (1994), pp. 167-189.
- Green, P, 'Occupation and co-existence: the impact of Macedon in Athens, 323-307', in Palagia & Tracey, 2003. pp. 1-8.
- Hadley, R, A, 'Diodorus 18.60.1-3: A Case of Remodelled Source Materials', *AHB*. 10. (1996). pp. 131-147.
- Hamilton, J, R, 'Cleitarchus and Aristobulus', *Historia*. 10. (1961), pp. 448–458.
- Hamilton, J, R, *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary*. Oxford, 1969.
- Hamilton, J, R, 'The Date of Quintus Curtius Rufus.' *Historia*.. 37. (1988), pp. 445-456.
- Hammond, N, G, L, & Griffith, G, T, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. II. (Oxford, 1979).
- Hammond, N, G, L, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great: The so-called Vulgate authors, Diodorus, Justin and Curtius*, Cambridge, 1983.
- Hammond, N, G, L, & Walbank, F, W, *History of Macedonia*, Vol. III. (Oxford, 1988).

- Hammond, N, G, L, 'Aspects of Alexander's Journal and Ring in His Last Days', *AJPh*. 110. (1989). pp. 155-160.
- Hammond, N, G, L, 'Casualties and Reinforcements of Citizen Soldiers in Greece and Macedonia', *JHS*. 109 (1989). pp. 56-68.
- Hammond, N, G, L, 'The Sources of Justin on Macedonia to the Death of Philip', *CQ*. 41. (1991). pp. 496-508.
- Harding, P, *From the end of the Peloponnesian War to the battle of Ipsus*. Cambridge, 1985.
- Hatzopoulos, M, B, *L'Organisation De L'Armee Macedonienne Sous Les Antigonides*. Μελετήματα. 30. Athens, 2001.
- Hatzopoulos, M, B, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings*. Vol. I. & Vol. II. Μελετήματα. 22. Athens, 2006.
- Hauben, H, 'On the Chronology of the Years 313 – 311 B.C.', *AJPh*. 94. (1973). pp. 256–267.
- Hauben, H 'The First War of the Successors (321 B.C.): Chronological and Historical Problems, *AncSoc*. 8. (1977). pp. 85–120.
- Hauben, H, 'Who is Who in Antigonus' Letter to the Scepsians (OGIS 5 = Welles, Royal Correspondence 1)', *EA*. 9 (1987). pp. 29-36.
- Hauben, H, & Meeus, A. (eds.) *The Age of the Successors and the Creation of the Hellenistic Kingdoms*. Lauven, 2014.
- Hauben, H, 'Ptolemy's Grand Tour', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 235-262.
- Heckel, W, 'Leonnatos, Polyperchon and the Introduction of Proskynesis', *AJP* 99. (1978). pp. 495-461.
- Heckel, W, 'The "Somatophylakes" of Alexander the Great: Some Thoughts', *Historia*. 27. (1978). pp. 224-228.
- Heckel, W, "'Somatophylakia": A Macedonian "Cursus Honorem"', *Phoenix*. 40. (1986). pp. 279-294.
- Heckel, W, *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great: A Prosopographic Study*. Stuttgart, 1988.
- Heckel, W, *The Marshals of Alexander the Great*. Routledge, 1992.
- Heckel, W, *Who's Who in the Age of Alexander the Great*. Blackwell, 2006.
- Heckel, W, Tritle, L, Wheatley, P (eds). *Alexander's Empire: Formulation to Decay*. Regina Books, 2007.

- Heckel, W, 'The Plot to Poison Alexander', in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 265 -276.
- Heckel, W, 'Polyperchon as 'Brigand': Propaganda or Misunderstanding?', *Mnemosyne*. 60. (2007). pp. 123-126.
- Heckel, W, 'Nicanor Son of Balacrus', *GRBS*. 47. (2007). pp. 401–412.
- Heckel, W, *The Conquest of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge, 2008.
- Heckel, W & Tritle, L, A, (eds.) *Alexander the Great: A New History*. Oxford, 2009.
- Heckel, W, 'Alexander, Achilles, and Heracles: Between Myth and History', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 21-34.
- Heckel, Müller & Wrightson. (eds.) *The Many Faces of War in the Ancient War*. Cambridge, 2015.
- Henry, R, *Photius Bibliothèque: Tome 1*. Paris, 1959.
- Hornblower, J, *Hieronymus of Cardia*. Oxford, 1981.
- Howe, T, & Reames, J, *Macedonian Legacies: Studies in Ancient Macedonian History and Culture in Honor of Eugene N. Borza*. Clarmont, California, 2008.
- Howe, T, 'The Diadochi, Invented Tradition, and Alexander's Expedition to Siwah', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 57-70.
- Howe, T, Edward Garvin, E & Wrightson, G (eds.) *Greece, Macedon and Persia*. Oxford, 2015.
- Howe, T, 'Introducing Ptolemy: Alexander and the Persian Gates', in Heckel, Müller & Wrightson, 2015. pp. 166-195.
- Hughes, S, *After the Democracy: Athens under Phocion (322/1-319/8 B.C.)*. Unpublished Thesis, University of Western Australia, 2008.
- Hägg, T, *The Art of Biography in Antiquity*. Cambridge, 2012.
- Jacoby, F, 'Hieronymos', *RE*. 8. (1913). 1540.
- Kanatsulis, D, 'Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsmann in der Zeit Philipps und Alexanders des Grossen', *Hellenika*. 16. (1958/59). pp. 16-64.
- Kebric, R, B, 'A Note on Duris in Athens', *CPh*. 69. (1974). pp. 286-287.
- Kebric, R, B, *In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos*. Wiesbaden, 1977.
- Kennedy, D, 'Thapsacus and Zeugma', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 277-298.
- Kosmin, P, J, *The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire*. London, 2014.

- Landucci Gattinoni, F, *L'arte del potere: Vita e opera di Cassandro di Macedonia*. Stuttgart 2003.
- Landucci Gattinoni, F, *Diodoro Siculo: Biblioteca storica Libro XVIII*. Milano, 2008.
- Landucci Gattinoni, F, 'Cassander's Wife and Heirs', in Wheatley & Hannah, 2009. pp. 261-275.
- Landucci Gattinoni, F, 'Diodorus XVIII 39.1-7 and Antipatros' Settlement in Triparadeisos', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 33-48.
- Landucci Gattinoni, F, 'Cult of the Dead and Vision of the Afterlife in Early Hellenistic Macedonia', in Howe, Edward Garvin & Wrightson, 2015. pp. 135-142
- Landucci Gattinoni, F, 'Seleucus vs. Antigonus: A Study on the Sources', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 30-42.
- Landucci Gattinoni, F, "Duride di Samo e i Diadochi: uno storiografo nella storia", in, Naas & Simon, 2015. pp. 37-56.
- Lane Fox, R, *Alexander the Great*. London. 1973.
- Lane Fox, R, 'King Ptolemy: Centre and Periphery', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 163-196.
- Lund, H, S, *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*. Routledge, 1992.
- Macurdy, G, H, 'The Political Activities and the Name of Cratesipolis', *AJPh* 50 (1929). pp. 273-278.
- Manni, E, 'tre note di cronologia ellenistica', *RAL*. 4. (1949). pp. 53-83.
- March, D, A, 'The Kings of Makedon: 399-369 B.C.', *Historia*. 44. (1995). pp. 257-282.
- Marincola, J, 'History without Malice: Plutarch Rewrites the Battle of Plataea', in Priestley & Zali, 2016. pp. 101-119.
- McNeal, R, A, 'Historical Methods and Thucydides 1.103.1', *Historia*. 19. (1970). pp. 306-325
- McKechnie, P, 'Greek Mercenary Troops and their Equipment', *Historia*. 43. (1994). pp. 297-305.
- McKechnie, P, 'Manipulation of Themes in Quintus Curtius Rufus Book 10', *Historia*. 48. (1999). pp. 44-60.
- McKechnie, P, 'Diodorus Siculus and Hephaestion's Pyre', *CQ*. 45. (1995). pp. 418-432.

- Meiggs, R, *The Athenian Empire*, Oxford, 1972.
- Meeus, A, 'The Power Struggle of the Diadochoi in Babylon 323 BC', *Anc. Soc.* 38. (2008). pp. 39-82.
- Meeus, A, 'Some Institutional Problems Concerning the Succession to Alexander the Great: 'Prostatia' and Chiliarchy,' *Historia*. 58. (2009). pp. 287-310.
- Meeus, A, 'Diodorus and the Chronology of the Third Diadoch War', *Phoenix*. 66. (2012). pp. 74-96.
- Meeus, A, 'What We Do Not Know About The Age Of The Diadochi: The Methodological Consequences Of The Gaps In The Evidence', in Alonso-Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 84-98.
- Meyer, E, 'Arrians Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen', *Hermes*. 33. (1898). pp. 648-652.
- Mileta, C, 'Überlegungen zur Herrschaft der Diadochen über die Indigenen Kleinasiens', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 413-440.
- Miller, S, G, 'Kleonai, the Nemean Games, and the Lamian War', *Hesperia Supplements* 20 (1982). pp. 100-108.
- Milns, R, D, 'The Date of Curitus Rufus and the "Historiae Alexandri", *Latomus*. 25. (1966). pp. 490-507.
- Milns, R, D, 'Arrian's Accuracy in Troop Details: A Note', *Historia*. 27. (1978). pp. 374-378.
- Milns, R, D, 'A Note of Arrian's Anabasis', *CP*. 78. (1983). pp. 47-50.
- Müller, O, *Antigonos Monophthalmos und 'Das Jahr der Könige*. Bonn, 1973.
- Müller, S, 'The Female Element of the Political Self-Fashioning of the Diadochi: Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and their Iranian Wives', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 199-214.
- Munro, J, A, R, 'A Letter from Antigonos to Scepstis, 311 B.C.', *JHS*. 19. (1899). pp. 330-340.
- Mørkholm, O, edited by Greison, P & Westermarck, U. (eds.) *Early Hellenistic Coinage: From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B. C.)*. Cambridge, 1991.
- Naas, V & Simon, M (eds) *De Samos à Rome: personnalité et influence de Douris*. Paris, 2015.



- Niese, B, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeronea*. Gotha, 1893.
- O'Sullivan, L, 'Asander, Athens and IG<sup>2</sup> 450: A New Interpretation', *ZPE*. 119. (1997). pp. 107-116.
- O'Sullivan, L, *The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317-307 BCE: A Philosopher in Politics*. Brill, 2009.
- O'Sullivan, L, 'Callisthenes and Alexander the Invincible God', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 35-52.
- Palagia, O & Tracy, S, V. (eds) *The Macedonian in Athens: 322-229 B.C.* Oxford, 2003.
- Palagia, O, 'The Grave Relief of Adeia, Daughter of Cassander and Cynnana', in Howe & Reames, 2008. pp. 195-214.
- Paschidis, P, *Between City and King: Prosopographical Studies on the Intermediaries Between the Cities of the Greek Mainland and the Aegean and the Royal Courts in the Hellenistic Period (322-190 BC)*. Μελετήματα. 59. Athens, 2008.
- Paschidis, P, 'Missing Years in the Biography of Polyperchon (318/7 and 308 BC onwards)', *Tekmeria* 9 (2008), pp. 233 – 250.
- Paschidis, P, 'Agora XVI and the Royal Title of Demetrius Poliorcetes', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 121-141.
- Pelling, C, B, R, 'Plutarch's Adaption of his Source-Material', *JHS*. 100. (1980). pp. 127-140.
- Pelling, C, *Plutarch and History*. London, 2002.
- Pitt, E, M & Richardson, W, P, 'Hostile Inaction? Antipater, Craterus and the Macedonian Regency', *CQ*. 67. (Forthcoming, 2017)
- Poddighe, E, *Nel segno di Antipatro: L'eclissi della democrazia ateniese dal 323/2 al 319/8 a.C.* (Rome, 2002).
- Poddighe, E, 'Propaganda Strategies and Political Documents', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 225-240.
- Pomeroy, A, J, 'Tacitus and the Crises of Empire', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015. pp. 277-298.
- Potter, D, S, 'IG II<sup>2</sup> 399; Evidence for Athenian Involvement in the War of Agis III', *ABSA*. 79. (1984). pp. 229 – 235.

- Pownall, F, 'Duris of Samos', in, Brill's *New Jacoby*, 2009. (76).
- Pownall, F, 'Duris of Samos and the Diadochi', in Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 43-56.
- Priestley, J & Zali, V, (eds.) *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Herodotus in Antiquity and Beyond*. Leiden & Boston, 2016.
- Roisman, J & Worthington, I. (eds), *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*. Oxford, 2010.
- Roisman, J, 'Hieronymus of Cardia: Causation and Bias From Alexander to His Successors.' in Carney & Ogden, 2010. pp. 135-150.
- Roisman, J, 'Perdikas's Invasion of Egypt', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 455-474.
- Romm, J, & Statler, R. B. (eds.). *The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander*. New York, 2010.
- Rosen, K, 'Political Documents in Heironymus of Cardia', *AClass*. 10. (1967). pp. 41-94.
- Rubincam, C, 'Numbers in Greek Poetry and Historiography', *CQ*. 53. (2003). pp. 448-463.
- Rubicam, C, 'A Tale of Two "Magni": Justin/Trogus on Alexander and Pompey', *Historia*. 54. (2005). pp. 265-274.
- Rufus Fears, J, 'Silius Italicus, Cataphracti, and the Date of Q. Curtius Rufus', *CPh*. 71. (1976). pp. 214-223.
- Sacks, K, S, *Diodorus Siculus and the First Century*. New Jersey, 1990.
- Schmitt, O, *Der Lamische Krieg*. Bonn, 1992
- Simpson, R, H, 'Antigonos, Polyperchon, and the Macedonian Regency', *Historia*. 6. (1957). pp. 371-373.
- Simpson, R, H, 'Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Greeks', *Historia*. 8. (1959). pp. 385-409.
- Stadter, P, A. (ed.), *Plutarch and the Historical Tradition*. Routledge, 1992.
- Stauber, J, *Die Bucht von Adramytteion I*. Bonn. 1996.
- Steele, R, B, 'Quintus Curtius Rufus', *AJPh*. 36. (1915). pp. 402-423.
- Steele, R, B, 'Pompeius Trogus and Justinus', *AJPh*. 38. (1917). pp. 19-41.
- Steele, R, B, 'The Method of Arrian in the Anabasis', *CPh*. 14. (1919). pp. 147-157.

- Steele, R, B, 'Arrian's Anabasis and Book XVII of Diodorus', *CPh*. 15. (1920). pp. 282-295.
- Stewart, A, *Faces of Power: Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics*. California, 1993.
- Strootman, R, 'Men to Whose Rapacity Neither Sea Nor Mountain Sets a Limit', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 307-322.
- Swain, S, 'Plutarch: Chance, Providence, and History', *AJPh*. 110. (1989). pp. 272-302.
- Swain, S, 'Character Change in Plutarch', *Phoenix*, 43. (1989). pp. 62-68.
- Syme, R, 'The Career of Arrian', *HSPh*. 86. (1982). pp. 181-211.
- Syme, R, 'The Date of Justin and Discovery of Trogus', *Historia*. 37. (1988). pp. 358-371.
- Talbert, R. J. A. (ed.), *Atlas of Classical History*. Croon Helm Ltd, 1985.
- Tarn, W, W, 'Herakles Son of Barsine,' *JHS*. 41 (1921). pp. 18-28.
- Tarn, W, W, 'Alexander and the Ganges', *JHS*. 43. (1923). pp. 93-101.
- Tarn W, W, *Alexander the Great. Vol. I*. Cambridge, 1948.
- Tarn, W, W, *Alexander the Great. Vol. II*. Cambridge, 1948.
- Tarn, W, W, *Alexander the Great II: Sources and Studies*. Cambridge, 1950.
- Treadgold, W, *The Nature of The Bibliotheca of Photius*. Washington, 1980.
- Tritle, L, A, *Phocion the Good*. London, 1988.
- Urban, R, "'Historiae Philippicae" bei Pompeius Trogus: Versuch einer Deutung', *Historia*. 31. (1982). pp. 82-96.
- Valassiades, C, 'A contribution to Cassander's bronze coinage', *XIII Congress International de Numismatica*, Madrid, 2003. pp. 405-413.
- Van Hook, L, *Isocrates. Vol. III*. Loeb Classical Library. Harvard, 1945.
- Walsh, J, 'Antipater and Early Hellenistic Literature', *AHB* 26. (2012). pp. 149-162.
- Wardman, A, *Plutarch's Lives*. London, 1974.
- Westlake, H, D, *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History*. Manchester, 1969.
- Westlake, H, D, 'Eumenes of Cardia', in Westlake, 1969. pp. 313-330.
- Williams, J, 'A Note of Athenian Chronology, 319/8-318/7 B.C.' *Hermes*. 112. (1984). pp. 300-305.

- Wheatley, P, 'Ptolemy Soter's Annexation of Syria 320 B.C.', *CQ.* 45. (1995). pp. 433-440.
- Wheatley, P, 'Problems in analysing source documents in Ancient History: the case of Philip, adviser to Demetrius Poliorcetes, 314-312 B. C., and *IG ii<sup>2</sup> 561*', *Limina*. 3. (1997). pp. 61-70.
- Wheatley, P, 'The Date of Polyperchon's Invasion of Macedonian and Murder of Heracles', *Antichthon* 32. (1998). pp. 12-23.
- Wheatley, P, *The Genesis of a King: The early life of Demetrius Poliorcetes, 336-306 B. C.* (PhD Thesis at The University of Western Australia, 1997. Bibliography updated 2000)
- Wheatley, P, 'The Chronology of the Third Diadoch War, 315 – 311 B.C.', *Phoenix*. 52. (1998). pp. 257–281.
- Wheatley, P, 'The Year 22 Tetradrachms of Sidon and the Date of the Battle of Gaza', *ZPE*. 166. (2003). pp. 268 – 276.
- Wheatley, P, 'An Introduction to the Chronological Problems in Early Diadoch Sources & Scholarship', in Heckel, Tritle & Wheatley, 2007. pp. 179–192.
- Wheatley, P & Hannah, R (eds) *Alexander & His Successors: Essays From the Antipodes*. Claremont, 2009.
- Wheatley, P, 'The Diadochi, or Successors to Alexander', in Heckel & Tritle, 2009. pp. 127-161.
- Wheatley, P, 'The *Heidelberg* Epitome: A Neglected Diadoch Source', in, Alonso Troncoso & Anson, 2013. pp. 17-29.
- Wheatley, P, 'Seleukos and Chandragupta in Justin XV 4', in Hauben & Meeus, 2014. pp. 501-516.
- Wheatley, P, & Baynham, E. (eds.), *East and West in the World of Alexander*. Oxford, 2015.
- Wheatley, P, 'Diadoch Chronography after Philip Arrhidaeus', in Wheatley & Baynham, 2015.
- Whitehead, D, *Hypereides: The Forensic Speeches*. Oxford, 2000.
- Wills, É, 'The Succession to Alexander', *CAH* 7.1. Cambridge, 1984. pp. 23-61.
- Worthington, I, 'Harpalus and the Macedonian Envoys', *LCM*. 9. (1984). pp. 47-48.
- Worthington, I (ed.), *Ventures into Greek History*, Oxford, 1994.

- Wörrle, M, 'Inschriften von Herakleia am Latmos III. Der Synoikismos det Latmioi mit den Pidaseis.' *Chiron* 33. (2003). pp. 121-143.
- Yardley, J, C, and Develin, R, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*, Atlanta, 1994.
- Yardley, J, C, and Heckel, W, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus. Volume I Books 11 – 12: Alexander the Great*. Clarendon 1997.
- Yardley, J, C, 'Justin on Tribuates and Generalships, Caesares, and Augusti', *CQ*. 50. (2000). pp. 632-634.
- Yardley, J, C, Wheatley, P, & Heckel, W, *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus. Volume II Books 13 - 15: The Successors to Alexander the Great*. Oxford 2011.
- Young, R, S, 'Godrian on the Royal Road', *PAHPS* 107. (1963). pp. 348–364.